

'Policing Can Win'

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The new Met Commissioner's First 100 Days

David Spencer

Foreword by William J. Bratton CBE

& Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington



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The 'Peelian' Principles of Policing¹

1. To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and severity of legal punishment.
2. To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour, and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.
3. To recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing observance of laws.
4. To recognise always that the extent to which the co-operation of the public can be secured diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives.
5. To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion, but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humour, and by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.
6. To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public co-operation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order, and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.
7. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.
8. To recognise always the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and to refrain from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary of avenging individuals or the State, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty.
9. To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.

¹The 'Peelian' Principles of Policing are often considered the fundamentals on which British policing is based. They first appeared as an appendix to *A New Study of Police History* by Charles Reith (1956). For more on their creation see S. Lentz & R. Chaires (2007), [link](#)

About the Author

David Spencer joined [Policy Exchange](#) as the Head of Crime & Justice in April 2022.

David was previously a police officer with the [Metropolitan Police Service](#), joining in 2003. After serving in uniformed and detective roles he was posted to Waltham Forest, East London in 2010 as the Detective Inspector responsible for combatting robbery and burglary. After many years of increasing robbery and burglary rates Waltham Forest was, under David's leadership, the only London borough to deliver three consecutive years of reductions in both crime types. During this time, he also led the local investigative response to the aftermath of the 2011 riots.

Appointed to a Detective Chief Inspector role in 2013 David took responsibility for tackling gang crime, drug supply and violent street crime. As an experienced detective, he regularly led the immediate response to the most serious offences and critical incidents. This included being the senior detective on-call for North London leading the initial investigative response to murders, kidnaps, high-risk missing persons, arsons, armed robberies and active threats to life.

After first proposing the idea for [Police Now](#) in 2013 while still undertaking his operational role, David was the driving force for the creation of this multi-award-winning national organisation. In 2016 he led the spin-out of Police Now from the Metropolitan Police Service to become an independent social enterprise. During his tenure Police Now established itself as one of the UK's Top 30 graduate recruiters and consistently delivered the most diverse cohort of officers joining the police service. Under his leadership Police Now's two leadership programmes brought nearly 2,500 highly qualified graduates into policing over half of whom would not otherwise have applied for a policing career.

David's formal qualifications include an under-graduate business degree, a master's degree in US politics, and a research master's degree in British politics. He has also undertaken executive education programmes at London Business School and the University of Oxford Business School.

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Foreword

William J. Bratton CBE, former Commissioner of the New York Police Department and former Chief of Police of the Los Angeles Police Department

Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service

British policing is in crisis. That one in seven of the 43 police forces of England and Wales have now been placed in ‘special measures’ by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate should act as a stark wake-up call for Britain’s political and policing leaders.

Whether in the UK or the USA, policing is no stranger to crisis. While the nature of the work means no police department could ever be entirely free of controversy, this report demonstrates the scale of the challenge the next Commissioner faces. Collapsing public confidence. A non-existent performance regime. Acts of the most serious criminality, misconduct or incompetence by police officers. Many of the extraordinary challenges described here are common to the policing profession in both the UK and the USA. Nothing less than an urgent and major turnaround of the Met is required.

Despite this, the Metropolitan Police Service remains the most iconic policing organisation in the world, second to none. Recognised globally for its rich history, the Met and New Scotland Yard has been at the forefront of fighting crime and keeping the public safe for nearly 200 years. With the right leadership the Met can return to its rightful place among the global law enforcement elite. Sir Mark Rowley’s appointment as the next Commissioner gives the Met the chance it needs. Out of many crises come many opportunities to create positive, impactful changes.

Over the coming months the Commissioner will need the freedom to put in place his own senior team that can drive a program of far-reaching reform. A new team of local police commanders, that are relentless in driving down crime and disorder, must be appointed. In his first days in the job the Commissioner will need to lay out his vision for how they are going to take the fight to those that bring crime and disorder to London’s neighbourhoods. Holding local police leaders to account through the Met’s own version of CompStat will be essential to turning back the tide of crime and disorder.

The principles of policing established by Sir Robert Peel nearly 200 years ago, and quoted at the start of this report, must remain the foundation of all police work. Renewing the concept of ‘Policing by Consent’ in London is essential to regaining the public’s confidence in the Met. To do this the Commissioner will need to rebuild rapidly local neighbourhood

policing. The 'low-level' crime and disorder which blights the lives of those living in London's communities needs to be taken seriously. The aggressive beggar, the anti-social neighbours and the prolific shoplifters, cannot be ignored. The Commissioner will need to prove to the people of London that under his leadership every single act of crime or disorder matters, every individual matters, and every neighbourhood matters. He will need to commit the Met to creating collaboratively with the public safe neighbourhoods everywhere, for everyone in London.

Last year the number of teenagers killed on London's streets was the highest since modern records began. Despite this, the number of stop and searches conducted by officers on the streets of London was 41% lower in July 2022 than in July 2020. Some of the police tactics to combat violent crime are not without controversy. Police officers on patrol must use them with care. Maintaining the public's trust and confidence in those tactics is critical. To retain and build that public confidence the Met must work harder to involve local residents in the decisions on how they use the tactics available to tackle violent crime. In the United States and the United Kingdom that philosophy is known as Community or Neighbourhood Policing.

The ability of the police to keep people safe and enforce the law relies on the public's belief that individual police officers and the Met as an institution can be trusted. You cannot break the law to enforce the law. The new Commissioner and his leadership team must work with the vast majority of hard-working and honest police officers to tackle head-on the elements of the Met's culture that permits criminality, serious misconduct or incompetence. As part of doing this the Commissioner will need to work relentlessly to improve the quality of training for new and experienced police officers. To get the best out of those who have the honour of leading the men and women of the Met, the very best in leadership development will be required. Officers must be able to access the knowledge of what is proven to work in combatting crime and disorder in London's neighbourhoods. Every officer needs a clear understanding of the law and the powers the law gives them. At every level of police leadership, officers must not feel inappropriately constrained by legislation such as the Human Rights Act, from taking the actions needed to combat crime and disorder, whether deployed on patrol or policing large-scale public order events.

Policing often finds itself having to navigate those situations where our nations and societies are most fractured. The only way different communities can have faith that the police are doing so fairly is if the public are confident that police officers are acting with unimpeachable impartiality, and humanity. Even a perception that an officer's decision making might be influenced by a partisan political view could be damaging to the public's confidence that policing is being done fairly. That recent polling in the UK found that, "the public were almost twice as likely to agree than disagree with the statement that 'the police are more interested in being woke than solving crimes'" should concern us all.

The Commissioner and the men and women of the Met cannot do it alone. Police chiefs expect to be held to account by the public and their elected representatives. However, for too long politicians of every stripe have criticised from the side-lines. Whether in public speeches, media interviews or anonymous briefings by advisors, it needs to stop. Every single elected official needs to get behind the Commissioner and his team. The scale of the challenge means that change won't happen overnight. As the Commissioner starts to take the action needed, it is unfortunately inevitable, as with any turnaround in any field, that more stories of bad behaviour and poor performance will come out. But reflexive tough-talking by politicians won't help. Politicians need to give the Commissioner the time and support he needs to get the job done.

From Sir Mark's first day as Commissioner, we are confident that he will articulate his vision for turning around the Met in a way that every single member of the Met and the people of London can get behind. Over his first 100 days real progress will need to be demonstrated. From the moment Sir Mark starts his tenure as Commissioner the pressure and scrutiny will be relentless. The men and women of the Met, working with the public, need to fight for every street, every neighbourhood, every borough across London. Together they can win the struggle against crime and disorder by adhering to Winston Churchill's words – "Never Give In, Never Give In, Never Give In".

To take the name of this report, the police officers on London's streets will need to believe, and will need to convince the public, that 'Policing Can Win'. By following the recommendations outlined in David Spencer's extraordinary report, coupled with his own vision, Sir Mark's Rowley's time as Commissioner will get off to the right start.

Executive Summary

The Metropolitan Police Service is in a state of permanent crisis. The Met is the UK's largest police force, with an annual budget of over £3.2 billion¹ and made up of over 46,000 police officers and staff. The force's primary mission is to keep safe the 9 million people who call London home along with the 30 million visitors to the capital every year. Also tasked with the fight against terrorism the Met has officers posted across the country and around the world.

Sir Mark Rowley QPM has been appointed as the next Commissioner with the task of executing one of the largest ever turnaround programmes in British public service. He takes over the Met at a time of crumbling public confidence, falling levels of crime detection and regularly reported acts of shocking misconduct and criminality by officers.

The Met's withdrawal from the streets is encapsulated by significantly reduced numbers of officers working in ward-based neighbourhood policing roles. The performance regime for dealing with the crime and anti-social behaviour that most concerns the public in their local areas is almost non-existent.

With the right leadership, however, there could be reasons for optimism. The Met's ability to police large events such as the celebrations for Her Majesty The Queen's Platinum Jubilee is remarkable. The Met's response to terrorist attacks and the ability to combat serious and organised crime is impressive. The Met's success at investigating the most serious criminality is almost unparalleled, with 93% of homicides in London solved in the five years between 2016 and 2020².

The central thesis to this report is that 'Policing Can Win' over those who would commit crime and disorder in our communities. In addition to summarising the core issues the Met has faced over the last five years, this report sets out the three areas where substantial changes must be made:

- 1. Leadership at Every Level:** Providing the leadership that the officers and staff of the Met need to effectively fight crime and keep the public safe.
- 2. Fighting Crime and Reconnecting with the Public:** Only by renewing the tradition of 'policing by consent' by working closely with the public will the police be successful in retaining the public's confidence, fighting crime and disorder, and keeping the public safe.
- 3. Police Officer Conduct and Competence:** Eliminating from policing those who are incompetent or would break the public's trust in policing by committing criminality, unlawful discrimination or serious misconduct.

1. Home Office, Police Grant Report 2022 to 2023 (England and Wales), [link](#)

2. Metropolitan Police Service, Homicide Dashboard, [link](#)

During and by the end of Sir Mark Rowley's first 100 days as Commissioner, things need to feel different. Different to the men and women of the Met, different to those who hold the Commissioner to account, and most importantly different to Londoners.

Whatever its failings, British policing remains a standard bearer of excellence around the world. One of the reasons for this is the men and women who make up the Met. They regularly demonstrate conspicuous bravery and commitment. Where others sit on the side-lines these remarkable men and women face the most extraordinary challenges and, at times, mortal danger. Sir Mark Rowley now has the honour of leading them. He takes on one of the biggest leadership challenges of modern times.

This report acts as a blueprint for Sir Mark Rowley's first 100 days as Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.

1. Introduction

The primary mission of the Metropolitan Police Service is to keep safe the 9 million people who call London home along with the 30 million visitors to the capital every year. Tasked with the fight against terrorism the Met also has officers posted across the country and around the globe. With an annual budget of over £3.2 billion³ and made up of over 34,000 police officers, 14,000 staff, and hundreds of volunteers the Met is by far the UK's biggest police force⁴.

Over recent years we have seen the Met at its best. The Met's ability to police large events such as the celebrations for Her Majesty The Queen's Platinum Jubilee, one of the largest policing operations ever seen in the United Kingdom is remarkable. The Met's response to terrorism, such as the 2017 attacks in Westminster, London Bridge, Finsbury Park, and Parsons Green are exemplars of courage and professionalism. The Met's ability to investigate serious criminality is almost unparalleled, with 93% of homicides in London solved in the five years between 2016 and 2020⁵.

But we have also seen the Met at its worst. Acts of shocking criminality and misconduct by officers, crumbling public confidence, and falling levels of performance on crime and anti-social behaviour. Frequently it has not been the event itself that has led to the strongest criticism but rather the Met's response, entirely within the control of senior leaders, which has drawn the greatest opprobrium. Too often the Met has found itself being accused of being defensive, tone deaf, or simply ineffective in its response to events.

There should be no illusion about the scale of the challenge facing the next Commissioner. Once described as one of the pre-eminent policing leaders of her generation⁶, Dame Cressida Dick QPM resigned having lost the confidence of the Mayor of London⁷. The recently published report by the former Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Sir Tom Winsor, highlights the fevered political atmosphere that the Commissioner operates within⁸.

Following the departure of the last Commissioner in April 2022 the Home Secretary announced the process to identify her successor⁹. The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis is appointed by Her Majesty The Queen, based on the recommendation of the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary must also have regard to any recommendation by the London Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime¹⁰. In July 2022 it was announced that Sir Mark Rowley QPM had been appointed as the next Commissioner of the Met. He starts his term of office on the 12th September 2022.

Sir Mark is a highly experienced police leader. Joining West Midlands Police as a police constable in 1987 he went on to be Chief Constable

3. Home Office, Police Grant Report 2022 to 2023 (England and Wales), [link](#)
4. Metropolitan Police Service, Workforce Data Report, June 2022, [link](#)
5. Metropolitan Police Service, Homicide Dashboard, [link](#)
6. The Guardian (14th March 2021), [link](#)
7. Mayor of London, Mayoral Statement on the Met Commissioner (10th February 2022), [link](#)
8. T. Winsor, Special commission on the resignation of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (24th August 2022), Home Office, [link](#)
9. Home Office, Recruitment Information Pack – Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service (13th April 2022), [link](#)
10. Section 42 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, [link](#)

of Surrey Police (2009-2011) and in 2011 was appointed as Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations with the Metropolitan Police Service. In that role, until his retirement in 2018, he led national counter-terrorism policing and was a member of the Met's management board.

Against the backdrop of the last five years Sir Mark Rowley will now lead one of the most substantial public service turnaround operations ever undertaken. He will need to be willing to make a conspicuous break from the past and enact a substantial programme of reform.

This report seeks to give Sir Mark Rowley, as he takes up his post as the new Commissioner, a head start.

2. The Last Five Years


There are five areas where the Met has faced the most significant challenge and criticism over the last five years. This section of the report summarises the key issues across each.

- i. The public's confidence in policing
- ii. Serious criminality and misconduct by police officers
- iii. Crime performance
- iv. Protest and public order
- v. Race and policing

The Public's Confidence in Policing

In the three years between March 2015 and March 2018 the proportion of Londoners who answered yes to whether the police were doing a good job in their local area was relatively stable at around 68%¹¹. From March 2018 that figure started to precipitously decline. By March 2022 less than half of Londoners believed that the police in their local area were doing a good job¹².

The proportion of respondents that agree that "the police in my local area do a good job" (March 2015 - March 2022)



Source: Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime¹³

Central to this has been the hollowing out of neighbourhood policing with significant reductions in both police officer and police community support officer (PCSO) headcounts within ward-based neighbourhood policing teams¹⁴.

11. Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime, Public Voice Dashboard, [link](#)

12. Ibid

13. Ibid

14. Metropolitan Police Service, Workforce Data Report, May 2021 & June 2022, [link](#)

The public's confidence in whether the police are doing a good job is more than just a glorified customer satisfaction rate. It is central to whether the police can be effective at fighting crime and keeping the public safe. There is a large body of evidence which demonstrates that where people have higher trust and confidence in the police they are more likely to come forward with information or intelligence, are more likely to obey the law, and are more likely to defer to police authority¹⁵.

The precipitous decline in the public's confidence over the last five years should be of deep concern to the leadership in both City Hall and New Scotland Yard. Everything the Commissioner does over the next year and beyond must be judged on whether it is likely to contribute to reversing the substantial decline in the public's confidence in the Met over the last five years. The public's confidence in the Met is the primary metric against which Sir Mark Rowley's term as Commissioner should be judged.

Serious Criminality and Misconduct by Police Officers

Whilst most police officers serve with integrity and act consistently in line with the standards expected of them by the public, this is not universally the case. The impact of a series of high-profile cases on the public's trust and confidence in the Met, and policing more broadly, has been significant.

No case stands out more than the abhorrent crimes committed by the serving Metropolitan Police officer who murdered Sarah Everard in March 2021. His actions were a betrayal of everything the public expect of those in policing and everything those who serve honourably in policing stand for.

Several reviews have been commissioned as a result and are now at different stages of enquiry and report:

- the Home Office sponsored independent inquiry by Dame Elish Angiolini DBE QC into the matters arising from the abduction, rape and murder of Sarah Everard¹⁶;
- a Metropolitan Police sponsored review of the force's culture and standards of behaviour, led by Baroness Louise Casey of Blackstock DBE CB¹⁷;
- several investigations of allegations of misconduct by the Independent Office for Police Conduct¹⁸; and
- a thematic inspection by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services of vetting and counter-corruption arrangements¹⁹.

In December 2021 two police officers were convicted of misconduct in a public office and sentenced to terms of imprisonment after it was discovered that they had taken and shared photographs of the murdered sisters Bibaa Henry and Nicole Smallman at a crime scene they were supposed to be guarding²⁰. Their mother, Rev. Mina Smallman, has been deeply critical of the Met and called for the resignation of the Dame Cressida Dick as Met Commissioner²¹.

15. E. Stanko & B. Bradford (2009), Beyond Measuring 'How Good a Job' Police are Doing: The MPS Model of Confidence in Policing, Policing, Volume 3 (4), pp. 322–330, [link](#)

16. The Angiolini Independent Inquiry, [link](#)

17. Metropolitan Police Service, Baroness Casey External Review Terms of Reference, [link](#)

18. Independent Office for Police Conduct Statement (10th March 2021), [link](#)

19. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, Inspection of capability and capacity to vet and monitor officers and staff (20th December 2021), [link](#)

20. R v Deniz Jaffer and Jamie Lewis, Sentencing Remarks (6th December 2021), [link](#)

21. BBC News (2nd November 2021), [link](#)

In December 2021 an inquest jury found that mistakes by officers may have contributed to the deaths of Daniel Whitworth, Jack Taylor and Gabriel Kovari in East London²². They, along with Anthony Walgate, were murdered in 2014 and 2015. The Independent Office for Police Conduct has now reopened the investigation into the original police investigations²³. It has been alleged by some of the victim's families that homophobia was a factor in the Met's failings²⁴.

In February 2022 the Independent Office for Police Conduct published its Learning Report into Operation Hotton, a series of investigations into the conduct of several officers working at Charing Cross Police Station between 2016 and 2018²⁵. Behaviours and attitudes were revealed which included bullying and sharing messages which were deeply offensive including racist, homophobic and misogynistic language. Of the 14 officers investigated, two were found guilty of gross misconduct and were dismissed from the Met (or would have been dismissed had they not already resigned). A further six officers were found to have no case to answer or were found not to have committed misconduct at the relevant hearing. Six officers were dealt with under unsatisfactory performance or reflective practice procedures.

There also remain a series of mainly historic and high-profile matters which continue to plague the Met. These include:

- The Daniel Morgan Independent Panel report, published in June 2021, which accused the Met of, "a form of institutional corruption"²⁶;
- The ongoing Undercover Policing Inquiry examining allegations of inappropriate activities by undercover officers²⁷; and
- The various investigations by the Independent Office for Police Conduct relating to Operation Midland, the investigation into false allegations of sexual abuse concerning a number of high-profile individuals²⁸.

Crime Performance

The Met's ability to prevent, reduce and solve crime over the past five years has been mixed²⁹.

The recorded number of Total Notifiable Offences (TNO) increased by 20% between 2015/16 and 2019/20³⁰. While restrictions related to the Covid-19 pandemic led to reductions in TNOs to 2015/16 levels during 2020/21 and part of 2021/22, they are now increasing and are expected to exceed one million reported offences a year from 2022/23³¹.

22. Prevention of Future Deaths Report: Anthony Walgate, Gabriel Kovari, Daniel Whitworth and Jack Taylor (21st July 2022), [link](#)

23. Independent Office for Police Conduct Statement (23rd June 2022), [link](#)

24. Statement on behalf of the families of Stephen Port's victims following inquest conclusion (10th December 2021), [link](#)

25. Independent Office for Police Conduct, Operation Hotton Learning Report (1st February 2022), [link](#)

26. The Report of the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel (June 2021), [link](#)

27. The Undercover Policing Inquiry, [link](#)


28. Independent Office for Police Conduct, Reports into Operation Midland, [link](#)

29. Although it is worth noting that changes in recorded crime can be driven by a range of factors, including improved crime recording standards, at a force level it provides the best indication of changing crime levels, particularly given the Crime Survey of England and Wales does not provide data at a force level.

30. Office for National Statistics, Crime in England and Wales, [link](#)

31. Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime London, Policing and Crime: An evidence base for London, November 2021, [link](#)

Total Notifiable Offences: Metropolitan Police Service 2015/16 - 2021/22



Source: Metropolitan Police Service³²

In addition to an increasing trend of formally recorded crime, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services has also identified a further 69,000 crimes which the Met failed to record. They state that almost no crimes were recorded by the Met when victims reported anti-social behaviour to the force³³.

Between 2016 and 2022 knife crime with injury in London has reduced by 14%³⁴ and gun crime has reduced by 27%³⁵, yet tragically in 2021 thirty teenagers were murdered in London. This is the highest number for nearly 20 years³⁶. In perhaps the cruellest example of disproportionality, black teenagers are many times more likely to be killed than white teenagers³⁷.

"I think many Londoners want the conflict, which exists on our streets to go away. And I'll be absolutely blunt about this. And this is, by the way, a problem of the politics and a problem of the media. There are more than 100 young men being killed every week, every year in this city. Many, many, many more being maimed in unpleasant and vicious ways. We do not hear a single word about it, actually. The police think about it, a bit. But in a sense, they think it's, they appear to think it's not really their problem. It's happening somewhere else. Why is this an issue? Well, of course, because all these people are black. Literally, almost all of them are black. And of course, let's not beat the beat about the bush here, the perpetrators are also black"³⁸.

Sir Trevor Philips OBE

Former Chair of the London Assembly and former Chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission

There has been a significant increase in the number of sexual offences reported to the Met with an additional 4,620 offences reported in the financial year to April 2022³⁹ compared to the financial year 2018/19⁴⁰. This may suggest that the Met is successfully increasing the confidence

32. Metropolitan Police Service, Crime Statistics (2015/16 – 2021/22), [link](#)

33. The Times (28th June 2022), [link](#)

34. Mayor of London, Police and Crime Plan for London 2022-2025, [link](#)

35. Ibid

36. Metropolitan Police Service, Homicide Dashboard, [link](#)

37. Ibid

38. Tweet by @Policy_Exchange (5th July 2022), [link](#)

39. Metropolitan Police Service, Total Notifiable Offences Dashboard (End of Year 2021/22), [link](#)

40. Metropolitan Police Service, Total Notifiable Offences Dashboard (End of Year 2018/19), [link](#)

of victims to report sexual offences, critical to the ability of the police service in being able to successfully catch dangerous predators. In the year to April 2022 only 4.3% of reported rapes were recorded by the Met as having been detected⁴¹.

The Met's ability to solve homicides remains impressive - 93% in London were solved in the five years between 2016 and 2020⁴². However, the Met's ability solve more common crime types is woefully low with only 3.8% of reported residential burglaries, 7.5% of reported personal robberies and 1.1% of reported vehicle crimes solved during the financial year 2021/22⁴³.

It is also worth noting the apparent increase in 'non-crime' demand on the Met. Alongside an increase of 28% in 999 calls to the Met between 2015 and 2018⁴⁴ non-crime incidents now account for 76% of all calls to the force's Command & Control centre. Calls relating to mental health increased by 40% between 2018 and 2020⁴⁵.

Protest and Public Order

Public order policing is always amongst the most challenging aspects of policing. The policing of the Euro 2020 football final at Wembley Stadium was the subject of criticism following significant levels of disorder. A review sponsored by the Football Association and conducted by Baroness Louise Casey of Blackstock DBE CB concluded that it was only by luck that very serious injury or worse was avoided⁴⁶.

Recent years have seen a measurable increase in the number of confrontational protests, with a particular focus on London⁴⁷. Over the last five years this has coincided with frequently changing restrictions regarding public gatherings due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The most notable protests in London have included those concerning:

- Violence against women and girls, particularly following the murder of Sarah Everard in March 2021;
- 'Black Lives Matter', particularly following the murder of George Floyd in the United States in May 2020; and
- Climate change, particularly by 'Insulate Britain' and 'Extinction Rebellion' during the summers of 2019 to 2021.

The vigil at Clapham Common on Saturday 13th March 2021, following the murder of Sarah Everard, was the subject of an inspection by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services⁴⁸. The Inspectorate stated that, "media coverage of this incident led to what many will conclude was a public relations disaster for the Metropolitan Police. It was on a national and international scale, with a materially adverse effect on public confidence in policing"⁴⁹. The Inspectorate also concluded however that, "the examination and analysis of body-worn video presented a true picture of the disorder, and the commendable restraint shown by police officers. This entirely contradicted the false assertions of police violence on that occasion"⁵⁰. A series of subsequent court hearings found that elements

41. Metropolitan Police Service, Total Notifiable Offences Dashboard (End of Year 2021/22), [link](#)

42. Metropolitan Police Service, Homicide Dashboard, [link](#)

43. Metropolitan Police Service, Total Notifiable Offences Dashboard (End of Year 2021/22), [link](#)

44. Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime London, Policing and Crime: An evidence base for London, November 2021, [link](#)

45. Ibid

46. The Baroness Casey Review: An independent Review of the events surrounding the UEFA Euro 2020 Final 'Euro Sunday' at Wembley (December 2021), [link](#)

47. D. Bailey, Decade of dissent: how protest is shaking the UK and why it's likely to continue (January 2020), The Conversation, [link](#)

48. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, An Inspection of the Metropolitan Police Service's policing of a vigil held in commemoration of Sarah Everard (30th March 2021), [link](#)

49. Ibid

50. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (2021), State of Policing: Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales, [link](#)

of the police decision making in the run-up to the vigil were unlawful⁵¹, particularly the Met’s failure to conduct a case-specific proportionality assessment as set out in *DPP v Ziegler* [2021] UKSC 23.

Race and Policing

Twenty-three years on from the Inquiry into the Murder of Stephen Lawrence by Sir William Macpherson⁵² race remains a live and highly controversial issue in British policing, and particularly within the Met. The National Police Chiefs’ Council and College of Policing have recently published their draft Race Action Plan which calls for significant reform in how policing protects and polices black people⁵³. The Met continues to face allegations that it has ‘overpoliced and under-protected’ black people and communities from both outside⁵⁴ and within its own ranks⁵⁵.

The Met has made progress in becoming more representative of the communities it serves over the last thirty years. However, the Met remains overwhelmingly white. Less than 20% of police officers are from Black, Asian and Multiple Ethnic Heritage⁵⁶ (BAMEH) groups⁵⁷ compared to over 40% of Londoners⁵⁸.

A number of recent high-profile cases, where officers have been accused of racism and which have caused considerable public concern include:

- The case of ‘Child Q’, a 15-year old black girl who was the subject of a strip-search at a North London school by two female officers in 2020. The case is now the subject of a misconduct investigation by the Independent Office for Police Conduct⁵⁹. The City & Hackney Safeguarding Children Partnership concluded that “racism was likely to have been an influencing factor”⁶⁰.
- The athletes Bianca Williams and Ricardo dos Santos in July 2020 were stopped and searched by officers from the Met’s Territorial Support Group in North-West London. The incident has received wide media attention, particularly after video footage of the incident was shared by athlete and coach Linford Christie OBE⁶¹. Officers are now facing gross misconduct proceedings following an investigation by the Independent Office for Police Conduct⁶².

These two cases were just two of the many events quoted by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services on placing the Met into their ‘Engage’ mechanism (often referred to as ‘special measures’)⁶³. Many of the concerns articulated within the Inspectorate’s letter are outlined in this report. The sheer number and seriousness of issues outlined by the Inspectorate and in this report demonstrates the scale of the challenge Sir Mark Rowley faces as the next Commissioner. The Met has nothing short of a complete turnaround to undertake over the coming months and years.

51. *Leigh v the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police* [2022] EWHC 527 (Admin)

52. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry by Sir William Macpherson of Cluny (February 1999), [link](#)

53. National Police Chiefs’ Council & College of Policing (2022), Police Race Action Plan: Improving policing for Black people, [link](#)

54. See for example Liberty (27th July 2020), [link](#)

55. See for example The Guardian (25th May 2022), [link](#)

56. Black, Asian and Multiple Ethnic Heritage (BAMEH) is the terminology used in the Metropolitan Police Service’s Workforce Data Report, [link](#)

57. Metropolitan Police Service, Workforce Data Report, June 2022, [link](#)

58. Office for National Statistics, Population estimates by ethnic group and religion: England and Wales 2019 (16th December 2019), [link](#)

59. Metropolitan Police Service, Child Q Update (15th June 2022), [link](#)

60. City of London and Hackney Safeguarding Children Partnership, Local Child Safeguarding Practice Review: Child Q (March 2022), [link](#)

61. Tweet by @ChristieLinford (4th July 2020), [link](#)

62. Independent Office for Police Conduct, News (27th April 2022), [link](#)

63. The Times (28th June 2022), [link](#)

3.1 Leadership at Every Level

“To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.”

Leading the Met is an enviable task. There are few roles in public life which provide such significant opportunities to transform individual lives and whole communities. Leadership in policing, however, is far more than the responsibility of the Commissioner and their senior team. As Sir Mark Rowley prepares to lead the Met's fight against crime and disorder there are three key elements to leadership within the Met for him to consider.

Firstly, like most large organisations, policing has a hierarchical structure. With eleven ranks between the Commissioner at New Scotland Yard and the constable on the street, the Met's enthusiasm for its hierarchy is perhaps exceptional⁶⁴. There are as many ranks below the chief superintendents, who on a day-to-day basis actually lead the frontline officers and staff who are serving the public, as there are ranks above who are leading the Met's 'strategic centre' from New Scotland Yard⁶⁵. Rebalancing the Met in favour of the frontline is an essential task for the new Commissioner.

Secondly, unlike many professions, in policing the most difficult and important decisions are often made by the most junior people. Like the US Marine Corps' 'Strategic Corporal'⁶⁶ the modern police officer must be the 'Strategic Constable'⁶⁷. Police constables often operate in the middle of night, potentially alone or with just one colleague to consult. In potentially violent or highly emotive situations constables are expected, sometimes with only a few months operational experience, to use their discretion and make decisions that might have a lifelong impact on those they are dealing with. The nature of the role of police constables is such that their recruitment and training must be exceptional, with the highest standards achieved throughout. The Met is some distance from this, particularly in relation to the initial training of officers, and a considerable programme of reform is required.

Finally, the vast majority of constables will never meet a chief officer (those officers of commander rank and above) in their day-to-day work. Beyond themselves, the people who have the greatest influence on any constable's approach to serving the public, be that their attitudes and behaviours or the actual quality of their work, is their sergeant and inspector. Driving any cultural or performance change in the Met is entirely contingent on the ability and willingness of sergeants and inspectors. The Commissioner will need to win their hearts and minds. Without their willing and enthusiastic involvement any change is doomed to fail.

64. Metropolitan Police Service, Workforce Data Report, May 2022, [link](#)

65. Ibid

66. C. Krulak (1999), The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War, Marines Magazine, [link](#)

67. M. Wood, The Strategic Constable, Blue Line (27th January 2021), [link](#)

Task 1: Leading from the top

The Mayor of London, as the police and crime commissioner for London, has responsibility for securing an efficient and effective police service for London⁶⁸. He is responsible for producing the police and crime plan⁶⁹, setting the Met's budget and holding the Commissioner to account for the policing of London. On a day-to-day basis the Mayor's policing role is delegated to the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime⁷⁰. Reporting to the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime, the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC)⁷¹ is led by a Chief Executive Officer.

The last Commissioner of the Met, Dame Cressida Dick QPM, resigned having lost the confidence of the Mayor of London⁷². The circumstances leading to her resignation have been the subject of a review commissioned by the Home Secretary and conducted by Sir Tom Winsor, the former Chief Inspector of Constabulary⁷³. The review has examined whether due process was followed⁷⁴ and makes recommendations on how the accountability processes might be strengthened in the future. The report conducted by Sir Tom Winsor is deeply critical of the current Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan. The conclusion is reached that Dame Cressida Dick, "was not treated fairly, and the dignity in departure to which she was entitled was denied for no good reason." Sir Tom Winsor also concluded that the Mayor's actions led to a serious risk of the stability of the Met being undermined⁷⁵.

In addition to being appointed based on the recommendation of the Home Secretary, the Commissioner is accountable to her for exercising the Met's national functions, most notably relating to counter-terrorism. There have long been calls for the Met's national responsibilities to be transferred to the National Crime Agency or other agencies⁷⁶. There are two main reasons for calls for the Met to be split. Firstly, it has been claimed that the Met is too large and too complex for a single Commissioner to be able to effectively lead both the policing of London and their national responsibilities⁷⁷. Secondly, that having the Commissioner be accountable to both the Mayor and the Home Secretary means that neither does so effectively⁷⁸. The calls for the Met to be split however are naïve – from both a political and an operational policing perspective.

From an operational policing perspective, the majority of the UK's likely terrorist targets are in London, as are the majority of the UK's counter-terrorism subjects of interest. The disconnection of local policing in London from the Met's counter-terrorism efforts would be counter-productive and would lead to a weakening in the UK's counter-terrorism operating model. The current system of protecting the public from terrorism is one of the best in the world. To upset that system for the benefit of what might appear to be a smoother system of governance would be perverse indeed.

From a political perspective, the Met is responsible for the policing of the nation's capital – the heart of the country's legislative, financial and cultural activity. The size of the Met alone makes it hugely significant - representing over 20% of the British policing workforce⁷⁹. It is inevitable

68. Section 3, Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, [link](#)

69. Mayor of London, Building a Safer London: Police and Crime Plan for London 2022 – 25, [link](#)

70. Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime, The Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime, [link](#)

71. Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime, Our Staff, [link](#)

72. Mayor of London, Mayoral Statement on Met Commissioner (10th February 2022), [link](#)

73. T. Winsor, Special commission on the resignation of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (24th August 2022), Home Office, [link](#)

74. Under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, [link](#)

75. T. Winsor, Special commission on the resignation of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (24th August 2022), Home Office, [link](#)

76. See for example The Daily Telegraph (18th July 2021), [link](#)

77. See for example M. MacGregor (2005), Manifesto for the Met, Policy Exchange, [link](#)

78. N. Bowes, The power struggle at the heart of police accountability in London, Centre for London (16th June 2022), [link](#)

79. Home Office, Police workforce, England & Wales, 30th September 2021, [link](#)

that the Home Secretary as the cabinet minister responsible to parliament for policing, will always take considerable interest in, comment on and be held to account by parliament for aspects of the performance of policing in London. This would be the case even if there were not the direct accountability provided by her oversight of the Met's national functions.

Given the Met's current position in 'special measures' and the events of the last year as outlined in the independent review by Sir Tom Winsor, the Home Secretary should consider taking formal action as permitted under legislation⁸⁰. The structure and process of police governance set out in legislation anticipates a situation whereby a police force's performance is so poor that the Home Secretary might give directions to the local policing body (in this case MOPAC) in an attempt to resolve the situation. If the current circumstances concerning the Met, as outlined earlier in this report, have not yet met the necessary threshold for directions to be given, it is difficult to conceive of how bad things would need to be for the Home Secretary to take the action anticipated in legislation. Therefore, as she is wholly entitled to do, the Home Secretary should direct the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime to take specific measures to remedy the failures which have now come to light. As set out in legislation the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime would be required by law to comply with such measures.

The next Commissioner will arrive in the role having been appointed by and received the support of both the Home Secretary (albeit one who has now recently left office) and the Mayor of London respectively. Over recent months both the Home Secretary⁸¹ and the Mayor⁸² have indicated that the Met must undergo a significant turnaround programme, with reform required to almost every aspect of the force. As in any major turnaround there will be decisions which will be deeply unpopular with some, both in and out of the Met. It is inevitable that there will be more revelations concerning systemic failings and officer conduct. Having given the Commissioner such a strong mandate for change, the Home Secretary, the Minister of State for Crime and Policing and the Mayor of London must vocally support the Commissioner and the Met as the Commissioner leads the changes necessary. Furthermore, point-scoring⁸³ by the Mayor of London or ministers against one another, whether publicly or anonymously by advisors, would be utterly deleterious to the likelihood that the Commissioner can be successful in turning the Met around. It must not continue.

Led by the Commissioner, the Met's Management Board are responsible for delivering policing for London in accordance with the police and crime plan set by the Mayor of London⁸⁴. The Met's previous Management Board included some of the most experienced leaders in British policing. Over the last five years these individuals have led the Met through significant challenges. Several of them have now announced their departure. Their commitment and dedication should be publicly recognised.

It is not unusual for a new Commissioner to reshape Management Board based on their approach and priorities. Sir Mark Rowley has

80. Section 40 Police Act 1996, [link](#)

81. Home Office, Letter to Sir Mark Rowley QPM from the Home Secretary the Rt Hon Priti Patel MP, [link](#)

82. Mayor of London, Mayor sets out demands for a 'reforming Commissioner' in major speech (17th June 2022), [link](#)

83. See for example BBC News (30th June 2022), [link](#) and Daily Mail (30th June 2022), [link](#)

84. Metropolitan Police Service, Senior Management Team, [link](#)

already advertised to appoint two new members of Management Board as Assistant Commissioners, the third most senior operational policing roles in the Met. It is essential that the Commissioner appoints individuals of exceptional talent to these critical roles. In addition to being outstanding operational and strategic policing leaders they must have the highest qualities of resilience, professionalism and courage. It is unfortunate that the number of chief police officers who are both qualified for the role (they must be drawn from the ranks of existing or recently retired chief police officers) and who will meet the standard necessary to be effective in these roles is incredibly small. Despite this Sir Mark must only appoint those who are up to the job. There must be no compromise.

Given MOPAC's function in holding the Met to account, there is always likely to be a natural and constructive tension between those at the top of the Met and those working in City Hall. Over the last two years, however, a number of the relationships between the senior teams at New Scotland Yard and MOPAC have become considerably strained⁸⁵. The significant changes to the Met's Management Board will provide some opportunity for a reset between New Scotland Yard and City Hall. To give the Met and MOPAC the best chance of success, the Mayor of London should take the opportunity to consider whether his own senior leadership team are now the right people to contribute to the turnaround programme which is required.

The Commissioner must set out his vision for policing London - to the public and to the 46,630 officers and staff of the Metropolitan Police Service⁸⁶. Given the level of independence with which those in policing, particularly at the most junior levels, often operate, it is critical that each understands the vision the Commissioner has for policing London. Central to that vision must be the idea that 'Policing Can Win' over those who would commit crime and disorder in our communities. Police forces are the only organisations focused primarily on the fight against crime and disorder. It is the public's expectation that the police will do everything lawfully and ethically possible to keep them safe, tackle crime and maintain order on the streets. Despite the extensive demands on policing, every officer and member of staff must operate from the perspective that they can make a difference and that core to their role is the fight against crime and disorder.

While the public's confidence in the Met is the primary metric of whether the Commissioner is successful in turning round the Met, the confidence of the Met's officers and staff is critical. The Met's last staff survey, published in October 2021, shows that the confidence of the workforce in the Met is, in many areas, even lower than the public's. The confidence of the officers and staff of the Met are amongst a series of metrics which should be used to measure the Commissioner's progress over the coming year.

85. See for example statements by the Deputy Commissioner and Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime to the Greater London Authority Police and Crime Committee, 23rd February 2022, [link](#)

86. Metropolitan Police Service, Workforce Data Report, July 2022, [link](#)

Topic	Positive Response	Year on Year change
I have confidence in the Met's senior leaders	39%	-2%
I feel proud to work for the Met	59%	-11%
I believe our <i>Met Direction</i> strategy is helping us improve our performance	29%	-2%
I believe the public trust us to keep them safe	30%	-12%
If I contacted the Met as a member of the public, I would be confident of receiving a good service	30%	-3%
When organisational changes are made, they are usually for the better	19%	-2%

Source: Metropolitan Police Service⁸⁷

That there are large numbers of people who make up the Met must not preclude the Commissioner from taking every opportunity to communicate his vision for the Met to them directly. The new Commissioner should replicate the steps of Sir John Stevens QPM when he became Commissioner of the Met in January 2000. Appointed in the aftermath of the publication of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry which concluded that the Met was 'institutionally racist', Stevens had the task of rebuilding the Met. The judgement of 'institutional racism' had left many officers who served honourably believing that they had personally been described as 'racist'. As the newly appointed Commissioner, Stevens set out to rebuild the confidence of the officers and staff of the Met. Amongst other steps Stevens did so by gathering thousands of officers and staff at a time in Westminster Hall in central London to set out his vision for the Met and take questions from officers and staff. Given Stevens has been described as, "the last commissioner to leave with his reputation intact"⁸⁸ it is worth replicating his approach. In addition, the Commissioner should take every possible opportunity to speak face-to-face with the officers and staff of the Met. He should complete drop-in sessions, attend team briefings, and go on patrol with officers.

Task 2: Empowering local commanders

In 2018 the Met changed its local policing model. Where previously each of the 32 London boroughs had a chief superintendent leading local policing, now each chief superintendent is responsible for between two and four London boroughs⁸⁹. Known as 'Basic Command Unit (BCU) commanders', these individual chief superintendents are, on average, leading teams of 1,600 police officers⁹⁰. The average size of a London BCU, led by a single BCU commander, is larger than a quarter of the police forces in England and Wales⁹¹. Meanwhile, every police force in England and Wales outside London is led by an entire command team of assistant, deputy and chief constables.


87. Metropolitan Police Service, The Met Survey (October 2021), [link](#)

88. The Times (4th July 2022), [link](#)

89. Metropolitan Police Service (2018), Basic Command Unit (BCU) Pathfinder Review, January 2018, [link](#)

90. Metropolitan Police Service, Workforce Data Report, June 2022, [link](#)

91. Home Office, Police Workforce: England & Wales, 31st March (2nd ed), [link](#)



Source: Metropolitan Police Service⁹²

That these are teams that are large is not necessarily problematic, so long as those undertaking the BCU commander roles are of sufficiently high calibre. In policing, as with every other public service, the quality of leadership matters. Everything must be done to build on and improve the quality of those undertaking these roles. Although the size of BCUs may have increased over the last five years, the autonomy of BCU commanders to make their own decisions on how policing is delivered locally has significantly reduced. This has been done in favour of the Met directing local policing from what has become a far stronger ‘strategic centre’. This shift in favour of the ‘strategic centre’ is typified by the 34% increase in the number of chief officers in the Met⁹³, from 29 in March 2016⁹⁴ to 39 in March 2021⁹⁵. This contrasts with a 20% reduction in the number of chief superintendents (the rank that typically undertakes the BCU commander role) who are actually leading the Met’s frontline local policing command teams across London⁹⁶. The significant reduction in the autonomy of BCU commanders over fundamental elements of how local policing is delivered causes three significant issues.

Firstly, it has created a greater distance between local people and those who are making the decisions on how best to police local areas. To effectively serve the public requires that those making tactical and deployment decisions are proximate enough to genuinely understand the people and communities they are policing. The most effective way of policing Barking may be vastly different to the most effective way of policing New Malden. The shift to the ‘strategic centre’ however has increased the likelihood of there being a ‘one size fits all’ approach to policing this city of 9 million people.

Secondly, the increasing size of the ‘strategic centre’, and the extent

92. Metropolitan Police Service, [link](#)

93. Those who are Commander (equivalent to Assistant Chief Constable in other forces) rank and above

94. Home Office, Police Workforce, England & Wales, 31st March 2016, [link](#)

95. Home Office, Police Workforce, England & Wales, 31st March 2021, [link](#)

96. Ibid

of the hierarchy within it are key drivers for the organisation's seemingly insatiable ability to create 'internal demand' for BCU commanders and their teams. At times BCU commanders can be faced with the wholly farcical situation where they receive conflicting instructions from different commanders based at New Scotland Yard⁹⁷. This internal demand has the effect of distracting frontline officers and leaders from the actual business of serving the public⁹⁸. Reducing the size and influence of the 'strategic centre' in favour of BCU commanders is critical to reducing the 'internal demand' which causes such intense frustration and distraction for frontline leaders and officers.

Finally, with more decisions dictated from a 'strategic centre' there is less likelihood of new ideas and different ways of working coming to the fore and being tested in an operational environment. The presumption that the centre knows best is stifling to those who might create new ideas to both increasing the public's confidence in policing and the fight against crime and disorder.

Several steps must be taken to increase the autonomy of BCU commanders and reduce the influence of the 'strategic centre'.

There should be a reduction in the number of chief officers across the Met⁹⁹. The Met's current situation strongly suggests that having more senior leaders does not necessarily equate to better organisational leadership. The number of commanders¹⁰⁰ in the Met should be reduced from the current nineteen to no more than eleven. The number of deputy assistant commissioners¹⁰¹ should be reduced from ten to no more than six.

Operational teams which are focused on local BCU crime and disorder problems such as violent crime, drugs and gangs should be placed under the leadership of BCU commanders. At a minimum this must include the Violent Crime Task Force and Local Intelligence Teams. Other large units which are currently led centrally should be reviewed to consider a large proportion of them being transferred to Basic Command Units. This should include a transfer of at least half of the 1,000 officers within the Met Operations Taskforce (including the majority of the Territorial Support Group) and most of the 1,300 officers within the Met Operations Roads and Transport command¹⁰².

Budgets should as far as possible be devolved to BCU commanders to enable them to make a far broader range of decisions which impact on the service provided to the public. BCU commanders should be able to make decisions around their workforce mix of police officers, police staff and police community support officers. They should also be able to make decisions around which police stations and other bases are open to the public and when.

Each local BCU commander should be supported by an effective HQ function led by a suitably qualified Chief Operating Officer. These teams should have specialist functions that have the necessary skills and experience in analysis, communications, finance, and HR rather than these skills being held centrally or staffed locally by police officers rather

97. Meeting with Met BCU Commander, June 2022

98. Meeting with Met BCU Commander, May 2022

99. Metropolitan Police Service, Senior Management Team, [link](#)

100. Equivalent to Assistant Chief Constables in other forces

101. Equivalent to Deputy Chief Constables in other forces

102. Metropolitan Police Service, Workforce Data Report, June 2022, [link](#)

than specialists. BCU Chief Operating Officers should have experience in leading these types of teams and should not be police officers. Officers currently undertaking roles within these teams should be returned to frontline policing duties.

To strengthen the influence of local people over the Met's 'strategic centre', representatives from local authorities, other partners and local communities should be involved in the appointment of BCU commanders. Once appointed BCU commanders should be posted for periods of between three and five years. Retention in post and promotions should be contingent on BCU commander performance against measures focused on:

- i. whether local people believe that the police are doing a good job locally;
- ii. effectiveness at dealing with the priorities of local people; and
- iii. effectiveness at preventing, reducing and detecting crime and disorder.

The Commissioner should undertake a rapid review of the entire BCU frontline policing model. The shift from 32 borough based local policing teams, each led by a single chief superintendent, to the 12 Basic Command Unit model has been deeply unpopular. It has been widely suggested, both by those within the Met¹⁰³ and leaders in local authorities¹⁰⁴, that the shift to the BCU command model has compromised operational effectiveness. If a rapid review concludes that operational effectiveness and public confidence has been affected by the introduction of the BCU model the Commissioner should make changes to the model without delay.

In addition to empowering BCU commanders to effectively lead policing in their local areas there should be a simultaneous focus on improving how local commanders and their teams are held to account by both local people and senior leaders within the Met. Local policing commanders are currently held to account through the monthly Frontline Executive Board meeting which, based on the Met's current performance across a series of measures, is failing to do so effectively. There is currently no formal process for the public themselves to hold local police commanders to account.

The Commissioner should take steps to revolutionise the entire process of how BCU commanders focus on and are held to account for crime and disorder in their local areas. Initially introduced by Commissioner Bill Bratton in New York in the 1990s, CompStat was a necessary albeit insufficient element for the turnaround that Bratton delivered during that period. It has been widely and successfully adopted elsewhere¹⁰⁵ and a version of the full CompStat process should be adopted across the Met. Critically it must not be a merely tokenistic effort at a version of CompStat, as has occurred in the past.

There are three pre-conditions for CompStat to be effective. Firstly, that BCU commanders are not only empowered but required to take wholesale

103. Meetings with Met Superintendents, Met Chief Inspector, Met BCU commander, May 2022

104. See for example London News Online (21st February 2018), [link](#) and West London News (20th February 2019), [link](#)

105. Police Executive Research Forum: Bureau of Justice Assistance (2013), COMPSTAT: Its origins, evolution, and future in law enforcement agencies, [link](#)

responsibility for tackling crime and disorder in their local area. To do this they must have under their direct control the intelligence, analysis and operational resources to be able to deal with crime and disorder in their local area. Secondly, policing commanders must start with the mindset that 'Policing Can Win' - the belief and mindset that by deploying the right resources at the right time it is possible for policing to reduce crime and disorder. Finally, there must be the understanding that CompStat is a whole system approach to tackling crime and disorder. Although regular performance meetings are the most well-known element, there is far more to successfully running a CompStat process, with intelligence gathering, analysis and operational tasking processes required at a local level, led by BCU commanders.

There are four core elements to the CompStat process¹⁰⁶:

- i. timely and accurate information or intelligence on crime and disorder problems made available at all levels of the organisation;
- ii. policing leaders determining the most effective tactics to tackle crime and disorder problems;
- iii. rapid, focused deployment of resources; and
- iv. relentless follow-up and assessment to learn what happened and make performance assessment.

For the CompStat process to be effective local policing commanders must review crime trends and intelligence on a continuing basis. Analytical products should be shared throughout the policing hierarchy to generate new ideas to tackle the crime and disorder problems faced by local people. Officers should be urged, as Bernard Hogan-Howe QPM did when he was appointed as Commissioner of the Met in 2011, to do everything, "legal and ethical to put the criminal on the back foot"¹⁰⁷. A constant cycle of analysis and review of the tactics at a local level should be established to identify what works. This will require a significant increase in the local analytical capability and capacity available to BCU commanders.

The assessment of those trends must subsequently lead to the creation of a plan and the rapid deployment of policing resources under their command, and where necessary the tasking of central resources. BCU commanders across the Met currently undertake BCU-wide 'pacesetter' reviews of incidents and deployments twice a day with their operational leaders. These are conducted at 0930 hours and 1530 hours daily. This is wholly insufficient and at least one further 'pacesetter' meeting should be introduced for every 24-hour period.

The purpose of pan-London CompStat meetings should be two-fold. Firstly, to scrutinise the plans of BCU commanders and their senior leadership teams to establish whether their plans for combatting crime and disorder are being effective. Secondly, to identify areas of excellence and good practice which can be replicated in other areas to bear down on crime and disorder.

To run large-scale Met-wide CompStat meetings effectively the

106.Y. Yuksel (2014), The implementation of CompStat in police organizations: the case of Newark Police Department, *The Journal of International Social Research*, Vol 7 (35), pp 779 – 801, [link](#)

107.Bernard Hogan-Howe, Speech to International Conference on Leadership and Standards in the Police Service (14th January 2013), [link](#)

following are required:

- i. Sir Mark Rowley should personally attend CompStat meetings. They should be chaired by the Assistant Commissioner for Frontline Policing.
- ii. CompStat meetings should be held weekly. Every week at least three of the twelve BCU commanders including their full senior leadership teams should be required to attend.
- iii. Central operational units should attend CompStat in order that they can also contribute to the effective problem solving and deployment of assets into BCUs to tackle crime and disorder problems.
- iv. CompStat meetings should focus on the effectiveness of the police response in tackling the crime and disorder priorities of local people, levels of public confidence in the police locally, and other high-priority crimes such as violent crime.
- v. A single performance and analysis product which breaks down crime and disorder information to ward-level, should be produced centrally to ensure consistency across London.
- vi. The Met's Strategic Insight Unit (the Met's specialist team of data scientists) should review and analyse CompStat products to rapidly identify what works in order that new tactics and approaches can be shared with BCU commanders across London.
- vii. CompStat should be the only pan-London meeting which BCU commanders are required to attend. There should be a substantial reduction in the number of centrally mandated, many hours-long pan-London meetings which BCU command teams are required to attend¹⁰⁸.

As part of driving accountability to local people, BCU commanders should be required present to their communities every 100 days on what they and their teams have achieved during that period against the priorities set by local people. These presentations should be data-led with local people having the opportunity to ask questions of local command teams. They should be open to the public, the media and partner agencies as well as being live streamed and available afterwards online.


Task 3: Recruiting and training leaders

The influx of new police officers through the Police Uplift Programme provides the Commissioner with a significant opportunity to shape the organisational culture of the Met for decades to come. In the three years since 2019/20 the Met has recruited nearly 9,500 new officers, nearly a third of the Met's entire police officer workforce¹⁰⁹, with a predicted further 4,000 officers to be recruited in 2022/23¹¹⁰.

108.Meeting with Met Superintendent, June 2022

109.Metropolitan Police Service, Workforce Data Report, June 2022, [link](#)

110.Metropolitan Police Service, Careers Website, [link](#)



Source: Metropolitan Police Service¹¹¹

Whilst this presents major challenges in terms of both training these officers and ensuring that there is sufficient experience across the policing workforce, it also presents significant opportunities. Within these new 13,500 officers there will be individuals of significant talent. Some will have considerable leadership experience from their previous careers.

To maximise the benefit of those officers who have joined the Met with previous leadership experience, the Commissioner should rapidly accelerate some of these individuals into formal leadership roles, as sergeants and inspectors. Although there is an existing fast track promotion programme run by the College of Policing¹¹² the number of officers involved is too small to have any substantive impact¹¹³. The Commissioner should implement a process in order that the most talented of these 13,500 officers can move into formal leadership roles at the earliest appropriate opportunity. A significant proportion, of between a quarter to a third, of the 500 officers typically promoted to the rank of sergeant annually should be from this cohort¹¹⁴.

The Commissioner should seek to identify officers in middle-ranking roles who have the potential, with appropriate development, to rapidly take on senior command and chief officer roles. Officers who are particularly talented should be able to 'skip' some of the eleven ranks in order to progress rapidly to more senior command roles. The Commissioner should also look to those who have left policing but have gained significant professional experience elsewhere and seek to entice them to return in more senior operational command and strategic policing roles.

Opportunities for the influx of new officers to contribute different ideas to the challenge of fighting crime and disorder should be created. The Commissioner's 100 project run by the Met between 2013-2016 enabled junior officers and staff to pitch ideas to the Commissioner and Management Board in the style of a Dragons' Den¹¹⁵. The Police Rewired¹¹⁶ project connects those on the policing frontline with technologists to contribute to the fight against crime through technology. Replicating

111. Ibid

112. College of Policing, Fast Track Programme (for serving constables), [link](#)

113. I. Campbell and S. Colover (2020), Fast Track and Direct Entry Programme evaluation: Overview Paper, July 2020, College of Policing, [link](#). NB: 314 officers joined the Fast Track Programme nationally in the five years between 2014-2019, although the exact numbers from the Met have not been published it can be presumed that over the five years this consisted of fewer than 100 officers over 5 years – a tiny fraction of those promoted to sergeant and inspector roles during that time.

114. Home Office, Police Workforce: England & Wales, 31st March (2nd ed), [link](#)

115. D. Spencer, M. Lloyd, L. Stephens (2014), Case for Change, Police Now (Appendix A), [link](#) & Commissioner's 100 Website, [link](#)

116. Police Rewired Website, [link](#)

forums such as these in order that those on the policing frontline can share new ideas of how best to serve the public and fight crime and disorder in local communities would give the Commissioner, Management Board and BCU commanders the opportunity to consider new solutions to crime and disorder problems.

In 2016 the College of Policing announced the introduction of the Policing Education Qualifications Framework¹¹⁷. This new framework has introduced significant changes to police training across England and Wales. The College of Policing states that the new training framework is, “based on a modern curriculum of dynamic operational training, underpinned by sound theoretical education”¹¹⁸. The introduction of the framework has been highly controversial throughout policing¹¹⁹. As a result of the new framework the Met’s initial police officer training is no longer exclusively delivered by the force’s own police training college, as was done historically. Initial police officer training is now predominantly delivered by an outsourced commercial provider alongside four universities.

Given the increased recruitment of police officers over recent years, as a result the government’s *Police Uplift Programme*, nearly a quarter of all Met police constables now have less than 3 years policing experience. Getting the initial training right is essential to the Met’s day to day operational effectiveness. Yet it has been widely suggested that the quality of initial police officer training being delivered is no longer consistently meeting the standards expected by leaders in local policing teams¹²⁰. Concerns have been expressed that officers leave the training environment without meeting the necessary standard of operational policing skills. Additionally, there are examples of training materials not meeting the necessary standard¹²¹ and trainers no longer being current in their operational policing expertise.

The Met’s specialist in-house training capability, such as firearms training and hostage and crisis negotiation training, is widely considered to be exceptional. There is no reason why initial police officer recruit training should not meet the same standard. The Commissioner should undertake a rapid review of existing initial police officer training. If it is found that this critically important training phase is not meeting the necessary standard, urgent steps should be taken to rectify this. This should include bringing in a new leadership team to lead the Met’s training design and delivery to resolve the apparently developing crisis in operational policing training. If necessary, the Met should be willing to withdraw from commercial relationships if it is not certain that future initial police officer training will consistently meet the necessary standard.

The Policing Education Qualifications Framework is the most significant work that the College of Policing has undertaken since the body was launched in February 2013. The College is constituted as an ‘operationally independent arms-length body of the Home Office’ and is almost entirely funded through public funds. It exists to¹²²:

117. College of Policing, Policing Education Qualifications Framework, [link](#)

118. Ibid

119. See for example Police Professional (6th December 2019), [link](#)

120. Meetings with Met Superintendent, Met Chief Inspector, Met Inspector, May 2022

121. The Times (15th July 2022), [link](#)

122. College of Policing, Business Plan 2021-22, [link](#)

- Share knowledge and good practice to support crime reduction;
- Set standards to help reduce crime and disorder; and
- Support professional development to help the response to new and emerging crime types.

With an annual spend of £71million in the financial year 2020/21¹²³, the College's total expenditure has been well over half a billion pounds since being created¹²⁴. The College's own 'Fundamental Review'¹²⁵, published nearly a decade on from the organisation's launch, reported that stakeholders believed that:

- "The College had not yet lived up to our potential or fully delivered on the expectations that officers, staff and the public have of policing's professional body."
- "The quality of the College's products are not always as good as they could be, which undermines our credibility in the eyes of the service."
- "An often slow and bureaucratic culture that is not sufficiently responsive to policing or other parts of the system, such as PCCs."

Based upon the College's own Fundamental Review, it is apparent that the organisation has become synonymous to many within policing with a reduction in standards alongside a perceived lack of real-world relevance to the prevention of crime and disorder. Given the College of Policing's own review and the challenges which appear to exist in relation to the new initial police officer training programmes the Commissioner should open the discussion within policing and the Home Office as to whether the College of Policing is providing a suitable return on investment. There should be consideration as to whether the College of Policing's functions might better be undertaken by individual forces, the Inspectorate or the Home Office itself.

Delivering the level of performance and cultural change within the Met will only be possible if the Commissioner is successful in securing the willing support of the Met's 7,000 sergeants, inspectors and staff supervisors. A new leadership and management development programme should be delivered to every leader across the Met. This should encapsulate both leadership and management skills as well as seeking to continually develop the operational competence of police leaders across the Met. Consideration should be given to re-establishing the Met's Leadership Academy created in the mid-2000s but long since closed.

To support officers in dealing with the increase in confrontational protest across London, police officers would benefit from additional training and greater clarity from leaders when operationally deployed, relating to policing impartiality¹²⁶. The perception that an officer's operational decision making, such as whether to arrest someone, might be influenced by a partisan political view has the potential to be hugely damaging to the public's confidence that policing is being done fairly.

123. College of Policing Limited, Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 31 March 2021, [link](#)

124. Companies House, Annual Accounts for the College of Policing (2013 - 2021), [link](#)

125. College of Policing (2020), Fundamental review of the College of Policing: Boosting professionalism, improving leadership and driving consistency, [link](#)

126. D. Bailey, Decade of dissent: how protest is shaking the UK and why it's likely to continue (January 2020), The Conversation, [link](#)

Acts that may be intended by an officer as a show of solidarity against discrimination for example, such as a police officer ‘taking the knee’¹²⁷ or an officer wearing a badge on their uniform, can easily be understood by the public as an expression of a partisan political view¹²⁸. To maintain the public’s confidence that police officers are acting with impartiality such acts should always be avoided.

This is an issue which has recently grown in prominence given that officers’ actions can be broadcast widely through social media. Recent polling has found that, “the public were almost twice as likely to agree than disagree with the statement that ‘the police are more interested in being woke than solving crimes’”¹²⁹. While this may be a grossly unfair distortion of what police officers engaging with the public are attempting to achieve at the policing of public events, the potential prominence of this perception is reflective of the scale of the challenge for modern policing.

In relation to the policing of confrontational protest the Commissioner should obtain a detailed review into what has become a highly complex legal landscape. The degree of complexity which officers must now navigate, particularly given the interaction of legislation¹³⁰ and case law¹³¹, is such that there is considerable potential for the legal framework to have a chilling effect on officers’ ability to deal effectively with protests across the capital. The review should provide clarity to policing leaders who are required to take operational decisions prior to and during protests, with officers more widely trained on how best to navigate the legal framework in order that they are able to balance the competing interests effectively. The Commissioner should work with the Home Office to ascertain whether the existing legal framework is enabling or hindering officers from being able to deal effectively with confrontational protests.

Recommendations

Task 1: Leading from the top

1. **The Commissioner must set out his vision for policing London to the public and to the 46,630 officers and staff of the Metropolitan Police Service.** Central to that vision must be the idea that ‘Policing Can Win’ over those who would commit crime and disorder in our communities.
2. **The Commissioner should gather thousands of officers and staff at a time to set out his vision for the Met and take questions from officers and staff.** In addition, the Commissioner should take every possible opportunity to complete drop-in sessions, attend team briefings, and go on patrol with officers.
3. **In reshaping Management Board and appointing new Assistant Commissioners there should be no compromise in the abilities and qualities of the individuals selected.** This will provide the Met with a strong foundation of senior leadership as the Commissioner starts the turnaround programme that is required.
4. **The Mayor of London should take the opportunity to review**

127. See for example The Times (10th June 2020), [link](#)

128. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, Getting the balance right? An inspection of how effectively the police deal with protests (March 2021), [link](#)

129. L. Tryl, ‘The police must show they care more about tackling crime than being woke, CapX’ (23rd August 2022), [link](#)

130. Such as the Human Rights Act 1998, [link](#)

131. Such as DPP v Ziegler and others [2021], [link](#)

his own senior leadership team and consider whether they are right people to contribute to the turnaround programme which is required. The Mayor's senior leadership team consists of the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime and the Chief Executive Officer of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime.

- 5. The Home Secretary should use her powers to direct the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime to take specific measures to rectify the failings within the Met.** This would place the issues on a formal footing under the relevant legislation and would help clarify for the public where accountability sits for the Met's current issues.

Task 2: Empowering local commanders

- 1. There should be a reduction in the number of chief officers across the Met.** The number of commanders in the Met should be reduced from the current nineteen to no more than eleven. The number of deputy assistant commissioners should be reduced from ten to no more than six.
- 2. The entire process of how BCU commanders focus on and are held to account for crime and disorder in their local areas should be revolutionised.** This should be based on a version of CompStat which has been successfully used in other forces.
- 3. To drive accountability to local people BCU commanders should present to their communities every 100 days.** This should cover what their teams have achieved during that period against the priorities set by local people.
- 4. The Commissioner should undertake a rapid review of the entire BCU frontline policing model.** If a rapid review concludes that operational effectiveness and public confidence has been affected by the introduction of the BCU model the Met should reverse this decision without delay.
- 5. Operational teams which are focused on local BCU crime problems such as violent crime, drugs and gangs should be placed under the leadership of BCU commanders.** At a minimum this must include the Violent Crime Task Force and the Local Intelligence Teams.
- 6. Other centralised operational units should be reviewed to consider a large proportion of them being transferred to Basic Command Units.** This should include a transfer of at least half of the 1,000 officers within the Met Operations Taskforce (including the majority of the Territorial Support Group) and most of the 1,300 officers within the Met Operations Roads and Transport command.
- 7. Budgets should as far as possible be devolved to BCU commanders to enable them to make a far broader range of operational deployment decisions.** This should include BCU commanders being able to make decisions around their workforce

mix of police officers, police staff and Police Community Support Officers and decisions over which police stations and other bases are open and when.

8. **Representatives from local authorities, other partners and local communities should be involved in the appointment of BCU commanders.** Once appointed BCU commanders should be posted for periods of between three and five years. Retention in post should be contingent on BCU commander performance.
9. **Each local BCU commander should be supported by an effective HQ function led by a suitably qualified Chief Operating Officer.** These teams should have specialist functions that have the necessary skills and experience in analysis, communications, finance, and HR rather than these skills being held entirely centrally or staffed locally by police officers rather than specialists.

Task 3: Recruiting and training leaders

1. **The Commissioner should utilise programmes to rapidly accelerate some of those who have recently joined the Met as police officers into formal leadership roles, as sergeants and inspectors.** A significant proportion, of between a quarter to a third, of the 500 officers typically promoted to the rank of sergeant annually should be from this cohort.
2. **The Commissioner should rapidly promote the most talented officers to more senior operational and strategic roles.** This should include enabling talented officers to 'skip' ranks and bringing in individuals with operational policing experience who have left the police service and since gained strategic leadership experience elsewhere.
3. **Opportunities for the influx of new officers to contribute different ideas to the challenge of fighting crime and disorder should be created.** These should replicate the successes of programmes such as the 2013 - 2016 Commissioner's 100 project and the Police Rewired project.
4. **The Commissioner should initiate a rapid review of initial recruit training.** If necessary the Met should be willing to withdraw from commercial relationships and the new Policing Educational Qualifications Framework if there is no likelihood of the necessary operational standards being met in short order. This review should include the appointment of a new training leadership team.
5. **The Commissioner should implement a new programme of leadership, management and operational development for leaders across the Met.** The Commissioner should consider re-establishing a new Leadership Academy for this purpose.
6. **Sergeants and inspectors should receive training and instruction in relation to impartiality in policing.** This is particularly relevant for the policing of confrontational protests where officers

should be cautioned against making potentially politically partisan statements or acts.

- 7. The Commissioner should consider advising the government to conduct an independent review of the College of Policing to establish whether the organisation is providing value for money.** This is in particular following the highly critical Fundamental Review of the College despite there being the investment of over half a billion in public funds over the last decade.
- 8. The Commissioner should obtain independent legal advice to provide guidance to policing leaders on how best to approach the legal landscape relating to confrontational protest.** The Commissioner should work with the Home Office to ascertain whether the existing legal framework is enabling or hindering officers from being able to deal effectively with confrontational protests.

3.2 Fighting Crime and Reconnecting with the Public

“To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.”

Regaining the public’s confidence in the Met is Sir Mark Rowley’s primary task as Commissioner. Too many Londoners no longer believe that the police in their local area are doing a good job¹³². Key to this has been a conspicuous ‘withdrawal from the streets’ by the Met over recent years. There are three key reasons for this feeling of withdrawal across the capital.

Firstly, there has been a significant reduction in the size of ward-based neighbourhood teams from the model originally created in the early 2000s. The original model posted one Sergeant, two Police Constables, and three Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) to each of London’s 624 wards¹³³. In 2007, an additional three PCSOs were posted to the 87 wards in London with over 14,000 residents¹³⁴. From a high of 1,872 ward-based police officers this has now reduced to 1,518 officers¹³⁵. The reduction in ward based PCSOs is even more significant having fallen from 2,133 to only 569¹³⁶.

Secondly, where ward-based teams were once ring-fenced from undertaking duties away from their neighbourhoods this has largely been eroded. Increasingly neighbourhood officers are required to undertake other duties such as ‘Central London Aid’¹³⁷ or ‘staffing up’ Emergency Response Patrol Teams, with as much as 14.5% of Dedicated Ward Officer time being abstracted to other duties in April 2022¹³⁸. As a result, even where officers are formally posted to ward-based neighbourhood duties they are increasing drawn into other tasks.

Thirdly, over the last ten years there has been a significant reduction in the number of community-based police stations across London¹³⁹. Even where these stations were technically under-utilised, for example with low numbers of members of the public visiting the police station to use the front counter services, they provided an important signal to local communities that a local police presence existed on which they could rely.

132. Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, Public Voice Dashboard, [link](#): Result for March 2022 to the question “Do the police do a good job locally?” has reduced from 67% to 49% since March 2018.

133. H. A. Davey & M. Pepper, Safer Neighbourhoods Scrutiny, Metropolitan Police Authority (February 2011), pp. 22-3, [link](#)

134. Ibid

135. Metropolitan Police Service, Workforce Data Report, May 2022, [link](#)

136. Ibid

137. On ‘Central London Aid’ officers are posted to duties away from their local Basic Command Unit, often policing protests or other major events such as the celebrations for HM The Queen’s Platinum Jubilee

138. Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, DWO Abstraction Dashboard (April 2022), [link](#)

139. MyLondon News (2nd January 2020), [link](#)

Task 1: Rebuilding ward-based neighbourhood policing teams

The importance of ward-based neighbourhood teams cannot be underestimated. There is a wealth of evidence to demonstrate that neighbourhood policing teams are effective at:

- reducing public perceptions of disorder;
- increasing the public's trust and confidence of the police; and
- increasing the perceived legitimacy of the police¹⁴⁰.

Neighbourhood policing teams are essential to the idea that, by working alongside local people, 'Policing Can Win' over those who might cause misery, disorder and crime in local communities. Recent years have represented the hollowing out of neighbourhood policing, partly due to a failure to provide clarity throughout the Met on their purpose, their core activities and their importance.

Of particular importance to the mission of neighbourhood policing teams is that they effectively tackle the 'low-level' criminality, disorder and anti-social behaviour which can plague local communities. That these issues have not been prioritised is a contributing factor to the collapsing levels of the public's confidence in the Met over the last five years. There are four reasons neighbourhood policing teams must consider these issues a priority.

Firstly, in recent polling for Policy Exchange 54% of respondents stated that they believed that the police and other authorities needed to do more to tackle anti-social behaviour¹⁴¹. 32% of respondents to the 2019/20 MOPAC Public Attitudes Survey said that drugs or anti-social behaviour should be the first priority for the Met to deal with in their local area¹⁴². There is a wealth of evidence to suggest that dealing with anti-social behaviour effectively is critical in maintaining the public's confidence in the police¹⁴³.

Secondly, levels of 'low-level' crime and disorder are key in determining people's quality of life, feelings of safety and sense of community¹⁴⁴. 'Low-level' criminality and disorder are often 'Signal Crimes' or 'Signal Disorder'¹⁴⁵ which act as indicators to the public that their local area is not safe.

Thirdly, 'low-level' crime and disorder can be indicators of future more serious criminality. A common example of this is the clearly made out link between anti-social behaviour, drug markets and serious violence¹⁴⁶. It is similarly found in the phenomenon of 'cuckooing' where the homes of vulnerable people are 'taken over' by criminals. In such circumstances there are often high levels of 'low-level' disorder aligned with more serious criminality, such as that committed by county line gangs¹⁴⁷. By tackling 'low-level' criminality and disorder it is possible for the police to have an impact on and prevent more serious criminality.

Finally, neighbourhood policing teams are the only policing teams

140.S. Colover & P. Quinton (2018), Neighbourhood policing: impact and implementation - summary findings from a rapid evidence assessment, College of Policing, [link](#)

141. Policy Exchange-Deltapoll polling, 7-8th May 2022, 1532 responses to national poll

142. Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime London, Policing and Crime: An evidence base for London, November 2021, [link](#)

143.E. Stanko & B. Bradford (2009), Beyond Measuring 'How Good a Job' Police are Doing: The MPS Model of Confidence in Policing, Policing, Volume 3, Number 4, pp. 322-330, [link](#)

144.H. Redgrave (2022), Rebuilding communities: Why it's time to put anti-social behaviour back on the agenda, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, [link](#)

145.M. Innes (2004), Signal crimes and signal disorders: notes on deviance as communicative action, British Journal of Sociology, Vol 55 (3), [link](#)

146.H. Redgrave (2022), Two sides of the same coin? The link between drugs markets and serious violence, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, [link](#)

147.J. Spicer et al (2019), The variable and evolving nature of 'cuckooing' as a form of criminal exploitation in street level drug markets, Trends in Organised Crime, Vol 23, [link](#)

commonly focused on tackling these sorts of issues which are of such importance to local people. The right interventions by neighbourhood policing teams can shape the public's perception of how safe they feel in their local area¹⁴⁸ - a clear example of policing winning on behalf of the public.

The Commissioner must clearly articulate the core activities of neighbourhood policing teams. They should be two-fold:

- i. Providing a visible uniformed policing presence on the streets.
- ii. Visibly tackling what **local residents** perceive as being the most important crime and disorder issues in their area through problem-solving techniques¹⁴⁹.

Sir Mark Rowley must demonstrate the importance he attaches to neighbourhood policing teams. Rebuilding them should be prioritised over other parts of the Met. There are a series of practical ways that their importance can be demonstrated. For some within the Met this will be unpopular; for local communities however, these steps are essential.

- Re-populating neighbourhood policing teams in every ward to the levels previously seen in the early 2000s, if necessary to the detriment of other teams.
- Officers must be posted to neighbourhood teams for a minimum of two years in order that they are able to develop their knowledge of the local area and so that local people can get to know and trust them.
- All uniformed constables and sergeants who wish to seek promotion should have completed at least a year on a neighbourhood policing team before being eligible for promotion.
- Neighbourhood officers should not be classed as a 'taskable' resource to be deployed to 'Outstanding Incidents'¹⁵⁰ which are primarily the responsibility of Emergency Response Patrol Teams.
- All officers posted to neighbourhood policing teams should be ring-fenced from any other duties with only the most serious exceptions (such as policing central London New Year's Eve, policing the Notting Hill Carnival, or the response to the aftermath of a serious terrorist incident).

There is substantial evidence that combining public engagement with foot-patrol and 'problem-solving techniques' can reduce disorder and criminality¹⁵¹ and support the public in feeling safer on the streets¹⁵². As a result police officers and PCSOs posted to neighbourhood policing teams should spend a significant proportion of their time conducting foot-patrol. When doing so officers should spend their time talking with local people in the streets, in their businesses and on their doorsteps.

Through these conversations officers will have the opportunity to build relationships with local people and to gather intelligence on local

148. M. Innes (2004), Signal crimes and signal disorders: notes on deviance as communicative action, *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol 55 (3), [link](#)

149. Weisburd et al (2010), Is problem-orientated policing effective in reducing crime and disorder?, *Criminology and Public Policy*, Volume 9 (1), [link](#)


150. 'Outstanding Incidents' are the list of incidents originating from calls by the public to either 999 or 101 which still require police attendance

151. R. Tuffin, J. Morris and A. Poole (2006), An evaluation of the impact of the national reassurance policing programme, Home Office, [link](#)

152. M. Camacho Doyle, L. Frogner, H. Andershed, A. Andershed (2015), Feelings of Safety In The Presence of Police, Security Guards, and Police Volunteers, *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, Vol 22 (1), July 2015, [link](#)

crime and disorder problems on which they can then act. Officers on foot patrol are also far more likely than those posted to other duties¹⁵³ to be able to intervene in the sort of 'low-level' crime disorder and anti-social behaviour which causes significant distress to the public.

All officers should follow the examples of several neighbourhood officers who use mapping tools and social media to share with the public where they are conducting foot-patrols in their local area.



Task 2: Give the power to the people

Central to increasing the public's confidence in policing is that officers posted to ward-based neighbourhood teams focus on the concerns of local people¹⁵⁴. The proportion of people who believe that the Met "are dealing with things that matter to this community" has reduced from 72% in December 2014 to 60% in March 2022¹⁵⁵. This has been particularly marked in some Boroughs, including Lambeth (21% drop), Croydon (18% drop), and Greenwich (17% drop)¹⁵⁶. This trend must be reversed.

The sense of community ownership is critical to the success of neighbourhood policing¹⁵⁷. To properly understand the issues which concern local people the Met must gather information from more than the 'usual suspects' – the elites that too often make up Independent Advisory Groups, Safer Neighbourhood Boards, or Ward Panels. Similarly, it is critical in considering the concerns of local people that this must be distinct from the concerns of interest, lobby or campaign groups. While such groups should not necessarily be disregarded by the Met's senior leaders, they are less important than the views of local citizens. To do this effectively the Met should invest in enabling every neighbourhood policing team to use app-based hyper-local polling tools within their local community to understand the issues which most concern local people. An example of this in action is the Zen-City platform, which has been used across the United States to positive effect¹⁵⁸.

By working closely with local people there is also the opportunity to

153. Such as Emergency Response Patrol Teams who spend most of their time responding to 999 calls from the public

154. Gill et al (2014), Community-oriented policing to reduce crime, disorder and fear and increase satisfaction and legitimacy among citizens: a systematic review, *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, Vol 10, [link](#)

155. Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime, Public Voice Dashboard, [link](#)

156. Ibid

157. A. Myhill (2012), Community engagement in policing: Lessons from the Literature, National Policing Improvement Agency, [link](#)

158. <https://zencity.io/zencity-for-law-enforcement/>

secure greater public support for the tactical options deployed by officers in dealing with local crime and disorder problems. Policing rightly operates more intensively in communities where there is more crime. However, in doing so it is essential that the public's support for the tactics used by officers is retained. By shifting beyond 'policing by consent' to 'policing by co-operation' there is the opportunity to significantly improve the public's trust in and support for the tactics used by the Met.

There are too many examples where local officers are instructed by the Met's 'strategic centre' to focus on issues which are wholly different to the issues that actually concern local people¹⁵⁹. Even more perniciously are the examples where the police give the appearance of allowing local people the opportunity to select their local policing teams' priorities when in reality the public's opinion is then totally ignored¹⁶⁰. Whether by intention or incompetence such an approach is ultimately dishonest and likely to lead to a loss of trust in the police by local people. It must not continue.

Once the crime and disorder issues that most concern the public in their local area are identified it is critical that local neighbourhood policing teams focus predominantly on resolving those issues, even if those issues might be considered by many in policing to be too 'low-level' to be important. Officers should publish on at least a monthly basis the amount of time that they have spent on:

- the specific local crime and disorder priorities set by the public;
- general foot-patrol duties in 'hot-spot' areas; and
- local public confidence building activities;

compared with other non-priority activities, particularly activities away from their neighbourhood.

It is essential that officers take every possible opportunity to communicate with the public what they are doing to resolve the priority crime and disorder issues identified by local people. This 'feedback loop' is essential if the public are to be confident that the issues that concern them are being resolved. Using an adapted form of the '100 Day Impact Event' model used on the *Police Now* Neighbourhood Graduate Leadership Programme¹⁶¹ the officers on each neighbourhood policing team should present their work to the public every 100 days. This should be done in person and online to maximise the number of local people who can see the activity undertaken by the police and the impact that activity is having on crime and disorder in their local areas.

As with being a detective or firearms officer, being an effective neighbourhood police officer requires specialist training, skills and attributes. The Commissioner should invest in ensuring that every neighbourhood officer, new and existing, is trained to the highest standard with the ability to¹⁶²:

159. Meeting with BCU Commander, May 2022

160. Ibid

161. *Police Now*, 8th September 2016, [link](#)

162. S. Colover & P. Quinton (2018), *Neighbourhood policing: impact and implementation - summary findings from a rapid evidence assessment*, College of Policing, [link](#)

- i. Patrol in a way that increases the public's confidence in local policing;
- ii. Communicate to the public the crime and disorder trends that they have identified;
- iii. Use the tools which enable them to understand which crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour problems local people think are the most important to deal with;
- iv. Use problem solving techniques to resolve crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour problems; and
- v. Communicate back to the public what has been achieved.

Task 3: A rapid, professional and transparent media response

Over the last five years the Met has been on the back foot when it comes to communicating with and responding to the public through both the traditional and social media. Beyond the nature of the events themselves, there are three reasons why this has been the case.

Firstly, the Met would, like many organisations, generally prefer to avoid the scrutiny of the media in the (potentially correct) expectation that in most cases issues such as officer misconduct can be resolved without ever being widely reported. As a result, the Met has not always sufficiently publicised (rather than merely published) information which might be damaging at the earliest opportunity. The impact of this is that when matters do eventually come to light the Met appears to be defensive or to have failed to have been honest with the public.

Secondly, there is the approach that until formal processes (such as misconduct investigations, independent inquiries or criminal trials) have been completed the Met should make almost no comment.

Finally, it is unfortunately the case that when senior officers are interviewed they can often appear to be defensive or unable to convey their message in terms which the public can easily understand. While they may be talented operational policing leaders, too many senior officers do not have the skills or sufficient media experience to communicate effectively through the media. This is, of course, not universal. Many of the interviews and briefings held in the immediate aftermath of the 2017 terrorist attacks, for example, were highly professional and are exemplars of how policing can approach such tasks. A number of these briefings were conducted by Sir Mark Rowley himself in his role at the time as the Assistant Commissioner responsible for national counter-terrorism policing.

Operation Hotton, examining officer misconduct at Charing Cross Police Station¹⁶³, is an example of these factors. The circumstances were known to senior leaders at New Scotland Yard and City Hall long before they entered the public domain. Publishing the details at an earlier stage alongside a detailed plan to deal with the issues revealed could have

163. Independent Office for Police Conduct, Operation Hotton Learning Report (Feb 2022), [link](#)

prevented the events which subsequently led to the departure of Dame Cressida Dick QPM as Commissioner of the Met¹⁶⁴.

Beyond the traditional broadcast and news media the proliferation of social media has transformed how the public obtain information. It is now common for videos of officers dealing with the public to be posted on social media¹⁶⁵, often where officers are using force¹⁶⁶. To an independent observer even the most professional use of force by a police officer can be distressing to witness¹⁶⁷. It is not uncommon for videos of such incidents to be posted, alongside a commentary which suggests that the police may not have acted appropriately (as indeed may well be the case). A damaging and inaccurate narrative can become the dominant version of events even where the facts do not bear this out. When such material appears on social media the Met must rapidly provide information to the public.

The arrival of Sir Mark Rowley as Commissioner must herald a new way of working in how the Met communicates with the public through both traditional and social media. This new way of working should be predicated on a presumption of transparency and publicising (not merely publishing) information to the public at the earliest possible opportunity.

As the first step in professionalising communications to and through the media the Commissioner should appoint a spokesperson who provides daily briefings to the broadcast and press media on the Met's work. For broadcast media these briefings should be on camera from the Met's purpose-built media suite at New Scotland Yard. It is essential that this person has the skills and experience to be able to communicate with the public through the media across the full range of the Met's strategic, performance, and day-to-day operational work. Daily briefings would establish the cadence for regular communication with the public through the media which has thus far been inadequate.

The appointment of a professional spokesperson does not preclude senior officers providing briefings to and answering questions from the media where this is appropriate. In particular, the appointment of a spokesperson should not be seen as a shield for the new Commissioner to prevent him being held to account by the press. The Commissioner should commit to conducting interviews with the press and broadcast media on a regular basis where the issues that the Met faces and the progress against plans to deal with them are confronted.

A social media rapid response capability should be established within the Met in order that social media can be monitored 24 hours a day every day to identify any incidents within London where police officers are involved. Particularly in cases where there is footage of the incident or the suggestion that officers may have acted inappropriately the rapid response unit should take immediate steps to provide accurate and timely information to the public. At a minimum this should include (within minutes and hours rather than days and weeks):

- an immediate public acknowledgement of the incident;
- a detailed summary of the officers' and witnesses' version of

164. See for example The Times (13th February 2022), [link](#)

165. See for example tweet by @sholmeslewis, [link](#)

166. See for example tweet by @SholaMos1, [link](#)

167. Independent Police Complaints Commission, Police use of force: evidence from complaints, investigations and public perception (March 2016), [link](#)

- events;
- officers' body worn video footage;
- CCTV where it is available;
- links to relevant policies and data, for example concerning police use of force; and,
- a short video statement by a senior officer or the Commissioner's spokesperson.

While the Met already publishes some use of force data¹⁶⁸, the Met should learn from the example provided by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)¹⁶⁹. The LAPD publish detailed information on their use of force on their website, and in particular 'officer involved shootings'. This includes publishing officers' body worn video wherever possible. The Met should take a similar, although broader approach by publishing details of all use of force. This should include publishing officers' body worn video footage wherever possible alongside links to use of force policies and the data and analysis which relates to use of force by officers.

Recommendations

Task 1: Rebuilding ward-based neighbourhood policing teams

- 1. The Commissioner must clearly articulate the importance of neighbourhood policing teams to the Met's crime fighting and public confidence mission.** This should be done on their first day in office.
- 2. The core activities of neighbourhood policing teams should be articulated within the Met, to the public, and to partner agencies.** They should be:
 - i. Providing a visible uniformed policing presence on the streets.
 - ii. Visibly tackling what **local people** perceive as being the most important crime and disorder issues in their area primarily through problem-solving techniques.
- 3. Neighbourhood policing teams in every ward should be repopulated to the levels previously seen in the early 2000s.** This should include:
 - i. one Police Sergeant
 - ii. two Police Constables
 - iii. three Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) (or a further three Police Constables if there are currently insufficient PCSOs)
- 4. The Commissioner should take steps to prioritise Neighbourhood policing over other teams.** Steps taken should include:
 - i. Officers posted to neighbourhood teams should be posted to those teams for a minimum of two years.
 - ii. All uniformed constables and sergeants seeking promotion

168. Metropolitan Police Service Use of Force Dashboard, [link](#)

169. LAPD Website, Critical Incident Videos, [link](#)

should have completed a minimum term on a neighbourhood policing team before being eligible for promotion. This should be a posting of at least one year.

- iii. Neighbourhood officers should not be classed as a 'taskable' resource to be deployed to 'Outstanding Incidents'¹⁷⁰. These incidents should be dealt with by Emergency Response Patrol Teams.
 - iv. All officers posted to neighbourhood policing teams should be ring-fenced from any other duties with only the most serious exceptions. Exceptions should include the policing of New Year's Eve and the Notting Hill Carnival, in addition to responding to very serious incidents such as terrorist attacks.
- 5. Police officers and PCSOs posted to neighbourhood policing teams should use mapping tools to show on social media where they are conducting patrols.** Officers should spend a significant proportion of their time conducting foot-patrol.

Task 2: Giving the power to the people

- 1. Neighbourhood officers should present the impact of their work to the public every 100 days.** This should be done in person and online so local people can see the activity undertaken by the police and the impact that activity is having on crime and disorder in their local areas.
- 2. Officers should publish on at least a monthly basis the amount of time that they have spent on key activities.** These activities should include:
 - i. the specific local crime and disorder priorities set by the public;
 - ii. general foot-patrol duties in 'hot-spot' areas; and
 - iii. local public confidence building activities.
- 3. The Met should invest in and use app-based hyper-local polling tools.** Local neighbourhood teams should use these to understand the crime and disorder issues which most concern local people.
- 4. The Commissioner should invest in ensuring that every neighbourhood officer, new and existing, is trained to the highest standard with delivering their vision of neighbourhood policing.** This should include:
 - i. Patrolling in a way that increases the public's confidence in local policing;
 - ii. Using the tools which enable them to understand which crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour problems local people think are the most important to deal with;
 - iii. Using problem solving techniques to resolve crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour problems; and
 - iv. Communicating back to the public what has been achieved.

170. 'Outstanding Incidents' are the list of incidents originating from calls by the public to either 999 or 101 which still require police attendance

Task 3: A rapid, professional and transparent media response

- 1. The Commissioner should appoint a spokesperson who provides daily briefings to the media on the Met's work.** It is essential that this person has the skills and experience to be able to communicate across the full range of the Met's strategic, performance, and day-to-day operational work.
- 2. The Commissioner should commit to conducting interviews with the press and broadcast media on a regular basis.** This will provide an opportunity for the issues that the Met faces, and the progress against plans to deal with them, to be presented to the public on a regular basis.
- 3. A social media rapid response capability should be established within the Met.** This will enable the Met to monitor social media 24 hours a day every day to identify any incidents within London where police officers are involved.
- 4. A rapid response media policy should be established to deal with incidents immediately when they appear on social media.** At a minimum this should include (within minutes and hours rather than days and weeks):
 - i. an immediate public acknowledgement of the incident;
 - ii. a detailed summary of the available officers' and witnesses' version of events;
 - iii. officers' body worn video footage;
 - iv. CCTV where it is available;
 - v. links to relevant policies and data, for example concerning police use of force; and,
 - vi. a short video statement by a senior police officer or the Commissioner's spokesperson.
- 5. The Met should establish a detailed use of force database for public access.** This should include officers' body worn video footage, links to use of force policies and wider data on the use of force by police officers.

3.3 Police Officer Misconduct

“To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour, and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.”

There is no doubt that those who commit criminality or serious misconduct must be identified and dismissed from the police service without delay. It is similarly vital that officers who do not meet the standards of competence necessary to serve the public, yet fall short of the misconduct threshold, are dealt with effectively. It is essential to regaining and retaining the trust of the public that this is achieved.

There are an infinite number of reasons why police officers might commit misconduct. Yet despite the number of very serious cases which have come to public attention over recent years it is difficult to claim that this is due to an *actual* increase in police misconduct or criminality. There are however four elements related to the current issues around police conduct that are worthy of note.

Firstly, the increased involvement of legal professionals throughout the misconduct process adds considerable time, cost and complexity. This is a process which is ultimately seeking to determine whether an officer remains employed rather than a criminal justice or similar outcome.

Secondly, the bar to demonstrating incompetence or misconduct is too high. This is particularly in relation to officers who repeatedly commit ‘low-level’ misconduct or incompetence. Legislative changes have made it less likely that officers will enter the formal misconduct process than they might previously have done. The initial recruitment and training processes to ensure that only those who meet the standards necessary to serve the public to a high standard are inadequate. It takes far too long to deal with those who commit misconduct or are incompetent¹⁷¹

Thirdly, as a response to reductions in real terms police funding during the 2010s and the increasing numbers of constables joining the Met under the Police Uplift Programme, supervision ratios at some ranks within the Met have increased. There are now fewer sergeants supervising more constables and so less intensive day-to-day scrutiny of frontline officers by line managers¹⁷². As a result there is a lower likelihood of misconduct or incompetence being identified at an early stage, and when issues are identified there is a lower likelihood that those issues will be dealt with effectively.

Finally, the increased prevalence of social media means that views or behaviour which might once have been private or unprovable are

171. House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee, Police Conduct and Complaints, 23rd Feb 2022, [link](#)

172. Metropolitan Police Service, Workforce Data Report, May 2022, [link](#) & Home Office, Police Workforce, England & Wales, 31st March 2016, [link](#)

now neither. Where once colleagues might express views or admit to unprofessional behaviour to one another in private, they are now doing so on WhatsApp groups. Social media and messaging apps provide a permanent and auditable record which did not previously exist. The behaviour and attitudes of the officers investigated by Operation Hotton are examples where officers might never have been identified twenty years ago¹⁷³.

Task 1: Setting the standard

A key element of Sir Mark Rowley's approach as Commissioner must be to take an unequivocal stance in relation to police misconduct with nothing short of a zero-tolerance attitude to criminality and unlawful discrimination by officers. He must commit to rooting out, by all means necessary, those officers and staff who are likely to damage the public's confidence in policing by acting in a manner which does not meet the standards expected of those in policing. On his first day in office the Commissioner should clearly articulate how he intends to address the issues raised around police officer misconduct. Decades on from Sir Robert Mark's commitment as Commissioner to rooting out corruption in the Met, he is now lauded for his achievements¹⁷⁴. Sir Mark Rowley's task as Commissioner is no less vital.

There are currently a series of reviews underway examining issues related to standards, conduct, and culture in the Met:

- the Home Office sponsored independent inquiry by Dame Elish Angiolini DBE QC into the matters arising from the abduction, rape and murder of Sarah Everard¹⁷⁵;
- a Metropolitan Police sponsored review of the force's culture and standards of behaviour, led by Baroness Louise Casey of Blackstock DBE CB¹⁷⁶;
- several investigations of allegations of misconduct by the Independent Office for Police Conduct¹⁷⁷; and
- a thematic inspection by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services of vetting and counter-corruption arrangements¹⁷⁸.

Whilst it is ultimately the Commissioner who is responsible for driving the changes required across the Met it is incumbent on those who are involved in the various reviews to give him the best possible chance of success. Wherever possible those leading reviews should provide a public report (if necessary an interim report) within the Commissioner's first 100 days in office. The Met should simultaneously provide their response and plan to deal with the issues identified. Given it is almost inevitable that other serious misconduct or performance issues will come to the fore in the early stages of the Commissioner's term it is essential that these are made public at the earliest opportunity.

Police regulations are the series of statutory instruments which govern

173. Independent Office for Police Conduct, Operation Hotton Learning Report (Feb 2022), [link](#)

174. The Times (2nd October 2010), [link](#)

175. Home Office, Angiolini Inquiry Terms of Reference (2nd February 2021), [link](#)

176. Metropolitan Police Service, Baroness Casey External Review Terms of Reference, [link](#)

177. Independent Office for Police Conduct Statement (10th March 2021), [link](#)

178. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, Inspection of capability and capacity to vet and monitor officers and staff (20th December 2021), [link](#)

all aspects of the terms and conditions of police officers' employment¹⁷⁹. This includes the processes governing police officer misconduct¹⁸⁰. Given they are governed by police regulations, changing the misconduct hearing process is beyond the scope of the Commissioner alone to change. However, given the significant public concern regarding the conduct of police officers the Commissioner should request that the government review the regulations relating to police officer misconduct. The government should urgently consider two immediate changes to reverse the increasing involvement of legal professionals in the police misconduct process in order to reduce the time, cost and complexity involved.

Firstly, in misconduct hearings which might lead to the dismissal of a police officer the panel must currently be led by a Legally Qualified Chair. Appointed by the Police and Crime Commissioner, Legally Qualified Chairs must be eligible under the conditions for judicial appointments¹⁸¹. The introduction of Legally Qualified Chairs in misconduct hearings has led to the Commissioner being unable to dismiss officers, even if they might believe it is necessary to do so to retain the public's confidence in the police service¹⁸². Having been introduced¹⁸³ with the aim of increasing the public's confidence in the police misconduct process, they are an experiment which has had the opposite effect and must be reversed.

Secondly, according to police regulations both officers and forces are entitled to be legally represented at misconduct hearings¹⁸⁴. Misconduct hearings are ultimately to determine whether an officer should remain appointed as a police officer. A more proportionate approach would be to remove legal representatives from the process entirely and for officers to be represented by the Police Federation. This would reduce the considerable cost and complexity inherent in what has unnecessarily become a quasi-judicial process. Such a shift would not preclude police officers subsequently pursuing matters through the employment tribunal process, with legal representation should they subsequently wish to do so.

Currently the vetting of police officers is primarily completed when individuals join the police service with only limited further reviews throughout an individual's career. The police vetting process should be overhauled in order that a significant number of individuals are selected to be re-vetted on an annual basis. In these cases the vetting process should also include interviews with officers' colleagues and members of the public that the officer has dealt with, the dip sampling of electronic records and detailed reviews of officers' social media platforms. As part of ongoing vetting there should also be the option to utilise psychological screening tools, albeit further research will be required to ascertain their effectiveness. Every police officer should be subject to random drug testing on at least an annual basis.

Task 2: Applying 'broken windows' to misconduct

Dealing effectively with 'low-level' conduct issues by police officers is essential to preventing more serious instances of misconduct in the future. Frequently, had less serious matters been dealt with at an earlier stage it is

179. Police Regulations 2003, [link](#)

180. Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020, [link](#)

181. Section 50 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, [link](#)

182. Section 28 Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020, [link](#)

183. Section 5 Police (Conduct) (Amendment) Regulations 2015, [link](#)

184. Section 7 Police (Conduct) Regulations 2008, [link](#)

perfectly possible that the subsequent more serious issues which then arise could have been prevented. Additionally, where one officer's misconduct or incompetence is not dealt with effectively, this increases the risk of other officers on the same team falling below the required standards. Too often these types of lower-level or borderline issues are not dealt with effectively by line managers¹⁸⁵.

Recent changes to police regulations have introduced the 'Reflective Practice' process. This process is now used to deal with underperformance or conduct which may just fall short of the misconduct threshold yet remains below of the expectations of the public¹⁸⁶. In such circumstances the intention is to remove from the formal misconduct process those individuals and issues which involve mistakes, poor judgement, or low levels of conduct. In such cases officers discuss their failing with a supervisor and reflect upon it, without there being a misconduct finding against them. While the introduction of the 'Reflective Practice' regime is a positive change, it is essential that it is used in the right circumstances. There is a significant risk that too many cases which should be dealt with as misconduct or under-performance are dealt with through the 'Reflective Practice' process. Should officers be able to receive multiple opportunities for 'Reflective Practice' without these then being used in subsequent misconduct proceedings, this could then lead to officers who should no longer be serving as police officers being retained. This must be prevented.

For officers at the start of their careers the training school environment can provide an ideal opportunity to examine whether individuals demonstrate the appropriate behaviours and attitudes to then go on to serve the public. The current processes do not maximise these opportunities and should be overhauled so as to prevent unsuitable individuals moving from a training to an operational environment. This should include professional standards investigators being permanently attached to all initial police officer training environments to enable processes to be undertaken and concluded at speed. The performance and conduct standard for failing to complete the training phase and moving to operational duties should be significantly increased.

The new Commissioner's expectations of frontline leaders in dealing with minor conduct or competence issues should be articulated without delay. Frontline sergeants and inspectors should receive training as to the standards expected of officers. Local Professional Standards Units should be reviewed to ensure that they are themselves staffed by savvy and professional investigators who are determined to deal effectively with the even low-level performance and conduct issues which arise. This is not currently universally the case and must be in the future.

185. Meetings with Detective Chief Inspector, Met Chief Inspector, Met Detective Inspector, Met Inspector, March 2022

186. Home Office (2020), Conduct, Efficiency and Effectiveness: Statutory Guidance on Professional Standards, Performance and Integrity in Policing, [link](#)

Task 3: Expanding public insight and community inspection

Providing the public and local communities with a greater insight into police tactics and conduct is essential to regaining the public's trust in the Met. The Met has over recent years expanded its 'ride-along' programme in order that members of the public are able to join officers on patrol¹⁸⁷. Similarly, the Met has recently introduced its 'Walk and Talk' scheme for women who would like to discuss their views on women's safety in the local area with a police officer¹⁸⁸. While beneficial, members of the public joining these schemes are scheduled in advance with the officers conducting these schemes carefully selected by the Met's leadership teams.

Over the last forty years a series of interventions have led to significant improvements in the treatment of those who are detained in police custody¹⁸⁹. Amongst these changes have been the introduction of Independent Custody Visitors. Independent Custody Visitors are appropriately vetted volunteers from the local community who visit police stations unannounced to check on the treatment and welfare of those held in police custody¹⁹⁰. It is only in the most exceptional circumstances that Independent Custody Visitors can be delayed in gaining access to custody suites.

The independent visitor scheme should be expanded beyond custody suites to other parts of policing. With appropriate vetting, members of local communities could be permitted access to police stations and other buildings across the Met enabling them to visit canteens, observe team briefings, and conduct 'ride-alongs' without prior notice. Under such a scheme all independent visitor reports should be made available to the public.

Expanding the independent visitor scheme to more of the Met would have multiple effects. Firstly, the conduct of police officers would improve given the potential for added external scrutiny. Secondly, there would be an increase in local community reassurance that police officers' conduct was meeting the necessary standard. Finally, there is evidence to suggest that the more the public feel informed about policing the more positive the public's views on policing effectiveness¹⁹¹.

The National Police Chiefs' Council and the College of Policing have recently published their draft Plan of Action on Inclusion and Race¹⁹². The Commissioner must review the Met's own plans to ensure that they are fit for purpose in relation to the policing of London. In particular, the Commissioner should take care not to be drawn into the debate over whether the Met and British policing more widely is or is not 'institutionally racist'. Although a debate which has dominated policing for over twenty years, the terminology itself is widely misunderstood and remains politically contested¹⁹³. It risks undermining the morale of officers who continue to serve honourably and alienating the next generation of young men and women from considering a policing career. Prioritising this question risks diverting the leadership of the Met from the most

187. Metropolitan Police Service, Ride Along Scheme, [link](#)

188. Metropolitan Police Service, Walk and Talk Scheme, [link](#)

189. L. Skinnis et al (2015), Preliminary findings on police custody delivery in the twenty-first century: Is it 'good' enough?, *Policing and Society*, Vol 27 (4), [link](#)

190. Independent Custody Visiting Association, [link](#)

191. Bradford et al (2009), Contact and Confidence: Revisiting the Impact of Public Encounters with the Police, *Policing and Society*, Vol 19 (1), [link](#)

192. National Police Chiefs' Council & College of Policing (2022), Police Race Action Plan: Improving policing for black people, [link](#)

193. Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities: The Report (2022), [link](#)

critical issue - ensuring that any plans ultimately contribute to preventing what is one of the cruellest disproportionalities in our society, that if you are black you are more than five times more likely to be killed than if you are white¹⁹⁴.

As part of the work to increase black people's confidence in policing the Race Action Plan makes a commitment to 'Explain or Reform' where disparities exist. There is opportunity in such an approach, however significant work is required within the Met to ensure that this contributes to the fight against crime and disorder, ultimately leading to safer communities for Londoners. There is a risk currently in the approach leading to ill-thought through and perverse outcomes.

The Explain element will require significant developments within the Met. Firstly, the Met will need to improve its capacity to better understand and analyse their own data. Secondly, the Met will need to be genuinely willing to be transparent and share that data and analysis with the public. Reports cannot, as they currently do, remain secret awaiting a Freedom of Information request.

The Met already conducts detailed analysis in relation to matters surrounding effectiveness of police tactics and whether their use is disproportionate. In one example, a recent publication by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime stated that analysis by the Met's Strategic Insights Unit found that,

“black Londoners (compared with their share of London's population) disproportionately experience Taser – but when accounting for other factors (like the presence of a weapon) the analysis found that Taser armed officers were no more likely to use Taser on a black Londoner than a white Londoner in encounters where any use of force (i.e. including handcuffs) occurred”¹⁹⁵.

Given the level of insight available and the potential to provide insight on how the Met police can be most effective in combatting the scourge of serious violence on the streets of London, the Met's Strategic Insights Unit's existing analytical products should be published at the earliest opportunity. As part of developing the Met's understanding of what works in tackling violent crime the capacity of the Met's Strategic Insight Unit should be increased in order that the most effective tactics can be identified and rapidly deployed across London at the earliest opportunity.

Using the Met's existing Use of Force Dashboard as a model a further dashboard should be created to provide the public with data on police conduct and public complaints relating to police officers¹⁹⁶.

In terms of Reform the focus should be on how to effectively combat the violence which leads to the disproportionate deaths of young black men on London's streets. Key will be how the Met works with the public to identify and obtain support for tactics to combat violent crime. Three steps are required. Firstly, no longer can decisions about police tactics be made in isolation by the police or with only a small number of elites, be they local Independent Advisory Groups or national oversight panels. A wider range of local residents must be consulted. Secondly, there should

194. Office for National Statistics, Homicide in England and Wales 2021, (10th February 2022), [link](#)

195. Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime London, Policing and Crime: An evidence base for London, November 2021, [link](#)

196. Metropolitan Police Service, Use of Force Dashboard, [link](#)

be a presumption that crime trends and the tactical options available are openly shared with local communities. Finally, while policing rightly operates more intensively in communities where there is more crime, deciding which tactics to deploy should be done in concert with people who live in those communities wherever possible.

The debate on how to combat the scourge of violent crime cannot be for the police alone. Last year the highest number of teenagers were killed on London's streets since modern records began. Despite this, the number of stop and searches conducted by officers on the streets of London was 41% lower in July 2022 than in July 2020¹⁹⁷. Police tactics to combat violent crime such as stop and search and the deployment of facial recognition software on the streets are not without controversy. Although Peel's 'Policing by Consent' was never just about the public passively accepting policing tactics, to be effective modern policing must move beyond consent towards 'Policing by Co-operation'.

Recommendations

Task 1: Setting the standard

1. **The Commissioner must take an unequivocal stance in relation to police misconduct with nothing short of a zero-tolerance attitude to criminality and unlawful discrimination by officers.** On their first day in office the Commissioner should clearly articulate how they intend to address the issues raised around police officer misconduct.
2. **Wherever possible those leading reviews into the Met should provide a public report (an interim report if need be) within the Commissioner's first 100 days in office.** The Met should simultaneously provide their response and plan to deal with the issues identified.
3. **The government should review the regulations relating to police officer misconduct.** The government should urgently consider two immediate changes to removing the role of Legally Qualified Chairs and the involvement of legal advisers at misconduct hearings.
4. **The police vetting process should be overhauled in order that a significant number of officers are selected to be re-vetted on an annual basis.** This should include interviews with officers' colleagues and members of the public that the officer has dealt with, the dip sampling of electronic records and detailed reviews of officers' social media platforms. Every police officer should be subject to random drug testing on at least an annual basis.
5. **Further research should be undertaken to ascertain the effectiveness of psychological screening for vetting purposes.**

197. Metropolitan Police Service, Stop and Search Dashboard, [link](#)

Task 2: Applying 'broken windows' to misconduct

- 1. The Commissioner's expectations of frontline leaders in dealing with minor conduct or competence issues should be articulated without delay.** Sergeants and inspectors should receive training as to the standards expected and the importance of dealing with officers who repeatedly fail to achieve the necessary standards of conduct or competence.
- 2. Local Professional Standards Units should be reviewed to ensure that they are staffed by savvy and professional investigators.** Local Professional Standards Units should focus on dealing effectively with officers who have repeated low-level performance and conduct issues.
- 3. Officers who are repeatedly subject to 'Reflective Practice' should be progressed to formal misconduct hearings for collective failings rather than waiting for a single more serious act of misconduct.**
- 4. The performance and conduct standard for officers to complete the initial police officer training phase and moving to operational duties should be significantly increased.** Professional Standards investigators should be permanently attached to training environments to enable processes to be undertaken and concluded at speed.

Task 3: Expanding public insight and community inspection

- 1. The Commissioner must review the Met's own plans linked to the Race Action Plan to ensure that they are fit for purpose in relation to the policing of London.** The focus should be on ensuring that any plans ultimately contribute to preventing what is one of the cruellest disproportionalities in our society - that if you are black you are more than five times more likely to be killed than if you are white.
- 2. The Commissioner should take care not to be drawn into the debate over whether the Met and British policing more widely is or is not 'institutionally racist'.** The terminology itself is widely misunderstood and remains politically contested.
- 3. The Met's Strategic Insights Unit's existing analytical products on the effectiveness and disproportionate use of police tactics should be published at the earliest opportunity.** As part of developing the Met's understanding of what works in tackling violent crime the capacity of the Met's Strategic Insight Unit should also be increased in order that the most effective tactics can be identified.
- 4. A dashboard should be created to provide the public with data on police conduct and public complaints relating to police officers.** The Met's existing Use of Force Dashboard should be used as a model.

5. **The Met should do more to consult with people in London's communities on the tactics the Met should use to combat serious violence on London's streets.** The focus should be on working with local communities directly rather than working with elite groups including independent advisory groups or oversight panels.
6. **The independent visitor scheme should be expanded beyond custody suites to other parts of policing.** With appropriate vetting, members of local communities could be permitted access to police stations and other buildings across the Met enabling them to visit canteens, observe team briefings, and conduct 'ride-alongs' without prior notice.

4. Conclusion: Beyond the 100 Days

We should be in no doubt of the scale of the challenge. Sir Mark Rowley takes over one of the biggest jobs in public service at a time when the Met is in permanent crisis. Few of his recent predecessors have left with their reputations enhanced by their time in the role. Londoners' confidence in whether the police in their local area are doing a good job is the lowest on record.

Despite the challenges the Met faces, the central thesis to this report is that 'Policing Can Win' over those who would commit crime and disorder in our communities. By following the recommendations outlined in this report the officers and staff of the Met will be able to do so.

Sir Mark Rowley and his senior leadership team cannot do this alone. From City Hall to the Home Office, from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary to the Independent Office for Police Conduct. Each organisation and the people leading them have a role to play in the Met's turnaround. Their constructive support will be essential.

The changes articulated in this report are merely the beginning of what is required. Beyond the first 100 days, and beyond the issues outlined in this report, the Commissioner will then need to make significant progress on a range of other issues. They include overhauling the Met's technology to aid officers and staff in the fight against crime and disorder; establishing a plan to tackle the massive increase in fraud, with one in nine people now falling victim to fraudsters every year; and reversing the shortfall in applicants to fill the Met's uniformed police officer vacancies.

For at least the next five years the Met will be undergoing a transformation to regain the trust and confidence of the public. Renewing the concept of 'Policing by Consent' and securing the trust and confidence of the public is the only way that the Met can fulfil the promise of the 'Peelian Principles' on which British policing has been based for nearly 200 years.

Historically British policing has been the standard bearer for policing excellence around the world. It can be again. There are few more important tasks in public service leadership today than successfully turning the Met around.

Londoners are relying on Sir Mark Rowley to succeed.

Summary of Recommendations

Leadership at Every Level

Recommendations

Task 1: Leading from the top

- 1. The Commissioner must set out his vision for policing London to the public and to the 46,630 officers and staff of the Metropolitan Police Service.** Central to that vision must be the idea that 'Policing Can Win' over those who would commit crime and disorder in our communities.
- 2. The Commissioner should gather 2-3,000 officers and staff at a time to set out his vision for the Met and take questions from officers and staff.** In addition, the Commissioner should take every possible opportunity to complete drop-in sessions, attend team briefings, and go on patrol with officers.
- 3. In reshaping Management Board and appointing new Assistant Commissioners there should be no compromise in the abilities and qualities of the individuals selected.** This will provide the Met with a strong foundation of senior leadership as the Commissioner starts the turnaround programme that is required.
- 4. The Mayor of London should take the opportunity to review his own senior leadership team and consider whether they are right people to contribute to the turnaround programme which is required.** The Mayor's senior leadership team consists of the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime and the Chief Executive Officer of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime.
- 5. The Home Secretary should use her powers to direct the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime to take specific measures to rectify the failings within the Met.** This would place the issues on a formal footing under the relevant legislation and would help clarify for the public where accountability sits for the Met's current issues.

Task 2: Empowering local commanders

- 1. There should be a reduction in the number of chief officers across the Met.** The number of commanders in the Met should be reduced from the current nineteen to no more than eleven. The number of deputy assistant commissioners should be reduced

from ten to no more than six.

2. **The entire process of how BCU commanders focus on and are held to account for crime and disorder in their local areas should be revolutionised.** This should be based on a version of CompStat which has been successfully used in other forces.
3. **To drive accountability to local people BCU commanders should present to their communities every 100 days.** This should cover what their teams have achieved during that period against the priorities set by local people.
4. **The Commissioner should undertake a rapid review of the entire BCU frontline policing model.** If a rapid review concludes that operational effectiveness and public confidence has been affected by the introduction of the BCU model the Met should reverse this decision without delay.
5. **Operational teams which are focused on local BCU crime problems such as violent crime, drugs and gangs should be placed under the leadership of BCU commanders.** At a minimum this must include the Violent Crime Task Force and the Local Intelligence Teams.
6. **Other centralised operational units should be reviewed to consider a large proportion of them being transferred to Basic Command Units.** This should include a transfer of at least half of the 1,000 officers within the Met Operations Taskforce (including the majority of the Territorial Support Group) and most of the 1,300 officers within the Met Operations Roads and Transport command.
7. **Budgets should as far as possible be devolved to BCU commanders to enable them to make a far broader range of operational deployment decisions.** This should include BCU commanders being able to make decisions around their workforce mix of police officers, police staff and Police Community Support Officers and decisions over which police stations and other bases are open and when.
8. **Representatives from local authorities, other partners and local communities should be involved in the appointment of BCU commanders.** Once appointed BCU commanders should be posted for periods of between three and five years. Retention in post should be contingent on BCU commander performance.
9. **Each local BCU commander should be supported by an effective HQ function led by a suitably qualified Chief Operating Officer.** These teams should have specialist functions that have the necessary skills and experience in analysis, communications, finance, and HR rather than these skills being held entirely centrally or staffed locally by police officers rather than specialists.

Task 3: Recruiting and training leaders

- 1. The Commissioner should utilise programmes to rapidly accelerate some of those who have recently joined the Met as police officers into formal leadership roles, as sergeants and inspectors.** A significant proportion, of between a quarter to a third, of the 500 officers typically promoted to the rank of sergeant annually should be from this cohort.
- 2. The Commissioner should rapidly promote to most talented officers to the most more senior operational and strategic roles.** This should include enabling talented officers to skip ranks and bringing in outsiders with operational policing experience who have gained strategic leadership experience elsewhere.
- 3. Opportunities for the influx of new officers to contribute different ideas to the challenge of fighting crime and disorder should be created.** These should replicate the successes of programmes such as the 2013 - 2016 Commissioner's 100 project and the Police Rewired project.
- 4. The Commissioner should initiate a rapid review of initial recruit training.** If necessary the Met should be willing to withdraw from commercial relationships and the new Policing Educational Qualifications Framework if there is no likelihood of the necessary operational standards being met in short order. This review should include the appointment of a new training leadership team.
- 5. The Commissioner should implement a new programme of leadership, management and operational development for leaders across the Met.** The Commissioner should consider re-establishing a new Leadership Academy for this purpose.
- 6. Sergeants and inspectors should receive training and instruction in relation to impartiality in policing.** This is particularly relevant for the policing of confrontational protesting where officers should be cautioned against making potentially politically partisan statements or acts.
- 7. The Commissioner should consider advising the government to conduct a further review of the College of Policing to establish whether the organisation is providing value for money.** This is in particular following the highly critical Fundamental Review of the College despite there being the investment of over half a billion in public funds over the last decade.
- 8. The Commissioner should commission an independent legal review to provide guidance to policing leaders on how best to approach the legal landscape relating to confrontational protest.** The Commissioner should work with the Home Office to ascertain whether the existing legal framework is enabling or hindering officers from being able to deal effectively with confrontational protests.

Fighting Crime and Reconnecting with the Public

Task 1: Rebuilding ward-based neighbourhood policing teams

1. **The Commissioner must clearly articulate the importance of neighbourhood policing teams to the Met's crime fighting and public confidence mission.** This should be done on their first day in office.
2. **The core activities of neighbourhood policing teams should be articulated within the Met, to the public, and to partner agencies.** They should be:
 - i. Providing a visible uniformed policing presence on the streets.
 - ii. Visibly tackling what **local people** perceive as being the most important crime and disorder issues in their area primarily through problem-solving techniques.
3. **Neighbourhood policing teams in every ward should be repopulated to the levels previously seen in the early 2000s.** This should include:
 - one Police Sergeant
 - two Police Constables
 - three Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) (or a further three Police Constables if there are currently insufficient PCSOs)
4. **The Commissioner should take steps to prioritise Neighbourhood policing over other teams.** Steps taken should include:
 - i. Officers posted to neighbourhood teams should be posted to those teams for a minimum of two years.
 - ii. All uniformed constables and sergeants seeking promotion should have completed a minimum term on a neighbourhood policing team before being eligible for promotion. This should be a posting of at least one year.
 - iii. Neighbourhood officers should not be classed as a 'taskable' resource to be deployed to 'Outstanding Incidents'¹⁹⁸. These incidents should be dealt with by Emergency Response Patrol Teams.
 - iv. All officers posted to neighbourhood policing teams should be ring-fenced from any other duties with only the most serious exceptions. Exceptions should include the policing of New Year's Eve and the Notting Hill Carnival, in addition to responding to very serious incidents such as terrorist attacks.
5. **Police officers and PCSOs posted to neighbourhood policing teams should use mapping tools to show on social media where they are conducting patrols.** Officers should spend a significant proportion of their time conducting foot-patrol.

198. 'Outstanding Incidents' are the list of incidents originating from calls by the public to either 999 or 101 which still require police attendance

Task 2: Giving the power to the people

- 1. Neighbourhood officers should present the impact of their work to the public every 100 days.** This should be done in person and online so local people can see the activity undertaken by the police and the impact that activity is having on crime and disorder in their local areas.
- 2. Officers should publish on at least a monthly basis the amount of time that they have spent on key activities.** These activities should include:
 - i. the specific local crime and disorder priorities set by the public;
 - ii. general foot-patrol duties in 'hot-spot' areas; and
 - iii. local public confidence building activities.
- 3. The Met should invest in and use app-based hyper-local polling tools.** Local neighbourhood teams should use these to understand the crime and disorder issues which most concern local people.
- 4. The Commissioner should invest in ensuring that every neighbourhood officer, new and existing, is trained to the highest standard with delivering their vision of neighbourhood policing.** This should include:
 - Patrolling in a way that increases the public's confidence in local policing;
 - Using the tools which enable them to understand which crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour problems local people think are the most important to deal with;
 - Using problem solving techniques to resolve crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour problems; and
 - Communicating back to the public what has been achieved.

Task 3: A rapid, professional and transparent media response

- 1. The Commissioner should appoint a spokesperson who provides daily briefings to the media on the Met's work.** It is essential that this person has the skills and experience to be able to communicate across the full range of the Met's strategic, performance, and day-to-day operational work.
- 2. The Commissioner should commit to conducting interviews with the press and broadcast media on a regular basis.** This will provide an opportunity for the issues that the Met faces, and the progress against plans to deal with them, to be presented to the public on a regular basis.
- 3. A social media rapid response capability should be established within the Met.** This will enable the Met to monitor social media 24 hours a day every day to identify any incidents within London where police officers are involved.
- 4. A rapid response media policy should be established to deal with incidents immediately when they appear on social media.** At a minimum this should include (within minutes and hours

rather than days and weeks):

- an immediate public acknowledgement of the incident;
 - a detailed summary of the available officers' and witnesses' version of events;
 - officers' body worn video footage;
 - CCTV where it is available;
 - links to relevant policies and data, for example concerning police use of force; and,
 - a short video statement by a senior police officer or the Commissioner's spokesperson.
5. **The Met should establish a detailed use of force database for public access.** This should include officers' body worn video footage, links to use of force policies and wider data on the use of force by police officers.

Police Officer Misconduct

Task 1: Setting the standard

1. **The Commissioner must take an unequivocal stance in relation to police misconduct with nothing short of a zero-tolerance attitude to criminality and unlawful discrimination by officers.** On their first day in office the Commissioner should clearly articulate how they intend to address the issues raised around police officer misconduct.
2. **Wherever possible those leading reviews into the Met should provide a public report (an interim report if need be) within the Commissioner's first 100 days in office.** The Met should simultaneously provide their response and plan to deal with the issues identified.
3. **The government should review the regulations relating to police officer misconduct.** The government should urgently consider two immediate changes to removing the role of Legally Qualified Chairs and the involvement of legal advisers at misconduct hearings.
4. **The police vetting process should be overhauled in order that a significant number of officers are selected to be re-vetted on an annual basis.** This should include interviews with officers' colleagues and members of the public that the officer has dealt with, the dip sampling of electronic records and detailed reviews of officers' social media platforms. Every police officer should be subject to random drug testing on at least an annual basis.
5. Further research should be undertaken to ascertain the effectiveness of psychological screening for vetting purposes.

Task 2: Applying 'broken windows' to misconduct

- 1. The Commissioner's expectations of frontline leaders in dealing with minor conduct or competence issues should be articulated without delay.** Sergeants and inspectors should receive training as to the standards expected and the importance of dealing with officers who repeatedly fail to achieve the necessary standards of conduct or competence.
- 2. Local Professional Standards Units should be reviewed to ensure that they are staffed by savvy and professional investigators.** Local Professional Standards Units should focus on dealing effectively with officers who have repeated low-level performance and conduct issues.
- 3. Officers who are repeatedly subject to 'Reflective Practice' should be progressed to formal misconduct hearings for collective failings rather than waiting for a single more serious act of misconduct.**
- 4. The performance and conduct standard for officers to complete the initial police officer training phase and moving to operational duties should be significantly increased.** Professional Standards investigators should be permanently attached to training environments to enable processes to be undertaken and concluded at speed.

Task 3: Expanding public insight and community inspection

- 1. The Commissioner must review the Met's own plans linked to the Race Action Plan to ensure that they are fit for purpose in relation to the policing of London.** The focus should be on ensuring that any plans ultimately contribute to preventing what is one of the cruellest disproportionalities in our society - that if you are black you are more than five times more likely to be killed than if you are white.
- 2. The Commissioner should take care not to be drawn into the debate over whether the Met and British policing more widely is or is not 'institutionally racist'.** The terminology itself is widely misunderstood and remains politically contested.
- 3. The Met's Strategic Insights Unit's existing analytical products on the effectiveness and disproportionate use of police tactics should be published at the earliest opportunity.** As part of developing the Met's understanding of what works in tackling violent crime the capacity of the Met's Strategic Insight Unit should also be increased in order that the most effective tactics can be identified.
- 4. A dashboard should be created to provide the public with data on police conduct and public complaints relating to police officers.** The Met's existing Use of Force Dashboard should be used as a model.
- 5. The Met should do more to consult with people in London's**

communities on the tactics the Met should use to combat serious violence on London's streets. The focus should be on working with local communities directly rather than working with elite groups including independent advisory groups or oversight panels.

- 6. The independent visitor scheme should be expanded beyond custody suites to other parts of policing.** With appropriate vetting, members of local communities could be permitted access to police stations and other buildings across the Met enabling them to visit canteens, observe team briefings, and conduct 'ride-alongs' without prior notice.



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