Qatar: Friend or Frenemy?

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Executive Summary and Introduction

Over the next month, the eyes of the world will focus on the splendour of the World Cup. After several years of a global pandemic, war in Ukraine and a recession which affects every home in the country, it is to be hoped football can put a smile back on our faces. But has the UK’s relationship with Qatar received the critical examination it deserves.

Over recent years, increasing focus has been paid to Qatar’s human rights record, with a particular focus on its record on LGBT rights, the status of women, and modern slavery. By 2013, it was clear researchers were uncovering evidence of horrific abuse of overseas labourers in Qatar, often of workers from Nepal. Between 4 June and 8 August 2013, the Nepalese Embassy in Doha recorded the deaths of 44 Nepalese workers, primarily from heart attacks, heart failure, and workplace accidents. In a shocking exclusive in February 2021, research by The Guardian, using data from official sources, found some 6,500 migrant workers from India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka had died in Qatar since the country was awarded the World Cup. The overall figure of workers deaths was likely to be higher, as this did not include workers from countries such as Kenya and the Philippines, who had also entered the country in significant numbers. Many of the deaths which occurred among Qatar’s two million strong migrant workforce were marked as being due to natural causes, a position openly criticised in a 2021 Amnesty International report. This found men in their 30s and 40s dying without warning, often in their sleep after working long shifts in terrible heat. Whilst new legislation introduced by the Qatari authorities has provided some mitigation in terms of working practices, Amnesty argued much more was needed to be done to protect labourers. In the run-up to the World Cup, a reminder was received that Qatar’s treatment of women can at times appear instinctive and brutal. In October 2020 an abandoned new-born baby was found in a bin at Doha airport. The Qatari authorities responded by removing 16 women from Australia, New Zealand and the UK from a flight, and conducting gynaecological examinations without the women’s consent. The Qatari Prime Minister subsequently took to social media to insist what happened ‘does not represent Qatar’s laws or values.’

What has received less attention is Qatar’s role in facilitating and funding Islamist ideologues and providing a base for them, including promulgating Islamist ideas across Europe and supporting groups such as

5. KBKAlThani, 30 October 2020: https://twitter.com/KBKAIrThani/status/1322131367879188480
the Muslim Brotherhood and the proscribed terrorist organisation Hamas. The main section of this report catalogues and analyses this process, across many years. In its foreign policy, Qatar has often pursued a route in conflict with British interests -- for example supporting Islamists in Libya and hosting Hamas. It has been accused of tolerating private funding of Islamist terror groups.

Whilst Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have increasingly moved away from supporting political Islam, Qatar has taken a different approach. European research has exposed that Qatar is funding an assertive Islamist milieu in the West. The need to look closely at Qatari funding of Islam in the West is emphasised by its track record in the Gulf. It has hosted Hamas and Taliban representatives in Doha, and its support for the Muslim Brotherhood, stretching back many decades, became a serious source of friction with its neighbours. Far from changing its outlook after being awarded the World Cup in 2010, in 2011 Qatar increased its support for the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab Spring.

In this country Qatar has invested in both British Islam and in the education and academic fields, with little public scrutiny or debate. UK universities have received at least £25m from Qatari sources, in addition to Qatari investment in community centres and in schools, including Batley Grammar. This report sets out specific concerns regarding the views of some individuals who have been involved in some of these projects in senior roles.

For example, the Emaan Islamic Centre in Sheffield has received millions of pounds of funding from Qatar, principally from the Nectar Trust (formerly Qatar Charity UK, or QCUK). Recent trustee, Ahmed Al-Rawi, Director of the Emaan Islamic Centre in Sheffield until 2020, has previously signed a statement supporting Iraqi and Palestinian uprisings, including against British troops.6 The founding chairman and chief executive of QCUK was a Qatari official, Yousuf Al-Kuwari, who was also the founder of Islamweb -- a website that has published fatwas stating that it is “forbidden” to swear an oath to obtain British citizenship.7 It has also published warnings to its Muslim readership against befriending Jews and Christians; one statement reads: “It is incumbent to hate them for the sake of Allah”.8 QCUK stated that during Al-Kuwari’s time as Islamweb chairman “he was not involved in the development or moderation of the website’s content or in its daily management”.9 It added, “The views and contents expressed in the website do not reflect the views of Mr al-Kawari [sic.] and cannot be attributed to him. They certainly do not reflect the views of and cannot be attributed in any way to QCUK.” Although Al-Kuwari resigned as chief executive of the Nectar Trust in May 2018, he retains his influence on QC’s European strategy as the chief executive of QC.10

While far from all of the partnerships that Qatar is involved in will be problematic, Qatar’s track record of supporting groups and individuals that promote global Islamism; the concerns presented over individuals involved in at least some projects in the UK; and the fundamentally

6. Nicholas Rufford and Abul Taher, British Muslim says troops are fair target, 31 October 2004. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/british-muslim-says-troops-are-fair-target-r0n9k965w
8. Ibid.
different values between Qatar and the UK, including on LGBT rights and religious freedom, mean that the nature of their relationships and cultural investments require more scrutiny than they have received today.

This report shines a spotlight into areas of Qatar, and its relationship with Britain, that deserve public examination. We hope that the attention of the World Cup will cause public awareness to be raised about Qatar’s role in supporting global Islamism.

Policy Recommendations

- The Department for Education should identify, track and scrutinise Qatari funding within the education system. This should include:
  - **DfE to instruct and resource the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (OFSTED) to issue guidance to inspectors to increase their focus on Qatari materials and programmes.** This should set out that where a school is using Qatari-funded materials or programmes to support its teaching, or materials funded by another overseas nation where there are concerns over the promotion of Islamist extremism, these are considered carefully in any inspection, with a particular focus on the content of materials or matters taught.
  - **DfE to issue guidance to the Office for Students (OfS) to increase its scrutiny of Qatari funding.** The Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill’s proposal of compulsory disclosure to the Office for Students of all overseas funding above a certain threshold from non-allied countries is an encouraging first step. This must be implemented, and support sought where necessary by the Office for Students from the Commission for Countering Extremism, and social cohesion specialists at the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, so that action can be taken if funding is linked with extremism.

- **Identify, track and scrutinise Qatari funding, official and unofficial, to Islamic causes, institutions and individuals within the UK.** Qatar has a record of promoting Islamism while claiming the best of intentions. The UK’s social cohesion must come first.

- **A net assessment should be carried out involving long range strategic analysis by a team of specialists working independently from established structures.** It is a type of approach suited to several of the questions which emerge from this report, and would address where in the long-term does Qatar sit in the Islamist movement internationally. Given the relationship between British elites and Qatar, it is crucial that the assessment is conducted independently from departments such as the Ministry of Defence or the intelligence agencies.
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- **The Home Secretary should instruct the Commission for Countering Extremism to conduct an analysis of the impact of overseas state actors, including Qatar, on extremism in the UK.** It is now seven years since the 2015 Government review of the Muslim Brotherhood. The scheduled Prevent review by William Shawcross will reset the compass of our domestic counter-extremism policy and the internal threats the country faces, but we must have a similar focus on the impact of overseas actors, including nation states, on our social cohesion.

- **Distrust and verify, then proceed with clarity.** The Government must not take Qatari leaders at their word when they talk about shared interests as the record shows this is unreliable. The parallels between the earlier British relationship with Saudi Arabia, and that with Qatar, are striking.

- **Provide clarity on, and vigorously prosecute any attempt by Qatar or its proxies to engage in cyber-attacks on British citizens, companies or institutions.** This represents a significant threat to the privacy of ordinary citizens and the integrity of business, the press and governmental institutions.

- **Issue a statement on how the proscription of Hamas impacts upon our relationship with Qatar.** In 2021, the Home Secretary proscribed Hamas in its entirety. Historically Hamas has found a welcoming port in Doha. A statement from the UK government on how the proscription of Hamas in this country impacts upon our relationship with Qatar is overdue.
Something in Disguise: The Case of Qatar

Sir John Jenkins

Introduction

For anyone interested in the affairs of the Middle East and North Africa in recent years, the issue of Qatar has assumed a puzzling centrality. It is tiny, with fewer than 3 million inhabitants, only around 350,000 of them nationals. But it has enormous wealth deriving from its huge reserves of natural gas, mainly in the offshore South Pars/North Dome field, which it shares with Iran. And it has for 30 years sought to exercise an international influence quite disproportionate to its size not just in the Middle East and North Africa but more widely. What sort of state is it; what have been the aims and implications of its highly activist and generously funded external policies; what is its relationship to Islamisms of all sorts; and how should we interpret the highly strained relations it has had with its neighbours and partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for the best part of 20 years now?

This is not simply a regional issue. Qatar has regularly been invoked by ministers of both main political parties in the UK as a friend and partner. Successive governments have sought to maintain good relations in order to benefit from Qatar’s huge energy reserves, to sell defence equipment and to attract Qatari investment into key infrastructural and now energy projects. The Qatars for their part claim already to be a major investor in Britain (though when examined this seems so far to be largely in property and other non-productive assets) and to be on the same side as Britain - and indeed its European allies and the US - in addressing key global challenges and more particularly those in the Middle East and North Africa.

This is at best a partial picture. In practice Qatar has often pursued a foreign policy at odds with British and wider western interests. This has been particularly evident since the 1995 coup which brought the father of the current Emir to power. Shaikh Hamad launched a drive to modernise Qatar’s physical infrastructure, develop its energy resources and actively seek new markets. On the back of the massively increased economic power this gave the country, Qatar also sought aggressively to distinguish itself from its giant neighbour, Saudi Arabia (with which it shares a so-called Wahhabi religious tradition, close cultural ties and tribal affiliations) and promote a highly activist and often interventionist regional policy of support for Islamist groups. The Arab Spring gave Qatar an ideal platform
to support the Muslim Brotherhood – with whom it had had a mutually beneficial relationship since the 1950s7 - and other Islamists in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya (many of whom it actually hosted)8 and indeed, through the funding of Hamas in Gaza,“and of Palestinian factions outside of Gaza.”9 This led to serious tensions with its Arab Gulf neighbours. Qatar, which had also built a largely unexamined reputation as a mediator in conflicts in Lebanon, Yemen and with Palestinian factions, claimed that it simply wished to promote democratic choice.10 This is at odds with the complete absence of democracy within Qatar itself11 and the highly dubious democratic credentials of many of those whom it in practice helped (for example, through hosting conferences, financial transfers and sometimes through massive ransom payments)12 – from Jabhat al Nusra (JaN),13 Hamas and Hezbollah to armed Islamist factions across N Africa, the IRGC and the Taleban.14 The fact that Qatar also allowed Israel in 1996 to open a Trade Office (subsequently closed in 2009) simply illustrates Doha’s desire to balance its equities and, in the words of one analyst, instrumentalise “rented power”.15

There has been very little questioning of this phenomenon within official circles in Britain. This is surprising. In Libya after 2011 joint Qatari and Turkish support was a significant factor in the rise of Islamist militias and the crippling of an emergent electoral process.16 This ran directly against British and wider western interests – and indeed against the expressed preference of most Libyans, as reflected in election results. In the same period there was also significant concern about Qatari (and Kuwaiti) tolerance of private funding to AQ and IS-linked groups in Syria, often associated with the presence within Qatar of individuals designated as foreign terrorists either by the US or the UN or both together – and indeed by some of Qatar’s own neighbours.17

Significant Qatari funding – unaccountable and often disguised – has also been used to support Islamist groups in the US, Britain and elsewhere in Europe over the past two decades.18 It has been used to shape press reporting.19 It is sometimes delivered in carrier bags.20 It has been used openly to support university departments and think tanks which engage in the study of highly contested regional issues (with well-known examples being Qatar’s relationships in different ways with The Brookings Institute and Georgetown University in Washington, Kings College, London, Bristol University and St Antony’s College, Oxford),21 and to build influence within parliamentary and other official circles.22

The precise nature and extent of much of this remain unclear, given the secretiveness of institutions such as the Qatar Foundation (QF), Qatar Charity (QC)23 and other funding mechanisms controlled by the Emiri Diwan or associated with the wider Al Thani family. But a glimpse of how the Qatari operate internationally has been provided by a number of innovative press investigations (originally in the UK by The Sunday Times), several detailed books and other reports which have appeared since 2013, often with a French or World Cup focus but indicative, and highly critical, of the wider impact of often secretive Qatari funding.
activities, particularly in Europe. More recently there has been further press interest, particularly in France and Germany. In the UK, The Times has continued to produce valuable reporting. But by and large there has been remarkably little attention paid in Britain to the way in which Qatari funding may be helping to shape an assertive Islamist milieu within Europe or the United Kingdom in particular and the implications of this for social cohesion and political stability. This is in sharp contrast to the attention given to recent allegations of Russian- or Chinese-funded interference in British political and cultural life.

This whole area has become an area of major concern and public attention in France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and elsewhere within the EU, where policy elites have concluded that the Islamist challenge – associated in continental Europe as much with Turkish as Qatari funding – represents a serious threat to the current social and political order. It is time we took the threat equally seriously in this country. There will, of course, be other sources of funding on which Islamists can draw. But in recent years Qatar has been far and away the most prominent Arab state funder of such activities.

This paper will therefore seek to address the following questions:

- How should we understand the objectives of Qatari political leaders, both in their own region and in the UK and wider Europe?
- What are the major funding institutions and sources at their disposal to pursue these objectives?
- How much funding has been made available over the last 20 years to pursue these objectives?
- How much has been directed towards causes, institutions or individuals specifically within the UK?
- What has been the impact of this funding?
- How much official and non-official scrutiny has been made of these activities?
- What has been the position of successive British governments towards them?
- What can we conclude from this?
- What assessment can we make of the benefits or disbenefits that have flowed to Britain from Qatari funding?
- What are the implications for HMG’s future policy towards Qatar?
- What are the implications more generally for the future investigation and control of funding flows from foreign governments, institutions and individuals to activist and partisan groups and individuals within Britain?

The Background
When I first went to the Gulf, in 1983, these questions would have seemed bizarre. Kuwait had become an independent and fully sovereign state in 1961, in part a response to the upheavals in Iraq after the collapse
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of the Baghdad Pact and the bloody republican-nationalist military coup of 1958. But the states of the lower Gulf, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE - 7 emirates which had once constituted the Trucial States - only achieved independence in 1971, after a tortuous and often bad-faith process of British disengagement (driven by economic weakness and the antipathy of the Labour Party to the residues of empire) which left a legacy of distrust that endures to this day.

The Gulf I knew in those days was an entirely different beast to the one western tourists and business travellers now see - the glitzy towers, internationalised beach resorts and malls of Dubai, the elegant urban landscape of Abu Dhabi or the extraordinary modernist architecture of Doha’s West Bay district. Abu Dhabi had turned itself from a small coastal town of barasti huts, with an Arab fort, the British Political Agency and the Standard Chartered Bank its only major landmarks, into a vibrant modern city. But it was still recognisably Middle Eastern. Large parts remained ramshackle. Dubai was centred on the Creek. No one drove between the two cities at night if they could help it: wandering camels could be lethal in the dark. Relationships between the ruling families of the 7 emirates were occasionally fractious. And political debates – often in private between rulers and their representatives but played out in public during the first years of the new federation - could be fierce, as they had been ever since the suppression of nascent merchant-led constitutional movements in the 1930s. The Gulf, so long administered from Bombay, whose traditional trade was oriented not north or west but towards the Indian Ocean, East Africa and Iran, was increasingly open to the political currents and contestations of the wider Arab world. Kuwait in particular was seen as the conduit for Arab nationalist and Islamist currents in the region. Its national assembly was a crucible of controversy, fuelled by the attempts of the ruling Sabah family to dilute its power and that of the leading merchant families. It had been in Kuwait that Yasir Arafat and Khalil al Wazir had founded Fatah in the 1950s. It was a centre of funding for revolutionary movements in Oman and Yemen. It boasted of being the most politically and socially radical state in the entire Gulf.

The rest of the Gulf, not least Doha, was sleepy and conservative. There was certainly some reason to believe that this would not always be the case. Restive labour movements had existed in the region since the discovery of commercially viable quantities of hydrocarbons in the 1930s. Many Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi Islamists had migrated to the Gulf, particularly after Nasser’s suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1954, drawn by the pressing need the emerging states had for teachers, doctors, lawyers and engineers. And after 1948 and then 1967 Palestinian émigrés of all political persuasions helping to staff newspapers, radio and TV stations and act as worldly and politically savvy advisors to the sheikhs.

But under the paternalistic rule of Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan in Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum in Dubai, Shaikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa in Bahrain, Shaikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani in Qatar, successive Sabah Emirs in Kuwait and indeed Sultan Qaboos bin
Said Al Said in Oman (whose trajectory has always been at an angle to its neighbours) the young Gulf states focused on domestic development, including the creation of a patrimonial economic system of favoured merchant families protected against external competition. They sought to insulate themselves from the violent conflicts of the wider region under the umbrella of the Arab League, implicit security guarantees from the permanent members of the UNSC and, after the shock of the Iranian Revolution and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, through the collective defensive huddle of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).36

Each of the smaller GCC states had concerns about claims by their neighbours on parts or all of their territories, often driven by known or suspected reserves of energy. Historically, the emerging and expansionist third Saudi state37 had laid claim to most if not all of the Arabian peninsula. And some of these claims remained in force. In 1971 Riyadh seized the strategic Khour al Udaid – between Abu Dhabi and Qatar and claimed by both - giving it unimpeded maritime access to the lower Gulf. Oman had disputes with the UAE around Jebel Hafit, just outside Al Ain, and over smaller enclaves to the North-East. It also had a dispute with KSA over parts of their mutual border. Bahrain and Qatar still dispute ownership of the Hawar islands and came to blows for a day in 1986 over a reef, Fasht al Dibl, only visible at low tide. There were border clashes in 1992 between Qatar and KSA (and very briefly in the late 1970s over their internal border between Abu Dhabi and Dubai).38 And in 2002 KSA briefly withdrew its ambassador from Doha. The UAE had a long-standing dispute with KSA over land around the Buraimi oasis39 and on the edge of the Empty Quarter to the west and south (involving a major shared oil field).40 Kuwait, where the memory of raids by the destructive Ikhwan of the emerging Saudi state in 1920 remained vivid, had disputes with Riyadh over what was known as the Neutral Zone to its South and also with Iraq, which from time to time claimed the whole of the country, over the precise demarcation of their land and maritime borders in the North. Iran claimed Bahrain41 – and with British acquiescence had occupied three islands belonging to Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah in 1971, on the very eve of UAE independence, giving it strategic control of the approaches to the Straits of Hormuz. Bahrain had administered much of the Qatar peninsula until the mid-C19th. And many members of the Al Khalifa were buried there – in Zubarah. This remains a source of tension.

There were also frictions, particularly in Kuwait, where the Sabah had naturalised - for political purposes - many tribal individuals whom urban Kuwaitis regarded as historically Saudi or Iraqi, and a large underclass had been created of other stateless tribal individuals known as “bidoun” - the Arabic for “without” (sc jinjiya/ citizenship) but also a pun on “bedu”. In Bahrain, KSA and Qatar there was suspicion about the allegiances in particular of the Murrah – a large tribe which straddled the borders of all three, sometimes swapped citizenship and for complex reasons was not fully trusted in any. In addition, there were other questions of divided loyalties, with some elements of the Bahraini ruling family, the so-called
Khawalid, seen as closer to Riyadh, and the Qawasim ruling families of two of the UAE's northern emirates (Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah), having historical and religious sympathies with the Wahhabis of Nejd (and indeed, as with the Khawalid, a resentful memory of power lost through British intervention).

By and large these disputes were managed, to be discussed only between rulers or their close representatives with a view to compromise or postponement. This was a very Arab way of doing things, consonant with the political culture in which the rulers of the time had been raised. There was always a fear that KSA, by virtue of its size, wealth, weight and significance, might bully them into concessions (as indeed had happened in 1974 with Shaikh Zayed). But this was infrequent. KSA was largely recognised as the first among equals. And there was always a deal to be made which would postpone any final resolution of a dispute to any party’s lasting disadvantage.

All Change
This dispensation was inevitably going to change as new, younger and more self-confident political elites emerged. The first sign of this was not in the traditionally “progressive” Kuwait or Bahrain but with the unexpected 1995 palace coup in Doha which saw Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifa overthrow his father (then in Switzerland for medical treatment).

The Gulf Dispute
This coup, together with subsequent unsuccessful Saudi attempts to reverse it, represent an inflection point, fundamentally challenging the nature of intra-Gulf relationships. Qatar, the only other so-called Wahhabi state in the world, had been subordinate to Riyadh since independence. But its possession of vast reserves of gas, an increasingly strategic element in the post-1973 global energy mix, was already making it wealthier on a per capita basis than any of its neighbours. And this produced both a new sense of self-confidence and an awareness of increased vulnerabilities, as a rich state with a micro-population and an inherently indefensible national territory. Kuwait had responded to a similar challenge after 1990 by doubling down on its international relationships with protector powers, such as the US and KSA. Bahrain had moved closer to Riyadh, the US and the UK. The UAE had made itself indispensable regionally as an entrepot and a trade and finance hub – and had started both to build impressively capable if inevitably small armed forces and to design innovative methods of governance. Qatar – while offering military facilities to the US (at the huge airbase in al Udaid, designed to replace facilities in KSA which had become awkward because of domestic Saudi politics) and to Turkey (in an echo, not lost on its neighbours, of the Ottoman garrisons in the C19th Gulf) - chose a different path.

And it was this that led eventually to the split between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt on one side, and Qatar on the other, which erupted – but did not originate - in 2014.
This dispute – which, particularly after the 2021 GCC Summit at Al ‘Ula in KSA, has now been parked but not resolved – illustrates the impact of some important and often neglected structural features of the region as it currently stands. A more detailed consideration of its causes can help us identify where our real national interests might lie.

Many analysts at the time seemed to believe that the fundamental reason for this dispute – as with more recent events in Saudi Arabia – was a clash of princely egos, between senior Saudi royals, Shaikh Muhammad bin Zayed of the UAE and King Hamad of Bahrain on one side and Shaikh Hamad, his then Foreign Minister, Shaikh Hamad bin Jassim, and his son and successor Shaikh Tamim in Doha. This was both patronising and misconceived. The crisis arose out of the logic of five decades of Gulf socio-economic development, the evolution of different, politically legitimating discourses and the urgent challenge of all varieties of political Islamism. It reflected important emerging differences in the political sociology of the Gulf. And it posed fundamental questions – not just about the GCC, but about the future of the wider region.

A proximate cause of the dispute was the Muslim Brotherhood, the role it and its affiliates had played during the so-called Arab Spring and massive Qatari support for it and other Islamist groups (which does not, of course, extend to support for Islamist groups or indeed dissent and investigative journalism in general - inside Qatar itself). As many pointed out at the time, it is perhaps surprising that the Brotherhood should have become such a contentious issue. Links between the Gulf and the Brotherhood go back to its foundation. Hassan al Banna, like many others in the region, saw in the rise of the Saudi state after 1902 an emblematically authentic Arab and Muslim response to colonialism and the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate. By his own account – and that of the not entirely reliable Lebanese memorialist, Amin al Rayhani – the two had established a personal relationship by the late 1920s. Abdul Aziz famously forbade the MB to organise formally in the Kingdom. But he also reportedly invited al Banna twice to settle in the Hejaz, once in 1928 and a second time after the Egyptian Government had sought to dissolve the Brotherhood in 1948, just before al Banna’s assassination. The annual Hajj, where al Banna and his successor, Hassan al Hodeibi, were allowed to operate freely, was the key to much of the MB’s early proselytisation and its later reconstitution. By the early 1950s, the MB had also managed to organise in Kuwait and Bahrain – politically the most advanced of the emerging states. Riyadh in particular gave huge material and moral support to the Muslim Brotherhood and related groups, from the late 1920s down to the 1980s. In response to Nasserism and Baathism, its rulers encouraged pan-Islamism. King Saud sought to intercede with Nasser on the MB’s behalf during the crisis of 1954 after the attempted assassination of Nasser and received al Hodeibi in Jeddah. King Faisal gave material help to the Brotherhood’s major public intellectual and would-be insurgent, Sayyid Qutb, while he was in prison and asked Nasser in 1966 to spare his life; Qutb’s works were published in Jeddah even when they were banned.
elsewhere. Faisal and his successors allowed prominent Egyptian Brothers in exile, such as Qutb’s brother, Muhammad, to establish themselves in business, government or universities inside the Kingdom.  

But in each instance, the driving impulse was raison d’État not ideological convergence. The Saudis wished to harness the Brotherhood as an instrument of statecraft, in the battle against other more immediate and obviously revolutionary threats. If they were short-sighted, they were not alone. Certainly, the policy came back to haunt them. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, welcomed by the Muslim Brotherhood internationally, exposed the deep fault lines in the Arab world between republicans, monarchists, pro-Palestinians, nationalists, Islamists, rich and poor. It suggested that the pan-Islamist aims of the MB, and other more extreme groups which sprang from it, might be irreconcilable with the increasingly worldly and national ambitions of prosperous Gulf states. This led to a temporary estrangement of the Kuwaiti Brotherhood from the main international current of the Brotherhood.

In addition, in some places the presence of committed proselytising and increasingly Salafised Muslim Brothers and the support provided to the MB and its offshoots by Saudi religious institutions produced an ideological ferment, combining MB political activism and Qutbist takfiris with an intense Salafi focus on issues of doctrine and personal conduct. From the 1960s this produced a regional movement – known as the Islamic Sahwa (“Awakening”) – which came in the 1990s to pose a powerful ideological challenge to existing political dispensations. In the eyes of some, this helped set the scene for the al Qaeda-related terror campaigns of the early 2000s. In reality, the connections were complex and often indirect, fuelled as much by ideological fissures as by agreement. But this is characteristic of all Islamist movements. And the perception of threat was heightened by the involvement of Sahwa scholars in the petitions movement fuelled by the US presence in the Kingdom after 1990.

The unease this all caused perhaps became first apparent when the then Chief Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz, issued fatwas in the late 1990s, stigmatising the MB as deviationists. Then in 2002 came a more decisive caesura when, in an Arabic press interview, the late Prince Naif spoke bitterly about the Saudi and Kuwaiti experience in 1990/91 and accused the MB of betraying the trust of the Gulf States. Some claim this was stimulated by the MB seeking to organise in the Kingdom after all, particularly among women. In fact, it was symbolic of a more decisive parting of ways between the Saudis and the Brotherhood.

This complex experience fuelled existing rivalries in the Gulf. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE it combined in 2012/13 with a cacophony of events arising out of the Arab Spring: the rise of MB-inflected politics in Tunisia; the Brotherhood victory in Egypt; a new MB assertiveness in Jordan and indeed the Gulf (notably Kuwait); and the appearance of MB-associated movements in Libya, alongside and sometimes in alliance with violent Takfiris, supported by Qatar. This sense of “Islamism on the march” helped provoke the regional counter reaction.
Those who had welcomed the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi and Hosni Mubarak were exclusively states that had themselves experienced a revolution (like Iran, Tunisia or later Libya), or those (like Qatar or Turkey) that had supported Islamist revolutionaries without reserve and saw an opportunity, particularly in Egypt, to advance their purposes – irrespective of the non-Islamist majority of protestors. The Saudis and the Emiratis in contrast were appalled and acquiesced with bad grace in the 2012 electoral victory of the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party in Cairo. Thereafter, there was external intervention on both sides of the emerging political conflict in Egypt from 2012 onwards.  It is worth underlining that the eventual success of the anti-MB forces would not have been possible, for all the efforts of certain influential figures and external funding, without substantial domestic support, based on rational assessments of the MB’s competence and not unreasonable fears about their intentions, from ordinary Egyptians and the institutions of state.

Yet all of this brought into sharp focus a fundamental policy divergence with profound implications for the future of the Gulf (and indeed the Arab world as a whole). Broadly speaking, there were three distinct ways of construing 2011 and its aftermath: first, those who saw and in some cases still see political Islamism, notably but not exclusively in its MB manifestation, as the wave of the future; second, those who saw and see it as a permanent and significant feature of the landscape that needs to be integrated but constrained within existing or emerging security-political systems; and third, those who saw and will always see it as the most serious challenge to the stability of the region, its prosperity and security and the survival of its ruling elites since the high tide of Nasserism in the 1960s.

For the first two groups (which include Qatar and Turkey), the key to the future prosperity and stability of all Arab and perhaps Muslim states was to domesticate political Islamism and harness it as the motor of a modified version of pious authoritarianism in religio-political modernist disguise. Given events since 2013 and the clear fragmentation of the Egyptian Brotherhood in particular, those two groups have needed to live with the counter-revolution. But – given the teleological determinism of most Islamisms – this may not have changed their fundamental stance: they may indeed continue to believe it is only a matter of time before another change takes place.

Those in the third group profoundly disagree, as do many on the receiving end of external interventions in favour of the MB and other Islamisms – for example in Libya and Syria. They believe that the raw will to power underlies all regional politics, given added life by revolution. On this view, the only rulers who can tame this rough beast, generate sustained legitimacy and deliver stability and prosperity are those who arise naturally from the cultural contours of a particular time, place and culture – like themselves. For them, the behaviour of the Brotherhood, from the beginning of the 2011 Revolution in Egypt and most egregiously once they secured power, confirmed beyond a shadow of doubt that the
ultimate goal of the Egyptian Brothers and indeed the MB as a whole, was to gain control of the Arab world’s most populous and culturally resonant state, remake it as a Brotherhood stronghold, arrange matters in such a way that they remained in power indefinitely and use that platform to promote Brotherhood ideology across a region prepared for it by eighty years of sustained effort.\textsuperscript{60} They believe the activities of the MB and its associates in Libya, Tunis and Yemen were part of this plan. They believe the MB would not have stopped at the Red Sea. Nasser, of course, saw the same countries as the key to his own very different hegemonic ambitions: many in the Gulf feared this was the Islamist reboot.\textsuperscript{61}

In particular, many senior Saudis came to believe that the shape-shifting nature of radical Islamist thought in general was a direct threat to national cohesion and identity, at a time when such things were more important than ever.\textsuperscript{62} There were clear signs after 2014 that Islamist-inspired and anti-Al-Saud constitutionalism might be stirring again, alongside \textit{haraki} and \textit{takfiri} Salafi activism, linked to events in Syria and Iraq.\textsuperscript{63} Riyadh wanted to prevent that. And the Saudis did – and do - not want the two holy cities, Mecca and Medina, used as convening points for Sunni Islamists (any more than by Iran) as happened in the MB’s foundational years and at times of trial and exile. The measures put in place since 2015 by Prince Muhammad bin Salman – as well as the repression of Islamists such as Salman al Awdah, Muhammad al Arifi and Awadh al Qarni and indeed the savage murder of Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 – have clearly had an effect in cowing Islamists and other opponents of the new dispensation. But it would be a mistake to assume they have simply disappeared.\textsuperscript{64}

Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia see the Muslim Brotherhood as a secretive, partisan, double-talking and divisive organisation. They reckon it is dedicated to a self-defined purification of Islam and the establishment of a transnational Islamic State, through incremental but ultimately revolutionary political activism, using tactical violence if necessary. To this end, it mimics some central features of a state, through its hierarchical structure and the requirement for members to swear an exclusive oath of loyalty to the Murshid. But it repudiates national identity and any loyalty other than that to the Murshid and God. \textsuperscript{65}

The Gulf rulers have concluded that this represents a dangerously and deliberately radical misreading of Islamic history in the service of anarchy (their term). Islam needs no purification. For the Saudi elite, the Kingdom is already a perfectly satisfactory Islamic State, whose ruler is religiously legitimate – manifested in his ability to enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong\textsuperscript{66} and by the unity of belief and of country. All Saudis owe absolute loyalty to him, as Wali al Amr, in the Hanbali (and now Madkhali) tradition, as they interpret it, of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, Ibn Taimiyya and Ibn Qaim al Jawziyya.\textsuperscript{67} Anyone who acknowledges fealty to another is therefore disloyal by definition. This is analogous to their problem with those Shia who acknowledge the temporal and spiritual sovereignty of an external Shia religious authority – as implied in the heterodox doctrine of \textit{Wilayat al Faqih} (or indeed the Shirazi doctrine of
something in disguise: the case of qatar

shura al fuqaha’). It is not principally for the governing elite a question of being shia. it is a question of territorial allegiance and loyalty to a sovereign individual. they have been engaged now for at least two decades in the delicate task of constructing a national identity precisely based on loyalty to the ruling dynasty and its reading of islam, as well as a set of defined – if necessarily constructed – territorial and historical characteristics, an instantiation and inracination of islam in rather than against the world.68

the crown prince is clearly bent on modernising, not just the business structures of the kingdom, but also its social and educational acquis in the service of a new and more open economic model. this is high risk: talk of fantastic robot cities like neom and regular arrests may simply be cover for a massively ambitious attempt to remake the kingdom without losing the foundational legitimacy of the al saud – and their own authority.69

it can also look high-handed. and political islamism of all sorts (not least because it will give political meaning to resistance from the more traditional ulema) is a threat to this project. the saudis know it has historically had substantial support within the kingdom itself. at the time of the clearing of the squares in egypt in mid-2013 there was an upsurge of sympathy for the egyptian brotherhood on saudi social media. in 2014 washington institute polling suggested 31% of saudis supported the mb while three years later polling suggested the current figure was 25% (a figure not that dissimilar to other arab countries).70 that is not a plurality. but it suggests a latent vulnerability if other things were to go wrong.

in a similar way, the emiratis, in particular the leadership of abu dhabi, who acknowledge a more diverse religious tradition than the saudis (dominantly maliki, inflected by imported sufism and shiism, as well as the other orthodox schools of sunni islamic jurisprudence), see the brotherhood not just as subversive but as reactionary and socially illiberal. to their minds it is opposed to everything they stand for in terms of a neo-patrimonial arab and islamic, highly securitised and segmented, but also socially permissive modernity. they reject the argument that political islamism is an irresistibly rising tide. they see it as a real threat to the prosperity and cohesion of the uae, based as that prosperity is on an acceptance that cultures can meet, acknowledge each other, celebrate difference, prosper and still remain intact in a small, rich country with strongly conservative social traditions and major global ambitions in the southern gulf at the hub of continents. for them the choice is a controlled aggiornamento – a modern mirror of the centuries when the multicultural trading towns of the gulf flourished in the interstices of the ottoman, persian and british empires – or a religious closure.71

you might say, so what – this is small potatoes. but emirati leaders are acutely aware of their vulnerability – unsurprising when you have the sort of highly successful, but demographically lop-sided and materially vulnerable socio-economic structure of the uae. that is why the emiratis were angered by the licence given to yusuf al qaradawi, the mb’s principal jurist until his retirement in 2020, and others, on al jazeera and elsewhere, publicly to question their islamic credentials and therefore
their political legitimacy. With at most some 1.5 million nationals in a total population of around 10 million they feel the challenge – in a way larger states might not – of maintaining harmony among large and diverse expatriate populations and solidarity among still highly conservative nationals. They think the MB have instrumentalised the Gulf once before and would do so again. And they are wary of a residual underlying fragility of relations among the constituent parts of the Federation – particularly the northern and largely Hanbali Qawasim emirates – and with some powerful neighbours. Some may dispute this. But if you speak to senior Emiratis there is no escaping the depth of feeling. And the fact is, they have a point.

In both countries, the memory of a powerful Muslim Brotherhood presence in the education, health and government systems since the 1950s remains vivid. I have had professionally successful Emiratis vividly describe to me, from their own experience, the psychological pressure to conform to pious and reactionary MB norms exerted by Al Islah on students at Al Ain University in the 1980s and 1990s – something I saw for myself at the time. They recall the xenophobic, reactionary, socially intolerant and often inflammatory tone of Al Islah’s monthly magazine, Al Mujtama’. Above all the rulers know for themselves the attractions of an essentialist, absolutist and self-contained ideology. Some very senior figures will say in private that they only narrowly avoided becoming Brothers themselves. They now see themselves as escapees from a cult (a term they regularly use). They do not intend to be recaptured.

This is not to say that the states of the region believe they can simply crush political Islamism. The issue is fundamentally not about its existence, but about who is allowed to instrumentalise it and whether it will ever genuinely accept subordination to national goals and state authority (as both the Kuwaiti and Bahraini affiliates have at various times done). Saudi and Emirati hostility to activist MB triumphalism after 2011 was not new, nor limited to the late King Abdullah or to Shaikh Muhammad bin Zayed. Furthermore, the proscription of the MB by the Saudis and Emiratis was never likely to lead them to sanction all their other neighbours where the MB has been allowed, within clear bounds, to organise under the supervision of the state (as in Jordan or Morocco, where the ruler’s religious status and splits within Islamist movements in any case provide enhanced guarantees of stability, or indeed Bahrain, where al Minbar has long been a part of the loyalist coalition). The same applied to the Saudi-backed elements of the Syrian opposition between 2012 and 2020, of which the MB, through the Syrian National Council (SNC), with Qatari encouragement, became an integral part both internally and externally. There was certainly pressure on some of these states to do more to rein in the MB. Some of them – particularly Jordan - did. There was also concern about too much Qatari influence through its clients in the SNC. But KSA and the UAE found inventive ways to manage any contradictions, as they also frequently did in Yemen.

The key point is this: as long as Islamists, including the MB, serve the
interests of their host state and its allies, everything is fine. When they become a perceived instrument of fitna – sedition – whether under the direction of external actors or independently – it is not. This is the real quarrel the Saudis and the UAE have with Qatar. They believe that Qatar and Turkey have consistently and in a sustained manner instrumentalised the MB internationally to serve their unilateral visions of a region where political Islamism becomes an instrument of their own national security interests – as defined by AKP ideologues and a small circle of decision makers in Doha. The MB was a willing and active accomplice for them, after decades of lying low. The accession of Shaikh Tamim in 2013 was supposed to provide redress. Many senior Saudis and Emiratis remained sceptical – they told me so - but they were prepared to give Qatar time.79

They eventually concluded that this had not worked. This was not an argument between unaccountable and frivolous individuals. It was a fundamental dividing line about the future not just of the Gulf but of the wider Arab and indeed Islamic worlds. It placed enormous stress on the GCC state system as a whole. And if that was the price to be paid, then so be it.80

And the argument is not simply about the Muslim Brotherhood, or indeed Qatari complaisance in allowing significant funding to reach dangerous terrorist organisations like AQ and the Islamic State. Qatar has regularly sought to interpose itself as a mediator between Hamas (whose oppressive rule in Gaza it has effectively bankrolled for years), Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, the Afghan Taliban and their enemies. Over Iran it has hunted with the hounds and run with the hares.81 And the Saudis remember what they believe to have been Qatari complicity with Muammar al Qaddafi when he was plotting to assassinate then Crown Prince Abdullah in 2001.82 This is quite a record.

And when we reflect on all this, we might conclude that far from this crisis being personality driven, it was the Qatari attempt to instrumentalise Islamists in their own interests and against those of their neighbours that was the problem That does not, of course, mean this is a clash between democracy on the one hand and authoritarianism on the other. Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are each willing to support democrats, oligarchs, liberals and reactionaries depending on the circumstances. It is rather a question of the nature of the state; of national security; of who gets to determine social and political normativity; and of who uses whom – in a region where the real threats are not to political systems but to the existence of states themselves.83

Investments and Influence
This is the context for the choices western governments, including that of the UK, have to make in the complex world of intra-Arab politics. We may think that we do not have to take sides. But if we want any relationships at all, then we must at least have a point of view. If you talk to any of the Gulf leaders, they will often lament the apparent naïveté of western politicians in their dealings with the states of the region. That naïveté sometimes
arises from ignorance. It sometimes arises from condescension, a belief – analogous to that of the India Office in the heyday of empire - that distinguishing between Arab rulers was for lesser powers: Britain rose above such mundane concerns.

There are consequences to this. If – for the sake of argument – Britain were to sell high-end military equipment, such as Typhoon Eurofighter aircraft or its most modern naval vessels to one Gulf state – Qatar for example, then it would make it more likely that the UAE (for example) would buy French. If we make Bahrain our naval base in the Gulf, then it is unlikely that either Qatar or the UAE would make similar facilities available on their territory. There are more purely commercial considerations as well. The Saudis, for example, have made it clear that anyone seeking to do long-term business with them will need to be based in the Kingdom, not in Dubai, Bahrain or Doha. And the Gulf states – like Egypt, for example – feel strong enough to play rival suitors off against one another.

In addition, understanding the nature of the states with which we deal is important more broadly for national security. This is not simply about the MB or other so-called democratic Islamists. From the 1980s onwards, substantial amounts of public and even more private funding flowed from the Gulf to the precursors of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Chechnya and the Balkans, then to AQ itself and subsequently to the Islamic State and related jihadi organisations in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. After the Saudis cracked down on such flows from within the Kingdom, the UN identified Kuwait and Qatar as the main financing hubs. The Qataris claim, with some justification, to have tightened up their laws, procedures and inspection regimes in the last few years. And they have certainly sought to align themselves in public with international development standards and aims, such as the Millennium Development Goals. But there are many who remain highly sceptical that this captures everything, particularly given alternative means of money transfers, the opaque nature of much Qatari official financing and the lack of qualified personnel, compared to other more well-established Gulf development institutions in Kuwait and the UAE.

And Qatari investment – through the secretive Qatari Investment Authority (QIA) or private individuals, often connected to the Royal Court - is rarely associated with start-up, technologically innovative, industrial, science-based or other job creating projects. They are almost invariably take-overs of established businesses, property purchases or minority positions in already profitable businesses. In Britain these have included Sainsbury’s, Heathrow Airport Holdings, British Airways, Harrods, The Shard (and the News Building), Grosvenor House Hotel, The Savoy, Claridge’s, The Berkeley, The Connaught, The Inter-Continental London Park Lane, Canary Wharf Group, the London Stock Exchange, Barclays, East Village in Stratford, Chelsea Barracks, the former US Embassy building in Grosvenor Square and The Ritz.

To a lesser extent, this is a pattern repeated across Europe and the US. Qatar owns the Plaza New York hotel, on the corner of Fifth Avenue and
Central Park, 10 per cent of the Empire State Building and 10 per cent of Tiffany’s, the luxury jewellery retailer. In France, perhaps Qatar’s most high-profile acquisition was its 2011 purchase of the French football giant, Paris Saint-Germain. The Valentino fashion group, luxury fashion house Balmain and the department store chain, Printemps, are all also Qatari-owned. The QIA also has or had holdings in Lagadère, Total and Louis Vuitton. Qatar also (of course) owns the global and highly partisan news organisation, Al Jazeera, its sporting channels spin-off, beIN Sports, and the Hollywood film and television company, Miramax. It was also prepared to invest $375m in Twitter in association with Elon Musk’s bid earlier this year.

Other shareholdings include 25 per cent of St Petersburg Airport, 11 per cent of Volkswagen, 19 per cent of Russia’s leading oil company, Rosneft, 9 per cent of the mining giant, Glencore, 5 per cent of Credit Suisse bank, 3 per cent of Siemens, 9 per cent of RWE and holdings in Glencore, Credit Suisse, Vinci, Deutsche Bank and Hapag-Lloyds.

This doubtless reflects the fact that Qatar has no indigenous internationally competitive businesses looking for investment opportunities elsewhere. It has no domestic science base nor technologies. It has natural gas and vast amounts of cash.

But how beneficial such investments are to the host countries is open to question. So when HMG announces a new trade and investment deal with Qatar, it probably needs to be treated with great caution. As does reported Qatari interest in Birmingham.

Qatar and the Promotion of Islamism in Europe

And this brings us to the core of the problem facing any western government. Is Qatari money – either in terms of payments for trade deals or in inward investment – an unalloyed benefit? And does it come with strings attached?

As we have seen, it is not at all clear that Qatari investment boosts a country’s productive capacity. This is not unique to Qatar. Much Saudi and Kuwaiti investment, for example, follows the same model – seeking a solid rate of return in rents rather than from innovation or job creation. But there is a darker side to Qatari funding, in the facilitation of funding for Islamists in the West. This is another area where precise information is hard to come by – all Qatari institutions are financially opaque. But the French experience is instructive. So is what we know of the activities in the UK. For example, between 2015 and 2019 the Nectar Trust “…received grants totalling more than £37 million from its parent organisation, the Doha-based Qatar Charity, which is banned in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt [although not by the UN with whom it continues to partner on humanitarian projects]. Its British arm has invested millions of pounds in the construction of allegedly Brotherhood-aligned European mosques and Islamic centres including in Sheffield, where it is in partnership with the Emaan Trust. The Emaan Trust’s leaders have included men with close links to the Brotherhood. Another trustee resigned in 2017 after the exposure of his virulently antisemitic views, including the claim that Jews control the world and were responsible for 9/11.”
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The World Cup

Another angle from which to view Qatar as a partner for the UK is through sport, notably the successful but hugely controversial Qatari bid for the 2022 FIFA World Cup in 2016. This was accompanied by well-documented reports of bribery and subsequently the abuse of workers, including significant numbers of reported deaths of construction workers – and more injured - as a result of the harsh climatic conditions, long working hours, abusive contractual conditions and lack of adequate health and safety procedures. FIFA itself was thrown into turmoil by the aftermath of the 2010 vote – and US and Swiss prosecutors followed up with criminal charges against some of those involved. The FIFA executive committee member, Muhammad al Hammam, was subsequently banned by FIFA from football administration for life. But neither he nor any other Qatari has ever been prosecuted. The former FIFA Secretary General, Sepp Blatter (who was acquitted of corruption by a Swiss court in July: the Swiss Attorney General has appealed), now says the decision was a mistake, denies responsibility and blames the French. His successor has allegedly moved his residence to Doha. Doha continues to deny any misconduct.

Indeed it consistently claims that the World Cup will instead be good not just for itself but the region as a whole, in footballing terms and more widely. There is scant evidence that the World Cup has ever really benefited any host country, let alone a wider region. And in spite of repeated claims by Qatar and FIFA, it is unclear how far human rights and labour conditions have genuinely improved. But the line is assiduously pushed by the army of lobbyists which Qatar, like all Gulf states but perhaps more so, employs to improve its image in the US and Europe. Qatar seeks actively and in often disturbing ways to suppress criticism. And Qatari twitter users react with outrage. Occasionally, this effort encounters an insuperable obstacle, as with the clear antisemitism or homophobia of some senior figures, or the failure by recipients of Qatari largesse to declare it. But none of this – or Qatar’s very dubious record in the Middle East and North Africa over the past 25 years – seems to have had any impact on the willingness of western governments to do diplomatic, political or commercial business with it.

This is remarkable. When I was the UK Special Representative to the Libyan National Transitional Council in 2011, I regularly sought to discover both from the Qatari team within the country and, through London and our Embassy in Doha what they were up to. They were not embedded with any of the rebel forces – as the Emiratis were, for example, in the Jebel Nafusa. Their role was rather a funding and supply operation. Once it became clear to me at least that they were supporting an Islamist effort to shape the uprising (as they were also doing at the time in Syria by seeking to insert their clients into the exiled Syrian National Council) I asked London to intervene with the Emir, the Crown Prince and the then Qatari Foreign Minister (who had been instrumental from the start in pushing western states to back the NTC). Nothing happened. I was told...
that the Qataris simply wanted to support democracy. Since they showed no signs of wanting democracy in their own country, this seemed to me unlikely. But I failed to persuade ministers.

And this is the problem. Qatar makes a great public show of being on the side of the angels. But in practice, what they do – and what they finance – is decided by a form of Realpolitik that privileges various manifestations of Islamism and a narrow conception of Qatari national interest above all else. That may well make sense for a small, hyper-rich state in the Gulf which prefers any conflict to happen a long way away from its own borders and seeks to deflect attention from its own shortcomings. But it does not necessarily make sense for us. Our failure to challenge this behaviour has caused problems for us in our external relations with Qatar’s neighbours. And perhaps more important, it has meant we fail to understand Qatari motives in financing various organisations and individuals inside our own country.

Given the experience of the last three decades, we should by now have seen enough of Qatari behaviour – however disguised it might be in the language of benevolence - to be on our guard.
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Endnotes

1. Making it currently the third largest exporter of LNG in the world. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resulting surge in energy prices has been even more beneficial for Qatar, now being wooed by everyone and discussing new long term deals with major international energy companies: see Wayne C Ackerman, Qatar strengthens ties with international energy players through North Field East Project, MEI, 5 July 2022 at https://www.mei.edu/publications/qatar-strengthens-ties-international-energy-players-through-north-field-east-project; Russia’s war helps Qatar boost its influence over global energy flows, The Financial Times, 6 July 2022 at https://www.ft.com/content/eb611a7b-45dd-4eea-ba62-f9fdac68d1d2. This has resulted in one of the highest GDP (PPP) per capita in the world, running in 2021 at around $98,000 and now almost certainly higher (see https://data.worldbank.org/country/qatar?view=chart). Given the huge disparities between Qatari nationals and expatriate workers, who constitute the majority of the population, that probably makes any individual Qatari one of the richest individuals in the world.

2. A good recent account of these issues is Guido Steinberg, Katars Außenpolitik: Entscheidungsprozesse, Grundlinien und Strategien, SWP-Studie 2022/S 12, 31.10.2022, 36 Pages, doi:10.18449/2022S12 at https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/katars-aussenpolitik. Steinberg is not unsympathetic to Qatar – for reason of German national interest - but alive to the dangers of its support for Islamisms of all varieties, from the Muslim Brotherhood to Salafi-jihadi groups, not just in the Middle East and North Africa but in Europe too. He is also aware of the inconsistencies in Qatar’s support for so-called democratic movements elsewhere and its highly authoritarian and family-based system of domestic rule.


4. For example, 24 Eurofighter Typhoons and 9 Hawk Trainers in December 2017, which the then Secretary of State for Defence said was “…a massive vote of confidence, supporting thousands of British jobs and injecting billions into our economy”. See Chris Johnston, Qatar buys 24 Eurofighter Typhoon jets in £6bn deal, BBC, 10 December 2017 at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-42302767. When the deal was confirmed, the same Minister said, “This monumental, multi-billion-pound deal is now officially in place, and
those from across government and industry who have worked so hard on it together can be extremely proud to see it reach this stage. It’s a massive boost to the British defence industry, helping to support thousands of jobs, and it will help us further build the trust between the UK and Qatar to tackle the challenges we both share, support stability in the region and deliver security at home.” See also Qatar jet export deal swings into action at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/qatari-jet-export-deal-swings-into-action.

5 See Qataris to receive visa-free access to UK, invest $12.5 billion, AL Monitor 25 May 2022 at https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/05/qataris-receive-visa-free-access-uk-invest-125-billion and Shanti Das, Qatar lavished British MPs with gifts ahead of World Cup, The Guardian, 29 October 2022 at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/29/qatar-lavished-british-mps-with-250000-worth-of-freebies-ahead-of-world-cup. “Relations between the UK and Qatar have strengthened in recent years. In May, the then prime minister, Boris Johnson, announced a “strategic investment partnership”, which will see Qatar invest in key sectors of the UK economy over the next five years, including fintech, life sciences and cybersecurity. Downing Street said the deal would create new UK jobs and was worth up to £10bn. Days later, the Ministry of Defence announced it would be funding counter-terrorism training for Qatar’s military ahead of the World Cup. Throughout the tournament, the RAF and Royal Navy will provide air and sea support.” It is not just the UK, see Qatar to invest $5 bln in Spain’s EU-funded recovery, Emir says, Reuters 18 May 2022 at https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatar-invest-5-bln-spains-eu-funded-recovery-emir-says-2022-05-18/.

6 Though there is now talk of long-term investment in life sciences, cyber and fintech: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-hails-10-billion-qatari-vote-of-confidence-in-the-uk. We shall see.

7 See the excellent paper by David B Roberts, Qatar’s Strained Gulf Relationships in Young (ed), 2015. Andrew Hammond, Qatar’s leadership transition: like father, like son, ECFR, 11 February 2014 (1) is also helpful. This meant that Qatar could instrumentalise its long-standing relationships with a range of senior Brothers and other Islamists, many of whom were long-term residents in Doha, during the Arab Spring. Shaikh Tamim has inevitably denied that Qatar has links to the MB: see Al Masry Al Youm, Emir of Qatar denies links to Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt Independent, 16 September 2022 at https://egyptindependent.com/emir-of-qatar-denies-links-to-muslim-brotherhood/; “This relation does not exist, and there are no active members of the Muslim Brotherhood or any groups related to it on Qatari land.” It is certainly true that Qatar has encouraged Islamists from time to time to keep a low profile or even to relocate to Istanbul or elsewhere at times when their presence is inconvenient. This may happen for the World Cup: see Qatar free of Muslim Brotherhood, Tactical Report 2022 at https://www.tacticalreport.com/news/article/60431-qatar-free-of-muslim-brotherhood/. The undoubtedly polemical but highly knowledgeable and experienced Albert M Fernandez, So Qatar Is Free of The Muslim Brotherhood? Really?, MEMRI Daily Brief No. 412, 21 September 2022 at https://www.memri.org/reports/
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so-qatar-free-muslim-brotherhood-really is sceptical.

8 So Hammond 2014 (1). “On the eve of Tamim’s accession, Qatar was an oasis of Arab Islamists who were a notable presence in university departments, think tanks, and other non-governmental organisations, while also forming a constant stream of participants at endless seminars and forums. Notably, debates suppressed elsewhere in the Gulf were fair game for public discussion – issues such as stability in Saudi Arabia in a post-uprising environment and the UAE’s handling of Islamists.”

9 See Hammond 2014 (1). “In 2011, Qatar took on the mantle of enabler of distant revolts and benefactor of a network of Islamist groups linked to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. It provided the political and financial muscle for armed rebellions that brought down the emir’s once-close friend Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libya – even sending several hundred troops to help the rebels – and that, while so far unsuccessful, have targeted his other former friend, Bashar Assad in Syria. As well as supporting the Brotherhood government in Egypt, Doha provided loans, hand-outs, and promises of massive investment to the Ennahdha-led government in Tunisia, the Hamas-run government in Gaza, the Syrian Brotherhood, its preferred party among the opposition groups there, and Islamist parties in Libya, Yemen, and Morocco. Al Jazeera promoted their narratives, resulting in a considerable boost for some of these movements during national polls.” Much Qatari funding to Hamas has been with Israeli consent – as a short-term measure to alleviate social conditions in the Gaza Strip. But it in effect subsidises Hamas violence. See Ehud Ya’ari, A Badly Needed New Approach to Quelling the Violence, The Washington Institute, 25 April 2022 at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/badly-needed-new-approach-quelling-violence “…this tiny, affluent emirate has become the primary cheerleader for Palestinian terrorism. Not only does the ruler, Sheikh Tamim [bin Hamad al-Thani], refrain from expressing any criticism of killing sprees on the streets of Israeli cities or speak out against youth turning the al-Aqsa court into a scene of violence, but he also directs his media empire led by the al-Jazeera broadcast network to pour oil onto the flames, constantly exacerbating tensions. For years Doha has been hosting and financing Hamas leadership, including many operatives involved in initiating attacks on Israel. The country has become an important link in the supply chain of terrorism.” The point is emphasised by Professor Shlomo Shpiro in the first part of Kontraste, report-München and Die Zeit 2022, Qatar.Geld. Macht, 20 – 22 September 2022 starting at https://www.daserste.de/information/politik-weltgeschehen/report-muenchen/videos/report-muenchen-geld-macht-katar-folge-1-video100.html, when he remarks that the regular subsidies Qatar supplied direct to Hamas with Israeli consent up until 2021 (subsequently put under UN control) were used not simply for humanitarian purposes but for buying weapons, building rockets and smuggling matériel. But the whole process makes Qatar important to all sides, regardless of the consequences. As the commentary puts it: “Eine schlaue Strategie: wer unverzichtbar ist, wird unangreifbar (A smart strategy: whoever is indispensable is also impregnable).”

10 A constant feature of Qatari diplomacy for three decades, involving – inter alios - Hamas, Hezbollah, Ansar Allah in Yemen – the Houthis – the Taliban and their opponents. None of this has in my view produced lasting results, though interposing themselves in this way
doubtless soothes Qatari vanity: for a recent example, see Elizabeth Hagedorn and Ali Hashem, Cautious optimism as US, Iran set to resume indirect talks in Qatar, AL Monitor, 27 June 2022 at https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/06/cautious-optimism-us-iran-set-resume-indirect-talks-qatar#ixzz7RK2Bxqq.

11 Which makes the remarks of the then Qatari FM, Hamad bin Jassim, at a press conference in Cairo in March 2013 (so shortly before Shaikh Hamad passed on his rule to his son, Tamim), doubly remarkable, “Qatar didn’t call for these revolutions but they started because of circumstances there – authoritarianism, and the desire for leaders to pass on their rule [to their sons].” See Hammond 2014 (1). Some people clearly lack a sense of irony.

12 Between 2013 and 2016 Qatar is reported to have paid JaN ransoms totalling at least $30 million and probably far more. In 2017 Qatar reportedly paid a ransom of around $1bn to an Iraqi Shia militia affiliated to the IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah for a group of kidnapped Qatari royals and their associates: see Paul Wood, ‘Billion dollar ransom’: Did Qatar pay record sum?, BBC, 17 July 2018 at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-44660369. Some of the money reportedly also found its way to Jabhat Tahrir al Sham, the precursor of JaN: Erika Solomon, The $1bn hostage deal that enraged Qatar’s Gulf rivals, The Financial Times, 5 June 2017 at https://web.archive.org/web/20170605210800/https://www.ft.com/content/dd033082-49e9-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43.


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difficulty is that Qatar did not do this in Libya and it does not do this in Qatar.

15 Diana Galeeva, Qatar: The Practice of Rented Power, Routledge 2022
16 See Pierre Péan and Vanessa Ratignier, Une France sous influence: Quand le Qatar fait de notre pays son terrain de jeu, Fayard 2014, Chapter 17 and Notes liv and lv below. For an early sighting of the protagonists, all of whom I knew in 2011, see Alia Brahim, Islamism in Libya, LSE, 20 April 2012 at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/81791/.
17 In Syria in particular it backfired badly: see Firas al Shoufi, Can Syria ever forgive Qatar? The Cradle, 3 October 2022 at https://thecradle.co/Article/Analysis/16256.
18 Christian Chesnot and Georges Malbrunot, Qatar, les secrets du coffre-fort, Paris 2013: Nos très chers émirs, Paris 2016 and Qatar Papers: comment l’émirat finance l’islam de France et de Europe. Neuilly-sur-Seine 2019 are fundamental. Péan and Ratignier 2014, Chapter 11 add helpful detail. For the UK specifically, see, for example, Andrew Norfolk, Qatari bank accused of funding jihadis, The Times, 7 August 2019 at https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/qatari-bank-accused-of-funding-jihadis-v3kbrmmqy: “Doha Bank’s largest shareholder is Qatar Investment Authority, the Gulf state’s sovereign wealth fund. The bank’s chairman and several directors are members of the emirate’s ruling al-Thani family.” And European Eye on Radicalization, The Billions and Extremism — Qatar and the UK, 4 December 2018 at https://eeradicalization.com/the-billions-and-extremism-qatar-and-the-uk/.
19 The Washington Post is an obvious example. The contributions of the late Jamal Khashoggi, for example, whose English, as I know from my own encounters with him, was imperfect, were prompted and shaped by an executive of the Qatar Foundation International – as the newspaper itself has acknowledged: See Nicholas Clairmont, Some Lives Matter More, The Daily Scroll, 7 September 2022 at https://thedailyscroll.substack.com/p/some-lives-matter-more?utm_medium=email. The Influential Middle East Eye, which ”often obscures its finances” and indeed its ownership, is famously sympathetic to Qatar: see Michael Rubin, Qatar’s Other Covert Media Arm, AEI, 25 July 2017 at https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/middle-east/qatars-other-covert-media-arm/.
20 See Prince Charles: Charity watchdog reviewing information over reports royal accepted carrier bag full of cash as a charity donation from Qatar ex-PM, Sky News 27 June 2022 at https://news.sky.com/story/prince-charles-charity-watchdog-reviewing-information-over-reports-royal-accepted-carrier-bag-full-of-cash-as-a-charity-donation-from-qatar-ex-pm-12640980?mc_cid=b79c2b4c47&mc_eid=1b3f0609af. During my time in Libya in 2011, Qatari funding to the Libyan rebels was delivered in bags on regular military transport flights into Benghazi. For an account of Qatari influence-buying in general – scattergun but with lots of interesting detail - see Irina Tsukerman, Qatar’s Use of Hacking and Mass Media To Assassinate Characters of Rivals and to Shut Down Criticism: Implications for Reputational Management, a paper delivered at the 2019 George
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21 Between 2007 and 2022 – and mostly since 2020 - Qatar seems to have donated around $1bn to various US universities and colleges, around double the amount donated by KSA and the UAE together: see https://sites.ed.gov/foreigngifts/. Carnegie Mellon, Cornell, Georgetown, Northwestern, Texas A&M and Virginia Commonwealth seem to have been the main beneficiaries. For Brookings, which has had a long-standing relationship with Qatar, see Michael Schaffer, He Tried to Reform the Way a Top D.C. Think Tank Gets Money. Now the FBI Is Looking Into Him, Politico, 17 June 2022 at https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/06/17/john-allen-brookings-institution-fbi-qatar-00040380 and Dan Friedman, A Top DC Think Tank Took Millions From Foreign Governments. Now Lawmakers Want Answers, Mother Jones, 3 October 2022 at https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2022/10/brookings-institution-elizabeth-warren-chuck-grassley-ted-cruz-qatar/. George-town has a campus in Doha. It also hosts the Bridge Project, which seems highly sympathetic to Islamist movements in the region. Jonathan Brown, the Al Waleed bin Talal professor of Islamic Civilisation at Georgetown, is the son-in-law of Sami al Arian, who moved to Turkey in 2015 after being indicted in the US in 2003 for fundraising for Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). His daughter reportedly works for Al Jazeera in Doha. A recent book edited by a professor on Georgetown’s Doha campus, Abdullah al Arian, Football in the Middle East: State Society and the Beautiful Game, is notably silent on many of the accusations levelled at Qatar over the World Cup. For KCL see https://www.kcl.ac.uk/research/qatar-centre-global-banking-finance. Dr Andreas Krieg of KCL’s School of Security Studies and Institute of Middle Eastern Studies helped run a large project in Qatar involving the Qatari and British MODs and SERCO: see https://www.kcl.ac.uk/people/krieg-dr-andreas. For Bristol see https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/projects/qatar-national-research-fund-n-khattab and https://www.bristol.ac.uk/international/countries/qatar.html. For St Antony’s, see Contemporary Islamic Studies, St Antony’s College, Oxford at https://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/research-centres/contemporary-islamic-studies. The CISOQ programme sponsors events such as The Relationship between Islamic Ethics and Islamic Law, St Antony’s College Oxford at https://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/events/relationship-between-islamic-ethics-and-islamic-law. Dr Jasser al Auda of the Qatar Faculty of Islamic Sciences seems to be
a regular speaker. His profile at https://admin.cilecenter.org/about-us/our-team/dr-jasser-auda gives some indication of Qatar’s wider reach in the UK: “Auda is a founding member and Head of the Dawah Committee at the International Union of Muslim Scholars and member of the European Council for Fatwa and Research. He teaches and supervises research on Maqasid Al-Shariah at the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Doha. He has a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Islamic law from the University of Wales, UK. He was previously a founding Director of the Maqasid Center in the Philosophy of Islamic Law in London”. On TR see Caroline Fourest, Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan. New York 2008. Qatar also donates to quasi-academic institutes like the European Institute for Human Sciences (IESH) in France (£800,000 reported in 2017). The IESH publishes fatwas following the guidance of the European Council on Fatwa and Research. The president of the Council for many years was the late Yusuf Al Qaradawi, who was banned from the UK: The National 2017. For Qatar’s coyness about its generosity to universities which wish to establish campuses in Doha see Nick Anderson, Qatars say Texas A&M pact for Doha branch should remain secret, The Washington Post 16 January 2016 at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/01/06/qataris-say-texas-am-pact-for-doha-branch-should-remain-secret/ and Texas university gets $76 million each year to operate in Qatar, contract says, The Washington Post, 8 March 2016 at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/03/08/texas-university-gets-76-million-each-year-to-operate-in-qatar-contract-says/. For an indication of the extent and financial impact of these and other funding/lobbying efforts see Ten years of lobbying: The Qatari lobby’s operations before and after the blockade, MEMO, 11 April 2021 at https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20210411-ten-years-of-lobbying-the-qatari-lobbys-operations-before-and-after-the-blockade/.

Shanti Das 2022 suggests that “the Qatari government made gifts to members of parliament worth £251,208 in the 12 months to October 2022, including luxury hotel stays, business-class flights and tickets to horse-racing events. The value of Qatar’s gifts was greater than the amount spent by the 15 other countries whose governments made donations to British MPs combined. And it was more than six times the £37,661 in gifts and hospitality given to MPs by the United Arab Emirates, the second-highest foreign government donor.”

With a bland website at https://www.qcharity.org/en/qa/about. There is little financial information in its annual reports (though a massive income of $506 million is reported for 2020 – the last year on record). But if you dig a little, you will discover some less bland information, notably concerning one of its board members, including Yousef bin Ahmed al-Kuwari, a founder of Islamweb.com, which “issued extremist fatwas and advised British Muslims that they should not swear an oath of citizenship to Britain”. Kuwari is the CEO of Nectar Trust, an affiliate of QC which its website does not mention. Islamweb was established under the aegis of the then Qatari Minister of Awqaf (and later Minister of the Interior), Sheikh Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani, who “… encouraged Khalid Sheikh Mohammed — the mastermind of the September 11 attacks

Georges Malbrunot has a more jaundiced view, « Ce qui passe par l’édification de mosquées conçues comme des centres de vie avec, si possible, des écoles, des centres commerciaux, des crèches, des espaces funéraires, des centres médicaux, sociaux et des logements. Il s’agit donc d’accompagner l’individu musulman de la naissance à la mort dans le cadre de l’Islam global prôné par les Frères musulmans. Ce sont bien des embryons de contre-sociétés qui favorisent le communautarisme. Ce qui, à moyen terme, peut devenir dangereux.” Weinberg 2014 claims that “Osama bin Laden’s former business agent Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl defected to the U.S. in 1996 and testified that bin Laden told him around 1993 that the semi-official Qatar Charitable Society (QCS) – now Qatar Charity – was one of the organization’s main sources of funding from institutions. Fadl also alleged that QCS’s director at the time was a fellow member of al-Qaeda who provided travel documents and funds, including paying fighters in Eritrea and providing $20,000 for an attack out of Sudan. In 2008, an interagency U.S. task force privately categorized Qatar Charity as a “terrorism support entity” worth monitoring because it had previously “demonstrated intent and willingness” to provide financial or operational support to terrorist organizations.” See also Matthew Epstein with Evan Kohlmann, The Effectiveness of U.S. Anti-Terrorist Financing Efforts: Arabian Gulf Financial Sponsorship of Al-Qaida via U.S.- Based Banks, Corporations and Charities, March 11 2003 at https://archives-financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/031103me.pdf and the leaked US diplomatic cable, Qatar Commits USD 40 million for UN Operations in Gaza, at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09DOHA314_a.html. Qatar is not uniquely accused, of course. But surely it is reasonable to have severe doubts about this particular organisation’s bona fides?

25 Most recently there has been a good Netflix documentary series, FIFA Uncovered and, in Germany, a fascinating multi-part podcast by ARD, report-München and Die Zeit, Katar.Geld.Macht on Apple Podcasts and a filmed documentary series, WM der Schande, ARDmediathek, 8 October 2022 onwards, at https://www.ardmediathek.de/sendung/katar-wm-der-schande/staffel-1/Y3JpZDovLi5dkci5kZS90XRhci13bS1kZXRle2NoYW5kZQ/1, the shorter but punchy Heimliche Supermacht – Wer ist Katars Herrscher Tamim Al Thani, ZDF, 19 October 2022 at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MDGhwmtWzk0 and the highly satirical Exklusiv: Wie Katar den Zuschlag für die WM 2022 bekommen hat, ZDF heute-show, 28 October 2022 at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XJ3P3pnc6uo. The activities of the QC have been a particular focus. It has reportedly been a highly significant donor to MB-adjacent bodies in Germany, including the Intercultural Centre for Dialogue and Education and a major mosque in Berlin, with a degree of secrecy attending both funding processes, and may have funded many more such institutions, again with an absence of transparency: see the enlightening three-part sister-documentary, Qatar.Geld.Macht, Kontraste, report-München und Die Zeit, 20 – 22 September 2022 starting at https://www.daserste.de/information/politik-weltgeschehen/report-muenchen/videos/report-muenchen-geld-macht-katar-folge-1-video100.html (which deals with all the accusations against Qatar, including what the commentary calls its “Doppelspiel (double game)” over Islamist extremism, not simply the issue of funding for Islamists in Germany); Frank Jansen, Berliner Verwaltungsgericht: Neuköllner Moscheeverein scheitert vorerst im Rechtsstreit mit Verfassungsschutz, Tagesspiegel, 26 April 2018 at https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/neukollner-moscheeverein-scheitert-vorerst-im-rechtsstreit-mit-verfassungsschutz-5520940.html; and Sascha Adamek and Pune Djalilevand, Katars Geld für Berliner Moscheevereine, RBB, 22 September 2022 at https://www.rbb24.de/wirtschaft/beitrag/2022/09/berlin-moschee-verein-geld-macht-katar-neukoellner-begegnungsstaette.html and https://twitter.com/jannibal_/status/1577024750085627904?s=43&ct=W0K185s_Vb0N5Gzhp-IW4w.


26 For example, Andrew Norfolk, Al Rayan Bank: Clients include ‘terror’ group and Abu Hamza’s former mosque, The Times 5 August 2019 at https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/al-rayan-bank-clients-include-terror-group-and-abu-hamzas-former-mosque-zfq0xk3bd. Jonathan Wilson, The World Cup has never been beautiful, UnHerd 10 November 2022 at https://unherd.com/2022/11/the-world-cup-has-never-been-beautiful/ is a more recent contribution with a football focus.

27 With some occasional exceptions: see Eliot Wilson, As we cosy up to Qatar, the West must face the moral maze of the Middle East, City AM, 4 April 2022 at https://www.cityam.com/in-dealing-with-qatar-west-forced-face-moral-maze-middle-east/.

28 See for example, Sir John Jenkins, Government backing of Islam in the

29 So called after the Perpetual Maritime Truce of 1853, which together with the General Maritime Treaty of 1820 and various agreements concluded from the 1890s through to the 1950s regulated British control of the region’s security and external relations: see James Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf, OUP 2007, Part 1


31 Including designs by Zaha Hadid, Norman Foster and I.M. Pei, whose Museum of Islamic Art has, like Abu Dhabi’s branch of the Louvre, become a major soft power asset for Qatar: see Nada Ammagui, Qatar’s World Cup and Public Art: Expanding the Field of Dialogue, AGSIW, 26 September 2022 at https://agsiw.org/qatars-world-cup-and-public-art-expanding-the-field-of-dialogue/.


34 Something many came to regret in 1990 when those countries Kuwait radicals – and indeed officials - had regularly denounced in public as evil殖民ists – the US, the UK and France – came to their rescue while those they had taken to their hearts, Palestinian radicals and the international Muslim Brotherhood, stood with Iraq. (Personal knowledge)

35 Courtney Freer, Rentier Islam, OUP 2018 gives a good account of the historical development of Islamism, particularly in its MB manifestation, in the Gulf as a whole.

36 Established in November 1981 and comprising KSA, Oman, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait.

37 Restored by Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman al Saud (popularly known as Ibn Saud), after his seizure of Riyadh from the family’s historic rivals, the Rashid, in 1902.

2010. On the historical background to Qatar/KSA relations see Abdul Rezak Bilgin, Relations Between Qatar and Saudi Arabia After the Arab Spring, Contemporary Arab Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3, September 2018, 113-134 at https://www.jstor.org/stable/48599596?read-now=1&refreqid=-excelsior%3A9b5e46c682d40fc58ae5e4a5514b37a&amp;seq=2#page_scan_tab_contents.

39. In which Aramco – at State Department urging – had become involved in the 1950s. Kelly 1980 is excellent on these disputes.

40. In 1974 the UAE was induced by Riyadh to recognise the Saudi claim to this land and to the Khour al Udai in return for Saudi abandonment of its claim to Buraimi. See Ramin Seddiq, Border Disputes on the Arabian Peninsula, The Washington Institute, 15 March 2001 at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/border-disputes-arabian-peninsula for a concise account of this and the other disputes described here.


43. See Bilgin 2018. Young 2015 is a good collection of essays on the subsequent trend within the GCC towards greater assertiveness.

44. See James Dorsey, Wahhabism vs. Wahhabism: Qatar’s Challenge to Saudi Arabia, National University of Singapore, Reflections No 4, 10 July 2014 at https://www.academia.edu/7620585/Wahhabism_vs_Wahhabism_Qatars_Challenge_to_Saudi_Arabia?email_work_card=view-paper.


gestures before – revising Al Jazeera programming or expelling certain prominent MB figures, for example. But Al ‘Ula seems to have been the moment – partly as a result of other geo-political shifts in the region – when a more stable deal became possible, with the support of the Trump administration. The positions of Bahrain, the UAE and KSA are slightly different, with the former remaining more hostile to Qatar and the latter two agreeing to a degree of tolerance (but not forgetting) for the moment (interviews with senior Saudi and UAE figures, October/November 2022).

47 David H Warren, Rivals in the Gulf: Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Abdullah Bin Bayyah, and the Qatar-UAE Contest Over the Arab Spring and the Gulf Crisis, Routledge 2021 has some sophisticated reflections on this final matter.


49 Al Banna first – and famously – made Hajj in 1936, when he claims to have extemporised a sermon in front of King Abdul Aziz. In the 1940s the MB had special areas reserved during the Hajj to receive and preach to pilgrims from all over the Islamic world: Richard Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood, Oxford 1993, 270. Abduh Mustafa Dasuqi, tarikh al ihkwan al muslimiina fil sa’udiyya”, “The History of the MB in KSA”), IkhwanWiki at http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86 %D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%85%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8
%A9 has a detailed account of MB Hajj activities from the 1930s onwards – from a MB perspective. The first general meeting of the EMB after Sadat’s softening was held in Mecca in 1973 during the Hajj; it reconstituted the leadership under a new Guidance Council, and (according to the Kuwaiti Islamist, Abdullah al Nafisi) allegedly appointed new Membership Committees for the Gulf States, including three in KSA (Riyadh, Dammam and Jeddah): see Abdullah bin Bajad al Oteibi, Al ikhwan al muslimuna al sa’udiyyah wal hijrah wal ‘alaqah (The Saudi MB: migration and relation), Al Mesbar Studies and Research Centre, 16 September 2013 at http://www.almesbar.net/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7/
The heavy Gulf presence was allegedly for the purposes of regenerating the MB’s financial resources. The Hajj was used to rebuild the MB’s international links: see Husam al Tammam, Al Ikhwan wa Al Sa’udiyya: Hal Daqqat Sa’a’at al Firaq? (“The MB and KSA: Has the Hour of Separation Struck?”), Al Qahirat al Misriyyah, 3 December 2002 at https://tammam.org/تالاقم251-2010-02-09-13-12-44.html Qaradawi has said the Hajj remains the central convening tool for the MB leadership.

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53 For the fatwas see Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz, *Fatwas (on the Muslim Brotherhood / Ikhwanul Muslimeen)*, YouTube, 22 May 2014 at [https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLEE6BDE1FDE3DC8B6&app=desktop](https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLEE6BDE1FDE3DC8B6&app=desktop). For the 23 November 2002 interview with Prince Naif in the Kuwaiti newspaper, *Al Siyasah*, in reality the culmination of years of disillusion, see the fascinating take of Tammam 2002. For the impact on Gulf leaders of the MB’s welcome for Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait see Muhammad Jaza’iri, “Ikhwan” al sa’udiyya wal khaliij…tajijf al manabi’ wal as’lat al qaliqah (“The MB of KSA and the Gulf…Drying the Wells and Disturbing Questions”), *Al Eqtisadia*, 4 May 2014 at [https://www.aleqt.com/05/04/article_846185.html](https://www.aleqt.com/05/04/article_846185.html).

54 In Libya notable MB figures backed by Qatar were the brothers, Ali, Usama and Ismail Sallabi, from their base in Doha; and the February 17 Brigade in Benghazi, commanded by Mustafa al Saqazli and Fawzi bu Katif, both allegedly affiliated with the MB. The Sallabis developed a close relationship with Abdul Hakim Bilhajj, the former commander of the jihadi Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), who was a frequent visitor to Doha: there were other links between the Libyan MB
and jihadi Salafists perhaps going back to their days together in Abu Salim Prison under Qaddafi and the deradicalisation programme of the early 2000s sponsored by Seif al Islam al Qaddafi and led by Ali Sallabi: see Péan and Ratignier 2014, Chapter 17 and Lindsey Hilsum, Sandstorm: Libya from Gaddafi to Revolution, London 2012, 178ff. All this was reinforced by the co-option of the Salaf Grand Mufti, Shaikh Sadiq al Ghariyani (allegedly at one point resident and active in the UK: see Patrick Sawyer, Radical Cleric Uses UK to Preach in Support of Violent Islamists, The Daily Telegraph, 30 August 2014 at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11065715/Radical-cleric-uses-UK-as-base-to-preach-in-support-of-violent-Islamists.html and Libya’s Universities: Pulling Them Apart, The Economist, 8 May 2014 at http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/05/libyas-universities ). This alliance may have been one of the ways in which Islamist militias in the West and East of Libya gained strength after 2011 – through the meshing of former LIFG fighters and newer MB-tinged revolutionaries into a unified force. If true, this illustrates the ease with which the MB and jihadi Salafis can form alliances of advantage.


The Qatari influence in Libya is very significant. The Qataris, like the Emiratis and Saudis, have engaged with the Libyan opposition. They have provided financial support to a wide range of Libyan political groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), as well as providing military support to some Libyan groups. The Qataris have also been involved in peace negotiations in Libya, and have attempted to broker a peace agreement between the Libyan government and the opposition. There are good accounts of aspects of Qatar’s foreign engagement, including with the MB, by Stig Jarle Hansen (ed), Religion, Prestige and Windows of Opportunity?, Noragric Working Paper No.48, October 2013, Department of International Environment and Development Studies at http://www.umb.no/statistik/noragric/publications/working_papers/working_paper_no._48.pdf, Sultan Barakat, Qatari Mediation: Between Ambition and Achievement, Brookings Middle East Centre, 10 November 2014 at http://www.brookings.edu~/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/11/10-qatari-mediation/final-pdf-english.pdf and Berouk Mesfin, Qatar’s diplomatic incursions into the Horn of Africa, ISS, Issue 8, November 2016 at https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ear8.pdf. I witnessed the extent of Qatari support for the MB in Libya at first hand in 2011. They did not simply support those who were effective: they supported some ineffective Islamists (for example the superannuated Defence Minister, Jalal al Dughaili, who was close to the MB 17 February militia) and did not support active non-Islamists (for example the Zintanis; they also by-passed the liberal Finance Minister, Ali Tarhouni: personal conversation with Ali Tarhouni in Abu Dhabi,
12-14 November 2015). **Hilsum 203ff** gets the gist. Essam Abdul Majid, of the violent Egyptian Islamic Group, fled to Qatar in 2013.


A point made to me recently (autumn 2022) by a number of senior Saudi and Emirati interlocutors in the UAE and London. The Qatari’s claim to have been supporting Egypt rather than the EMB. But that is disputed by many others. The Bahrainis, Emiratis and Saudis, of course, have a common view of Qatar’s position. There has been a lot written on the subject: for example, Ulrichsen 2014; Roberts 2014 – with a good brief historical account of how Qatar’s links with the MB developed, Hammond 2014 (1) and (2) and 2013; Boghardt 2014; Khan 2014; Weinberg 2014 and 2016; Shideler, Froehlke & Fischer 2014; Blair and Spencer; Gilligan; Freer 2015 and Warren. There are good accounts of aspects of Qatar’s foreign engagement, including with the MB, by Hansen 2013; Barakat 2014 and Mesfin 2016. I saw it in action in Libya in 2011. Hilsum 2012, 203ff gets the gist. For more general reflection on the implications for the GCC see Young 2014, Freer 2016 and Steven A Cook and Hussein Ibish, Turkey’s Resurgence as a Regional Power Confronts a Fractured GCC, AGSIW, 18 December 2019 at https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Steve-Cook_Ibish_Turkey_ONLINE-1.pdf.

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As I heard at the time. David Butter, Egypt and the Gulf, Allies and Rivals, Chatham House 20 April 2020 at https://reader.chathamhouse.org/egypt-and-gulf-allies-and-rivals#introduction is a useful summary of Egyptian–Gulf relations before, during and after the Arab Spring.

Martin Chulov, I will return Saudi Arabia to moderate Islam, says crown

63 This does not mean that this constitutionalism is at all liberal or democratic: it is generally not – though there are liberals and democrats inside the Kingdom. For a flavour of the debate in the 1990s see the passages from three of the key figures, Salman al Awdah, Muhammad al Mas’ari and Sa’ad al Faqih at John Calvert, Islamism: A Documentary and Reference Guide, Westport CT, 2008, 168ff.

64 There are reflections on impact of violent repression on Islamist movements in Jérôme Drevon, The reconfiguration of the Egyptian Islamist social movement family after two political transitions in Hendrik Kraetzschmar (ed), Islamists and the Politics of the Arab Uprisings, Governance, Pluralisation and Contention, Edinburgh 2018. Some of the conclusions are banal (violence begets violence). But the central theme, that social movements are shaped by and respond adaptively to their context is uncontestable.

65 The MB have developed what one Saudi writer calls “fiqh al mafahim” (a pun on fiqh al maqasid – the jurisprudence of intentions: Jonathan Brown, Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenge and Choices of Interpreting the Prophet’s Legacy, Oneworld Publications, London 2014 (Kindle Edition), 5718) – a strategy of semantic evasion, by which they and others in their orbit customise concepts like “democracy”, “the state”, “human rights” or within “an Islamic frame of reference” – designed to be decodable differentially by initiates and outsiders but destabilising meaning – analogous to Gramsci’s analysis of the construction of symbolic hegemony. See John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism, London, Hurst and Company 2010, 276, Lacroix 2011, 54; Roxanne L Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought, New Jersey, Princeton 2009, 81. Fourest 2008 is an openly partisan contribution to the debate and focuses on an individual and not central if still charismatic figure. But it indicates a tendency. See also David Pollock, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and its Record of Double-Talk, The Washington Institute, 26 January 2012 at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/egypts-muslim-brotherhood-and-its-record-of-double-talk Roel Meijer, Islamist Movements and the Political After the Arab Uprisings, POMEPS, 24 January 2014 at http://pomeps.org/2014/02/04/islamist-movements-and-the-political-after-the-arab-uprisings/ comments, “The General Guide, Mohammad al Badie, did use terms such as citizenship, general rights and the will of the people but it is unclear if the will of the people can contradict the will of God (or that of the Brotherhood. Kandil 2015, chapter 3 has a good section on the MB’s relativist approach to the truth – even internally. He makes the point that some of this derives from the MB’s deliberate rejection of socially critical or analytic thought. The EMB dissident, Tharwat al Khirbawi, Sirr al Ma’bad (“Secret of the Temple”), 269 referred to the current leadership
in 2012 as “lying, deceitful, failed and Takfiri...lies leap from them... they lie like they breathe”. See also Muhammad Musa'ad al Arabi, Al Ikhwan: Baina al Wataniyya wal umumiyya: mas’alat al tanthim al duwali lil jama’ah (“The MB: Between Nationalism and Internationalism: the question of the MB’s international organisation”), Mominoun Without Borders, 12 https://www.mominoun.com/articles/66201438-


Lorenzo Vidino, The Muslim Brotherhood in the West, London 2010, contains many other examples – see for example 86ff and 208ff.

The foundational text for this is Quran Surah Al ‘Imran, 3.110. For the importance of variants of Saudi Salafism - notably al Madkhaliyya - to this legitimation see Tadros (1) and Samuel Tadros, Islamist vs. Islamist: The Theologico-Political Questions, The Hudson Institute, 18 December 2014 (2) at https://www.hudson.org/research/10883-islamist-vs-islamist-the-theologico-political-questions.

Nabil Mouline, Les prétentions hégémoniques du wahhabisme, CNRS Editions, 9 March 2017 at https://www.academia.edu/34804845/Les_pr%C3%A9tentions_h%C3%A9g%C3%A9moniques_du_wahhabisme_The_Hegemonic_Pretentions_of_Wahhabism is a good short guide to the emergence, history and significance of Saudi Salafism. Nabil Mouline, The Clerics of Islam: Religious Authority and Political Power in Saudi Arabia, Yale, 2014 is the full version. The non-khalifal nature of this rule - shaped by contemporary controversies about the reinstution of the office - is demonstrated by Abdul Aziz in 1931 telling the Syrian Druze notable, Adil Arslan, that “the reopening of the question of the caliphate was calculated to breed dissensions in the Moslem world of a character disadvantageous to the interests of Islam”, Redouie 1970, 188. For some thoughts about the Saudi use of Salafism in the context of a resectarianised Middle East see F Gregory Gause III, Saudi Arabia and Sectarianism in Middle East International Relations, Sectarianism and International Relations. POMEPS Studies 38, March 2020 at https://pomeps.org/pomeps-studies-38-sectarianism-and-international-relations. For the Emirati deployment of the Mauretanian loyalist 'alim, Shaikh Abdullah Bin Bayyah, as a counterweight to Qaradawi-inspired activist Islamism, see Warren 2021.


Madawi al Rasheed, Muted Modernists, London 2015 takes the dyspeptic view. But if change is not imposed from the top, it is unlikely – as we have seen everywhere else in the region – that it will emerge from
a liberal awakening. Polling suggests that the Saudi population is becoming keener on social and other freedoms. But the success of organized Islamists in municipal elections in the Kingdom since 2005 suggests that they again would be the beneficiaries of a premature political loosening.


71 On which see Onley 2007 and Nelida Fuccaro, Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf, CUP, 2009. I speak from personal experience. When I first worked in Abu Dhabi nearly thirty-five years ago the Minister of Education was Dr Said Salman, from the northern Emirate of Ajman, who had studied under Yusuf al Qaradawi – often seen as the senior international jurisprudential authority for the Muslim Brotherhood – at his Islamic Institute in Doha. Salman had strong MB sympathies. The man who was Vice-Chancellor of the only University (at Al Ain), Cultural Adviser at the Emiri Diwan and later responsible for curriculum development in the Ministry of Education was the senior – and highly respected – Egyptian Hadith scholar and former Muslim Brother, Ezzedin Ibrahim. See Zaki Nusseibeh, In Memoriam – Dr Ezzedin Ibrahim, Liwa, Volume 2, Number 3, June 2010 at http://www.na.ae/en/Images/LIWA03.pdf and Ashraf ‘Eid al ‘Antabli and Abduh Mustafa Dasuqi, Shaikh Ezzeddin Ibrahim, 1928-30 January 2010 at http://www.ikhwan-wiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%B9%D8%B2_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86_%D8%A5%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%85 (the MB’s influence was pervasive: Al Islah – backed by Ras al Khaimah and given house room in Dubai perhaps because of the Emirate’s experience in the 1930s with Arab nationalism – was an object of suspicion even then, not least through links with its openly MB Kuwaiti equivalent (the operationalising of which in the wake of the Arab Spring to achieve socio-political change and the gateway they provided to even more radical groups, like the hard-line Umma Party of the Kuwaiti Salafi, Hakim al Mutairi, were some of the accusations subsequently made against the movement, not least in the Al Arabiya documentary). See Rashid 2013, Samir Salama, Rise

Qaradawi benefited hugely from Qatari sponsorship from the 1960s onwards: see HA Hellyer, Yusif al-Qaradawi Has Died, Carnegie, 28 September 2022 at https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/88030. His relationship to the MB was close but complex. He was reportedly offered the post of Murshid more than once but preferred to maintain an apparently independent platform while expanding his influence within the MB internationally, with Qatari backing. He was excluded from the UK in 2008. Given his often inflammatory views, the many tributes paid to him by MB or MB-adjacent figures on his death are instructive: see After Years of Denying Ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, Near Universal Acclaim for Late Brotherhood Spiritual Guide, Global Influence, 29 September 2022 at https://www.global-influence-ops.com/after-years-of-denyin

ties-to-the-muslim-brotherhood-near-universal-acclaim-for-late-brotherhood-spiritual-guide/. The eulogy by Anas al Tikriti of the Cordoba Foundation for 5PillarsUk is particularly enlightening on many levels: A tribute to Sheikh Yusuf Al Qaradawi, 26 September 2022 at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ifOSM_6YE_Y&t=3s. Tikriti says that the government of Qatar is now collating a collected edition of Qaradawi’s works. See also Bettina Graef and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, The Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, London 2009 particularly the contribution by Hussam Tammam, Yusuf al Qaradawi and The Muslim Brothers: The Nature of a Special Relationship and Vidino 2010, 98ff. There is an interesting critique of Graef and Skovgaard-Petersen for ignoring Qaradawi’s intolerance and antisemitism by Khaled Hroub, Al Qaradawi ist kein Symbol der islamischen Toleranz, Die Welt, 2 October 2010 at https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article6435289/Al-Qa-radawi-ist-kein-Symbol-islamischer-Toleranz.html. See also Martyn Frampton and Shiraz Maher Between ‘Engagement’ and a ‘Values-Led’ Approach: Britain and the Muslim Brotherhood from 9/11 to the Arab Spring. Qaradawi’s appearance on 20 February 2011 to lead communal prayers in Cairo’s Tahrir Square was symbolic. He had been banned from doing so in Egypt after 1981. On his triumphant return he was flanked by the EMB leadership. Ranko 2014, 1185 remarks that he “gilt als internationale Leitfigur für den Islamismus als transnationale Bewegung” (“counts as a leading international figure of transnational Islam”). But this aroused misgivings too, with some comparing his return to that of Khomeini to Tehran in 1979 after 14 years in exile. For Qaradawi, Qatar and the Arab Spring see David H. Warren, ‘The ʿUlamāʿ and the Arab Uprisings 2011-13: Considering Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the “Global Mufti,” between the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Legal Tradition, and Qatari Foreign Policy’, New Middle Eastern
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Studies, 4, 2014 at http://www.brismes.ac.uk/nmes/archives/1305. There are examples of Qaradawi’s attacks on the UAE at Al Arabiya 2014 and The National 2014. For al Jazeera see Hugh Miles, Al-Jazeera: The Inside Story of the Arab News Channel That Is Challenging the West, London 2006, Kristen Gillespie, The New Face of Al Jazeera, The Nation, 9 November 2016 at https://www.thenation.com/article/new-face-al-jazeera/, and Mohamed Fahmy, The Price of Al Jazeera’s Politics, FikraForum 26 June 2015 at http://fikraforum.org/?p=7055#.VY_YFVIGsY1. http://www.mei.edu/content/article/turkey%E2%80%99s-choices-muslim-brotherhood-or-regional-isolation. The second part of the multi-part podcast from Die Zeit, Geld:Macht:Katar, Al Jazeera als Machtinstrument – Katar und die Medien, 2022 at https://www.zeit.de/politik/2022-10/nachrichtensender-al-jazeera-medien-katar-podcast is also excellent, providing examples of the different messaging of AJ English and Arabic and of the platform given to Qaradawi’s vicious antisemitism: the programme assesses the size of AJ’s audience in Arabic at anywhere between 50m and an unlikely 300m householders, with the lower figure alone representing a huge slice of the potential audience. See also Rubin 2017, “The US military had significant experience with Al Jazeera Arabic in Iraq. It was not uncommon for an anonymous tip to direct US soldiers to an insurgent den which was empty of insurgents but rigged with explosives. When American forces would arrive on the scene, they would find Al Jazeera cameramen nearby and on neighboring rooftops, waiting to film the ambush.” There is a section on the inter-linkage between Qatar, Turkey and Al Jazeera at Prazan 2014, 4245ff. This goes back a long way. When I was HMCG Jerusalem many Palestinians believed Al Jazeera Arabic was explicitly pro-Hamas under its then head, Wadah Khanfar. And throughout the Arab Spring and subsequently Al Jazeera Arabic was widely seen as more pro-MB than its English language equivalent. There are suggestive parallels in the publications of the Gülen movement in Turkey: see Rodrik 2013 and Pınar Doğan and Dani Rodrik 2012 and 2013.

Endnotes

are good on the MB/Salafi/Wahhabi cross currents; and for a broader perspective on the challenges facing the Gulf States as a whole Sean L Yom and Gregory Gause III, Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On, Journal of Democracy Vol 23, Issue 4, October 2012 at http://www.journaldemocracy.org/article/resilient-royals-how-arab-monarchies-hang and the collection of essays at Ana Echague, The Gulf States and the Arab Uprisings, FRIDE 28 June, 2013 at http://www.fride.org/publication/1139/the-gulf-states-and-the-arab-uprisings. On this threat see Lacroix, 2014; Boghardt 2014; Pollock 2014, showing substantial minority support for the MB in KSA, and Ben Hubbard. ISIS Turns Saudis Against the Kingdom and Families Against Their Own, The New York Times, 31 March 2016 at http://www.ny-times.com/2016/04/01/world/middleeast/isis-saudi-arabia-wahhabism.html. Saudi concern would only have been heightened by public criticism of KSA and the UAE by MB Friday preachers during the occupation of Rabi’ al ’Adawiya and Al Nahda Squares in Cairo and Qaradawi from Doha on Al Jazeera in 2012. Ghannouchi publicly claimed in 2012 that the current monarchical system in KSA was doomed and about to be overwhelmed by the same sort of uprising Tunisia and Egypt had seen: Alain Gresh, Gulf Cools Towards Muslim Brothers, Le Monde Diplomatique, 2 November 2011 at http://mondediplo.com/2012/11/02egypt. The MB also gave public support to the Houthis during the border war with Yemen in 2009: see Oteibi 2014 and Rasheed 2013 (1 and 2). The question of MB organisation in KSA is a famously murky area. Senior Saudis claim that the MB was never allowed to organise there, in spite of a direct request in the 1930s from Hassan al Banna to King Abdul Aziz to do so. Some also deny that there are many if any Saudi members. But Oteibi 2014 writes of involvement by members from KSA, not all Egyptian, in the MB’s Guidance Council. There is some support for this in Omar al “Izzi, al ikhwan al sa’diyin... al tayyar alathi lam yaqul kalimatan ba’d (“The Saudi MB – The Current That Has Not Yet Spoken”), Al ‘Asr/IkhwanWiki. 25 July 2004 at https://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=ادعى مستدرك نبي الله رأيت ما نبي الله رأيت. Yusuf Nada does not demur when interviewed by Ahmad Mansour, interview with Yusuf Nada, Al Jazeera, 16 April 2014 (بالانجليزية: أهدف نادا، رؤية الإخوان المسلمين في المملكة العربية السعودية) at http://arabist.net/blog/2014/4/22/ahmed-mansour-interviews-youssef-nada, http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/withoutbounds/2014/4/16/%d9%8a%d9%88%d8%b3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d9%87%d9%86%d9%82%d9%88%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b5%d8%b1-%d8%b3%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%a8-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1—%d9%85%d8%b5%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a7-%d8%a7-%d9%84%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%81-%d9%86%d8%af%
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when the interviewer suggests the MB have Saudi members. Privately others will talk of up to 25,000 MB members (including an unknown number of Saudis) in KSA. Oteibi 2014 suggests that the well-known Professor of Sharia at King Khaled University and anti-secular polemicist, Awadh al Qarni was the chief organiser of MB activity in the Kingdom and helped fund their international activities. Al Qarni has denied it. It would be illegal if true - also risky: he has over 12 million followers on Twitter. He has, however, said in an extensive interview with Al Sharq al Awasat that the MB is an ideological association not a brigaded presence in KSA, with wide influence; and Sahwa Shaikhs were "Salafised Ikhwan": see Obaid al Suhaime, Hiwar al Shaikh ‘Awadh al Qarni ma’a Sahifat al Sharq al Awsat (Conversation of Shaikh Awadh al Qarni with Al Sharq al Awsat: al Ikhwan al Muslimuuna Mawjudin fil Sa’udiyyah ka-Tayyar Fikri yu’athir was yata’athar (“The MB are present in KSA as an intellectual current that influences and is influenced”)), IkhwanWiki, 1 June 2010 at http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE_%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%B6_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%86%D9%8A_%D9%85%D8%B9_%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%A9_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%82_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7. And he is identified under ضروع خيشلا نرقلا on IkhwanWiki as the most prominent MB figure in KSA. He was detained in September 2017, along with Salman al ‘Awda, the former at least having links to Qaradawi through the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) and having urged KSA to reconcile with Qatar. Ali ‘Ashmawi, a MB renegade, has claimed the MB did in fact organise in KSA from the 1960s onwards. Tammam 2002 claims that the MB in KSA had a range of country branches there from Egyptian to Yemeni. Lacroix 2014 suggests the Saudi MB certainly exists in some sense, as he does, for example, in Lacroix 2011, 44ff in speaking of Saudi Brothers such as Dr Abdullah al Turki of the WML and Hamad al Sulayfih. Oteibi 2014 has a list of alleged Muslim Brothers who had or have close connections to KSA. See Wright 2006, 78-80. Lacroix 2010, 38 ff describes a process of “ta’akhwanat” - “Brotherhoodification” from the 1960s onwards through the education system, which the MB dominated. The reasons for Saudi alarm are well described by Tammam 2002. Turabi has much detail on all this – and expresses well the bemusement felt by the MB at their sudden rejection by a Saudi establishment they thought was on their side. For the stirrings of Islamist constitutionalism see Lacroix 2014. Two major figures are Walid Abu al Khayr, with links to the MB, and Muhammad al Ahmari, a former President of the MB-aligned Islamic Association of North America, (who has been granted Qatari citizenship – a bone of contention between the two states). Other Saudi MB-sympathisers were said to be involved in the 2011 petitions that flowed from this. They
are still going: see **Lacroix 2010, 26**, "On 8 August 2013……fifty-six sheikhs, some of them known to be close to the Saudi Muslim Brotherhood, condemned the ‘removal of a legitimately elected president’ and a violation of ‘the will of the people’. They added: ‘We express our opposition and surprise at the path taken by some countries who have given recognition to the coup…thereby taking part in committing a sin and an aggression forbidden by the laws of Islam – and there will be negative consequences for everyone if Egypt enters a state of chaos and civil war.’ KSA substantially dialled back its official support to Islamist movements globally after 9/11 and sought to regulate private flows more closely. This will not have stopped all private funding, of course. For the history see **Shadi Hamid and Peter Mandaville, Islam as statecraft: How governments use religion in foreign policy, Brookings November 2018 at** https://www.brookings.edu/research/islam-as-statecraft-how-governments-use-religion-in-foreign-policy/.  
77 See **Christopher Phillips, Gulf Actors and the Syria Crisis, in The New Politics of Intervention of Gulf Arab States, London School of Economics and Political Science Middle East Centre, Collected Papers Vol. 1, 41-51, 2015 at** https://www.academia.edu/33604758/Gulf_Actors_and_the_Syria_Crisis and Hammond 2014 (1) and (2).  
78 See **Neil Partrick, The UAE’s War Aims in Yemen, Carnegie, 24 October 2017 at** http://carnegie-mec.org/sada/73524. There have been tensions over Aden in particular and support for Islah, who have been associated with and assassination campaign in the South. The Yemeni Salafi/MB Islah leaders, Abdul Wahhab Muhammad Abdul Rahman Humayqani and Abdul Majid al Zindani, who are said to have had close ties to UBL and Abdullah Azzam, and been cultivated off and on by KSA, were designated as terrorists by the US and UN in 2004: see **https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2249.aspx**. **Victoria Clark, Yemen: Dancing on the Heads**
of Snakes, New Haven 2010 (Kindle Edition, 1686 and 3555 and Gregory D. Johnsen, Profile of Shaikh Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4, Issue 7, 6 April 2006 (1) at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f37856261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=Gregory%20Johnsen&tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=726&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7#.V3jN7aYMcM and Yemen’s Al-Imam University: A Pipeline for Fundamentalists?, Terrorism Monitor Volume 4, Issue 22, 16 November 2006 (2) at https://jamestown.org/program/yemens-al-iman-university-a-pipeline-for-fundamentalists/.


80 For the transition from Hamad to Tamim, the expectations to which it gave rise and the actual outcomes see Hammond 2014 (1) and (2).

81 And not just with Iran. At the recently launched Doha Forum (the successor to the similar Al Jazeera Forum) Qatar clearly seeks to help normalise contact between Islamists, non-Islamists and senior western officials. There may be case for this from time to time. But it cuts across the domestic policies of some western governments (including France, Austria and the UK) and the reasons for it are never articulated. See Dexter van Zile, Islamist Americans Rub Shoulders With Western Elites in Doha, Focus on Western Islamism, 4 April 2022 at https://islamism.news/2022/04/04/islamist-americans-rub-shoulders-with-western-elites-in-doha/?goal=0_1ce70fa9e8-35cd37acdc-34202777. The Doha Conference for Interfaith Dialogue is analogous: see Doha Meeting of International Muslim Brotherhood Leaders Features CAIR Executive Director, GIO, 16 June 2022 at https://www.global-influence-ops.com/doha-meeting-of-international-muslim-brotherhood-leaders-features-cair-executive-director/.

82 Recordings of their conversations were allegedly handed over by Qaddafi to King Abdullah in 2011 in revenge for Qatari support to Libyan Islamists (conversation with a senior Saudi in October 2022): I have listened to them.


84 I can confirm this from my own experience as HMA Riyadh between 2012 and 2015. Once the Saudis had recognised the threat such groups posed domestically, largely as a result of the eruption of AQ-inspired violence inside the Kingdom between 2002 and 2005, they stopped official funding without the consent of the receiving state: see Frédéric Burnand, Le très charitable entrisme du Qatar en Europe, SwissInfo, 25 April 2019 at https://www.swissinfo.ch/
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86 See Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2020: Qatar at https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/qatar/.

87 Disbursed principally through the Qatar Foundation (QF), the Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD) or Qatar Charity (QC – the zakat/sadaqa arm of the state’s development system – and therefore largely private moneys). See Sebastian Sons, Einflussnahme und „Nation Branding“: Katars Entwicklungspolitik verfolgt gleich mehrere Ziele, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 15 August 2022 at https://www.rosalux.de/news/id/46840/einflussnahme-und-nation-branding: „Dennoch wird noch immer die mangelnde Transparenz der katarischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit bemängelt, und Organisationen wie QC finanzieren angeblich weiterhin Initiativen, die den Muslimbrüdern nahestehen, unter anderem in Europa.[*] Weiterhin wird das humanitäre Engagement Katars auch durch einen Mangel an Ressourcen ausgebremst: Zwar verfügt das Emirat
über ausreichende finanzielle Mittel, allerdings fehlt vielfach die Expertise und das Perso-
nal. So wurden hinter vorgehaltener Hand die ambitionierten Pläne Scheicha Mosas von
eigenen Mitarbeiter*innen skeptisch betrachtet, da schlichtweg die personellen Kapazi-
täten fehlten, um die Ziele umzusetzen.”

88 A recent exception being reported by Rachel Millard, Qatar plots big expansion of Welsh gas facilities as UK bets on shift to LNG, The Daily Telegraph, 8 November 2022 at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2022/11/08/qatar-plots-big-expansion-welsh-gas-facilities-uk-bets-shift/. This, of course, will help shift Qatari LNG.

89 See McManus 2022, Chapter 15, “It looks as if Qatar’s best bet for the future may be as a landlord.”


from senior AJ figures, see https://twitter.com/marcgoldberg111/status/158120341268249601?s=43&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw. AJ English often publishes opinion pieces at the intersection between “progressive” identity politics and Islamism: for an egregious example see Mark LeVine, Abolishing whiteness has never been more urgent, AJ English, 17 November 2019 at https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/11/abolishing-whiteness-has-never-been-more-urgent/. Middle East Eye (MEE) meanwhile, which is regularly accused of being covertly funded by Qatar (see Note xviii above), has ranged itself on the side of Islamists on a range of issues relating to British domestic politics, including antisemitism, Islamophobia and most recently the communal disturbances in Leicester: see Wasiq Wasiq, Who Is CJ Werleman and Why Does He Defame British Hindus? Islamism News, 28 September 2022 at https://islamism.news/2022/09/28/who-is-cj-werleman-and-why-does-he-defame-british-hindus/?goal=0_1ce70fade8-fbd5896d39-34202777.

92 See Adam Lucente, Qatar's sovereign wealth fund, Dubai’s Vy Capital help Elon Musk buy Twitter, AL Monitor, 5 May 2022 at https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/05/qatars-sovereign-wealth-fund-dubais-vy-capital-help-elon-musk-buy-twitter#ixzz7fQl4t3BK.

93 According to Kontraste, report-München and Die Zeit 2022, Qatar, through the QIA and individual investors, has Euro25bn of holdings in Germany alone.


96 Extensively documented by Chesnot and Malbrunot 2013, 2016, 2019.


98 Blake and Calvert 2016 have the details. James Dorsey is always worth
reading on the subject too: search on https://www.jamesmdorsey.net. There is an excellent German-language series on the issue at WM der Schande, ARDmediathek, 8 October onwards at https://www.ardmediathek.de/sendung/katar-wm-der-schande/staffel-1/Y3lpZDoVL3dkciSkZ9YXRhci13bSlkZXItc2N0YW5kZQ/1.


100 Which affects British citizens as well: see Sean O’Neill, Briton found hanged ‘was tortured by Qatar police’, The Times, 29 September 2022 at https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/briton-found-hanged-was-tortured-by-qatar-police-x62fbh6qg?utm_medium=Social. This behaviour is not, of course, unique to Qatar. But it undercuts Qatar’s claims to be more benign than its neighbours.


103 The Qataris have denied that al Hammam was a member of the off-
cial Qatari bid team. The new Netflix documentary series, FIFA Uncovered, reports an allegation that the head of the bid team, Hassan al Thawadi, offered $1.5 million to three African FIFA officials for their votes: Martyn Ziegler, Qatar 2022 bid chief alleged to have offered cash for votes, The Times, 10 November 2022. Thawadi denies the allegation.


107 See Blake and Calvert 2016 for a detailed account of the shenanigans. ARDmediathek 2022 is a quick, graphic and televisual guide. Martyn Ziegler, The Men Who Gave the World Cup to Qatar, The Times, 9 November 2022 is a handy guide to the individuals involved. The Qataris continue to repeat their protestations of innocence. FIFA declared “the crisis over” in 2016. The affair still shocks. Alainna Liloia, Qatar World Cup: Limits of Liberalization, Carnegie, 27 October 2022 at https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/88278 suggests the event may lead to genuine reform. We shall see.

108 For Qatari claims about benefits, see Sabena Siddiqui, FIFA World Cup’s economic impact will extend beyond Qatar, AI Monitor, 2 September 2022 at https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/08/fifa-world-cups-economic-impact-will-extend-beyond-qatar. Miguel Delaney, Qatar’s World Cup legacy has to go beyond a spectacular vanity project – but will it?, The Independent, 12 August 2022 at https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/world-cup-qatar-100-days-to-go-b2142962.html offers a more jaundiced view. See also Alainna Liloia, Qatar World Cup: Limits of Liberalization, Carnegie, 27 October 2022 at https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/88278.

109 The former ILO and current HRW and NGO interviewees in the ARDmediathek 2022 series, Die Toten at https://www.ardmediathek.de/video/katar-wm-der-schande/episode-2-die-toten-s01-e02/wdr/Y3JpZDovl3Nwb3J0c2NoYXUuZGUvc3BvcnRzY2hhds1mZm1wZWtdmlkZW8tOTYzMzkyNg are highly sceptical. See also Spencer 2022 and Dom Smith, Southgate ‘Can’t Speak for Workers’, The Times 3 November 2022.

110 KSA and the UAE also use lobbyists and digital social media to promote their causes: see Norm Coleman Oversees GOP Congressional War chest, then lobbies on Saudi Arabia’s Behalf, The Intercept, 22 September 2022.
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111 The allegations detailed in Armin Rosen, Biden Administration Backs Qatar Lobby, Tablet, 3 November 2022 at https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/biden-administration-backs-qatar-lobby-elliott-broidy-armin-rosen are certainly disturbing and, if true, illustrate the extraordinary lengths to which Qatar is prepared to go to suppress hostile scrutiny even within the US. The case of Theo Zwanziger, a high-ranking German FIFA official, who was hostile to Qatar’s World Cup bid, is perhaps emblematic of Qatar’s activities in Europe: Eiholzer and Schmid 2022 and Alan Suderman and Ciaran Fahey, Qatar deploys ex-spies to blunt German’s World Cup criticism, AP, 27 February 2022 at https://apnews.com/article/soccer-sports-germany-international-soccer-world-cup-b5d21e04200ca43df0325ee8f8ec37a. Another example from the US is Laura Kelly, GOP lawmaker targeted for influence op by ex-CIA officer over anti-Qatar bill: report, Yahoo News, 27 October 2022 at https://news.yahoo.com/gop-lawmaker-targeted-influence-op-143942508.html. Jonathan Calvert and others, Exposed: The Global Hacking Network that targets VIPs, The Sunday Times, 6 November 2022, Ahmad Mansour, Was Sigmar Gabriel über Katar sagt, macht mich wirklich wütend, Focus, 3 November 2022 at https://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/gastkommentar-von-ahmad-mansour-was-sigmar-gabriel-ueber-katar-sagt-macht-mich-wirklich-wuetend_id_176091389.html. Part 3 of ARDmediathek 2022 and Christoph Ehrhardt, Katars Aussenminister: „Uns ärgert die Doppelmoral“, FAZ, 6 November 2022 at https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/qatars-aussenminister-beklagt-doppelmoral-in-deutschland-18441328.html usefully illustrate the Qatari strategy in connection with the World Cup in particular: often the response is simply to accuse critics of double standards, racism, orientalism or Islamophobia: see Sanaullah Ataullah, Political goals behind World Cup criticism, says Al Khater, The Peninsula, 8 November 2022 at https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/08/11/2022/political-goals-behind-world-cup-criticism-says-al-khater. The Emir himself has amped up the theme: Andrew Mills, Qatar faced unprecedented criticism over hosting World Cup, emir says, Reuters, 25 October 2022 at https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatar-faced-unprecedented-criticism-host-country-world-cup-emir-says-2022-10-25/?mc_cid=374c03a322&mce_id=1b3fbc09af. Another way of suppressing crit-
icism is to hire – in some cases allegedly covertly – the equivalent of Abbasid praise-poets: see Matt Lawton, More England Band Members Named as Qatar Cheerleaders., The Times, 5 November 2022.

112 See for example Qataris, Pro-Qatar Twitter Users Launch Campaign Condemning Denmark For Planning To Highlight Qatar’s Human Rights Violations During FIFA World Cup, MEWMRI 17 October 2022 at https://www.memri.org/reports/qataris-pro-qatar-twitter-users-launch-campaign-condemning-denmark-planning-highlight-qatar and Qatari Media Campaign In Support Of Hend Al-Muftah, A Qatari Diplomat Who Was Rejected For A UN Role Due To Antisemitic, Homophobic Views: ‘She Spoke For All The Qataris’ at https://www.memri.org/reports/qatari-media-campaign-support-hend-al-muftah-qatari-diplomat-who-was-rejected-un-role-due. Again, this is not unusual in the Gulf. But it is a problem for those who claim that Qatar is different – and indeed better or more worthy of support than its rivals.


115 With a base in Benghazi and another in Tobruk. I saw this for myself on the ground. See also Péan and Vanessa Ratiognier, Chapter 17. The Qatari armed forces are the smallest in the Gulf. So perhaps it is unsurprising that they should have sought to use cash rather than howitzers. But Florence Gaub, From Doha with Love: Gulf Foreign Policy in Libya in Various Authors, The New Politics of Intervention of Gulf Arab States, LSE Middle East Centre, April 2015 at https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/61772/1/The%20new%20politics%20of%20intervention%20of%20Gulf%20Arab%20states.pdf is altogether too generous (and inexplicably ignores the pro-Islamist slant of Qatari policy while adducing evidence that demonstrates it: this is not neo-Nasserism)
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Annex A

Qatar Charity UK/Nectar Trust: a hub for supporting Brotherhood projects across Europe

Qatar Charity opened a representative office in London, Qatar Charity UK (QCUK), in 2012, the year after the Arab Spring and two years after Qatar was awarded the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

QCUK was established to manage a portfolio of international projects, including the construction or development of Islamic community centres and schools in Britain, France, Italy, and Germany, as well as in the United States, Canada, and Australia – many of these involving organisations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2014, Chairman Sheikh Hamad bin Nasser al-Thani declared Qatari charitable spending in Europe from 2010 to 2014 to be more than 500 million Qatari riyals (\(£80.3\) million by 2014 exchange rates).\(^{11}\)

In October 2017, QCUK was officially renamed as the Nectar Trust. The timing for this was interesting. It came several months after Saudi Arabia and its allies imposed a political and economic boycott on Qatar and banned Qatar Charity from operating in their countries.

Between April 2014 and March 2018, QC in Doha provided \(£37.3\) million in grants to QCUK/Nectar Trust to fund projects in Europe and elsewhere.\(^{13}\) The largest amount paid in one year to QCUK was \(£27.7\) million in 2016/17.\(^{14}\) The financial report for 2021 does not name any donor, but only records donations worth \(£1,777\). This is a huge drop from previous years, but QCUK/Nectar Trust has a balance of almost \(£3\) million, suggesting that the Covid pandemic impacted its ability to dispense of its funds.

QCUK/Nectar Trust’s most recent financial report – for 2021 – identifies its largest project as the An-Nour Centre in Mulhouse, France, which is managed by the Muslim Association of Alsace (AMAL).\(^{15}\) AMAL is an affiliate of French Muslims (Musulmans de France, MF), the French representative of the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE), recently renamed the Council of European Muslims.\(^{16}\) The An-Nour Centre is “the largest of the 140 projects funded

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12. Ibid.
14. Nectar Trust, Trustees’ Report and Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31 March 2017, p.20. The payments made by QCUK to the European projects listed below do not necessarily reflect the total of QC’s financial support to them. As Qatar Papers show, other payments were made directly from Doha.
by Qatar Charity in Europe”. Together with a centre managed by the Muslim Association of Chablais near Geneva, the An-Nour Centre attracted a grant of £5.4 million in 2018/19. In 2018, QCUK/Nectar Trust provided funding of £5.52 million under the heading “educational support in Europe” to Muslim organisations in France, Germany and Italy for community centres, schools and student accommodation in Paris, Marseilles, Frankfurt, Verona, Rome, and Catania.

Another beneficiary of this allocation of funds was the European Institute for Human Sciences (EIHS) in Château Chinon. Demonstrating the Muslim Brotherhood-orientation of this project, EIHS’s founders appealed to Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi to design the curriculum of this training centre for imams. EIHS also received £65,747 in 2014/15 from QCUK/Nectar Trust for new buildings and refurbishments, and an additional £86,196 in 2017/18. The total amount of Qatar’s donations to EIHS, however, appears to be much more. Chesnot and Malbrunot’s documents show that the EIHS has received “at least four hundred and fifty thousand euros for student campus accommodation”.

The largest of QCUK/Nectar Trust projects in Britain is the Emaan Islamic Centre in Sheffield run by the Emaan Trust. This project is a multi-purpose Muslim community centre, located on 3.4 square kilometres of land, which was purchased in 2011. Construction began in 2012. In March 2020, the centre – branded as the Sheffield Grand Mosque – launched its Facebook page and held its first Annual General Meeting. The Emaan Trust’s website says that the centre “provides a comprehensive set of facilities and activities for the whole of the Muslim community in the area”. These include sex-segregated prayer halls and a special space for “reverts” (Muslim converts). The Nectar Trust’s financial report for 2018 claimed that when the centre is complete, it will serve more than 20,000 people who live within a five mile radius of the centre. The Emaan Trust’s financial report for 2021 report states that the centre “provides a comprehensive set of facilities for the whole of Muslim community in the area” but also asserts that the centre “builds bridges for civilised communications and serves people in Sheffield and surrounding areas”.

However, the Nectar Trust’s description of the Emaan Trust’s Islamic Centre as promoting “positive integration” is questionable. The local Muslim population’s use of their own separate facilities – including a full-time school, a nursery, a gym, a restaurant, a multi-purpose hall, and a creche – may provide Muslims with less incentive to use local public facilities and to interact with non-Muslims in their community.

The Sheffield Grand Mosque is a substantial project that has brought together Qatari money and British Islamists. Among the Emaan Trust’s recent trustees is also one of the most proactive figures in British Islamist circles: Ahmed Al-Rawi. In 2010, journalist Ian Johnson described him as “a driving force behind the [Muslim] Brotherhood in Britain and Europe for thirty years.” Al-Rawi was the president of the FIOE and a long-time member of the European Council of Fatwa and Research. He was the president of the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) between 2007 and

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27. Ian Johnson, A Mosque in Munich, p.198.
28. His Eminence Professor Ahmed Al-Rawi, 20 January 2019. https://www.e-cfr.org/2019/01/20/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d8%b3%d8%aa%d8%a7%d8%b0
2010, and a member of its shura council between 2009 and 2013. He was a director of the Emaan Trust until July 202010 and was a trustee of the European Institute for Human Sciences until 2017.11 In 2004, alongside five Hamas leaders, Al-Rawi signed a bayān (declaration) supporting Iraqi and Palestinian uprisings until “the land of Islam [is] cleansed from the filth of occupation”.12 “If they (the British) attack,” he said, “it’s the right of the civilians to resist the British. Any people who are occupied, they have the right to resist. I prefer it to be peaceful, but if they choose to resist by other means it’s their choice”.13

Another trustee of the Emaan Trust, Abderazak Bougara, is also a trustee of MAB’s charitable trust based in London, alongside Raghad Altikriti, a former president of the MAB and the sister of Anas Altikriti, also a former MAB president.14 In 2013, Bougara represented the MAB on the national council of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB).15

According to the Nectar Trust/QCUK’s financial reports, the Emaan Centre and a separate project in Manchester collectively received £1.4 million in 2018/19, and just over £1.02 million in 2017.16 It is unclear how much each project received from these amounts. In 2015/16, payments to the Emaan Trust for the Sheffield centre amounted to £1.87 million, and in 2014/15, payments amounted to £57,001.17 According to the Emaan Trust’s website, a “very active fundraiser in Qatar who helped in fundraising towards the Emaan Trust Project from 2011 to 2017” was Fahd bin Salem Al Muraikhi.18 Funding for the Emaan Centre has also been obtained from Kuwait.

In 2017, when QCUK changed its name to the Nectar Trust, it relocated its offices in London. There was also a change in senior personnel. In 2017, the director general of QCUK, Ayyoub Abouliaqin, a French national, left his position within the charity. Personnel changes also occurred within the board of trustees at the time of QCUK’s renaming in 2017. The founding chairman and chief executive of QCUK was a Qatari official, Yousef Al-Hammadi. He is the son of preacher Ahmad Al-Hammadi, who French intelligence have described as a “patron affiliated with the Muslim Brothers, also operating in structures linked to Muslim extremism”.19

33. Nicholas Rufford and Abul T aher, British Muslim says troops are fair target, 31 October 2004. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/uk-muslim-says-troops-are-fair-target-rfo9k9s5yc
40. Ibid
42. Mr. Yousef bin Ahmed Al-Kuwari, Chief Executive Officer of Qatar Charity. https://www.qcharity.org/en/qc/chief-executive-officer
43. Chesnот and Georges Malbrunоt, The Qatar Papers, p.29.
Annex B

Qatari involvement in the UK education system

In recent years, Qatar has made efforts to modernise its education system. It has also become a major donor in education globally, stating that it has supported the spending of some $2.3bn on primary education and is proactive in developing partnerships with universities in the UK and elsewhere.

It is normal for schools and universities to work with overseas partners when teaching languages or foreign cultures. Seeking international funding is something the Government has correctly encouraged universities to do, and it has helped to maintain the UK’s position in research and development in international league tables for universities. We do not suggest that the activities below should be suspected to be illegitimate or harmful. We present this information as a documentary record to demonstrate the scale of Qatari involvement in the UK education system. However, given the broader issues highlighted in this report over Qatar’s active promotion of Islamism and links with organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, we consider that the scale of their involvement in the UK education system should be recognised.

Schools

The Qatar Foundation has been involved with various British educational institutions, both on British soil and abroad. According to the British Council’s website, for example, it has collaborated with the Qatar Foundation and the Greater London Authority in developing programmes for ten schools across the UK aiming to increase understanding of the Arab world and boost the numbers of teachers and students of Arabic. Grants for the Arabic language and culture program can reach £15,000 a year. Successful schools will also be offered other benefits, which include online teaching materials and links with international schools.

The Qatar Foundation and the British Council collaborated to establish the Arabic Certificate Course at Goldsmiths College in 2013. Since 2016,
Qatar Foundation International has provided bursaries for teachers to take the course, 46 which provides a foundation in up-to-date methodologies for teaching Arabic as a second/foreign language to primary- and secondary-age learners. 47 The British Council has also worked with Qatar Foundation International (QFI), a U.S.-based member of the Qatar Foundation that is “dedicated to Arabic language and culture education for students and teachers across the world”. 48 Qatar Foundation International partners with a series of organisations and events in the UK: the Liverpool Arab Arts Festival; Shubbak, “the UK’s largest biennial festival of contemporary Arab culture”, 49 as well as the Centre for Arab British Understanding (CAABU); Scotland’s National Centre for Languages (SCILT); and the Conway Education Centre in Belfast. 50

Qatar Foundation International reports that it has created three Arabic Teacher Councils in the United Kingdom. These provide support for educators and organise professional events: 51

- North-West Teachers Council, hosted by Bolton Muslim Girls School
- West Yorkshire Teachers Council, hosted by Leeds University
- Arabic Teachers Council in London and Southern England, hosted by Goldsmiths, University of London. 52

Funding examples include:

Northern Ireland
In 2017 Qatar Foundation International donated a total of £400,000 to the British Council towards a programme which provided four schools in Northern Ireland the opportunity to provide Arabic as a foreign language option. 53

Anglo European School Ingatestone, Essex
Received grant from Qatar Foundation International (QFI) to engage an Arabic teacher. 54 The funding has also enabled the school to roll out related programmes at two primary ‘feeder’ schools. 55

Fitzalan High School, Cardiff
Receives funding from the Qatar Foundation. 56 There is some evidence that Fitzalan High School first received a grant from the British Council. 57

Horton Park Primary, Bradford
Receives QFI funding but in its own material on the Arabic programmes, the school only refers to a ‘British Council’ project. 58 59

Crickhowell High School, Brecon Beacons
In 2019 the school held an ‘Arabian Evening’ to launch a partnership with QFI and the British Council. 60

47. Goldsmiths University of London Certificate Course. https://www.qf.org/about-qfi/where-we-work/united-kingdom/uk-opportunities/goldsmiths-university-of-london-certificate-course/
49. https://www.shubbak.co.uk/about/
50. Qatar Foundation International: UK partners. https://www.qf.org/about-qfi/where-we-work/united-kingdom/uk-partners/
55. Anglo European school: International School Award. https://www.aeessex.co.uk/international-national-school-award/
58. Horton Park Primary, Arabic is the language to learn, July 2015. https://hortonparkacademy.co.uk/arabic-is-the-language-to-learn/
60. Crickhowell HS. 23 October 2019: https://twitter.com/crickhowells/status/1186998271035752448
St Paul’s Church of Wales Primary School, Cardiff
A Christian church school, listed on the Qatar Foundation International website and teaches Arabic to its pupils.61

Copthorne Primary, Bradford
A primary school in Bradford teaching Arabic that is listed on the QFI website.62

Batley Grammar, Batley Girls, and Upper Batley High School
Each of these schools are listed on the QFI website as having received support.63 Batley Grammar school was the scene of blasphemy protests in 2021 that led to a school teacher being forced into hiding.64

Bolton Muslim Girls School
The North-West Teachers Council is hosted by Bolton Muslim Girls School.

Other schools listed on the QFI website as having received funding include Brighton Aldridge Community Academy, Bolder Academy (Isleworth), Madani Schools Federation (Leicester), North Birmingham Academy, Fitzalan High School (Cardiff) and Abraham Moss Community School.65

Universities
This section provides examples of Qatari funding to universities in the United Kingdom (or their international campuses). It is indicative rather than exhaustive and based on freedom of information (FOI) act requests to universities over the past decade, some of which have received fuller responses than others. Some of the funding below may include research grants but for the most part – and especially when specified as such - research grants were not included in this list.

Oxford University
Qatar donated £3,000,000 to the Margaret Thatcher Scholarship Trust in 2016 (Qatar Development Fund).66 Earlier there had been a donation to create a Professorship in Contemporary Islamic Studies in 2008 totalling £2,390,000 (Qatar Foundation).67 68 An FOI request response from Oxford University lists donations (reason unspecified) of £5,944,500 from Qatar in 2009. Some of this may be related to the Professorship in Contemporary Studies donation in 2008.69

Further cooperation between the University of Oxford and Qatar has occurred since 2013, when the Qatar Foundation launched a training programme “to further enhance the expertise of top tier managers and improve efficiency across the organization”, tailored in partnership with the Saïd Business School.70 Gifts from the Qatar Foundation created the position of the IM Pei Professor of Islamic Art and Architecture at Oxford’s Faculty of Oriental Studies.71
Imperial College London
In 2013, the QF reported ICL as a ‘collaborative institution’, listing grants and donations to the ICL totalling £2,926,484.72

Goldsmiths University
Qatar supported the creation of the London and Southern England Arabic Teachers Council at Goldsmiths. This is an ongoing project and is sponsored (undisclosed sum) by Qatar Foundation International).73

University of Nottingham
In 2013 the Qatar Foundation reported this university as a ‘collaborative institution’, listing grants and donations to Nottingham totalling £1,032,625.74

Sussex University
Qatar funded ‘provision of Collaborative graphical tools for security policies’ in 2020. The amount donated was £143,634.75

Kings College London
King’s College London and Qatar Central Bank signed a donation agreement marking the intention to create a Qatar Centre for Global Banking & Finance within Kings Business School. The project has been made possible due to significant funding (undisclosed sum) from Qatar Central Bank.76 77 There was a donation to KCL of £5,000,000 in 2015 from Shard Funding Ltd – registered in Jersey and majority owned by Qatar - to the KCL Science Gallery London project.78

Leeds University
Qatar supported the creation of the Yorkshire Arabic Teachers Council at Leeds University. This is an ongoing Arabic language project and is sponsored (undisclosed sum) by Qatar Foundation International. A 2015 FOI request highlighted other Qatar donations to Leeds:
• Leeds University Qatar National Research Fund Faculty of Engineering: £240,449.79
• Leeds University Qatar University Faculty of Engineering: £171,828.80

University of Edinburgh
Qatar funded research posts during 2012/2013, with a donation of £90,184.81 In 2013 the Qatar Foundation reported Edinburgh as a ‘collaborative institution’, listing grants and donations to the university totalling £1,731,384.82

Ulster in Qatar
Ulster University has a branch in Qatar.83 It is known that the Qatar Foundation sponsored most of these international branch projects. The level of cooperation and costs in this institution remain undisclosed.84
UCL Qatar

In 2013 the Qatar Foundation reported UCL as a ‘collaborative institution’, listing grants / donations to UCL totalling £2,075,432.\(^8^5\) UCL had opened a branch in Doha, and it is not known how much of this funding was related to this venture or if this is for separate London-based projects.\(^8^6\) In 2020 UCL Qatar closed its doors after a ten-year relationship between the Emirate and the institution.\(^8^7\)

University of Warwick

Donations from Qatar to the value of £203,909 were received by Warwick between 2012–2014. Reason and use unspecified.\(^8^8\)

Wales Lampeter

Received £1,800,000 from Qatar and other Gulf states for Islamic Studies at the university in 2000.\(^8^9\)

University of Cambridge

In 2013 the Qatar Foundation reported the University of Cambridge as a ‘collaborative institution’, listing grants and donations totalling £1,752,954.\(^9^0\) The University of Cambridge Students Union received Qatar Airways sponsorship.\(^9^1\) The extent to which student unions or societies at other institutions have received Qatari funding is unclear.

The total value of the grants recorded above is over £2.5 million, and there are almost certainly others.

85. QNRF: Facilitating research collaboration between the UK and Qatar, Dr Abdul Sat- tar Al-Talie (Executive Director, QNRF), The British Library, London, June 2013. https://staffnet.cs.manchester.ac.uk/newsletters/2013-07-08qnrf.pdf
86. UCL Qatar (2010-2020): https://www.ucl.ac.uk/global/regional-focus/ucl-qatar-2010-2020
89. Report only names ‘Qatari rulers’ as a benefactor, alongside other leaders in the Gulf. See: Donald MacLeod, Disappearing worlds, 14 November 2000. https://www.theguardian.com/education/2000/nov/14/highereducation
90. QNRF: Facilitating research collaboration between the UK and Qatar, Dr Abdul Sat- tar Al-Talie (Executive Director, QNRF), The British Library, London, June 2013. https://staffnet.cs.manchester.ac.uk/newsletters/2013-07-08qnrf.pdf
Annex C

Qatar and blasphemy

The International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), self-described as an “Islamic institution that brings together Muslim scholars from different countries of the world”, was established in 2004 by the late Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, widely considered to have been the spiritual and intellectual guide of the global Muslim Brotherhood. IUMS is headquartered in Doha, Qatar. In December 2017, it was listed as a terrorist organisation by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, who claimed IUMS used “Islamic rhetoric as a cover to facilitate terrorist activities”.

The IUMS has played an important role in supporting “blasphemy” laws at an international level. In 2012, the IUMS helped Qatar draft a law to ban attacks on, or offenses to, “religion”. The Qatari Justice Minister Hassan bin Abdullah al-Ghanem complained that:

>In recent years, there have been insults and offenses against religion through drawings, films and other means. Thus we have taken the initiative to create a legislative instrument on an international level to protect the sacredness of all religions. The draft will be presented at the United Nations.

Qatar has not acted alone in pressing the United Nations to adopt resolutions regarding the defamation of religion. For many years, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (now renamed the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) – a coalition of 57 Muslim states – sponsored such resolutions. In 2009, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a non-binding resolution on the defamation of religion, introduced by Pakistan on behalf of the OIC.

In 2014, Qatar’s own blasphemy laws came under scrutiny at the UN Human Rights Council. In a presentation on Qatar’s human rights record, the International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU) raised concerns not only about the situation for freedom of religion, belief, expression and assembly in Qatar – it also expressed concerns about blasphemy being punishable with a prison sentence. The IHEU noted that in Qatar blasphemy is punishable by up to seven years in prison, and that proselytising on behalf of an organisation, society, or foundation of any religion other than Islam can be punished by up to ten years in prison. It also noted that, although not currently used, apostasy remains a capital offense in Qatar. IHEU said it supported “France’s call for Qatar [to] guarantee the exercise

France has become a target of the IUMS’s ire in recent years, particularly since October 2020, when French schoolteacher Samuel Paty was beheaded by an Islamist extremist for showing cartoons of Mohammed in a class on freedom of expression. Two examples below are illustrative.

In January 2021, Al Quds Al-Arabi reported that the IUMS called on the French government to stop interfering with the “privacy of Islam” and rejected a new French Charter of Republican Values aiming to curtail foreign influence over Muslim groups and mosques. IUMS Secretary General Ali Al-Qaradaghi said the IUMS stressed that “the French mosque document contradicts the tenets of Islam and the freedom of belief guaranteed in all the world, including Paris”. And in March 2021, Al-Qaradaghi addressed a Facebook post to France’s Minister for Citizenship, Marlène Schiappa. He denounced the Minister’s request for mosque imams to recognise same-sex marriage as “a double standard against Islam” and described homosexuality as an “aggression” against human nature. He also urged Muslims in France “to appeal to civil law and institutions to confront any law that limits their human rights and most importantly their religious freedom”.


97. Muslim Scholars “criticise the French intervention in Islam” and reject double dealings with religions. (Arabic), 24 January 2014. https://www.alquds.co.uk/%D8%B9%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86-


Annex D

A bibliography of reports examining human rights issues and Qatar

Human Rights Watch

- 2021: ““Everything I Have to Do is Tied to a Man” Women and Qatar’s Male Guardianship Rules” (https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/03/29/everything-i-have-do-tied-man/women-and-qatars-male-guardianship-rules)

Amnesty International

  - Briefing on Qatar specifically
Qatar: Friend or Frenemy?

  - Specific discussion of Qatar’s anti-terrorism legislation and human rights crackdowns
  - Report to UN on Qatari human rights abuses
  - Suggests a variety of reforms, in particular death penalty abolition
  - First AI World Cup related report
- 2014: “Abusive labour migration policies: Submission to the UN Committee on Migrant Workers’ day of general discussion on workplace exploitation and workplace protection, 7 April 2014” [link](https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior42/002/2014/en/)
  - Second World Cup report
  - Third World Cup report
- 2016: “The Ugly Side of the Beautiful Game: Exploitation of migrant workers on a Qatar 2022 World Cup site”
  - Summary: [link](https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/


**Anti-Slavery**


• Only major piece of work, from 2013 in cooperation with the Guardian
Qatar: Friend or Frenemy?

US State Department

Freedom House
- Note – every single Qatar report is essentially identical, listing Qatar as “not free” and identifying basically the same issues
Annex E

Problematic Qatar: a chronology

1995: Qatari Coup

- Prince Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani overthrows his father, defeats allegedly Saudi-backed counter-coup in 1996

1995: Qatari Foundation

- Qatar establishes a network of foundations linked to its banking system that it will later use to funnel money to Islamist groups

Late-1990s: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Link

- 9/11 attacks planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed identified in Qatar, US unable to extradite him and he eventually reaches Afghanistan

2003: Qatari Charities

- US Government identifies Qatar as a hotbed for Jihadist-linked charities

2010: Qatar-Afghanistan Link

- Taliban opens a de facto embassy in Qatar to facilitate international negotiations

2011: Involvement in Libya

- Qatar supports Libyan opposition with links to al-Qaeda

2012: Hosting the Hamas Politburo

- Qatar begins hosting Hamas’ Politburo after heavily financing the group

2012: Becoming Hamas’ Benefactor

- Qatari Emir visits Gaza, pledges $400 million to Hamas


106. Qatar said to order several Hamas terror chiefs to get out, 3 June 2017. https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-main-backer-qatari-said-to-expel-several-members/

2013: Funding Jabhat al-Nusra
- Qatar becomes the primary benefactor of Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, during the early stages of the Syrian Civil War

2013: Al-Qaeda Charities
- Qatar sets up a charity network for Jabhat al-Nusra that is only identified in 2015

2014 (onward): Hostage Exchanges
- Qatar establishes itself as the primary mediator with Jabhat al-Nusra during hostage negotiations, effectively funnels money to the group through ransoms

2014 (onward): ISIS Funding
- Qatar is alleged to be a premier location for ISIS-related charities and support organisations

2015-2021: Qatari Sanctions
- US Treasury Department sanctions multiple Qatari citizens for links with Jihadists and facilitating major Jihadist funding efforts

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111. Why Qatar is the focus of terrorism claims, 13 June 2017. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-40246734