Executive Summary

Over recent years the Metropolitan Police Service has been in a state of almost permanent crisis. The Met is the UK’s largest police force, with an annual budget of over £3.2billion¹Home Office, Police Grant Report 2022 to 2023 (England and Wales), and made up of over 46,000 police officers and staff. The force’s primary mission is to keep safe the 9 million people who call London home along with the 30 million visitors to the capital every year. Also tasked with the fight against terrorism the Met has officers posted across the country and around the world. Yet the Met has lost its way.

The next Commissioner will soon be appointed with the task of executing one of the largest ever turnaround programmes in British public service. They take over the Met at a time of crumbling public confidence, falling levels of crime detection and regularly reported acts of shocking misconduct and criminality by officers. The Met’s withdrawal from the streets is encapsulated by significantly reduced numbers of officers working in ward-based neighbourhood policing roles. The performance regime for dealing with the crime and anti-social behaviour that most concerns the public in their local areas is almost non-existent.

With the right leadership, however, there are reasons for optimism. The Met’s ability to police large events such as the celebrations for Her Majesty The Queen’s Platinum Jubilee is remarkable. The Met’s response to terrorist attacks and the ability to combat serious and organised crime is impressive. The Met’s success at investigating the most serious criminality is almost unparalleled, with 93% of homicides in London solved in the five years between 2016 and 2020²Metropolitan Police Service, Homicide Dashboard, . With the right leadership the commitment of the vast majority of the Met’s officers and staff to tackling crime and disorder across London will be unwavering.

This report sets out the three areas that the Commissioner must focus on during his first 100 days in office.

1. Leadership at Every Level

• The Commissioner must articulate their vision for the Met to the public and the officers and staff of the Met. This vision should emphasise that ‘Policing Can Win’ over those who would commit crime and disorder in London’s communities.
• The Commissioner should bring his own top team into the Met at the earliest opportunity in order that the turnaround can start immediately.
• Local policing commanders should be empowered to tackle the crime and disorder problems in local areas. Wherever possible operational, intelligence and analysis units should be under the direct command of local policing commanders.
• A version of CompStat, used to great effect elsewhere, should be introduced at the earliest opportunity. CompStat should be used to drive analysis of crime and disorder and subsequent operational deployments across London. CompStat should be used to hold local policing commanders to account for delivering reductions in crime and disorder across the capital.
• The entire police officer initial training regime should be urgently reviewed. Dependent on the review the Commissioner should be prepared to wind back recent reforms should they  be found to have failed to deliver officers to be operationally deployable to the necessary standards. The Commissioner should also ask the question within policing whether the College of Policing is fit for purpose having become synonymous to many in policing with a reduction in standards and a lack of real-world relevance to fighting crime and disorder.

2. Fighting Crime and Reconnecting with the Public

• Ward-based neighbourhood policing teams must urgently be rebuilt across London. They are the most effective way to increase the public’s confidence in local policing.
• Officers in ward-based neighbourhood teams must focus on dealing with the crime and disorder that most concerns local people. In particular, officers must tackle the ‘Signal Crimes’ and ‘Signal Disorder’ which cause the public to feel unsafe. Taking the lessons from the ‘Broken Windows’ approach to policing these types of crime and disorder must be prioritised.
• Officers must take opportunities to understand the problems which most concern local people. Officers should use new technology to ascertain the views of local people rather than the elites who often form advisory groups.
• The Met’s approach to communicating with the public through the media must be overhauled. There must be a new approach to responding to footage which appears on social media in order that the public receive accurate information from the Met at the earliest opportunity.

3. Police Officer misconduct

• The Commissioner must set the standard expected by him and the public of police officers and staff. It must be unequivocal that officers guilty of criminality or unlawful discrimination cannot remain in policing.
• Steps must be taken to deal more effectively with those officers and staff who repeatedly commit ‘low-level’ misconduct or do not meet the necessary standard of competence. A ‘Broken Windows’ approach should be taken to dealing with those who regularly commit even ‘low-level’ misconduct.
• The Commissioner must review the Met’s plans linked to the Race Action Plan, created by the College of Policing and National Police Chiefs’ Council. It is essential that the Met’s operational and tactical plans are primarily focused on tackling what is one of the cruellest disproportionalities in our society – that black people are five times more likely to be the victim of homicide than white people. The Commissioner should take care not to be drawn into the debate whether the Met and British policing more widely is ‘institutionally racist’. The terminology itself is widely misunderstood and remains politically contested. It risks both undermining the morale of officers who continue to serve honourably and alienating the next generation of young men and women from considering a policing career.
• In deciding which operational tactics should be used to tackle violent crime the Met should work far more closely with local people. Vitally the Met must actively seek the involvement of those beyond the elites who commonly populate interest groups, lobby groups and advisory groups.
• The public must be given far more opportunities for an insight into the Met, including with the expansion of the independent visitor schemes beyond custody suites and the publication of data concerning complaints and use of force.

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Summary of Recommendations

Leadership at Every Level

Fighting Crime and Reconnecting with the Public

Task 1: Rebuilding ward-based neighbourhood policing teams

1. The Commissioner must clearly articulate the importance of neighbourhood policing teams to the Met’s crime fighting and public confidence mission. This should be done on their first day in office.
2. The core activities of neighbourhood policing teams should be articulated within the Met, to the public, and to partner agencies. They should be:
   • Providing a visible uniformed policing presence on the streets.
   • Visibly tackling what local people perceive as being the most important crime and disorder issues in their area primarily through problem-solving techniques.
3. Neighbourhood policing teams in every ward should be repopulated to the levels previously seen in the early 2000s. This should include:
   • one Police Sergeant
   • two Police Constables
   • three Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) (or a further three Police Constables if there are currently insufficient PCSOs)
4. The Commissioner should take steps to prioritise Neighbourhood policing over other teams. Steps taken should include:
   • Officers posted to neighbourhood teams should be posted to those teams for a minimum of two years.
   • All uniformed constables and sergeants seeking promotion should have completed a minimum term on a neighbourhood policing team before being eligible for promotion. This should be a posting of at least one year.
   • Neighbourhood officers should not be classed as a ‘taskable’ resource to be deployed to ‘Outstanding Incidents ³‘Outstanding Incidents’ are the list of incidents originating from calls by the public to either 999 or 101 which still require police attendance’.These incidents should be dealt with by Emergency Response Patrol Teams.
   • All officers posted to neighbourhood policing teams should be ring-fenced from any other duties with only the most serious exceptions. Exceptions should include the policing of New Year’s Eve and the Notting Hill Carnival, in addition to responding to very serious incidents such as terrorist attacks.
5. Police officers and PCSOs posted to neighbourhood policing teams should use mapping tools to show on social media where they are conducting patrols. Officers should spend a significant proportion of their time conducting foot-patrol.

Task 2: Giving the power to the people

1. Neighbourhood officers should present the impact of their work to the public every 100 days. This should be done in person and online so local people can see the activity undertaken by the police and the impact that activity is having on crime and disorder in their local areas.
2. Officers should publish on at least a monthly basis the amount of time that they have spent on key activities.These activities should include:
   • the specific local crime and disorder priorities set by the public;
   • general foot-patrol duties in ‘hot-spot’ areas; and
   • local public confidence building activities.
3. The Met should invest in and use app-based hyper-local polling tools. Local neighbourhood teams should use these to understand the crime and disorder issues which most concern local people.
4. The Commissioner should invest in ensuring that every neighbourhood officer, new and existing, is trained to the highest standard with delivering their vision of neighbourhood policing. This should include:
   • Patrolling in a way that increases the public’s confidence in local policing;
   • Using the tools which enable them to understand which crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour problems local people think are the most important to deal with;
   • Using problem solving techniques to resolve crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour problems; and
   • Communicating back to the public what has been achieved.

Task 3: A rapid, professional and transparent media response

1. The Commissioner should appoint a spokesperson who provides daily briefings to the media on the Met’s work. It is essential that this person has the skills and experience to be able to communicate across the full range of the Met’s strategic, performance, and day-to-day operational work.
2. The Commissioner should commit to conducting interviews with the press and broadcast media on a regular basis. This will provide an opportunity for the issues that the Met faces, and the progress against plans to deal with them, to be presented to the public on a regular basis.
3. A social media rapid response capability should be established within the Met. This will enable the Met to monitor social media 24 hours a day every day to identify any incidents within London where police officers are involved.
4. A rapid response media policy should be established to deal with incidents immediately when they appear on social media. At a minimum this should include (within minutes and hours rather than days and weeks):
   • an immediate public acknowledgement of the incident;
   • a detailed summary of the available officers’ and witnesses’ version of events;
   • officers’ body worn video footage;
   • CCTV where it is available;
   • links to relevant policies and data, for example concerning police use of force; and,
   • a short video statement by a senior police officer or the Commissioner’s spokesperson.
5. The Met should establish a detailed use of force database for public access. This should include officers’ body worn video footage, links to use of force policies and wider data on the use of force by police officers.

Police Officer Misconduct

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1. Introduction

The primary mission of the Metropolitan Police Service is to keep safe the 9 million people who call London home along with the 30 million visitors to the capital every year. Tasked with the fight against terrorism the Met also has officers posted across the country and around the globe. With an annual budget of over £3.2billion⁴Home Office, Police Grant Report 2022 to 2023 (England and Wales), link and made up of over 34,000 police officers, 14,000 staff, and hundreds of volunteers the Met is by far the UK’s biggest police force⁵Metropolitan Police Service, Workforce Data Report, June 2022, link .

Over recent years we have seen the Met at its best. The Met’s ability to police large events such as the celebrations for Her Majesty the Queen’s Platinum Jubilee, one of the largest policing operations ever seen in the United Kingdom is remarkable. The Met’s response to terrorism, such as the 2017 attacks in Westminster, London Bridge, Finsbury Park, and Parsons Green are exemplars of courage and professionalism. The Met’s ability to investigate serious criminality is almost unparalleled, with 93% of homicides in London solved in the five years between 2016 and 2020⁶Metropolitan Police Service, Homicide Dashboard, link .

But we have also seen the Met at its worst. Acts of shocking criminality and misconduct by officers; crumbling public confidence; and falling levels of crime detection. Frequently it has not been the event itself that has led to the strongest criticism but rather the Met’s response, entirely within the control of senior leaders, which has drawn the greatest opprobrium. Too often the Met has found itself being accused of being defensive, tone deaf, or simply ineffective in its response to events.

There should be no illusion about the scale of the challenge facing the next Commissioner. Once described as one of the pre-eminent policing leaders of her generation⁷The Guardian (14^th March 2021), link , Dame Cressida Dick QPM resigned having lost the confidence of the Mayor of London⁸Mayor of London, Mayoral Statement on the Met Commissioner (10^th February 2022), link. Since her departure the Met has been led by Acting Commissioner Sir Stephen House QPM who as the Deputy Commissioner has been central to the leadership of the Met over the last four years.

Following the departure of the last Commissioner in April 2022 the Home Secretary announced the process to identify her successor⁹Home Office, Recruitment Information Pack – Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service (13^th April 2022), link . The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis is appointed by Her Majesty The Queen based on the recommendation of the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary must also have regard to any recommendation by the London Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime¹⁰Section 42 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, link . Against a backdrop of the last five years the person who takes on the job will need to be a leader of remarkable talent. He will need to be willing to make a conspicuous break from the past and enact a substantial programme of reform. It will be one of the most substantial public service turnaround operations ever undertaken. It is a task that will not be for the faint of heart.

About the Report

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2. The Last Five Years

The Public’s Confidence in Policing

In the three years between March 2015 and March 2018 the proportion of Londoners who answered yes to whether the police were doing a good job in their local area was relatively stable at around 68%¹¹Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, Public Voice Dashboard, link . From March 2018 that figure started to precipitously decline. By March 2022 less than half of Londoners believed that the police in their local area were doing a good job¹²Ibid .

Serious Criminality and Misconduct by Police Officers

Whilst most police officers serve with integrity and act consistently in line with the standards expected of them by the public, this is not universally the case. The impact of a series of high-profile cases on the public’s trust and confidence in the Met, and policing more broadly, has been significant.

No case stands out more than the abhorrent crimes committed by the serving Metropolitan Police officer who murdered Sarah Everard in March 2021. His actions were a betrayal of everything the public expect of those in policing and everything those who serve honourably in policing stand for.

Several reviews have been commissioned as a result and are now at different stages of enquiry and report:

• the Home Office sponsored independent inquiry by Dame Elish Angiolini DBE QC into the matters arising from the abduction, rape and murder of Sarah Everard¹⁶Home Office, Angiolini Inquiry Terms of Reference (2^nd February 2021), link;
• a Metropolitan Police sponsored review of the force’s culture and standards of behaviour, led by Baroness Louise Casey of Blackstock DBE CB¹⁷Metropolitan Police Service, Baroness Casey External Review Terms of Reference, link ;
• several investigations of allegations of misconduct by the Independent Office for Police Conduct¹⁸Independent Office for Police Conduct Statement (10^th March 2021), link ; and
• a thematic inspection by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services of vetting and counter-corruption arrangements¹⁹Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, Inspection of capability and capacity to vet and monitor officers and staff (20^th December 2021), link .

In December 2021 two police officers were convicted of misconduct in a public office and sentenced to terms of imprisonment after it was discovered that they had taken and shared photographs of the murdered sisters Bibaa Henry and Nicole Smallman at a crime scene they were supposed to be guarding²⁰R v Deniz Jaffer and Jamie Lewis, Sentencing Remarks (6^th December 2021), link . Their mother, Rev. Mina Smallman, has been deeply critical of the Met and called for the resignation of the previous Met Commissioner²¹BBC News (2^nd November 2021), link .

In December 2021 an inquest jury found that mistakes by officers may have contributed to the deaths of Daniel Whitworth, Jack Taylor and Gabriel Kovari in East London²²Prevention of Future Deaths Report: Anthony Walgate, Gabriel Kovari, Daniel Whitworth and Jack Taylor (21^st July 2022), link  . They along with Anthony Walgate, were murdered in 2014 and 2015. The Independent Office for Police Conduct has now reopened the investigation into the original police investigations²³Independent Office for Police Conduct Statement (23^rd June 2022), link . It has been alleged by some of the victim’s families that homophobia was a factor in the Met’s failings²⁴Statement on behalf of the families of Stephen Port’s victims following inquest conclusion (10^th December 2021), link .

In February 2022 the Independent Office for Police Conduct published its Learning Report into Operation Hotton, a series of investigations into the conduct of a number of officers working at Charing Cross Police Station between 2016 and 2018²⁵Independent Office for Police Conduct, Operation Hotton Learning Report (1^st February 2022), link . Behaviours and attitudes were revealed which included bullying and sharing messages which were deeply offensive including racist, homophobic and misogynistic language. Of the 14 officers investigated two were found guilty of gross misconduct and were dismissed from the Met (or would have been dismissed had they not already resigned). A further six officers were found to have no case to answer or were found not to have committed misconduct at the relevant hearing. Six officers were dealt with under unsatisfactory performance or reflective practice procedures.

There also remain a series of mainly historic and high-profile matters which continue to plague the Met. These include:

• The Daniel Morgan Independent Panel report, published in June 2021, which accused the Met of, “a form of institutional corruption”²⁶The Report of the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel (June 2021), link ;
• The ongoing Undercover Policing Inquiry examining allegations of inappropriate activities by undercover officers²⁷The Undercover Policing Inquiry, link ; and
• The various investigations by the Independent Office for Police Conduct relating to Operation Midland, the investigation into false allegations of sexual abuse concerning a number of high-profile individuals²⁸Independent Office for Police Conduct, Reports into Operation Midland, link .

Crime Performance

The Met’s ability to prevent, reduce and solve crime over the past five years has been mixed.

The recorded number of Total Notifiable Offences (TNO) increased by 20% between 2015/16 and 2019/20²⁹Office for National Statistics, Crime in England and Wales, link . While restrictions related to the Covid-19 pandemic led to reductions in TNOs to 2015/16 levels during 2020/21 and part of 2021/22, they are now increasing and are expected to exceed one million offences a year from 2022/23³⁰Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime London, Policing and Crime: An evidence base for London, November 2021, link .

Total Notifiable Offences: Metropolitan Police Service 2015/16 – 2021/22

Source: Metropolitan Police Service³¹Metropolitan Police Service, Crime Statistics (2015/16 – 2021/22), link

In addition to an increasing trend of formally recorded crime, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services has also identified a further 69,000 crimes which the Met failed to record. They state that almost no crimes were recorded by the Met when victims reported anti-social behaviour to the force³²The Times (28^th June 2022), link .

Between 2016 and 2022 knife crime with injury in London has reduced by 14%³³Mayor of London, Police and Crime Plan for London 2022-2025, link and gun crime has reduced by 27%³⁴Ibid

, yet tragically in 2021 thirty teenagers were murdered in London. This is the highest number for nearly 20 years³⁵Metropolitan Police Service, Homicide Dashboard, link . In perhaps the cruellest example of disproportionality, black teenagers are many times more likely to be killed than white teenagers³⁶Ibid . In a damning indictment the former Chair of the London Assembly and of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, Sir Trevor Philips OBE, recently stated,

“I think many Londoners want the conflict, which exists on our streets to go away. And I’ll be absolutely blunt about this. And this is, by the way, a problem of the politics and a problem of the media. There are more than 100 young men being killed every week, every year in this city. Many, many, many more being maimed in unpleasant and vicious ways. We do not hear a single word about it, actually. The police think about it, a bit. But in a sense, they think it’s, they appear to think it’s not really their problem. It’s happening somewhere else. Why is this an issue? Well, of course, because all these people are black. Literally, almost all of them are black. And of course, let’s not beat the beat about the bush here, the perpetrators are also black.”³⁷Tweet by @Policy_Exchange (5^th July 2022), link

There has been a significant increase in the number of sexual offences reported to the Met with an additional 4,620 offences reported in the financial year to April 2022³⁸Metropolitan Police Service, Total Notifiable Offences Dashboard (End of Year 2021/22), link compared to the financial year 2018/19³⁹Metropolitan Police Service, Total Notifiable Offences Dashboard (End of Year 2018/19), link . This may suggest that the Met is successfully increasing the confidence of victims to report sexual offences, critical to the ability of the police service in being able to successfully catch dangerous predators. In the year to April 2022 only 4.3% of reported rapes were recorded by the Met as having been detected⁴⁰Metropolitan Police Service, Total Notifiable Offences Dashboard (End of Year 2021/22), link .

The Met’s ability to solve homicides remains impressive - 93% in London were solved in the five years between 2016 and 2020⁴¹Metropolitan Police Service, Homicide Dashboard, link . However, the Met’s ability solve more common crime types is woefully low with only 3.8% of reported residential burglaries, 7.5% of reported personal robberies and 1.1% of reported vehicle crimes solved during the financial year 2021/22⁴²Metropolitan Police Service, Total Notifiable Offences Dashboard (End of Year 2021/22), link .

It is also worth noting the apparent increase in ‘non-crime’ demand on the Met. Alongside an increase of 28% in 999 calls to the Met between 2015 and 2018⁴³Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime London, Policing and Crime: An evidence base for London, November 2021, link non-crime incidents now account for 76% of all calls to the force’s Command & Control centre. Calls relating to mental health increased by 40% between 2018 and 2020⁴⁴Ibid .

Protest and Public Order

Public order policing is always amongst the most challenging aspects of policing. The policing of the Euro 2020 football final at Wembley Stadium was the subject of criticism following significant levels of disorder. A review sponsored by the Football Association and conducted by Baroness Louise Casey of Blackstock DBE CB concluded that it was only by luck that very serious injury or worse was avoided⁴⁵The Baroness Casey Review: An independent Review of the events surrounding the UEFA Euro 2020 Final ‘Euro Sunday’ at Wembley (December 2021), link .

Recent years have seen a measurable increase in the number of confrontational protests, with a particular focus on London⁴⁶D. Bailey, Decade of dissent: how protest is shaking the UK and why it’s likely to continue (January 2020), The Conversation, link . Over the last five years this has coincided with frequently changing restrictions regarding public gatherings due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The most notable protests in London have included those concerning:

• Violence against women and girls, particularly following the murder of Sarah Everard in March 2021;
• ‘Black Lives Matter’, particularly following the murder of George Floyd in the United States in May 2020; and
• Climate change, particularly by ‘Insulate Britain’ and ‘Extinction Rebellion’ during the summers of 2019 to 2021.

The vigil at Clapham Common on Saturday 13^th March 2021, following the murder of Sarah Everard, was the subject of an inspection by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services⁴⁷Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, An Inspection of the Metropolitan Police Service’s policing of a vigil held in commemoration of Sarah Everard (30^th March 2021), link . The Inspectorate stated that, “media coverage of this incident led to what many will conclude was a public relations disaster for the Metropolitan Police. It was on a national and international scale, with a materially adverse effect on public confidence in policing”⁴⁸Ibid

. The Inspectorate also concluded however that, “the examination and analysis of body-worn video presented a true picture of the disorder, and the commendable restraint shown by police officers. This entirely contradicted the false assertions of police violence on that occasion”⁴⁹Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (2021), State of Policing: Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales, link .

Race and Policing

Twenty-three years on from the Inquiry into the Murder of Stephen Lawrence by Sir William Macpherson⁵⁰The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry by Sir William Macpherson of Cluny (February 1999), link race remains a live and highly controversial issue in British policing, and particularly within the Met. The National Police Chiefs’ Council and College of Policing have recently published their draft Race Action Plan which calls for significant reform in how policing protects and polices black people⁵¹National Police Chiefs’ Council & College of Policing (2022), Police Race Action Plan: Improving policing for Black people, link . The Met continues to face allegations that it has “overpoliced and underprotected” black people and communities from both outside⁵²See for example Liberty (27^th July 2020), link and within its own ranks⁵³See for example The Guardian (25^th May 2022), link .

The Met has made progress in becoming more representative of the communities it serves over the last thirty years. However, the Met remains overwhelmingly white. Less than 20% of police officers are from Black, Asian and Multiple Ethnic Heritage⁵⁴Black, Asian and Multiple Ethnic Heritage (BAMEH) is the terminology used in the Metropolitan Police Service’s Workforce Data Report, link (BAMEH) groups⁵⁵Metropolitan Police Service, Workforce Data Report, June 2022, link compared to over 40% of Londoners⁵⁶Office for National Statistics, Population estimates by ethnic group and religion: England and Wales 2019 (16^th December 2019), link .

A number of recent high-profile cases, where officers have been accused of racism and which have caused considerable public concern include:

• The case of ‘Child Q’, a 15-year old black girl who was the subject of a strip-search at a North London school by two female officers in 2020. The case is now the subject of a misconduct investigation by the Independent Office for Police Conduct⁵⁷Metropolitan Police Service, Child Q Update (15^th June 2022), link . The City & Hackney Safeguarding Children Partnership concluded that “racism was likely to have been an influencing factor”⁵⁸City of London and Hackney Safeguarding Children Partnership, Local Child Safeguarding Practice Review: Child Q (March 2022), link .
• The athletes Bianca Williams and Ricardo dos Santos in July 2020 were stopped and searched by officers from the Met’s Territorial Support Group in North-West London. The incident has received wide media attention, particularly after video footage of the incident was shared by athlete and coach Linford Christie OBE⁵⁹Tweet by @ChristieLinford (4^th July 2020), link . Officers are now facing gross misconduct proceedings following an investigation by the Independent Office for Police Conduct⁶⁰Independent Office for Police Conduct, News (27^th April 2022), link .

These two cases were just two of the many events quoted by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services on placing the Met into their ‘Engage’ mechanism (often referred to as ‘special measures’)⁶¹The Times (28^th June 2022), link . Many of the concerns articulated within the Inspectorate’s letter are outlined in this report.

The sheer number and seriousness of issues outlined by the Inspectorate and in this report demonstrates the scale of the challenge the next Commissioner faces. The Met has nothing short of a complete turnaround to undertake over the coming months and years.

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3.1 Leadership at Every Level

“To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.”

Leading the Met is an enviable task. There are few roles in public life which provide such significant opportunities to transform individual lives and whole communities. Leadership in policing, however, is far more than the responsibility of the Commissioner and their senior team. As the next Commissioner prepares to lead the Met’s fight against crime and disorder there are three key elements to leadership within the Met for them to consider.

Firstly, like most large organisations, policing has a hierarchical structure. With eleven ranks between the Commissioner at New Scotland Yard and the constable on the street, the Met’s enthusiasm for its hierarchy is perhaps exceptional⁶²Metropolitan Police Service, Workforce Data Report, May 2022, link . There are as many ranks below the chief superintendents, who on a day-to-day basis actually lead the frontline officers and staff who are serving the public, as there are ranks above who are leading the Met’s ‘strategic centre’ from New Scotland Yard⁶³Ibid . Rebalancing the Met in favour of the frontline is an essential task for the next Commissioner.

Secondly, unlike many professions, in policing the most difficult and important decisions are often made by the most junior people. Like the US Marine Corp ‘Strategic Corporal’⁶⁴C. Krulak (1999), The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War, Marines Magazine, link the modern police officer must be the ‘Strategic Constable’⁶⁵M. Wood, The Strategic Constable, Blue Line (27^th January 2021), link . Police constables often operate in the middle of night, potentially alone or with just one colleague to consult. In potentially violent or highly emotive situations constables are expected, sometimes with only a few months operational experience, to use their discretion and make decisions that might have a lifelong impact on those they are dealing with. The nature of the role of police constables is such that their recruitment and training must be exceptional, with the highest standards achieved throughout. The Met is some distance from this, particularly in relation to the initial training of officers, and a considerable programme of reform is required.

Finally, the vast majority of constables will never meet a chief officer (those officers of commander rank and above) in their day-to-day work. Beyond themselves, the people who have the greatest influence on any constable’s approach to serving the public, be that their attitudes and behaviours or the actual quality of their work, is their sergeant and inspector. Driving any cultural or performance change in the Met is entirely contingent on the ability and willingness of sergeants and inspectors. The Commissioner will need to win their hearts and minds. Without their willing and enthusiastic involvement any change is doomed to fail.

Task 1: Leading from the top

The Mayor of London, as the police and crime commissioner for London, has responsibility for securing an efficient and effective police service for London⁶⁶Section 3, Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, link . He is responsible for producing the police and crime plan⁶⁷Mayor of London, Building a Safer London: Police and Crime Plan for London 2022 – 25, link , setting the Met’s budget and holding the Commissioner to account for the policing of London. On a day-to-day basis the Mayor’s policing role is delegated to the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime⁶⁸Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, The Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime, link . Reporting to the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC)⁶⁹Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, Our Staff, link is led by a Chief Executive Officer.

The last Commissioner of the Met, Dame Cressida Dick QPM, resigned having lost the confidence of the Mayor of London⁷⁰Mayor of London, Mayoral Statement on Met Commissioner (10^th February 2022), link . The circumstances leading to her resignation are now the subject of a review commissioned by the Home Secretary, to be conducted by Sir Tom Winsor, the former Chief Inspector of Constabulary⁷¹Home Office, Commissioner Accountability Review: Terms of Reference (19^th May 2022), link . The review will examine whether due process was followed⁷²Under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, link and make recommendations on how the accountability processes might be strengthened in the future.

In addition to being appointed based on the recommendation of the Home Secretary, the Commissioner is accountable to her for exercising the Met’s national functions, in particular relating to counter-terrorism. There have long been calls for the Met’s national responsibilities to be transferred to the National Crime Agency or other agencies⁷³See for example The Daily Telegraph (18^th July 2021), link . There are two main reasons to calls for the Met to be split. Firstly, it has been claimed that the Met is too large and too complex for a single Commissioner to be able to effectively lead both the policing of London and their national responsibilities⁷⁴See for example M. MacGregor (2005), Manifesto for the Met, Policy Exchange, link  . Secondly, that having the Commissioner be accountable to both the Mayor and the Home Secretary means that neither does so effectively⁷⁵N. Bowes, The power struggle at the heart of police accountability in London, Centre for London (16^th June 2022), link . The calls for the Met to be split however are naïve – from both a political and an operational policing perspective.

From an operational policing perspective the majority of the UK’s likely terrorist targets are in London, as are the majority of the UK’s counter-terrorism subjects of interest. The disconnection of local policing in London from the Met’s counter-terrorism efforts would be counter-productive and would lead to a weakening in the UK’s counter-terrorism operating model. From a political perspective, the Met represents over 20% of the British policing workforce⁷⁶Home Office, Police workforce, England & Wales, 30^th September 2021, link . Given its scale, the Home Secretary, as the cabinet minister ultimately responsible to parliament for policing, will always take considerable interest in, comment on and be held to account by parliament for the Met’s performance. This would be the case even if there were not the direct accountability provided by her oversight of the Met’s national functions.

Given the Met’s current position however, the Home Secretary should consider taking formal action as permitted under legislation⁷⁷Section 40 Police Reform Act 1996, link . As she is entitled to do, she should consider directing the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime to take specific measures to remedy the failures which have now come to light. The Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime would be required by law to comply with such measures. This would give considerable clarity to the public as to who is accountable for the success or failure of the Met’s turnaround programme.

The next Commissioner will arrive in the role having received the consent and support of both the Home Secretary and the Mayor of London. Over recent months both the Home Secretary⁷⁸Home Office, Recruitment Information Pack – Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service (13^th April 2022), link and the Mayor⁷⁹Mayor of London, Mayor sets out demands for a ‘reforming Commissioner’ in major speech (17^th June 2022), link have given strong indications that the Met must undergo a turnaround programme, with reform required to almost every aspect of the force. As in any major turnaround there will be decisions which will be deeply unpopular with some, both in and out of the Met. It is inevitable that there will be more revelations concerning systemic failings and officer conduct. Having given the Commissioner such a strong mandate for change, the Home Secretary, the Minister of State for Crime and Policing and the Mayor of London must vocally support the Commissioner and the Met as the Commissioner leads the changes necessary. Furthermore, point-scoring⁸⁰See for example BBC News (30^th June 2022), link and Daily Mail (30^th June 2022), link by the Mayor of London, the Home Secretary, or the Minister of State against one another would be utterly deleterious to the likelihood that the Commissioner can be successful in turning the Met around. It must not continue.

Led by the Commissioner, the Met’s Management Board are responsible for delivering policing for London in accordance with the police and crime plan established by the Mayor of London⁸¹Metropolitan Police Service, Senior Management Team, link . The Met’s current Management Board includes some of the most experienced leaders in British policing. Prior to their current roles on the Met’s Management Board three members were Chief Constables in other police forces⁸²In relation to: Assistant Commissioner Matt Jukes QPM link, Assistant Commissioner Nick Ephgrave QPM link, Deputy Commissioner Sir Stephen House QPM link , one was previously the Deputy Chief Constable of the biggest force outside London⁸³In relation to: Assistant Commissioner Louisa Rolfe OBE link , and another was previously the Senior National Co-ordinator for Counter Terrorism⁸⁴In relation to: Assistant Commissioner Helen Ball QPM link . The police staff members of the Met’s Management Board possess similarly considerable levels of leadership experience.

Over the last five years these individuals have led the Met through significant challenges. Their commitment and dedication should be publicly recognised. Looking to the immediate future, several of the Met’s Management Board are likely to leave as their five-year fixed term appointments are due to come to an end⁸⁵Chief Police Officers are initially appointed on five-year contracts – Regulation 11, Police Regulations 2003, link . It is also not unusual for a new Commissioner to reshape Management Board based on the Commissioner’s approach and priorities. The Commissioner should look to do this at the earliest opportunity. This would provide the Met with as much leadership stability for as long as possible as he starts the turnaround programme that is required.

Given MOPAC’s function in holding the Met to account, there is always likely to be a natural and constructive tension between those at the top of the Met and those working in City Hall. Over the last two years, however, a number of the relationships between the senior teams at New Scotland Yard and MOPAC have become considerably strained⁸⁶See for example statements by the Deputy Commissioner and Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime to the Greater London Authority Police and Crime Committee, 23^rd February 2022, link . The significant changes which can be anticipated to the Met’s Management Board will provide some opportunity for a reset between New Scotland Yard and City Hall. To give the Met and MOPAC the best chance of success, the Mayor of London should take the opportunity to consider whether his own senior leadership team are now the right people to contribute to the turnaround programme which is required.

The Commissioner must set out his vision for policing London – to the public and to the 46,527 officers and staff of the Metropolitan Police Service⁸⁷Metropolitan Police Service, Workforce Data Report, June 2022, link . Given the level of independence with which those in policing, particularly at the most junior levels, often operate, it is critical that each understands the vision the Commissioner has for policing London. Central to that vision must be the idea that ‘Policing Can Win’ over those who would commit crime and disorder in our communities. Police forces are the only organisations focused primarily on the fight against crime and disorder. It is the public’s expectation that the police will do everything lawfully and ethically possible to keep them safe, tackle crime and maintain order on the streets. Despite the extensive demands on policing, every officer and member of staff must operate from the perspective that they can make a difference and that core to their role is the fight against crime and disorder.

While the public’s confidence in the Met is the primary metric of whether the Commissioner is successful in turning round the Met, the confidence of the Met’s officers and staff is critical. The Met’s last staff survey, published in October 2021, shows that the confidence of the workforce in the Met is, in many areas, even lower than the public’s. The confidence of the officers and staff of the Met are amongst a series of metrics which should be used to measure the Commissioner’s progress over the coming year.

Topic	Positive Response	Year on Year change
I have confidence in the Met’s senior leaders	39%	-2%
I feel proud to work for the Met	59%	-11%
I believe our Met Direction strategy is helping us improve our performance	29%	-2%
I believe the public trust us to keep them safe	30%	-12%
If I contacted the Met as a member of the public, I would be confident of receiving a good service	30%	-3%
When organisational changes are made, they are usually for the better	19%	-2%

Source: Metropolitan Police Service⁸⁸Metropolitan Police Service, The Met Survey (October 2021), link

That there are large numbers of people who make up the Met must not preclude the Commissioner from taking every opportunity to communicate his vision for the Met to them directly. The Commissioner should replicate the steps of Sir John Stevens QPM when he became Commissioner of the Met in January 2000. Appointed in the aftermath of the publication of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry which concluded that the Met was ‘institutionally racist’, Stevens had the task of rebuilding the Met. The judgement of ‘institutional racism’ had left many officers who served honourably believing that they had personally been described as ‘racist’. As the newly appointed Commissioner, Stevens set out to rebuild the confidence of the officers and staff of the Met. Amongst other steps Stevens did so by gathering 2-3,000 officers and staff at a time in Westminster Hall in central London to set out his vision for the Met and take questions from officers and staff. Given Stevens has been described as, “the last commissioner to leave with his reputation intact”⁸⁹The Times (4^th July 2022), link it is worth replicating his approach. In addition, the Commissioner should take every possible opportunity to speak face-to-face with the officers and staff of the Met. He should complete drop-in sessions, attend team briefings, and go on patrol with officers.

Task 2: Empowering local commanders

In 2018 the Met changed its local policing model. Where previously each of the 32 London boroughs had a chief superintendent leading local policing, now each chief superintendent is responsible for between two and four London boroughs⁹⁰Metropolitan Police Service (2018), Basic Command Unit (BCU) Pathfinder Review, January 2018, link . Known as ‘Basic Command Unit (BCU) commanders’, these individual chief superintendents are, on average, leading teams of 1,600 police officers⁹¹Metropolitan Police Service, Workforce Data Report, June 2022, link . The average size of a London BCU, led by a single BCU commander, is larger than a quarter of the police forces in England and Wales⁹²Home Office, Police Workforce: England & Wales, 31^st March (2^nd ed), link .  Meanwhile, every police force in England and Wales outside London is led by an entire command team of assistant, deputy and chief constables.

Source: Metropolitan Police Service⁹³Metropolitan Police Service, link

That these are teams are large is not necessarily problematic, so long as the those undertaking the BCU commander roles are of sufficiently high calibre. In policing, as with every other public service, the quality of leadership matters. Everything must be done to build on and improve the quality of those undertaking these roles. Although the size of BCUs may have increased over the last five years, the autonomy of BCU commanders to make their own decisions on how policing is delivered locally has significantly reduced. This has been done in favour of the Met directing local policing from what has become a far stronger ‘strategic centre’. This shift in favour of the ‘strategic centre’ is typified by the 34% increase in the number of chief officers in the Met⁹⁴Those who are Commander (equivalent to Assistant Chief Constable in other forces) rank and above, from 29 in March 2016⁹⁵Home Office, Police Workforce, England & Wales, 31^st March 2016, link to 39 in March 2021⁹⁶Home Office, Police Workforce, England & Wales, 31^st March 2021, link . This contrasts with a 20% reduction in the number of chief superintendents (the rank that typically undertakes the BCU commander role) who are actually leading the Met’s frontline local policing command teams across London⁹⁷Ibid. The significant reduction in the autonomy of BCU commanders over fundamental elements of how local policing is delivered causes three significant issues.

Firstly, it has created a greater distance between local people and those who are making the decisions on how best to police local areas. To effectively serve the public requires that those making tactical and deployment decisions are proximate enough to genuinely understand the people and communities they are policing. The most effective way of policing Barking may be vastly different to the most effective way of policing New Malden. The shift to the ‘strategic centre’ however has increased the likelihood of there being a ‘one size fits all’ approach to policing this city of 9 million people.

Secondly, the increasing size of the ‘strategic centre’, and the extent of the hierarchy within it are key drivers for the organisation’s seemingly insatiable ability to create ‘internal demand’ for BCU commanders and their teams. At times BCU commanders can be faced with the wholly farcical situation where they receive conflicting instructions from different commanders based at New Scotland Yard⁹⁸Meeting with Met BCU Commander, June 2022. This internal demand has the effect of distracting frontline officers and leaders from the actual business of serving the public⁹⁹Meeting with Met BCU Commander, May 2022. Reducing the size and influence of the ‘strategic centre’ in favour of BCU commanders is critical to reducing the ‘internal demand’ which causes such intense frustration and distraction for frontline leaders and officers.

Finally, with more decisions dictated from a ‘strategic centre’ there is less likelihood of new ideas and different ways of working coming to the fore and being tested in an operational environment. The presumption that the centre knows best is stifling to those who might create new ideas to both increasing the public’s confidence in policing and the fight against crime and disorder.

Several steps must be taken to increase the autonomy of BCU commanders and reduce the influence of the ‘strategic centre’.

There should be a reduction in the number of chief officers across the Met¹⁰⁰Metropolitan Police Service, Senior Management Team, link . The Met’s current situation strongly suggests that having more senior leaders does not necessarily equate to better organisational leadership. The number of commanders¹⁰¹Equivalent to Assistant Chief Constables in other forces in the Met should be reduced from the current nineteen to no more than eleven. The number of deputy assistant commissioners¹⁰²Equivalent to Deputy Chief Constables in other forces should be reduced from ten to no more than six.

Operational teams which are focused on local BCU crime and disorder problems such as violent crime, drugs and gangs should be placed under the leadership of BCU commanders. At a minimum this must include the Violent Crime Task Force and Local Intelligence Teams. Other large units which are currently led centrally should be reviewed to consider a large proportion of them being transferred to Basic Command Units. This should include a transfer of at least half of the 1,000 officers within the Met Operations Taskforce (Territorial Support Group) and most of the 1,300 officers within the Met Operations Roads and Transport command¹⁰³Metropolitan Police Service, Workforce Data Report, June 2022, link .

Budgets should as far as possible be devolved to BCU commanders to enable them to make a far broader range of decisions which impact on the service provided to the public. BCU commanders should be able to make decisions around their workforce mix of police officers, police staff and Police Community Support Officers. They should also be able to make decisions around which police stations and other bases are open to the public and when.

Each local BCU commander should be supported by an effective HQ function led by a suitably qualified Chief Operating Officer. These teams should have specialist functions that have the necessary skills and experience in analysis, communications, finance, and HR rather than these skills being held centrally or staffed locally by police officers rather than specialists. BCU Chief Operating Officers should have experience in leading these types of teams and should not be police officers. Officers currently undertaking roles within these teams should be returned to frontline policing duties.

To strengthen the influence of local people over the Met’s ‘strategic centre’, representatives from local authorities, other partners and local communities should be involved in the appointment of BCU commanders. Once appointed BCU commanders should be posted for periods of between three and five years. Retention in post and promotions should be contingent on BCU commander performance against measures focused on:

1. whether local people believe that the police are doing a good job locally;
2. effectiveness at dealing with the priorities of local people; and
3. effectiveness at preventing, reducing and detecting crime and disorder.

The Commissioner should undertake a rapid review of the entire BCU frontline policing model. The shift from 32 borough based local policing teams, each led by a single chief superintendent, to the 12 Basic Command Unit model has been deeply unpopular. It has been widely suggested, both by those within the Met¹⁰⁴Meetings with Met Superintendents, Met Chief Inspector, Met BCU commander, May 2022 and leaders in local authorities¹⁰⁵See for example London News Online (21^st February 2018), link and West London News (20^th February 2019), link , that the shift to the BCU command model has compromised operational effectiveness. If a rapid review concludes that operational effectiveness and public confidence has been affected by the introduction of the BCU model the Met should reverse this decision without delay.

In addition to empowering BCU commanders to effectively lead policing in their local areas there should be a simultaneous focus on improving how local commanders and their teams are held to account by both local people and senior leaders within the Met. Local policing commanders are currently held to account through the monthly Frontline Executive Board meeting which, based on the Met’s current performance across a series of measures, is failing to do so effectively. There is currently no formal process for the public themselves to hold local police commanders to account.

The Commissioner should take steps to revolutionise the entire process of how BCU commanders focus on and are held to account for crime and disorder in their local areas. Initially introduced by Commissioner Bill Bratton in New York in the 1990s, CompStat was a necessary albeit insufficient element for the turnaround that Bratton delivered during that period. It has been widely and successfully adopted elsewhere¹⁰⁶Police Executive Research Forum: Bureau of Justice Assistance (2013), COMPSTAT: Its origins, evolution, and future in law enforcement agencies, link and a version of the CompStat process should be adopted across the Met.

There are three pre-conditions for CompStat to be effective. Firstly, that BCU commanders are not only empowered but required to take wholesale responsibility for tackling crime and disorder in their local area. They must have under their direct control the intelligence, analysis and operational resources to be able to deal with crime and disorder in their local area. Secondly, policing commanders must start with the mindset that ‘Policing Can Win’ – the belief and mindset that by deploying the right resources at the right time it is possible for policing to reduce crime and disorder. Finally, there must be the understanding that CompStat is a whole system approach to tackling crime and disorder. Although regular performance meetings are the most well-known element, there is far more to successfully running a CompStat process, with intelligence gathering, analysis and operational tasking processes required at a local level, led by BCU commanders.

There are four core elements to the CompStat process¹⁰⁷Y. Yuksel (2014), The implementation of CompStat in police organizations: the case of Newark Police Department, The Journal of International Social Research, Vol 7 (35), pp 779 – 801, link:

1. timely and accurate information or intelligence on crime and disorder problems made available at all levels of the organisation;
2. policing leaders determining the most effective tactics to tackle crime and disorder problems;
3. rapid, focused deployment of resources; and
4. relentless follow-up and assessment to learn what happened and make performance assessment.

For the CompStat process to be effective local policing commanders must review crime trends and intelligence on a continuing basis. Analytical products should be shared throughout the policing hierarchy to generate new ideas to tackle the crime and disorder problems faced by local people. Officers should be urged, as Bernard Hogan-Howe QPM did when he was appointed as Commissioner of the Met in 2011, to do everything, “legal and ethical to put the criminal on the back foot”¹⁰⁸Bernard Hogan-Howe, Speech to International Conference on Leadership and Standards in the Police Service (14^th January 2013), link . A constant cycle of analysis and review of the tactics at a local level should be established to identify what works. This will require a significant increase in the local analytical capability and capacity available to BCU commanders.

The assessment of those trends must subsequently lead to the creation of a plan and the rapid deployment of policing resources under their command, and where necessary the tasking of central resources. BCU commanders across the Met currently undertake BCU-wide ‘pacesetter’ reviews of incidents and deployments twice a day with their operational leaders. These are conducted at 0930 hours and 1530 hours daily. This is wholly insufficient and at least one further ‘pacesetter’ meeting should be introduced for every 24-hour period.

The purpose of pan-London CompStat meetings should be two-fold. Firstly, to scrutinise the plans of BCU commanders and their senior leadership teams to establish whether their plans for combatting crime and disorder are being effective. Secondly, to identify areas of excellence and good practice which can be replicated in other areas to bear down on crime and disorder.

To run large-scale Met-wide CompStat meetings effectively the following are required:

1. The Commissioner should attend CompStat meetings. They should be chaired by the Assistant Commissioner for Frontline Policing.
2. CompStat meetings should be held weekly. Every week at least three of the twelve BCU commanders including their full senior leadership teams should be required to attend.
3. Central operational units should attend CompStat in order that they can also contribute to the effective problem solving and deployment of assets into BCUs to tackle crime and disorder problems.
4. CompStat meetings should focus on the effectiveness of the police response in tackling the crime and disorder priorities of local people, levels of public confidence in the police locally, and other high-priority crimes such as violent crime.
5. A single performance and analysis product which breaks down crime and disorder information to ward-level, should be produced centrally to ensure consistency across London.
6. The Met’s Strategic Insight Unit (the Met’s specialist team of data scientists) should review and analyse CompStat products to rapidly identify what works in order that new tactics and approaches can be shared with BCU commanders across London.
7. CompStat should be the only pan-London meeting which BCU commanders are required to attend. There should be a substantial reduction in the number of centrally mandated, many hours-long pan-London meetings which BCU command teams are required to attend¹⁰⁹Meeting with Met Superintendent, June 2022.

As part of driving accountability to local people, BCU commanders should also present to their communities every 100 days on what they and their teams have achieved during that period against the priorities set by local people. These presentations should be data-led with local people having the opportunity to ask questions of local command teams. These presentations should be open to the public, the media and partner agencies. They should be live streamed and available afterwards online.

Task 3: Recruiting and training leaders

The influx of new police officers through the Police Uplift Programme provides the Commissioner with a significant opportunity to shape the organisational culture of the Met for decades to come. In the three years since 2019/20 the Met has recruited nearly 9,500 new officers, nearly a third of the Met’s entire police officer workforce¹¹⁰Metropolitan Police Service, Workforce Data Report, June 2022, link , with a predicted further 4,000 officers to be recruited in 2022/23¹¹¹Metropolitan Police Service, Careers Website, link .

Number of police officers recruited by the MPS 2013/14 – 2022/23 (22/23 – projection)

Source: Metropolitan Police Service¹¹²Ibid

Whilst this presents major challenges in terms of both training these officers and ensuring that there is sufficient experience across the policing workforce, it also presents significant opportunities. Within these new 13,500 officers there will be individuals of significant talent. Some will have considerable leadership experience from their previous careers.

To maximise the benefit of those officers who have joined the Met with previous leadership experience, the Commissioner should rapidly accelerate some of these individuals into formal leadership roles, as sergeants and inspectors. Although there is an existing fast track promotion programme run by the College of Policing¹¹³College of Policing, Fast Track Programme (for serving constables), link the number of officers involved is too small to have any substantive impact¹¹⁴I. Campbell and S. Colover (2020), Fast Track and Direct Entry Programme evaluation: Overview Paper, July 2020, College of Policing, link, NB: 314 officers joined the Fast Track Programme nationally in the five years between 2014-2019, although the exact numbers from the Met have not been published it can be presumed that over the five years this consisted of fewer than 100 officers over 5 years – a tiny fraction of those promoted to sergeant and inspector roles during that time.  . The Commissioner should implement a process in order that the most talented of these 13,500 officers can move into formal leadership roles at the earliest appropriate opportunity. A significant proportion, of between a quarter to a third, of the 500 officers typically promoted to the rank of sergeant annually should be from this cohort¹¹⁵Home Office, Police Workforce: England & Wales, 31^st March (2^nd ed), link .

Opportunities for the influx of new officers to contribute different ideas to the challenge of fighting crime and disorder should be created. The Commissioner’s 100 project run by the Met between 2013-2016 enabled junior officers and staff to pitch ideas to the Commissioner and Management Board in the style of a Dragons’ Den¹¹⁶D. Spencer, M. Lloyd, L. Stephens (2014), Case for Change, Police Now (Appendix A), link & Commissioner’s 100 Website, link . The Police Rewired¹¹⁷Police Rewired Website, link project connects those on the policing frontline with technologists to contribute to the fight against crime through technology. Replicating forums such as these in order that those on the policing frontline can share new ideas of how best to serve the public and fight crime and disorder in local communities would give the Commissioner, Management Board and BCU commanders the opportunity to consider new solutions to crime and disorder problems.

In 2016 the College of Policing announced the introduction of the Policing Education Qualifications Framework¹¹⁸College of Policing, Policing Education Qualifications Framework, link . This new framework has introduced significant changes to police training across England and Wales. The College of Policing states that the new training framework is, “based on a modern curriculum of dynamic operational training, underpinned by sound theoretical education”¹¹⁹Ibid

. The introduction of the framework has been highly controversial throughout policing¹²⁰See for example Police Professional (6^th December 2019), link . As a result of the new framework the Met’s initial police officer training is no longer exclusively delivered by the force’s own police training college, as was done historically. Initial police officer training is now predominantly delivered by an outsourced commercial provider alongside four universities.

It has been suggested that the quality of initial police officer training being delivered is not consistently meeting the standards expected by leaders in local policing teams¹²¹Meetings with Met Superintendent, Met Chief Inspector, Met Inspector, May 2022

. Concerns have been expressed that officers leave the training environment without meeting the necessary standards in operational policing skills. The Met’s specialist in-house training capability, such as firearms and hostage and crisis negotiation training, is widely considered to be exceptional. There is no reason why initial police officer recruit training should not meet the same standard. The new Commissioner should undertake a rapid review of existing initial police officer training. If it is found that this critically important training phase is not meeting the necessary standard, urgent steps should be taken to rectify this. If necessary, the Met should be willing to withdraw from commercial relationships if it is not certain that future initial police officer training will consistently meet the necessary standard.

The Policing Education Qualifications Framework is the most significant work that the College of Policing has undertaken since the body was launched in February 2013. The College is constituted as an ‘operationally independent arms-length body of the Home Office’ and is almost entirely funded through public funds. It exists to¹²²College of Policing, Business Plan 2021-22, link :

• Share knowledge and good practice to support crime reduction;
• Set standards to help reduce crime and disorder; and
• Support professional development to help the response to new and emerging crime types.

With an annual spend of £71million in the financial year 2020/21¹²³College of Policing Limited, Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 31 March 2021, link , the College’s total expenditure has been well over half a billion pounds since being created¹²⁴Companies House, Annual Accounts for the College of Policing (2013 – 2021), link . The College’s own ‘Fundamental Review’¹²⁵College of Policing (2020), Fundamental review of the College of Policing: Boosting professionalism, improving leadership and driving consistency, link , published nearly a decade on from the organisation’s launch, reported that stakeholders believed that:

• “The College had not yet lived up to our potential or fully delivered on the expectations that officers, staff and the public have of policing’s professional body.”
• “The quality of the College’s products are not always as good as they could be, which undermines our credibility in the eyes of the service.”
• “An often slow and bureaucratic culture that is not sufficiently responsive to policing or other parts of the system, such as PCCs.”

Based upon the College’s own Fundamental Review, it is apparent that the organisation has become synonymous to many within policing with a reduction in standards alongside a perceived lack of real-world relevance to the prevention of crime and disorder. Given the College of Policing’s own review and the challenges which appear to exist in relation to the new initial police officer training programmes the Commissioner should open the discussion within policing and the Home Office as to whether the College of Policing is providing a suitable return on investment. There should be consideration as to whether the College of Policing’s functions might better be undertaken by individual forces or the Home Office itself.

Delivering the level of performance and cultural change within the Met will only be possible if the Commissioner is successful in securing the willing support of the Met’s 7,000 sergeants, inspectors and staff supervisors. The Commissioner should review the current training of those officers and staff to establish whether the existing leadership development programmes are reaching the necessary standard. Consideration should be given to re-establishing the Met’s Leadership Academy created in the mid-2000s but long since closed.

To support officers in dealing with the increase in confrontational protest across London, police officers would benefit from additional training and greater clarity from leaders when operationally deployed, relating to policing impartiality¹²⁶D. Bailey, Decade of dissent: how protest is shaking the UK and why it’s likely to continue (January 2020), The Conversation, link . The perception that an officer’s operational decision making, such as whether to arrest someone, might be influenced by a partisan political view has the potential to be hugely damaging to the public’s confidence that policing is being done fairly. Acts that may be intended by an officer as a show of solidarity against discrimination for example, such as a police officer ‘taking the knee’¹²⁷See for example The Times (10^th June 2020), link or an officer wearing a badge on their uniform, can easily be understood by the public as an expression of a partisan political view¹²⁸Her Majesty’s Inpsectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, Getting the balance right? An inspection of how effectively the police deal with protests (March 2021), link . To maintain the public’s confidence that police officers are acting with impartiality such acts should always be avoided. Providing clear instruction to officers and training for frontline sergeants and inspectors would assist officers in dealing these issues as they arise.

In relation to the policing of confrontational protest the Commissioner should obtain a detailed review into what has become a highly complex legal landscape. The degree of complexity which officers must now navigate, particularly given the interaction of legislation¹²⁹Such as the Human Rights Act 1998, link and case law¹³⁰Such as DPP v Ziegler and others [2021, link , is such that there is considerable potential for the legal framework to have a chilling effect on officers’ ability to deal effectively with protests across the capital. The review should provide clarity to policing leaders who are required to take operational decisions prior to and during protests, with officers more widely trained on how best to navigate the legal framework in order that they are able to balance the competing interests effectively. The Commissioner should work with the Home Office to ascertain whether the existing legal framework is enabling or hindering officers from being able to deal effectively with confrontational protests.

Recommendations

Task 1: Leading from the top

1. The Commissioner must set out his vision for policing London to the public and to the 46,527 officers and staff of the Metropolitan Police Service. Central to that vision must be the idea that ‘Policing Can Win’ over those who would commit crime and disorder in our communities.
2. The Commissioner should gather 2-3,000 officers and staff at a time to set out his vision for the Met and take questions from officers and staff. In addition, the Commissioner should take every possible opportunity to complete drop-in sessions, attend team briefings, and go on patrol with officers.
3. The Commissioner should seek to reshape Management Board based on his approach and priorities at the earliest opportunity. This will provide the Met with as much leadership stability for as long as possible as he starts the turnaround programme that is required.
4. The Mayor of London should take the opportunity to review his own senior leadership team and consider whether they are right people to contribute to the turnaround programme which is required. The Mayor’s senior leadership team consists of the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime and the Chief Executive Officer of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime.
5. The Home Secretary should consider using her powers to direct the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime to take specific measures to rectify the failings within the Met. This would place the issues on a formal footing under the relevant legislation and would help clarify for the public where accountability sits for the Met’s current issues.

Task 2: Empowering local commanders

1. There should be a reduction in the number of chief officers across the Met. The number of commanders in the Met should be reduced from the current nineteen to no more than eleven. The number of deputy assistant commissioners should be reduced from ten to no more than six.
2. The entire process of how BCU commanders focus on and are held to account for crime and disorder in their local areas should be revolutionised. This should be based on a version of CompStat which has been successfully used in other forces.
3. To drive accountability to local people BCU commanders should present to their communities every 100 days. This should cover what their teams have achieved during that period against the priorities set by local people.
4. The Commissioner should undertake a rapid review of the entire BCU frontline policing model. If a rapid review concludes that operational effectiveness and public confidence has been affected by the introduction of the BCU model the Met should reverse this decision without delay.
5. Operational teams which are focused on local BCU crime problems such as violent crime, drugs and gangs should be placed under the leadership of BCU commanders. At a minimum this must include the Violent Crime Task Force and the Local Intelligence Teams.
6. Other centralised operational units should be reviewed to consider a large proportion of them being transferred to Basic Command Units. This should include a transfer of at least half of the 1,000 officers within the Met Operations Taskforce and most of the 1,300 officers within the Met Operations Roads and Transport command.
7. Budgets should as far as possible be devolved to BCU commanders to enable them to make a far broader range of operational deployment decisions. This should include BCU commanders being able to make decisions around their workforce mix of police officers, police staff and Police Community Support Officers and decisions over which police stations and other bases are open and when.
8. Representatives from local authorities, other partners and local communities should be involved in the appointment of BCU commanders. Once appointed BCU commanders should be posted for periods of between three and five years. Retention in post should be contingent on BCU commander performance.
9. Each local BCU commander should be supported by an effective HQ function led by a suitably qualified Chief Operating Officer. These teams should have specialist functions that have the necessary skills and experience in analysis, communications, finance, and HR rather than these skills being held entirely centrally or staffed locally by police officers rather than specialists.

Task 3: Recruiting and training leaders

1. The Commissioner should utilise programmes to rapidly accelerate some of those who have recently joined the Met as police officers into formal leadership roles, as sergeants and inspectors. A significant proportion, of between a quarter to a third, of the 500 officers typically promoted to the rank of sergeant annually should be from this cohort.
2. Opportunities for the influx of new officers to contribute different ideas to the challenge of fighting crime and disorder should be created. These should replicate the successes of programmes such as the 2013 – 2016 Commissioner’s 100 project and the Police Rewired project.
3. The Commissioner should initiate a rapid review of initial recruit training. If necessary the Met should be willing to withdraw from commercial relationships and the new Policing Educational Qualifications Framework if there is no likelihood of the necessary operational standards being met in short order.
4. The Commissioner should review the current training of sergeants, inspectors and staff to establish whether the existing leadership development programmes are reaching the necessary standard. The Commissioner should consider establishing a new Leadership Academy for this purpose.
5. Sergeants and inspectors should receive training and instruction in relation to impartiality in policing. This is particularly relevant for the policing of confrontational protesting where officers should be cautioned against making potentially politically partisan statements or acts.
6. The Commissioner should consider advising the government to conduct a further review of the College of Policing to establish whether the organisation is providing value for money. This is in particular following the highly critical Fundamental Review of the College despite there being the investment of over half a billion in public funds over the last decade.
7. The Commissioner should commission an independent legal review to provide guidance to policing leaders on how best to approach the legal landscape relating to confrontational protest. The Commissioner should work with the Home Office to ascertain whether the existing legal framework is enabling or hindering officers from being able to deal effectively with confrontational protests.

Next chapter

3.2 Fighting Crime and Reconnecting with the Public

“To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.”

Regaining the public’s confidence in the Met is the next Commissioner’s primary task. Too many Londoners no longer believe that the police in their local area are doing a good job¹³¹Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, Public Voice Dashboard, link: Result for March 2022 to the question “Do the police do a good job locally?” has reduced from 67% to 49% since March 2018.. Key to this has been a conspicuous ‘withdrawal from the streets’ by the Met over recent years. There are three key reasons for this feeling of withdrawal across the capital.

Firstly, there has been a significant reduction in the size of ward-based neighbourhood teams from the model originally created in the early 2000s. The original model posted one Sergeant, two Police Constables, and three Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) to each of London’s 624 wards¹³²H. A. Davey & M. Pepper, Safer Neighbourhoods Scrutiny, Metropolitan Police Authority (February 2011), pp. 22-3, link . In 2007, an additional three PCSOs were posted to the 87 wards in London with over 14,000 residents¹³³Ibid. p23 . From a high of 1,872 ward-based police officers this has now reduced to 1,518 officers¹³⁴Metropolitan Police Service, Workforce Data Report, May 2022, link . The reduction in ward based PCSOs is even more significant having fallen from 2,133 to only 569¹³⁵Ibid  .

Secondly, where ward-based teams were once ring-fenced from undertaking duties away from their neighbourhoods this has largely been eroded. Increasingly neighbourhood officers are required to undertake other duties such as ‘Central London Aid’¹³⁶On ‘Central London Aid’ officers are posted to duties away from their local Basic Command Unit, often policing protests or other major events such as the celebrations for HM The Queen’s Platinum Jubilee  or ‘staffing up’ Emergency Response Patrol Teams, with as much as 14.5% of Dedicated Ward Officer time being abstracted to other duties in April 2022¹³⁷Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, DWO Abstraction Dashboard (April 2022), link . As a result, even where officers are formally posted to ward-based neighbourhood duties they are increasing drawn into other tasks.

Thirdly, over the last ten years there has been a significant reduction in the number of community-based police stations across London¹³⁸MyLondon News (2^nd January 2020), link . Even where these stations were technically under-utilised, for example with low numbers of members of the public visiting the police station to use the front counter services, they provided an important signal to local communities that a local police presence existed on which they could rely.

Task 1: Rebuilding ward-based neighbourhood policing teams

The importance of ward-based neighbourhood teams cannot be underestimated. There is a wealth of evidence to demonstrate that neighbourhood policing teams are effective at: ¹³⁹S. Colover & P. Quinton (2018), Neighbourhood policing: impact and implementation – summary findings from a rapid evidence assessment, College of Policing, link

• reducing public perceptions of disorder;
• increasing the public’s trust and confidence of the police; and
• increasing the perceived legitimacy of the police.

Neighbourhood Policing Teams are essential to the idea that, by working alongside local people, ‘Policing Can Win’ over those who might cause misery, disorder and crime in local communities. Recent years have represented the hollowing out of neighbourhood policing, partly due to a failure to provide clarity throughout the Met on their purpose, their core activities and their importance.

Of particular importance to the mission of neighbourhood policing teams is that they effectively tackle the ‘low-level’ criminality, disorder and anti-social behaviour which can plague local communities. That these issues have not been prioritised is a contributing factor to the collapsing levels of the public’s confidence in the Met over the last five years. There are four reasons neighbourhood policing teams must consider these issues a priority.

Firstly, in recent polling for Policy Exchange 54% of respondents stated that they believed that the police and other authorities needed to do more to tackle anti-social behaviour¹⁴⁰Policy Exchange-Deltapoll polling, 7-8^th May 2022, 1532 responses to national poll . 32% of respondents to the 2019/20 MOPAC Public Attitudes Survey said that drugs or anti-social behaviour should be the first priority for the Met to deal with in their local area¹⁴¹Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime London, Policing and Crime: An evidence base for London, November 2021, link . There is a wealth of evidence to suggest that dealing with anti-social behaviour effectively is critical in maintaining the public’s confidence in the police¹⁴²E. Stanko & B. Bradford (2009), Beyond Measuring ‘How Good a Job’ Police are Doing: The MPS Model of Confidence in Policing, Policing, Volume 3, Number 4, pp. 322–330, link .

Secondly, levels of ‘low-level’ crime and disorder are key in determining people’s quality of life, feelings of safety and sense of community¹⁴³H. Redgrave (2022), Rebuilding communities: Why it’s time to put anti-social behaviour back on the agenda, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, link . ‘Low-level’ criminality and disorder are often ‘Signal Crimes’ or ‘Signal Disorder’¹⁴⁴M. Innes (2004), Signal crimes and signal disorders: notes on deviance as communicative action, British Journal of Sociology, Vol 55 (3), link which act as indicators to the public that their local area is not safe.

Thirdly, ‘low-level’ crime and disorder can be indicators of future more serious criminality. A common example of this is the clearly made out link between anti-social behaviour, drug markets and serious violence¹⁴⁵H. Redgrave (2022), Two sides of the same coin? The link between drugs markets and serious violence, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, link . It is similarly found in the phenomenon of ‘cuckooing’ where the homes of vulnerable people are ‘taken over’ by criminals. In such circumstances there are often high levels of ‘low-level’ disorder aligned with more serious criminality, such as that committed by county line gangs¹⁴⁶J. Spicer et al (2019), The variable and evolving nature of ‘cuckooing’ as a form of criminal exploitation in street level drug markets, Trends in Organised Crime, Vol 23, link . By tackling ‘low-level’ criminality and disorder it is possible for the police to have an impact on and prevent more serious criminality.

Finally, neighbourhood policing teams are the only policing teams commonly focused on tackling these sorts of issues which are of such importance to local people. The right interventions by neighbourhood policing teams can shape the public’s perception of how safe they feel in their local area¹⁴⁷M. Innes (2004), Signal crimes and signal disorders: notes on deviance as communicative action, British Journal of Sociology, Vol 55 (3), link – a clear example of policing winning on behalf of the public.

The Commissioner must clearly articulate the core activities of neighbourhood policing teams. They should be two-fold:

1. Providing a visible uniformed policing presence on the streets.
2. Visibly tackling what local people perceive as being the most important crime and disorder issues in their area through problem-solving techniques¹⁴⁸Weisburd et al (2010), Is problem-orientated policing effective in reducing crime and disorder?, Criminology and Public Policy, Volume 9 (1), link .

The Commissioner must demonstrate the importance he attaches to neighbourhood policing teams. Rebuilding them should be prioritised over other parts of the Met. There are a series of practical ways that their importance can be demonstrated. For some within the Met this will be unpopular; for local communities however, these steps are essential.

• Re-populating neighbourhood policing teams in every ward to the levels previously seen in the early 2000s, if necessary to the detriment of other teams.
• Officers must be posted to neighbourhood teams for a minimum of two years in order that they are able to develop their knowledge of the local area and so that local people can get to know and trust them.
• All uniformed constables and sergeants who wish to seek promotion should have completed at least a year on a neighbourhood policing team before being eligible for promotion.
• Neighbourhood officers should not be classed as a ‘taskable’ resource to be deployed to ‘Outstanding Incidents¹⁴⁹‘Outstanding Incidents’ are the list of incidents originating from calls by the public to either 999 or 101 which still require police attendance ’ which are primarily the responsibility of Emergency Response Patrol Teams.
• All officers posted to neighbourhood policing teams should be ring-fenced from any other duties with only the most serious exceptions (such as policing central London New Year’s Eve, policing the Notting Hill Carnival, or the response to the aftermath of a serious terrorist incident).

There is substantial evidence that combining public engagement with foot-patrol and ‘problem-solving techniques’ can reduce disorder and criminality¹⁵⁰R. Tuffin, J. Morris and A. Poole (2006), An evaluation of the impact of the national reassurance policing programme, Home Office, link and support the public in feeling safer on the streets¹⁵¹M. Camacho Doyle, L.Frogner, H. Andershed, A. Andershed (2015), Feelings of Safety In The Presence of Police, Security Guards, and Police Volunteers, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Vol 22 (1), July 2015, link . As a result police officers and PCSOs posted to neighbourhood policing teams should spend a significant proportion of their time conducting foot-patrol. When doing so officers should spend their time talking with local people in the streets, in their businesses and on their doorsteps.

Through these conversations officers will have the opportunity to build relationships with local people and to gather intelligence on local crime and disorder problems on which they can then act. Officers on foot patrol are also far more likely than those posted to other duties¹⁵²Such as Emergency Response Patrol Teams who spend most of their time responding to 999 calls from the public

to be able to intervene in the sort of ‘low-level’ crime disorder and anti-social behaviour which causes significant distress to the public.

All officers should follow the examples of several neighbourhood officers who use mapping tools and social media to share with the public where they are conducting foot-patrols in their local area.

 

Task 2: Give the power to the people

Central to increasing the public’s confidence in policing is that officers posted to ward-based neighbourhood teams focus on the concerns of local people¹⁵³Gill et al (2014), Community-oriented policing to reduce crime, disorder and fear and increase satisfaction and legitimacy among citizens: a systematic review, Journal of Experimental Criminology, Vol 10, link . The proportion of people who believe that the Met “are dealing with things that matter to this community” has reduced from 72% in December 2014 to 60% in March 2022¹⁵⁴Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, Public Voice Dashboard, link . This has been particularly marked in some Boroughs, including Lambeth (21% drop), Croydon (18% drop), and Greenwich (17% drop)¹⁵⁵Ibid . This trend must be reversed.

The sense of community ownership is critical to the success of neighbourhood policing¹⁵⁶A. Myhill (2012), Community engagement in policing: Lessons from the Literature, National Policing Improvement Agency, link . To properly understand the issues which concern local people the Met must gather information from more than the ‘usual suspects’ – the elites that too often make up Independent Advisory Groups, Safer Neighbourhood Boards, or Ward Panels. Similarly, it is critical in considering the concerns of local people that this must be distinct from the concerns of interest, lobby or campaign groups. While such groups should not necessarily be disregarded by the Met’s senior leaders, they are less important than the views of local citizens. To do this effectively the Met should invest in enabling every neighbourhood policing team to use app-based hyper-local polling tools within their local community to understand the issues which most concern local people. An example of this in action is the Zen-City platform, which has been used across the United States to positive effect¹⁵⁷https://zencity.io/zencity-for-law-enforcement/ .

By working closely with local people there is also the opportunity to secure greater public support for the tactical options deployed by officers in dealing with local crime and disorder problems. Policing rightly operates more intensively in communities where there is more crime. However, in doing so it is essential that the public’s support for the tactics used by officers is retained. By shifting beyond ‘policing by consent’ to ‘policing by co-operation’ there is the opportunity to significantly improve the public’s trust in and support for the tactics used by the Met.

There are too many examples where local officers are instructed by the Met’s ‘strategic centre’ to focus on issues which are wholly different to the issues that actually concern local people¹⁵⁸Meeting with BCU Commander, May 2022 . Even more perniciously are the examples where the police give the appearance of allowing local people the opportunity to select their local policing teams’ priorities when in reality the public’s opinion is then totally ignored¹⁵⁹Ibid . Whether by intention or incompetence such an approach is ultimately dishonest and likely to lead to a loss of trust in the police by local people. It must not continue.

Once the crime and disorder issues that most concern the public in their local area are identified it is critical that local neighbourhood policing teams focus predominantly on resolving those issues, even if those issues might be considered by many in policing to be too ‘low-level’ to be important. Officers should publish on at least a monthly basis the amount of time that they have spent on:

• the specific local crime and disorder priorities set by the public;
• general foot-patrol duties in ‘hot-spot’ areas; and
• local public confidence building activities;

compared with other non-priority activities, particularly activities away from their neighbourhood.

It is essential that officers take every possible opportunity to communicate with the public what they are doing to resolve the priority crime and disorder issues identified by local people. This ‘feedback loop’ is essential if the public are to be confident that the issues that concern them are being resolved. Using an adapted form of the ‘100 Day Impact Event’ model used on the Police Now Neighbourhood Graduate Leadership Programme¹⁶⁰Police Now, 8^th September 2016, link the officers on each neighbourhood policing team should present their work to the public every 100 days. This should be done in person and online to maximise the number of local people who can see the activity undertaken by the police and the impact that activity is having on crime and disorder in their local areas.

As with being a detective or firearms officer, being an effective neighbourhood police officer requires specialist training, skills and attributes. It is not a generic role which any officer can walk into without the right training. The Commissioner should invest in ensuring that every neighbourhood officer, new and existing, is trained to the highest standard with the ability to¹⁶¹S. Colover & P. Quinton (2018), Neighbourhood policing: impact and implementation – summary findings from a rapid evidence assessment, College of Policing, link :

1. Patrol in a way that increases the public’s confidence in local policing;
2. Use the tools which enable them to understand which crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour problems local people think are the most important to deal with;
3. Use problem solving techniques to resolve crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour problems; and
4. Communicate back to the public what has been achieved.

Task 3: A rapid, professional and transparent media response

Over the last five years the Met has been on the back foot when it comes to communicating with and responding to the public through both the traditional and social media. Beyond the nature of the events themselves, there are three reasons why this has been the case.

Firstly, the Met would, like many organisations, generally prefer to avoid the scrutiny of the media in the (potentially correct) expectation that in most cases issues such as officer misconduct can be resolved without ever being widely reported. As a result, the Met has not always sufficiently publicised (rather than merely published) information which might be damaging at the earliest opportunity. The impact of this is that when matters do eventually come to light the Met appears to be defensive or to have failed to have been honest with the public.

Secondly, there is the approach that until formal processes (such as misconduct investigations, independent inquiries or criminal trials) have been completed the Met should make almost no comment.

Finally, it is unfortunately the case that when senior officers are interviewed they can often appear to be defensive or unable to convey their message in terms which the public can easily understand. While they may be talented operational policing leaders, too many senior officers do not have the skills or sufficient media experience to communicate effectively through the media. This is, of course, not universal. Many of the interviews and briefings held in the immediate aftermath of the 2017 terrorist attacks, for example, were highly professional and are exemplars of how policing can approach such tasks.

Operation Hotton, examining officer misconduct at Charing Cross Police Station¹⁶²Independent Office for Police Conduct, Operation Hotton Learning Report (Feb 2022), link , is an example of these factors. The circumstances were known to senior leaders at New Scotland Yard and City Hall long before they entered the public domain. Publishing the details at an earlier stage alongside a detailed plan to deal with the issues revealed could have prevented the events which subsequently led to the departure of Dame Cressida Dick QPM as Commissioner of the Met¹⁶³See for example The Times (13^th February 2022), link .

Beyond the traditional broadcast and news media the proliferation of social media has transformed how the public obtain information. It is now common for videos of officers dealing with the public to be posted on social media¹⁶⁴See for example tweet by @sholmeslewis, link , often where officers are using force¹⁶⁵See for example tweet by @SholaMos1, link  . To an independent observer even the most professional use of force by a police officer can be distressing to witness¹⁶⁶Independent Police Complaints Commission, Police use of force: evidence from complaints, investigations and public perception (March 2016), link . It is not uncommon for videos of such incidents to be posted, alongside a commentary which suggests that the police may not have acted appropriately (as indeed may well be the case). A damaging and inaccurate narrative can become the dominant version of events even where the facts do not bear this out. When such material appears on social media the Met must rapidly provide information to the public.

The arrival of the Commissioner must herald a new way of working in how the Met communicates with the public through both traditional and social media. This new way of working should be predicated on a presumption of transparency and publicising (not merely publishing) information to the public at the earliest possible opportunity.

As the first step in professionalising communications to and through the media the Commissioner should appoint a spokesperson who provides daily briefings to the broadcast and press media on the Met’s work. For broadcast media these briefings should be on camera from the Met’s purpose-built media suite at New Scotland Yard. It is essential that this person has the skills and experience to be able to communicate with the public through the media across the full range of the Met’s strategic, performance, and day-to-day operational work. Daily briefings would establish the cadence for regular communication with the public through the media which has thus far been inadequate.

The appointment of a professional spokesperson does not preclude senior officers providing briefings to and answering questions from the media where this is appropriate. In particular, the appointment of a spokesperson should not be seen as a shield for the Commissioner to prevent them being held to account by the press. The Commissioner should commit to conducting interviews with the press and broadcast media on a regular basis where the issues that the Met faces and the progress against plans to deal with them are confronted.

A social media rapid response capability should be established within the Met in order that social media can be monitored 24 hours a day every day to identify any incidents within London where police officers are involved. Particularly in cases where there is footage of the incident or the suggestion that officers may have acted inappropriately the rapid response unit should take immediate steps to provide accurate and timely information to the public. At a minimum this should include (within minutes and hours rather than days and weeks):

• an immediate public acknowledgement of the incident;
• a detailed summary of the officers’ and witnesses’ version of events;
• officers’ body worn video footage;
• CCTV where it is available;
• links to relevant policies and data, for example concerning police use of force; and,
• a short video statement by a senior officer or the Commissioner’s spokesperson.

While the Met already publishes some use of force data¹⁶⁷Metropolitan Police Service Use of Force Dashboard, link , the Met should learn from the example provided by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) ¹⁶⁸LAPD Website, Critical Incident Videos, link . The LAPD publish detailed information on their use of force on their website, and in particular ‘officer involved shootings’. This includes publishing officers’ body worn video wherever possible. The Met should take a similar, although broader approach by publishing details of all use of force. This should include publishing officers’ body worn video footage wherever possible alongside links to use of force policies and the data and analysis which relates to use of force by officers.

Recommendations

Task 1: Rebuilding ward-based neighbourhood policing teams

1. The Commissioner must clearly articulate the importance of neighbourhood policing teams to the Met’s crime fighting and public confidence mission. This should be done on their first day in office.
2. The core activities of neighbourhood policing teams should be articulated within the Met, to the public, and to partner agencies. They should be:
   • Providing a visible uniformed policing presence on the streets.
   • Visibly tackling what local people perceive as being the most important crime and disorder issues in their area primarily through problem-solving techniques.
3. Neighbourhood policing teams in every ward should be repopulated to the levels previously seen in the early 2000s. This should include:
   • one Police Sergeant
   • two Police Constables
   • three Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) (or a further three Police Constables if there are currently insufficient PCSOs)
4. The Commissioner should take steps to prioritise Neighbourhood policing over other teams. Steps taken should include:
   • Officers posted to neighbourhood teams should be posted to those teams for a minimum of two years.
   • All uniformed constables and sergeants seeking promotion should have completed a minimum term on a neighbourhood policing team before being eligible for promotion. This should be a posting of at least one year.
   • Neighbourhood officers should not be classed as a ‘taskable’ resource to be deployed to ‘Outstanding Incidents¹⁶⁹‘Outstanding Incidents’ are the list of incidents originating from calls by the public to either 999 or 101 which still require police attendance ’. These incidents should be dealt with by Emergency Response Patrol Teams.
   • All officers posted to neighbourhood policing teams should be ring-fenced from any other duties with only the most serious exceptions. Exceptions should include the policing of New Year’s Eve and the Notting Hill Carnival, in addition to responding to very serious incidents such as terrorist attacks.
5. Police officers and PCSOs posted to neighbourhood policing teams should use mapping tools to show on social media where they are conducting patrols. Officers should spend a significant proportion of their time conducting foot-patrol.

Task 2: Giving the power to the people

1. Neighbourhood officers should present the impact of their work to the public every 100 days. This should be done in person and online so local people can see the activity undertaken by the police and the impact that activity is having on crime and disorder in their local areas.
2. Officers should publish on at least a monthly basis the amount of time that they have spent on key activities. These activities should include:
   • the specific local crime and disorder priorities set by the public;
   • general foot-patrol duties in ‘hot-spot’ areas; and
   • local public confidence building activities.
3. The Met should invest in and use app-based hyper-local polling tools. Local neighbourhood teams should use these to understand the crime and disorder issues which most concern local people.
4. The Commissioner should invest in ensuring that every neighbourhood officer, new and existing, is trained to the highest standard with delivering their vision of neighbourhood policing. This should include:
   • Patrolling in a way that increases the public’s confidence in local policing;
   • Using the tools which enable them to understand which crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour problems local people think are the most important to deal with;
   • Using problem solving techniques to resolve crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour problems; and
   • Communicating back to the public what has been achieved.

Task 3: A rapid, professional and transparent media response

1. The Commissioner should appoint a spokesperson who provides daily briefings to the media on the Met’s work. It is essential that this person has the skills and experience to be able to communicate across the full range of the Met’s strategic, performance, and day-to-day operational work.
2. The Commissioner should commit to conducting interviews with the press and broadcast media on a regular basis. This will provide an opportunity for the issues that the Met faces, and the progress against plans to deal with them, to be presented to the public on a regular basis.
3. A social media rapid response capability should be established within the Met. This will enable the Met to monitor social media 24 hours a day every day to identify any incidents within London where police officers are involved.
4. A rapid response media policy should be established to deal with incidents immediately when they appear on social media. At a minimum this should include (within minutes and hours rather than days and weeks):
   • an immediate public acknowledgement of the incident;
   • a detailed summary of the available officers’ and witnesses’ version of events;
   • officers’ body worn video footage;
   • CCTV where it is available;
   • links to relevant policies and data, for example concerning police use of force; and,
   • a short video statement by a senior police officer or the Commissioner’s spokesperson.
5. The Met should establish a detailed use of force database for public access. This should include officers’ body worn video footage, links to use of force policies and wider data on the use of force by police officers.

Next chapter

3.3 Police Officer Misconduct

“To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour, and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.”

There is no doubt that those who commit criminality or misconduct must be identified and dismissed from the police service without delay. It is similarly vital that officers who do not meet the standards of competence necessary to serve the public, yet fall short of the misconduct threshold, are dealt with effectively. It is essential to regaining and retaining the trust of the public that this is achieved.

There are an infinite number of reasons why police officers might commit misconduct. Yet despite the number of very serious cases which have come to public attention over recent years it is difficult to claim that this is due to an actual increase in police misconduct or criminality. There are however four elements related to the current issues around police conduct that are worthy of note.

Firstly, the increased involvement of legal professionals throughout the misconduct process adds considerable time, cost and complexity. This is a process which is ultimately seeking to determine whether an officer remains employed rather than a criminal justice or similar outcome.

Secondly, the bar to demonstrating incompetence or misconduct is too high. This is particularly in relation to officers who repeatedly commit ‘low-level’ misconduct or incompetence. Legislative changes have made it less likely that officers will enter the formal misconduct process than they might previously have done. The initial recruitment and training processes to ensure that only those who meet the standards necessary to serve the public to a high standard are inadequate. It takes far too long to deal with those who commit misconduct or are incompetent¹⁷⁰House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee, Police Conduct and Complaints, 23^rd Feb 2022, link

Thirdly, as a response to reductions in real terms police funding during the 2010s and the increasing numbers of constables joining the Met under the Police Uplift Programme, supervision ratios at some ranks within the Met have increased. There are now fewer sergeants supervising more constables and so less intensive day-to-day scrutiny of frontline officers by line managers¹⁷¹Metropolitan Police Service, Workforce Data Report, May 2022, link & Home Office, Police Workforce, England & Wales, 31^st March 2016, link . As a result there is a lower likelihood of misconduct or incompetence being identified at an early stage, and when issues are identified there is a lower likelihood that those issues will be dealt with effectively.

Finally, the increased prevalence of social media means that views or behaviour which might once have been private or unprovable are now neither. Where once colleagues might express views or admit to unprofessional behaviour to one another in private, they are now doing so on WhatsApp groups. Social media and messaging apps provide a permanent and auditable record which did not previously exist. The behaviour and attitudes of the officers investigated by Operation Hotton are examples where officers might never have been identified twenty years ago¹⁷²Independent Office for Police Conduct, Operation Hotton Learning Report (Feb 2022), link .

Task 1: Setting the standard

The next Commissioner must take an unequivocal stance in relation to police misconduct with nothing short of a zero-tolerance attitude to criminality and unlawful discrimination by officers. They should commit to rooting out, by all means necessary, those officers and staff who are likely to damage the public’s confidence in policing by acting in a manner which does not meet the standards expected of those in policing. On their first day in office the Commissioner should clearly articulate how they intend to address the issues raised around police officer misconduct. Decades on from Sir Robert Mark’s commitment as Commissioner to rooting out corruption in the Met, he is now lauded for his achievements¹⁷³The Times (2^nd October 2010), link . The next Commissioner’s task is no less vital.

There are currently a series of reviews underway examining issues related to standards, conduct, and culture in the Met:

• the Home Office sponsored independent inquiry by Dame Elish Angiolini DBE QC into the matters arising from the abduction, rape and murder of Sarah Everard¹⁷⁴Home Office, Angiolini Inquiry Terms of Reference (2^nd February 2021), link ;
• a Metropolitan Police sponsored review of the force’s culture and standards of behaviour, led by Baroness Louise Casey of Blackstock DBE CB¹⁷⁵Metropolitan Police Service, Baroness Casey External Review Terms of Reference, link ;
• several investigations of allegations of misconduct by the Independent Office for Police Conduct¹⁷⁶Independent Office for Police Conduct Statement (10^th March 2021), link ; and
• a thematic inspection by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services of vetting and counter-corruption arrangements¹⁷⁷Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, Inspection of capability and capacity to vet and monitor officers and staff (20^th December 2021), link .

Whilst it is ultimately the Commissioner who is responsible for driving the changes required across the Met it is incumbent on those who are involved in the various reviews to give the Commissioner the best possible chance of success. Wherever possible those leading reviews should provide a public report (if necessary an interim report) within the Commissioner’s first 100 days in office. The Met should simultaneously provide their response and plan to deal with the issues identified. Given it is almost inevitable that other serious misconduct or performance issues will come to the fore in the early stages of the next Commissioner’s term it is essential that these are made public at the earliest opportunity.

Police regulations are the series of statutory instruments which govern all aspects of the terms and conditions of police officers’ employment¹⁷⁸Police Regulations 2003, link . This includes the processes governing police officer misconduct¹⁷⁹Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020, link . Given they are governed by police regulations, changing the misconduct hearing process is beyond the scope of the Commissioner alone to change. However, given the significant public concern regarding the conduct of police officers the Commissioner should request that the government review the regulations relating to police officer misconduct. The government should urgently consider two immediate changes to reverse the increasing involvement of legal professionals in the police misconduct process in order to reduce the time, cost and complexity involved.

Firstly, in misconduct hearings which might lead to the dismissal of a police officer the panel must currently be led by a Legally Qualified Chair. Appointed by the Police and Crime Commissioner, Legally Qualified Chairs must be eligible under the conditions for judicial appointments¹⁸⁰Section 50 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, link . The introduction of Legally Qualified Chairs in misconduct hearings has led to the Commissioner being unable to dismiss officers, even if they might believe it is necessary to do so to retain the public’s confidence in the police service¹⁸¹Section 28 Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020, link . Having been introduced¹⁸²Section 5 Police (Conduct) (Amendment) Regulations 2015, link with the aim of increasing the public’s confidence in the police misconduct process, they are an experiment which has had the opposite effect and must be reversed.

Secondly, according to police regulations both officers and forces are entitled to be legally represented at misconduct hearings¹⁸³Section 7 Police (Conduct) Regulations 2008, link . Misconduct hearings are ultimately to determine whether an officer should remain appointed as a police officer. A more proportionate approach would be to remove legal representatives from the process entirely and for officers to be represented by the Police Federation. This would reduce the considerable cost and complexity inherent in what has unnecessarily become a quasi-judicial process. Such a shift would not preclude police officers subsequently pursuing matters through the employment tribunal process, with legal representation should they subsequently wish to do so.

Currently the vetting of police officers is primarily completed when individuals join the police service with only limited further reviews throughout an individual’s career. The police vetting process should be overhauled in order that a significant number of individuals are selected to be re-vetted on an annual basis. In these cases the vetting process should also include interviews with officers’ colleagues and members of the public that the officer has dealt with, the dip sampling of electronic records and detailed reviews of officers’ social media platforms. As part of ongoing vetting there should also be the option to utilise psychological screening tools, with further research required to ascertain their effectiveness. Every police officer should be subject to random drug testing on at least an annual basis.

Task 2: Applying ‘broken windows’ to misconduct

Dealing effectively with ‘low-level’ conduct issues by police officers is essential to preventing more serious instances of misconduct in the future. Frequently, had less serious matters been dealt with at an earlier stage it is perfectly possible that the subsequent more serious issues which then arise could have been prevented. Additionally, where one officer’s misconduct or incompetence is not dealt with effectively, this increases the risk of other officers on the same team falling below the required standards. Too often these types of lower-level or borderline issues are not dealt with effectively by line managers¹⁸⁴Meetings with Detective Chief Inspector, Met Chief Inspector, Met Detective Inspector, Met Inspector, March 2022 .

Recent changes to police regulations have introduced the ‘Reflective Practice’ process. This process is now used to deal with underperformance or conduct which may just fall short of the misconduct threshold yet remains below of the expectations of the public¹⁸⁵Home Office (2020), Conduct, Efficiency and Effectiveness: Statutory Guidance on Professional Standards, Performance and Integrity in Policing, link . In such circumstances the intention is to remove from the formal misconduct process those individuals and issues which involve mistakes, poor judgement, or low levels of conduct. In such cases officers discuss their failing with a supervisor and reflect upon it, without there being a misconduct finding against them. While the introduction of the ‘Reflective Practice’ regime is a positive change, it is essential that it is used in the right circumstances. There is a significant risk that too many cases which should be dealt with as misconduct or under-performance are dealt with through the ‘Reflective Practice’ process. Should officers be able to receive multiple opportunities for ‘Reflective Practice’ without these then being used in subsequent misconduct proceedings, this could then lead to officers who should no longer be serving as police officers being retained. This must be prevented.

For officers at the start of their careers the training school environment can provide an ideal opportunity to examine whether individuals demonstrate the appropriate behaviours and attitudes to then go on to serve the public. The current processes do not maximise these opportunities and should be overhauled so as to prevent unsuitable individuals moving from a training to an operational environment. This should include Professional Standards investigators being permanently attached to all initial police officer training environments to enable processes to be undertaken and concluded at speed. The performance and conduct standard for failing to complete the training phase and moving to operational duties should be significantly increased.

The Commissioner’s expectations of frontline leaders in dealing with minor conduct or competence issues should be articulated without delay. Frontline sergeants and inspectors should receive training as to the standards expected of officers. Local Professional Standards Units should be reviewed to ensure that they are themselves staffed by savvy and professional investigators who are determined to deal effectively with the even low-level performance and conduct issues which arise.

Task 3: Expanding public insight and community inspection

Providing the public and local communities with a greater insight into police tactics and conduct is essential to regaining the public’s trust in the Met. The Met has over recent years expanded its ‘ride-along’ programme in order that members of the public are able to join officers on patrol¹⁸⁶Metropolitan Police Service, Ride Along Scheme, link . Similarly, the Met has recently introduced its ‘Walk and Talk’ scheme for women who would like to discuss their views on women’s safety in the local area with a police officer¹⁸⁷Metropolitan Police Service, Walk and Talk Scheme, link . While beneficial, members of the public joining these schemes are scheduled in advance with the officers conducting these schemes carefully selected by the Met’s leadership teams.

Over the last forty years a series of interventions have led to significant improvements in the treatment of those who are detained in police custody¹⁸⁸L. Skinns et al (2015), Preliminary findings on police custody delivery in the twenty-first century: Is it ‘good’ enough?, Policing and Society, Vol 27 (4), link . Amongst these changes have been the introduction of Independent Custody Visitors. Independent Custody Visitors are appropriately vetted volunteers from the local community who visit police stations unannounced to check on the treatment and welfare of those held in police custody¹⁸⁹Independent Custody Visiting Association, link . It is only in the most exceptional circumstances that Independent Custody Visitors can be delayed in gaining access to custody suites.

The independent visitor scheme should be expanded beyond custody suites to other parts of policing. With appropriate vetting, members of local communities could be permitted access to police stations and other buildings across the Met enabling them to visit canteens, observe team briefings, and conduct ‘ride- alongs’ without prior notice. Under such a scheme all independent visitor reports should be made available to the public.

Expanding the independent visitor scheme to more of the Met would have multiple effects. Firstly, the conduct of police officers would improve given the potential for added external scrutiny. Secondly, there would be an increase in local community reassurance that police officers’ conduct was meeting the necessary standard. Finally, there is evidence to suggest that the more the public feel informed about policing the more positive the public’s views on policing effectiveness¹⁹⁰Bradford et al (2009), Contact and Confidence: Revisiting the Impact of Public Encounters with the Police, Policing and Society, Vol 19 (1), link .

The National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing have recently published their draft Plan of Action on Inclusion and Race¹⁹¹National Police Chiefs’ Council & College of Policing (2022), Police Race Action Plan: Improving policing for black people, link . The Commissioner must review the Met’s own plans to ensure that they are fit for purpose in relation to the policing of London. In particular, the Commissioner should take care not to be drawn into the debate over whether the Met and British policing more widely is or is not ‘institutionally racist’. Although a debate which has dominated policing for over twenty years, the terminology itself is widely misunderstood and remains politically contested¹⁹²Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities: The Report (2022), link . It risks undermining the morale of officers who continue to serve honourably and alienating the next generation of young men and women from considering a policing career. Prioritising this question risks diverting the leadership of the Met from the most critical issue – ensuring that any plans ultimately contribute to preventing what is one of the cruellest disproportionalities in our society, that if you are black you are more than five times more likely to be killed than if you are white¹⁹³Office for National Statistics, Homicide in England and Wales 2021, (10^th February 2022), link .

As part of the work to increase black people’s confidence in policing the Race Action Plan makes a commitment to ‘Explain or Reform’ where disparities exist. There is opportunity in such an approach, however significant work is required within the Met to ensure that this contributes to the fight against crime and disorder, ultimately leading to safer communities for Londoners. There is a risk currently in the approach leading to ill-thought through and perverse outcomes.

The Explain element will require three significant developments within the Met. Firstly, the primary focus in such an approach should be on how to reduce the disproportionately high number of black men being killed or maimed on London’s streets. Secondly, the Met will need to improve its capacity to better understand and analyse their own data. Finally, the Met will need to be genuinely willing to be transparent and share that data and analysis with the public. Reports cannot, as they currently do, remain secret awaiting a Freedom of Information request.

The Met already conducts detailed analysis in relation to matters surrounding effectiveness of police tactics and whether their use is disproportionate. In one example, a recent publication by the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime stated that analysis by the Met’s Strategic Insights Unit found that,

“black Londoners (compared with their share of London’s population) disproportionately experience Taser – but when accounting for other factors (like the presence of a weapon) the analysis found that Taser armed officers were no more likely to use Taser on a black Londoner than a white Londoner in encounters where any use of force (i.e. including handcuffs) occurred”¹⁹⁴Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime London, Policing and Crime: An evidence base for London, November 2021, link .

Given the level of insight available and the potential to provide insight on how the Met police can be most effective in combatting the scourge of serious violence on the streets of London, the Met’s Strategic Insights Unit’s existing analytical products should be published at the earliest opportunity. As part of developing the Met’s understanding of what works in tackling violent crime the capacity of the Met’s Strategic Insight Unit should be increased in order that the most effective tactics can be identified and rapidly deployed across London at the earliest opportunity.

Using the Met’s existing Use of Force Dashboard as a model a further dashboard should be created to provide the public with data on police conduct and public complaints relating to police officers¹⁹⁵Metropolitan Police Service, Use of Force Dashboard, link.

In terms of Reform the focus should be on how to effectively combat the violence which leads to the disproportionate deaths of young black men on London’s streets. Key will be how the Met works with the public to identify and obtain support for tactics to combat violent crime. Three steps are required. Firstly, no longer can decisions about police tactics be made in isolation by the police or with only a small number of elites, be they local Independent Advisory Groups or national oversight panels. A wide range of local people must be consulted. Secondly, there should be a presumption that crime trends and the tactical options available are openly shared with local communities. Finally, while policing rightly operates more intensively in communities where there is more crime, deciding which tactics to deploy should be done in concert with people who live in those communities wherever possible. Although Peel’s ‘policing by consent’ was never just about the public passively accepting policing tactics, to be effective modern policing must move beyond consent towards ‘policing by co-operation’.

Recommendations

Task 1: Setting the standard

1. The Commissioner must take an unequivocal stance in relation to police misconduct with nothing short of a zero-tolerance attitude to criminality and unlawful discrimination by officers. On their first day in office the Commissioner should clearly articulate how they intend to address the issues raised around police officer misconduct.
2. Wherever possible those leading reviews into the Met should provide a public report (an interim report if need be) within the Commissioner’s first 100 days in office. The Met should simultaneously provide their response and plan to deal with the issues identified.
3. The government should review the regulations relating to police officer misconduct. The government should urgently consider two immediate changes to removing the role of Legally Qualified Chairs and the involvement of legal advisers at misconduct hearings.
4. The police vetting process should be overhauled in order that a significant number of officers are selected to be re-vetted on an annual basis. This should include interviews with officers’ colleagues and members of the public that the officer has dealt with, the dip sampling of electronic records and detailed reviews of officers’ social media platforms. Every police officer should be subject to random drug testing on at least an annual basis.
5. Further research should be undertaken to ascertain the effectiveness of psychological screening for vetting purposes.

Task 2: Applying ‘broken windows’ to misconduct

1. The Commissioner’s expectations of frontline leaders in dealing with minor conduct or competence issues should be articulated without delay. Sergeants and inspectors should receive training as to the standards expected and the importance of dealing with officers who repeatedly fail to achieve the necessary standards of conduct or competence.
2. Local Professional Standards Units should be reviewed to ensure that they are staffed by savvy and professional investigators. Local Professional Standards Units should focus on dealing effectively with officers who have repeated low-level performance and conduct issues.
3. Officers who are repeatedly subject to ‘Reflective Practice’ should be progressed to formal misconduct hearings for collective failings rather than waiting for a single more serious act of misconduct.
4. The performance and conduct standard for officers to complete the initial police officer training phase and moving to operational duties should be significantly increased. Professional Standards investigators should be permanently attached to training environments to enable processes to be undertaken and concluded at speed.

Task 3: Expanding public insight and community inspection

1. The Commissioner must review the Met’s own plans linked to the Race Action Plan to ensure that they are fit for purpose in relation to the policing of London. The focus should be on ensuring that any plans ultimately contribute to preventing what is one of the cruellest disproportionalities in our society – that if you are black you are more than five times more likely to be killed than if you are white.
2. The Commissioner should take care not to be drawn into the debate over whether the Met and British policing more widely is or is not ‘institutionally racist’. The terminology itself is widely misunderstood and remains politically contested.
3. The Met’s Strategic Insights Unit’s existing analytical products on the effectiveness and disproportionate use of police tactics should be published at the earliest opportunity. As part of developing the Met’s understanding of what works in tackling violent crime the capacity of the Met’s Strategic Insight Unit should also be increased in order that the most effective tactics can be identified.
4. A dashboard should be created to provide the public with data on police conduct and public complaints relating to police officers. The Met’s existing Use of Force Dashboard should be used as a model.
5. The Met should do more to consult with people in London’s communities on the tactics the Met should use to combat serious violence on London’s streets. The focus should be on working with local communities directly rather than working with elite groups including independent advisory groups or oversight panels.
6. The independent visitor scheme should be expanded beyond custody suites to other parts of policing. With appropriate vetting, members of local communities could be permitted access to police stations and other buildings across the Met enabling them to visit canteens, observe team briefings, and conduct ‘ride- alongs’ without prior notice.

Next chapter

4. Conclusion: Beyond the 100 Days

We should be in no doubt of the scale of the challenge. The next Commissioner will take over one of the biggest jobs in public service at a time when the Met has been repeatedly rocked by crisis. Few of his recent predecessors have left with their reputations enhanced by their time in the role. Londoners’ confidence in whether the police in their local area are doing a good job is the lowest on record.

Despite the challenges the Met faces, the central thesis to this report is that ‘Policing Can Win’ over those who would commit crime and disorder in our communities. By following the recommendations outlined in this report the officers and staff of the Met will be able to do so.

The Commissioner and his senior leadership team cannot do this alone. From City Hall to the Home Office, from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary to the Independent Office for Police Conduct. Each organisation and the people leading them have a role to play in the Met’s turnaround. Their constructive support will be essential.

The changes articulated in this report are merely the beginning of what is required. Beyond the first 100 days, and beyond the issues outlined in this report, the Commissioner will then need to make significant progress on a range of other issues. They include overhauling the Met’s technology to aid officers and staff in the fight against crime and disorder; establishing a plan to tackle the massive increase in fraud, with one in nine people now falling victim to fraudsters every year; and reversing the shortfall in applicants to fill the Met’s uniformed police officer vacancies.

For at least the next five years the Met will be undergoing a transformation to regain the trust and confidence of the public. It is only by securing the trust and confidence of the public that the Met can fulfil the promise of the ‘Peelian Principles’ on which British policing has been based for nearly 200 years.

Historically British policing has been the standard bearer for policing excellence around the world. It can be again. There are few more important tasks in public service leadership today than successfully turning the Met around.

Londoners are relying on the next Commissioner to succeed.