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BEYOND BREXIT

Essential reading on international affairs and
security in a changing world

A Policy Exchange Report

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John Bew, [“The Great Eurosion”](#), *American Interest* (November 2017)

Jonathan Dupont, [Global Britain, Global Solutions: How British R&D can transform international development](#) (November 2017)

John Bew, [“World Order: Many-Headed Monster or Noble Pursuit?”](#), *Texas National Security Review* (October 2017)

Martyn Frampton, Ali Fisher and Nico Prucha, [The New Netwar: Countering Extremism Online](#) (September 2017)

John Bew and Gabriel Elefteriu, [Foreign Policy and National Security in the New Parliament](#), (September 2017)

John Bew and David Martin Jones, [UK Strategy in Asia: Some Starting Principles](#) (September 2017)

Jonathan Dupont, [Global Britain, Global Challenges: How to make aid more effective](#) (July 2017)

John Bew and Gabriel Elefteriu, [The UK and the Western alliance: NATO in the new era of realpolitik](#) (March 2017)

Prof. Nigel Biggar, [After Iraq: When to go to war?](#) (February 2017)

Jo Cox, Alison McGovern and Tom Tugendhat, [The Cost of Doing Nothing: The Price of Inaction in the Face of Mass Atrocities](#) (January 2017)

John Bew and Gabriel Elefteriu, [Making Sense of British Foreign Policy After Brexit](#) (July 2016)

Tom Tugendhat and Laura Croft, [The Fog of Law: An introduction to the legal erosion of British fighting power](#) (September 2013)

Richard Ekins, Tom Tugendhat and Jonathan Morgan, [Clearing The Fog of Law: Saving our armed forces from defeat by judicial diktat](#) (September 2016)

The importance of reading beyond Brexit

Brexit has transformed the contours of British foreign policy but its full effects will not be known for many years. On the one hand, its opponents warn that it risks undermining the UK national interest by disrupting crucial relationships with its nearest neighbours. On the other hand, its advocates suggest that there is a moment to seize, arguing that Britain now has increased freedom of manoeuvre and latitude of action in the world beyond. The former bemoan what they see as the triumph of a “little Britain” or “isolationist” mentality, while the latter aspire to a vision of a new “global Britain” in which the UK expands its influence in other parts of the globe.

Such debates are unlikely to be resolved in the near future. There is no doubt that the matter of leaving the EU will consume a significant portion of parliamentary business over the next few years. With a hung parliament, the government will also be highly cautious about taking actions likely to cause a foreign policy division in the House of Commons. A major defeat, such as the one experienced by David Cameron over the question of intervention in Syria in 2013, could spark another general election. But the UK cannot afford to sit on its hands during this period. An understanding of how the international landscape is changing beyond Britain is arguably more important than ever before. Whether it be fulfilling obligations to allies, honouring international commitments, dealing with threats to national security, seizing opportunities to increase trade and prosperity, or taking measures to prepare for future peace and prosperity, the more we know, the better.

It is now axiomatic that the world is entering into a period of profound and rapid change. This has been brought about by a confluence of factors – from the rise of new powers, to deep structural economic and demographic trends and rapid technological change. While there are many reasons to be optimistic about the future, such transformations bring with them the risk of destabilisation and disorder. The international institutions set up in the wake of the Second World War are coming under strain, while the laws and norms that govern political and economic relations between states are being challenged.

Among other things, we are witnessing the damaging effects of complacency and over-confidence about the triumph of liberalism and capitalism that emerged in the West at the end of the Cold War. The expectation that the warm

glow of globalisation would create ever more harmony, peace and security has been undercut by a resurgence of great power politics and ethno-religious conflict. In 2017 alone, we saw: the repeated testing of inter-continental ballistic missiles by North Korea; the mass murder of hundreds of civilians by chemical weapons in Syria; a spate of terrorist attacks across Europe, Asia and America; state failure in Venezuela; and allegations that cyber-attacks and espionage influenced the results of a presidential election in the world's most powerful democracy.

Many national governments are over-stretched, internally divided on foreign policy and locked in a "crisis management" approach to national security. With the pace of political, economic, social, military and technological change occurring faster than ever before, there is an alarming knowledge deficit about the drivers of global affairs.

Appropriately, reading lists have experienced something of a return to fashion in national security circles in recent years. In 2007, then Lieutenant General James Mattis (now US Secretary of Defence) published an extensive list of recommended books in the *Small Wars Journal*.¹ "By reading, you learn through others' experiences, generally a better way to do business," he explains.² Another important figure in the Trump administration whose reading habits have been the subject of discussion is Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, the President's National Security Advisor, who spoke at Policy Exchange twice in 2017. In his reading recommendations, McMaster places a particular emphasis on the importance of history.³ The following is not a definitive reading list so much as an introductory survey of literature of relevance to British foreign and national security policy. Inclusion in the list does not necessarily denote approval

1 ["Lt Gen James Mattis' Reading List"](#), *Small Wars Journal*, 5 June 2007.

2 Jill R. Russell, ["With rifle and bibliography: General Mattis on professional reading"](#), *Strife*.

3 Andrew Erdman, ["How militaries learn and adapt: An interview with Major General H.R. McMaster"](#), *McKinsey & Company*, April 2013; ["The McMaster Reading List"](#), *CDR Salamander*, 21 February 2017; Heather Hurlburt, ["Hey, General McMaster: Does your strategy canon have space for works by women, Asians or Africans?"](#), *Foreign Policy*, 24 February 2017.

or agreement. It is merely hoped that the identification of some important themes provides a useful starting point for practitioners, parliamentarians, scholars and students.

The “crisis of world order”

Within the last decade, a consensus has emerged in the West that there is a crisis of “world order”. The starting point for any discussion of this must be Henry Kissinger’s 2014 book of that name, which traces conceptions of international order from the Treaty of Westphalia to the modern day. In Kissinger’s view, both China and the United States need to absorb the lessons of the decade before the First World War, when the gradual build-up of an atmosphere of suspicion and latent confrontation escalated into conflict. At the same time, he argues that a new working relationship “cannot be achieved by proclamation” alone. What is needed is not a simple grand bargain between the US and China but “a concept of order that transcends the perspective and ideals of any one region or nation.”⁴

Alternative variations on the same theme have emerged across the political spectrum. When she was considering a run for president in 2016, Hillary Clinton reviewed Kissinger’s book in the *Washington Post* and agreed on the necessity of “reimagining and reinforcing the global order to meet the demands of an increasingly interdependent age.”⁵ Also on the Democrat side of the spectrum, a more critical review of Kissinger’s book was offered by scholar-practitioner Anne-Marie Slaughter, who suggested it did not take sufficient account of important factors in the international environment such as “climate change, pandemics, poverty, illiteracy, global criminal networks, energy, genocide, atrocities, and women”.⁶

Robert Kagan, generally considered a neo-conservative thinker, also made an important contribution to the world order debate in 2014 with an agenda-setting essay in the *New Republic* entitled, “Superpowers Don’t Get to Retire”.

4 Henry Kissinger, *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History*, (London: Penguin, 2015)

5 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “[Hillary Clinton reviews Henry Kissinger’s ‘World Order’](#)”, *The Washington Post*, 4 September 2014.

6 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “[How to Fix America’s Foreign Policy](#)”, *New Republic*, 19 November 2014.

Kagan bemoaned what he saw as a loss of appetite for international leadership in the United States, feeding into increased global instability. “If a breakdown in the world order that America made is occurring, it is not because America’s power is declining”, he argued, as the country’s wealth, power and potential influence, he said, remained adequate to meet the present challenges. Ultimately, for Kagan, this was “an intellectual problem, a question of identity and purpose.”⁷

If the prevailing American worldview is changing, then, it is partly due to domestic political pressures. In a March 2016 essay for *The American Interest*, Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry suggested that the foundations of the post-Second World War American-led international order had been a “centrist tradition of American world leadership,” marked by a “strong bipartisan internationalist tradition.” A radical conservative critique was challenging the “foundations of Pax Americana” at home, and thereby infecting foreign policy too.⁸ As Eliot Cohen, one of the most influential Republican critics of the Trump administration has noted in his 2017 book, *The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force*, it was increasingly difficult to convince the US electorate of the necessary costs involved with America retaining its position as “the guarantor of world order.”⁹

More recently, Philip Zelikow, a historian who has served in a number of different positions in the White House, State Department and Pentagon, suggested in *The Atlantic* that the world is “slouching towards a grave systemic crisis”. More than that, he suggests that every one of the West’s major adversaries – Russia, Iran and China – is better equipped to set the strategic initiative than their democratic counterparts in the Atlantic alliance. In another thinly veiled criticism of the Trump administration, Zelikow also warns that

7 Robert Kagan, “[Superpowers Don’t Get to Retire](#)”, *New Republic*, 26 May 2014.

8 Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry, “Unraveling America the Great,” *American Interest* 11, no. 5 (March 2016).

9 Eliot Cohen, *The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force* (New York: Basic Books, 2017)

“Blustery declarations, backed by unsustainable commitments ... [will not] regain the strategic initiative.”¹⁰

That the UK has grown used to operating closely with the United States, and sharing many of the same goals, means that these issues have profound implications for British foreign policy. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review stressed the importance of maintaining a “rules-based” international order as a core goal of British national security strategy. Two essays on the British perspective on the world order debate include “The Eclipse of the West” in the *New Statesman*, and “World Order: Many-Headed Monster or Noble Pursuit?” in the *Texas National Security Review*.¹¹

¹⁰ Philip Zelikow, [“Is the World Slouching Towards a Grave Systemic Crisis?”](#), *The Atlantic*, 11 August 2017.

¹¹ John Bew, [“The Eclipse of the West”](#), *New Statesman*, 31 January 2017; and [“World Order: Many-Headed Monster or Noble Pursuit?”](#), *Texas National Security Review*, 24 October 2017.

The impact of Trump

Since his election in November 2016, reading the runes of President Trump's national security strategy has been a challenging task. Much attention has been given to his choice of appointments for key positions at the State Department, Department of Defense, or to the White House National Security Council. Some insights into Trump's attitude to world affairs have been provided by Charlie Laderman and Brendan Simms in their book, *Donald Trump: The Making of a World View*.¹²

Trump is known to hold many views which are directly hostile to the American foreign policy establishment. This led many Republican national experts to refuse to support him during the early stages of his candidacy, when he took a lead in the Republican primaries, signing an open letter condemning him on the influential website *War On The Rocks* in March 2016.¹³ One of the most influential of Trump's defenders against this criticism was Michael Anton, now Deputy Assistant to the President for Strategic Communications at the National Security Council. In an article written before he joined the administration, Anton questioned the broad consensus—firmly held on both sides of the aisle—that a Trump presidency would undermine the “liberal international order.” Against this, he argued that the desirability of this liberal international order was presumed rather than proven, and compared the foreign policy establishment to a “priesthood”.¹⁴ In an article for *International Security*, Professor Patrick Porter suggests that American grand strategy is remarkably consistent, and questions whether this conservatism and failure to adapt has served its strategic interests.¹⁵

¹² Brendan Simms and Charlie Laderman, *Donald Trump: The Making of a World View* (London: Endeavour Press, 2017)

¹³ [“Open Letter on Donald Trump from GOP National Security Leaders”](#), 2 March 2016.

¹⁴ Michael Anton, [“America and the Liberal International Order”](#), *American Affairs* I, No. 1 (Spring 2017).

¹⁵ Patrick Porter, “Why U.S. grand strategy has not changed: Power, Habit and the Foreign Policy Establishment.” *International Security* (forthcoming), 42:3 (2018).

The publication of a new US National Security Strategy (NSS) in December 2017 can be understood as an attempt to move the discussion on US grand strategy onto different terrain. While it is not written in language that one would conventionally associate with Trump, it does aim to build on some of his campaign promises. Some of the key themes were previewed in a *New York Times* op-ed by Lt. Gen. McMaster (the National Security Advisor) and Gary D. Cohn (the director of the National Economic Council) in May 2017. In that article, they insisted that “America First” did not mean “America Alone” and that the US would continue to work closely with allies in pursuit of global leadership. “America First is rooted in the confidence that our values are worth defending and promoting”, it went on to say, “This is a time of great challenge for our friends and allies around the globe – but it is also a moment of extraordinary opportunity.”¹⁶ The headline theme of the new NSS is the idea of “competitive engagement”. A further elucidation of some of the ideas underlying this new doctrine can be seen in a seminal essay by Nadia Shadlow – who is now on the NSC – written in January 2017.¹⁷ It is also worth citing the work of Jakub Grygiel and Wess Mitchell, two scholar-practitioners who are now serving in the State Department. Their 2015 book, *The Unquiet Frontier*, stressed the continued importance of strong alliances on the periphery of American power networks, and has been cited favourably on a number of occasions by H.R. McMaster.¹⁸

16 Gary D. Cohn and Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, [“America First Doesn’t Mean America Alone”](#), 30 May 2017, *Wall Street Journal*.

17 Nadia Schadlow, [“Welcome to the Competition”](#), *War on the Rocks*, 26 January 2017.

18 Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell, *The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and the Crisis of American Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016)

The limits of globalisation and return of geopolitics

Alongside this crisis of world order, there is a growing body of literature that recognises that globalisation has been a much more complex process than has previously been assumed. The influence of science and technology in accelerating change in foreign affairs is something that is now receiving more attention. Some important examples include Thomas Friedman's *Thank You for Being Late*; Clay Shirky's *Here Comes Everybody*; Sean Lawson's *Nonlinear Science and Warfare*; and Joshua Cooper Ramo's *The Seventh Sense*.¹⁹

At the same time, there has been a revival of interest in the more traditional practice of "geopolitics", which stresses the importance of geography to shaping international affairs. Purists may wish to return to the seminal article by the English geographer Halford Mackinder – said to be the founding father of the practice – on "The Geographic Pivot of History".²⁰ Tim Marshall's *Prisoners of Geography* provides a more recent British primer on the subject.²¹ Of today's geopolitical writers, Robert Kaplan is the most influential. Two of his most important works include *The Revenge of Geography* and *The Return of Marco Polo's World and the U.S. Military Response*.²² The blunting of Western power in

19 Thomas Friedman, *Thank you for being late: An Optimist's guide to thriving in an age of accelerations* (London: Penguin, 2016); Clay Shirky, *Here Comes Everybody* (London: Allen Lane, 2008); Sean Lawson, *Nonlinear Science and Warfare* (London: Routledge 2014); Joshua Cooper Ramo, *The Seventh Sense: Power, Fortune, and Survival in the Age of Networks* (New York: Little Brown and Company, 2016).

20 H J Mackinder, "[The geographical pivot of history](#)", *The Geographic Journal*, April 1904. For a more recent reflection on this, see Paul Kennedy, "[The pivot of history](#)", *The Guardian*, 19 June 2014.

21 Tim Marshall, *Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need to Know About Global Politics*, (London: Elliott & Thompson, 2015)

22 Robert D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography: What the map tells us about coming conflicts and the battle against fate* (New York: Random House, 2012); and "[The Return of Marco Polo's World and the U.S. Military Response](#)", *Center for New American Security*, May, 2017).

the face of traditional geographical and cultural cleavages is the theme of Patrick Porter's *The Global Village Myth: Distance, War and the Limits of Power*.²³

By 2025, two-thirds of the world's population will be living in Asia, with just five per cent in the United States and seven per cent in Europe. The countries of the Indo-Pacific already account for over 51 per cent of the world's population, and the World Bank estimates that the economies of Asia already produce half of the total percentage of the world's goods. In 2014, the International Monetary Fund announced that, in terms of purchasing power, China had become the world's largest economy, overtaking the United States. Two recent books intended to shine a light on these changes are Gideon Rachman's *Easternisation* and Michael Auslin's *The End of the Asian Century*. The latter takes a more sceptical view of the rise of Asia. It identifies a number of severe challenges ahead for a number of Asia's key powers, particularly China, India and Japan.²⁴

Kurt Campbell's *The Pivot* remains the starting point for examining the shift in American strategic priorities from Europe to the Asia Pacific.²⁵ Fears of war continue to shape projections of future US-China relations, which partly explain the influence of Graham Allison's *Destined for War*.²⁶ Allison recounts a series of historical examples which show how, when an established hegemon is challenged by a rising power, the confrontation often results in war. Another crucial interjection in this debate is Christopher Coker's *The Improbable War*, which also suggests that a war between China and the US is entirely plausible.²⁷

23 Patrick Porter, *The Global Village Myth: Distance, War, and the Limits of Power*, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015). Reviewed in: G. John Ikenberry, "[Review: The Global Village Myth: Distance, War, and the Limits of Power](#)", *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2016.

24 Gideon Rachman, *Easternisation: War and Peace in the Asian Century* (London: Bodley Head, 2016)
Michael R. Auslin, *The End of the Asian Century: War, Stagnation, and the Risks to the World's Most Dynamic Region* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2017)

25 Kurt Campbell, *The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia*, (New York: Twelve, 2016)

26 Graham T. Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China escape Thucydides's Trap?* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2017)

27 Christopher Coker, *The Improbable War: China, the United States and logic of great power conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015)

For a detailed academic account of China's rise and some of the underlying ideas shaping its economic behaviour, Robin Porter's *From Mao to Market* is an excellent starting point.²⁸ A longer term perspective is provided by Jonathan Fenby in his *History of Modern China*, which begins in the mid-nineteenth century.²⁹ A popular account of China's growing influence is offered in Martin Jacques's *When China Rules the World*.³⁰ A number of writers have begun to stress the role of history in conditioning China's worldview and approach to foreign affairs, as evinced in Howard W. French's *Everything Under the Heavens*.³¹ Two of Britain's most prominent China scholars are Rana Mitter, whose *A Bitter Revolution* is required reading, and Kerry Brown, whose 2016 report, *Erase and Rewind*, is one of the few to discuss UK-China relations in any depth.³²

Notwithstanding the pressures it has faced, NATO remains the foundation stone of UK national defence strategy. As such, the renewed threat posed by Russia to the alliance, across a number of domains, is at the forefront of national security concerns. James Sherr's "The Militarization of Russian Policy" is the best recent account of the changing nature of the threat.³³ This pairs well with one of the best books on Russian foreign policy in recent years, Bobo Lo's *Russia and the New World Disorder*.³⁴ Another important brief work on Russian strategic thinking is provided by Michael Kofman in *The Moscow School of Hard Knocks*.³⁵

28 Robin Porter, *From Mao to Market: China Reconfigured* (London: Hurst, 2011)

29 Jonathan Fenby, *The Penguin History of Modern China: The fall and rise of a Great Power, 1850 to present* (London: Allen Lane, 2008)

30 Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The end of the Western World and the birth of a New Global Order* (London: Penguin, 2012)

31 Howard W. French, *Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China's Push for Global Power* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2017)

32 Rana Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution: China's struggle with the modern world* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Kerry Brown, "Erase and Rewind: Britain's relations with China", Australia-China Relations Institute, 2015. Available at: <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/lci/documents/Kerry-Brown-Britains-relations-with-China.pdf>

33 James Sherr, "[The Militarization of Russian Policy](#)", *Transatlantic Academy*, 22 August 2017.

34 Bobo Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*, (Baltimore: Brookings Institution Press, 2015). Reviewed by Robert Legvold in *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2016. Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/2015-12-10/russia-and-new-world-disorder>

35 Michael Kofman, "[The Russian School of Hard Knocks: Key Pillars of Russian Strategy](#)", *War on the Rocks*, 17 January 2017.

Kofman has also written about what he sees as failures of conception in Western analysis of Russian intentions.³⁶ At the time of President Trump's election, there was some speculation about the likelihood of a rapprochement between Washington DC and Moscow. This now seems highly unlikely for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, Jeffrey Taylor's 2016 essay in *The Atlantic*, "The Time is Ripe for Détente 2.0", explores what such a radical policy shift might look like if it was attempted at a later date.³⁷

36 Michael Kofman, "[The Seven Deadly Sins of Russia Analysis](#)", *War on the Rocks*, 23 December 2015.

37 Jeffrey Taylor, "[The Time is Right for Détente, 2.0](#)", *The Atlantic*, 8 August 2016.

UK Foreign Policy

“Know thyself” is one of the first requirements of statecraft. And yet there is a shortage of serious scholarship and self-reflection when it comes to analysis of British foreign policy. Jamie Gaskarth’s *British Foreign Policy* offers an introductory survey of the primary actors and processes in British foreign policy, with chapters on identity, Britain’s place in the world, the ethics of foreign policy and the military and economic influences on policymaking.³⁸ For a general account of British post-war foreign and defence policy, Robert Self’s *British Foreign and Defence Policy since 1945* [is a good place to start](#).³⁹ Other important works include *British Foreign Policy and the National Interest*⁴⁰ and Oliver Daddow and Jamie Gaskarth’s *British Foreign Policy: the New Labour Years*.⁴¹

Recent talk of reinvigorating the Commonwealth or “Anglosphere” means that it is more important than ever to understand the historical context to UK foreign policy. On the legacy of empire, Niall Ferguson’s *Empire* and Shashi Tharoor’s *Inglorious Empire* provide starkly different perspectives.⁴² Manjari Chatterjee Miller’s *Wronged by Empire* shows how the experience of being subject to Western imperialism continues to have an impact on Indian and Chinese foreign policy.⁴³ On Britain’s vexed relationship with Europe over the centuries, Brendan Simms provides the most authoritative account.⁴⁴

Since 1945, the UK has fought and engaged in a number of “small wars”, from the period of de-colonisation through to the era after 9/11. The changing

38 Jamie Gaskarth, *British Foreign Policy: Crises, Conflict and Future Challenges* (Cambridge: Polity, 2013).

39 Robert Self, *British Foreign and Defence Policy since 1945: Challenges and dilemmas in a changing world* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010)

40 Timothy Edmunds, Robin Porter and Jamie Gaskarth, *British Foreign Policy and the National Interest: Identity, Strategy and Security* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014).

41 Oliver Daddow and Jamie Gaskarth, *British Foreign Policy: the New Labour Years* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010).

42 Niall Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* (London: Penguin, 2004); Shashi Tharoor, *Inglorious Empire: What the British Did to India* (London: Hurst 2017)

43 Manjari Chatterjee Miller, *Wronged by Empire: Post-imperial ideology and foreign policy in India and China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2013).

44 Brendan Simms, *Britain’s Europe: A Thousand Years of Conflict and Cooperation* (London: Penguin, 2017)

political and ideological backdrop to these are discussed in Aaron Edwards's *Defending the Realm*.⁴⁵ More broadly, Hew Strachan's *The Direction of War* reveals the muddled thinking that exists on questions of military intervention.⁴⁶ In *Blair's Successful War*, Andrew Dorman investigates the conditions that made for a successful UK-led intervention in Sierra Leone.⁴⁷ Tim Bird and Alex Marshall's account of the failings of the Western campaign in Afghanistan provides a detailed account of the longest intervention of the post-war era⁴⁸, while Theo Farrell's sobering study of British involvement in the ISAF campaign will be the authoritative account for years to come.⁴⁹

The making of UK foreign policy at the level of diplomacy is addressed at length by John Dickie in *The New Mandarins: How British Foreign Policy Works*⁵⁰ and John Coles in *Making Foreign Policy*.⁵¹ Formerly of the Foreign Office, Tom Fletcher addresses the new challenges to the traditional conduct of foreign policy in *Naked Diplomacy: Power and Statecraft in the Digital Age*.⁵² An insight into prime ministerial and cabinet influence on foreign policy is provided by Gill Bennett in *Six Moments of Crisis*⁵³, while Richard Aldrich and Rory Cormac's *The Black Door* outlines how intelligence influences decision-making in this domain.⁵⁴ Polling work by Chatham House provides a deeper understanding of trends within British public opinion on foreign policy issues.⁵⁵ The oscillation of

45 Aaron Edwards, *Defending the Realm? The Politics of Britain's Small Wars Since 1945* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012)

46 Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012)

47 Andrew Dorman, *Blair's Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone* (London: Routledge, 2009).

48 Tim Bird and Alex Marshall, *Afghanistan: How the West Lost its Way* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2011).

49 Theo Farrell, *Unwinnable: Britain's War in Afghanistan, 2001-2014* (London: The Bodley Head, 2017)

50 John Dickie, *The New Mandarins: How British Foreign Policy Works*, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2004)

51 John Coles, *Making Foreign Policy: A Certain Idea of Britain*. (London: John Murray, 2000).

52 Tom Fletcher, *Naked Diplomacy: Power and Statecraft in the Digital Age*, (London: William Collins, 2016)

53 Gill Bennett, *Six Moments of Crisis: Inside British Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013)

54 Richard Aldrich and Rory Cormac's *The Black Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence British Prime Ministers* (London: William Collins 2017).

55 Thomas Raines, "[Internationalism or Isolationism? The Chatham House-YouGov Survey](#)", Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 30 January 2015.

attitudes to intervention and non-intervention on issues such as Libya and Syria has also been the subject of new academic scholarship.⁵⁶

The role of “soft power” as an instrument of British influence abroad has been a subject of much discussion in recent years. Christopher Hill and Sarah Beadle’s “The Art of Attraction: Soft Power and the UK’s Role in the World” provide a useful assessment, though this was pre-Brexit.⁵⁷ Another valuable contribution to this discussion is the 2014 House of Lords report on British influence, “Persuasion and Power in the Modern World”.⁵⁸ More recently, the work of Tom Cargill and the British Foreign Policy Research Group represents a hugely important contribution to the foreign policy debate post-Brexit, in seeking to broaden the discussion on the UK’s role abroad beyond Westminster and Whitehall. A particularly important contribution is their November 2017 report, “Rising Power-Revitalising British Foreign Policy for a New Global Era”.⁵⁹

Reports by the RAND Corporation and the Henry Jackson Society have looked more at hard power and other capabilities in a post-Brexit environment.⁶⁰ Other important contributions to this discussion include: Malcolm Chalmers’s “UK Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit”;⁶¹ Tim Oliver and Michael Williams’s “Making the ‘special relationship’ great again?”⁶²; and Tim Oliver’s “Fifty shades

56 Jason Riefler, Harold D. Clarke, Thomas J. Scotto, David Sanders, Marianne C. Stewart and Paul Whitely, “[Prudence, principle and minimal heuristics: British public opinion toward the use of military force in Afghanistan and Libya](#)”, *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 16, No. 1, 28-55 (2014); James Strong, *Public Opinion, Legitimacy and Tony Blair’s War in Iraq*. (London: Routledge, 2017)

57 Christopher Hill and Sarah Beadle, “[The Art of Attraction: Soft Power and the UK’s Role in the World](#)”, *British Academy*, 1 March 2014; Tom Cargill, “Rising Power-Revitalising British Foreign Policy for a New Global Era”, *British Foreign Policy Group*,

58 “[Persuasion and Power in the Modern World](#)”, *House of Lords Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence*, 11 March 2014.

59 Tom Cargill, “[Rising Power-Revitalising British Foreign Policy for a New Global Era](#)”, *British Foreign Policy Group*, 10 November 2017.

60 James Black et al, “[Defence and security after Brexit: Understanding the possible implications of the UK’s decision to leave the EU](#)”, *RAND*, 5 March 2017; James Rogers, “[An Audit of Geopolitical Capability: A Comparison of Eight Major Powers](#)”, *The Henry Jackson Society*, 12 September 2017.

61 Malcolm Chalmers, “[UK Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit](#)”, *RUSI Briefing Papers*, 9 January 2017.

62 Tim Oliver and Michael Williams, “[Making the ‘special relationship’ great again?](#)”, *IDEAS Reports, LSE Ideas*, 9 February 2017.

of Brexit: Britain's EU referendum and its implications for Europe and Britain".⁶³ Policy Exchange's *Britain in the World* Project has published a series of reports on issues that cut across foreign policy and defence. Recent examples include: *Foreign Policy and National Security in the New Parliament*; *UK Strategy in Asia: Some Starting Principles*; *The UK and the Western alliance: NATO in the New Era of Realpolitik*; and *Making Sense of British Foreign Policy After Brexit*.⁶⁴

Book length treatments of UK foreign policy and grand strategy are rare but two studies are of particular note: Julian Lindley-French's *Little Britain?: Twenty-First Century Strategy for a Middling European Power*⁶⁵; and Lord David Owen's more recent *British Foreign Policy After Brexit*.⁶⁶ In a rare academic discussion of UK grand strategy, David Blagden has made the case for the UK to play the role of an "offshore balancer" in an era of multi-polarity.⁶⁷ One thing that is particularly important in guiding future foreign policy is the counsel of former practitioners. In this spirit, former National Security Adviser and British Ambassador to France Sir Peter Ricketts has recently offered a reminder of the importance of the UK's post-Cold War defence cooperation within the EU states.⁶⁸ Another vital contribution has been by Sir Simon Fraser in a speech at Chatham House in November 2017, "In Search of a Role: Rethinking British Foreign Policy".⁶⁹ The best recent essay on Britain's role in the world is Yale by historian Paul Kennedy,

63 Tim Oliver, "[Fifty shades of Brexit: Britain's EU referendum and its implications for Europe and Britain](#)", *International Spectator*, 6 February 2017.

64 John Bew and Gabriel Elefteriu, "[Foreign Policy and National Security in the New Parliament](#)", *Policy Exchange*, 22 September 2017; John Bew and David Martin Jones, "[UK Strategy in Asia: some starting principles](#)", *Policy Exchange*, 4 September 2017; John Bew and Gabriel Elefteriu, "[The UK and the Western Alliance: NATO in the new era of realpolitik](#)", *Policy Exchange*, 28 March 2017; John Bew and Gabriel Elefteriu, "[Making Sense of British Foreign Policy After Brexit](#)", *Policy Exchange*, 19 July 2016.

65 Julian Lindley-French, *Little Britain?: Twenty-First Century Strategy for a Middling European Power*, (London: Self-Published, 2015)

66 David Owen and David Ludlow, *British Foreign Policy After Brexit*, (London: Biteback Publishing, 2017)

67 David Blagden, "Global multipolarity, European security and implications for UK grand strategy: back to the future, once again" *International Affairs* 91:2 (2015), pp.333-350.

68 Peter Ricketts, "[The EU and Defence: The Legacy of Saint-Malo](#)", *The RUSI Journal* 162, No. 3 (2017).

69 Sir Simon Fraser in a speech at Chatham House in November 2017, "[In Search of a Role: Rethinking British Foreign Policy](#)", 7 November 2017.

with a stress on the continued importance of sea power to twenty-first century international competition.⁷⁰



⁷⁰ Paul Kennedy, "Britain's prestige is sinking as China bids to rule the waves", *The Times*, 11 November 2017.