Fighting Crime and Disorder



Policing experience from America

William Bratton (Hon) CBE

With Rt Hon Nick Herbert MP and Sir Paul Stephenson Edited by Blair Gibbs



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Published by Policy Exchange, Clutha House, 10 Storey's Gate, London SW1P 3AY www.policyexchange.org.uk

ISBN: 978-1-906097-96-7

Printed by Heron, Dawson and Sawyer Designed by SoapBox, www.soapboxcommunications.co.uk

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About the Authors

William Bratton (Hon) CBE is America's most famous cop and is widely regarded as one of the most successful police chiefs in modern US history. Renowned for delivering sweeping reforms to police management in New York and elsewhere, Bill Bratton cut crime rates, drove efficiencies and raised morale in all of the key posts he held – improving the security and quality of life of millions of residents. The only person ever to serve as head of the LAPD and the NYPD, Chief Bratton established an international reputation for re-engineering police departments and fighting crime in the 1990s.

As Chief of the New York City Transit Police, Boston Police Commissioner, then New York City Police Commissioner, he revitalized morale and cut crime in all three posts, achieving the largest crime declines in New York City's history. A US Army Vietnam veteran, Chief Bratton began his policing career in 1970 as a police officer with the Boston Police Department, rising to Superintendent of Police. In the 1980s, Chief Bratton headed two other police agencies, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Police and the Massachusetts Metropolitan District Commission Police. He was appointed by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani as the 38th Commissioner of the NYPD in 1994, and became Chief of the LAPD in 2002. Now working in the private sector, Bratton is the Chairman of Kroll, one of Altegrity, Inc.'s four core businesses. Kroll is described as - "the world's leading risk consulting company, providing a broad range of investigative, intelligence, financial, security, and technology services to help clients reduce risks, solve problems, and capitalize on opportunities."

Bratton is Vice Chair of the Homeland Security Advisory Council that provides security policy recommendations to the Secretary of the US Department of Homeland Security. **Rt Hon Nick Herbert MP** was elected MP for Arundel & South Downs in May 2005. Prior to being appointed Minister of State for Justice (jointly with the Home Office) he has held positions of Shadow Minister for Police Reform, Shadow Secretary of State for Justice and most recently Shadow Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Prior to his election as an MP Nick was the Director of Reform, the independent think tank which he cofounded in 2002. He was Chief Executive of Business for Sterling from 1998 to 2000. He takes an active interest in rural communities and international aid for health issues (tuberculosis). He read Law and Land Economy at Magdalene College, Cambridge.

Sir Paul Stephenson joined Lancashire Constabulary in 1975 and was appointed to the rank of Superintendent in February 1988. Following a post in research and development he took operational commands in Lancashire and Northern Ireland with the Royal Ulster Constabulary. He was appointed Assistant Chief Constable Merseyside Police in October 1994, with responsibility for Territorial Policing Operations. On 1 May 1999 he was appointed Deputy Chief Constable Lancashire Constabulary, responsible for the operations and operational support portfolios. He led the constabulary on strategic development including constructing the organisation's response to Best Value, crime reduction and its development of problem oriented policing, successfully embedding it within the police culture of Lancashire and he remains an affiliate of the Centre for Problem Oriented Policing in the USA. On 25 July 2002 he was appointed Chief Constable of Lancashire Constabulary, responsible for an organisation of over 5,600 staff and the provision of policing services to one and a half million residents and visitors. During this time he was the Chair of the Lancashire Criminal Justice Board and the Lancashire Strategic Partnership. During this period he was also the Association of Chief Police Officers lead on Crime, working nationally with a number of key stakeholders to coordinate

professional advice and guidance on crime related issues to the police service and partners. On 16 March 2005 Sir Paul was appointed Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service. His role included the function of Chief Operating Officer and in particular oversight of strategy, organisational performance and diversity. In March 2007 Sir Paul was appointed to the board of the National Policing Improvement Agency. Sir Paul was awarded the Queen's Policing Medal for services to policing in May 2000 and he received a knighthood in the Queens Birthday Honours List of June 2008. On 28 January 2009 Sir Paul became Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service.

Charles Moore is a columnist for The Spectator and The Daily Telegraph. He previously edited both The Daily Telegraph and The Sunday Telegraph as well as The Spectator. Charles is Chairman of Policy Exchange and is currently working on an authorised biography of Margaret Thatcher.

Blair Gibbs joined Policy Exchange in June 2010 as the Head of Crime and Justice policy. He edited the Policy Exchange report Fitting the Crime: Reforming Community Sentences (November 2010) and Bringing Rights Back Home (February 2011). He has been a regular commentator on current policing and criminal justice topics, appearing on TV and radio and writing numerous articles for the national print media. Prior to joining Policy Exchange he worked (2007-10) as Chief of Staff and senior policy advisor to the Policing and Criminal Justice Minister, Rt Hon Nick Herbert MP; as a director of the TaxPayers' Alliance, and before that as a Home Affairs researcher at the think tank Reform. He read History & Politics at Merton College, Oxford.

Policy Exchange's Crime and Justice Unit

What we stand for

- **Creating a safer society.** The United Kingdom suffers above-average levels of crime compared to peer group nations but high crime rates are not the inevitable result of living in a prosperous, urbanised society. Policy Exchange believes that an effective criminal justice system can reduce crime and make communities safer. Through a modern, reformed system of police, courts, prisons and probation, crime can be controlled, harm prevented and the number of victims reduced, without resorting to authoritarian measures.
- The current system is failing. Too many people are victims of crime, high crime rates affect the poorest members of society, and too many neighbourhoods are blighted by disorder and endemic anti-social behaviour. The criminal justice system is often unresponsive to the needs of victims and mostly unaccountable to the public it is there to serve freezing people out, denying victims a voice and preventing real community engagement.
- The State controls too much. Government oversees a system that is far too centrally-controlled, stifling innovation and sapping the morale of the professionals who work in it. Criminal justice agencies have grown accustomed to looking upwards to the centre instead of devising local, collective responses to law and order issues. Local agencies lack autonomy, and best practice takes too long to spread. The centralised approach has distorted political debate and undermined morale, and the State's failure to combat high rates of crime has eroded public confidence.

Our vision

- A fair, just and effective criminal justice system that prevents crime and disorder. Government has a moral obligation to provide security to citizens, but it does not have a monopoly on best practice. We believe most successful crime reduction policies arise from local innovation, not centrally devised responses.
- The State should devolve power and responsibility to local agents wherever possible, unlocking the expertise of those closest to the front-line. Government should agree budgets and set legal frameworks to uphold the rule of law and decide punishment, but the management and delivery of criminal justice services need not always be undertaken by the State alone.
- The private and voluntary sector should be unlocked and fully integrated into delivery and allowed to engage on an equal footing with the public sector. Giving people more information and a greater say over how agencies prevent and tackle crime will improve performance and make the whole criminal justice system more responsive to local needs. This requires dynamic local leadership, the right incentives and partnerships that focus on delivering clear, measurable outcomes that matter to the public.
- Rebuilding public confidence in the criminal justice system depends upon **increased transparency**, **clearer accountability**, **real local control and greater citizen involvement**.

Current areas of relevant work

• Police Reform: The police can reduce crime and modern policing arrangements should reflect the heightened demands of serious and organised crime while respecting the importance of local neighbourhood needs. British policing in the last forty years has consistently struggled to suppress rising levels of crime,

whilst becoming distant from the public's priorities and detached as a profession from its own founding principles established by Sir Robert Peel. Home Office micromanagement has undermined public confidence in policing and weakened the historic bonds between the police and the communities they serve. Reform of policing should be driven by the need to improve accountability, modernise the workforce and fight crime more effectively. Public confidence is a product of effective policing that combats crime, not an objective in itself.

If you would like to find out more about our work, please contact:

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Acknowledgements

This publication is a record of remarks made at a speaker event during a visit by Bill Bratton to London in November 2010 when he was a guest of Policy Exchange. Policy Exchange would like to thank Michael John at Altegrity Ltd. and Gordon Wasserman, who were instrumental in assisting with the London programme for Bill Bratton's visit, as were Caroline Murdoch at New Scotland Yard and Nick Timothy in the Home Office. Rt Hon Keith Vaz MP and Elizabeth Flood of the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee gave their kind permission to reprint the oral evidence from their police enquiry session. Special thanks are extended to Robert Rosenkranz, Trustee of Policy Exchange, whose generous sponsorship made the visit possible, to George Currie, who transcribed the speeches, to Rory Geoghegan and Karen Sosa for their work on the supplementary material, and to all the staff at Policy Exchange who helped with the media and events.

Preface

Five years ago, while Bill Bratton was serving a second term as Chief of Police in Los Angeles, I was asked a straightforward question: if you could bring about one change to reduce crime in London, what would you rather have? One thousand extra prison places, one thousand extra police officers, or Bill Bratton as Metropolitan Police Commissioner? The answer at the time was obvious and today the point still stands: effective police leadership is more important than the resources a force has at its disposal.

The crime-fighting achievements of Bill Bratton are truly remarkable. What really stands out from his record in all places he has led police over the last thirty years – in Boston, in New York, and most recently in Los Angeles – is not his support for a particular policing strategy or management technique, but his style of leadership.

Bratton's record, particularly in New York in the mid-1990s, is now familiar in the United Kingdom and his public appearances here still generate significant interest from both the public and police professionals. But contrary to some lazy stereotypes, Bratton's success in New York was not due to him being a tough, 'zero tolerance' crime-fighter who busted criminal networks and came down hard on all offenders. Bratton's leadership was much more sophisticated, intelligent and impressive than this caricature.

The real story of Bratton in New York was more to do with the changes he brought to the NYPD, than any change to how the police behaved on the streets. Central to it was a commitment to devolution, discretion and transparency. For Bratton, fighting crime means effective policing; that is, policing in which responsibility is devolved to precinct (district) commanders who know best how to allocate resources and police their neighbourhoods and in which these commanders are held accountable to ensure they deliver. Devolving decisions, rewarding talent and encouraging responsibility and innovation – the key elements of transformative leadership.

Bratton himself was more than willing to be held personally accountable for his record, too. As a high-profile police leader, Bratton knew he had an obligation to be accountable to the public for his department's record on crime. And more importantly, Bratton believed that the police could and should be measured by this. There was this firm belief that the police can cut crime ("cops count"),

⁶⁶ Policing is vital to a safe and prosperous society, but it is not about how many cops there are or how much money is spent – it is about leadership that gives an organisation purpose⁹⁹ and a real conviction that policing could make a difference; it wasn't just a crime displacement exercise.

Central to Bratton's policing approach was the CompStat system, an innovative police management tool developed by Bratton in the NYPD and now in use in major forces around the world although not much in Britain. This

system sounds simple, even simplistic, but it works, and it was crucial to measurement and accountability. It provides the regular crime updates needed to enable police managers to allocate resources effectively and respond quickly, while also being the mechanism to hold local commanders to account. These CompStat meetings are theatre, where rises in crime locally demand an explanation and poor performance is exposed and challenged. Another sort of leader would have felt threatened and exposed by such a tool.

Bratton understood that large organisations, especially urban police departments, could become demoralised and ineffective without strong, accountable leadership that gives an organisation its purpose. When Bratton arrived at the NYPD in 1994, the organisation had lost its way. The overriding objective of the department, as recounted in his memoir *Turnaround* (1998), was to avoid external criticism, not to fight crime. There are clear parallels here with the Metropolitan Police, which in the last decade appeared more concerned with its own brand and image in the media, than its performance on crime.

What Bratton achieved in kick-starting New York's turnaround is a proud legacy that continues to this day. New York remains the safest large city in the United States. The scale of the crime decline – particularly in New York but also in Los Angeles – was unparalleled (see Appendix B). The turnarounds are now undisputed and they were not accidents of history. Academic study strongly suggests they owed an enormous amount to effective policing, and to the bold tipping-point leadership that Bratton brought to the police departments in those cities, almost irrespective of the resources at his disposal.

As funding is reduced and police officer numbers fall in England and Wales in the years ahead, this lesson above all others should resonate. Policing is vital to a safe and prosperous society, but it is not about how many cops there are or how much money is spent – it is about leadership that gives an organisation purpose and gets cops out there in the right place, doing the right thing at the right time. Elements of British policing remain the best in the world, but we have much to learn from the American experience and from police leaders like Bratton who demonstrate what can be done to fight crime with the right policies, the right attitude and the right leadership.

Blair Gibbs

Head of Crime and Justice Unit, Policy Exchange

1. Welcome Address

Charles Moore

Welcome to this very important event. Last week we had Matt Ridley talking to us about exchange – he played on our name Policy Exchange. He developed this theory in his book *The Rational Optimist* that it's exchange which is the great human characteristic, the characteristic of human progress, the exchange of ideas and practice, which is what makes us constantly adapt and succeed.

The more of that exchange we can have with what's happened in policing in the United States the better. And in fact our guest tonight is in fact the possessor of a CBE, I think we have to call it an honorary CBE if you're not a British citizen – which sadly for us he isn't – because of the exchange of best practice from the United States with Britain.

Policy Exchange has, for several years now, tried to develop new ideas of police accountability. We've had a lot of influence I think on current government thinking, though the Minister who's present tonight may deny that. Most people in Britain think they know a lot about American policing because they watch a lot on television, a lot of dramas on television, but actually the story and drama of Bill Bratton's achievements is just as exciting or more so than what you might see on these programmes.

He's unique I think in having been the commissioner of the NY police department and the police chief of the LAPD, and from coast-to-coast his experience has been uniquely successful. He's going to speak to us about his career and experiences, but before he does, can you please welcome the Policing Minister, Nick Herbert, who is going to introduce him to us.

2. Introduction

Rt Hon Nick Herbert MP, Minister of State for Policing and Criminal Justice

Thank you very much indeed Charles. Good evening ladies and gentlemen. It's a huge pleasure to be here and to see so many senior police officers present. I'm often told that I must feel very reassured constantly to be surrounded by so many police officers and, therefore, to feel so safe. But I have to reply that – as was pointed out to me by a friend who texted me on the day it happened – the President of Ecuador had to be rescued from his own police service by the intervention of the army after he initiated a reform of their pay and conditions. I haven't yet begun to recruit my republican guard but, should it be necessary I may be asking for volunteers. I say that with Paul Stephenson present.

It is a particular pleasure to be able to introduce Bill Bratton this evening. He has fulfilled, as Charles mentioned, this unique position of being the head of both the New York police, as Commissioner from 1994 to 1996, and then as head of the LAPD as well, between 2002 and 2009 – I note therefore serving under mayors of different political persuasions. And, I think we all look forward immensely to the insights that his remarks will give us but, one of the things that is so clear is that there was a great difference in resource available to Bill in LA with a much smaller police force than was available to him in New York.

The triumph of policing in New York which delivered huge falls in crime during his tenure, falls that academic research has pointed out considerably exceeded the international falls in crime and the national fall that was experienced in the United States at the time, was then replicated when Bill took over in LA, thereby proving that in this case lightning does indeed strike twice and also proving that the reforms were driven by the man.

I think it's important to say that the United States and the United Kingdom are different countries with slightly different cultures and different styles of policing. It's important for us to understand those differences. But we can of course learn internationally from where things have gone right. As I'm sure Bill would be the first to say, the United States can learn from the great successes in UK policing. And it seems to me that both models draw in essence on the style of policing that was set by Sir Robert Peel when he founded the first Metropolitan police force and talked about the basic mission of the police to "prevent crime and disorder".

Here, we are told that 43 police forces in England and Wales is too many; in the United states there are 17,000 police departments. Bill is not the only police chief who has delivered big reductions in crime against a background of tight resources, something that is being shared at the moment between both countries with US departments facing tough budgetary situations as well. In our own country, Sir Hugh Orde in Northern Ireland delivered reductions in crime against the background of a smaller police force too. So we should remember our domestic successes as well.

Nevertheless, the triumph of accountability and what that helped to deliver – ideas such as crime mapping – were all things which I and others, and I'm sure also Policy Exchange, saw when they went over to the United States and visited Bill and others. Specifically, street level crime mapping was something I saw when I visited Bill in LA in 2007, and the Coalition Government is committed to introducing that in January next year. Today, we've given notice of the introduction of our Police Reform Bill which will replace police authorities with directly-elected Police and Crime Commissioners. So we can learn from where things are done well, both here and abroad. But, above all, we can certainly celebrate the career, and learn from, indisputably one of the world's great crime-fighters – somebody who is celebrated not just in his own country, but also here in the United Kingdom. And that's why it is a special pleasure to be able to welcome Bill Bratton, CBE, this evening. Thank you.

Fighting Crime and Disorder: Policing experience from America

William Bratton (Hon) CBE

Thank you for that very effusive introduction and thank you on behalf of my wife Rikki, who is here with me, for the opportunity to once again visit your wonderful country and this great city. Thank you, certainly, to the Policy Exchange for allowing me to continue to contribute thoughts and ideas to the ongoing debate about the importance of policing and what works and what doesn't. And also thank you for the opportunity to once again return to England to see if I can continue my quest to perfect my English. I am often times accused in the United States – with my Bostonian accent – of never having acquired the language, so coming over here helps me to reinforce that I am hopefully acquiring it slowly but surely.

Tonight I want to share some of that language with you and I've been asked to share the American policing experience through my eyes and through my experiences. The Chinese have an expression that I have continually embraced and it's an expression well known to you that "May you live in interesting times". Well for forty years of my life I have had the phenomenal opportunity to always live in interesting times because policing is always of interest to those of us in the profession and certainly of importance to all of you who are impacted by the profession.

And over these past forty years I have seen around the world but most specifically in my country and almost as specifically in your country that cops count, police matter. I am a strong advocate of the importance of police. Forty years in the business has not dissuaded me from that importance and the reaffirmation that I made the right decision in 1970 to become a Boston police officer at the age of twenty-three. Each and every day of these past forty years I have had the opportunity to not only enhance my sense of value of my contribution to the society that I work with but that each and every day I had the opportunity to have a profound impact on the lives of so many people; whether in the Nineties, the 8 million people living in New York City, or more recently, the last 7 years, the 4 million people living in Los Angeles. Decisions made by me, my leadership team, decisions by officers on patrol in the neighbourhoods, every decision we make has the potential to improve their lives or, possibly, detract from the quality of their lives. So I am a profound advocate of our profession and its importance in our democratic society.

In our democracies, either our constitutional democracy or yours, the obligation of government, the first and primary obligation is to ensure public safety, public order, and it was to that end, that the police, ultimately, were created. The modern police conception was

conceived here, Sir Robert Peel, 1829, and in an earlier meeting with Sir Paul Stephenson we had a discussion about that first year. I will not share that with you because he asked me not to, those recollections of the Metropolitan Police of 1829, when they first took to the

66 Forty years in the business has not dissuaded me from that importance ... cops count, police matter **99**

beat in the city. But, when I review the Nine Principles of Policing promulgated by Sir Robert Peel a hundred and some odd years ago not too far from this spot, it strikes me that the right expression is everything old is new again. We have truly returned to the phenomenal wisdom of that gentleman when he began to advocate the importance of police in the city of London and the country of England. The understanding that the importance of police in delivering public safety, all the other benefits and truths of society emanate from that first fundamental obligation, whether it be education, healthcare, social reform, all of it is more impactful and more beneficial if it is delivered in a safe society. So, in terms of the subject of my discussion this evening, cops count, police matter, it is formed on that foundation and that basis.

In the United States we have, over the last forty years, been engaged in a series of revolutions, evolutions, paradigms. One of the great things about the profession of policing is that it is always changing. If you don't like it today just wait until tomorrow, because it's going to be different. And certainly in your country in the next week, two months, it's going to be very different, and I'm so pleased to have had this opportunity over these past two days to get very close to what has been proposed and what is going to be promulgated and what will effectively take place very shortly because it is nothing short of a revolution in the way you intend to police your country. But what is the intention of that change? It is the intention of every change in policing: to try to find a better way to deliver that first obligation of government – public safety.

I think, looking at my experience in my country, that we have come so far. We have established a phenomenal foundation on which to build further going forward; going forward in times of plenty and in times of shortage of resources. In both our countries over the next several years we are certainly facing shortage of resources, not only for public safety but for so many other things. But if we get it right, continue to get it right in America, and as you engage in your own new experiment, and get it right here, if we provide that foundation of public safety all the other benefits of society will flourish; a stronger economy, more monies available for healthcare and schools, more monies for more police, more technology, it all begins in my perspective with policing.

My country has gone through phenomenal changes in how we look at our police and what we expect of them. In the 1970s we went through the first revolution that I was part of as a young police officer, being acted upon by that revolution. It was a desire in my country to professionalise its police service, a profession that had seemed to lose its way in the Fifties and Sixties, in which our minority citizens, our African-Americans in particular, felt abused and brutalised by that profession. A society which many of our college-educated young people, during their college years, felt disaffected from society and focused a lot of that anger on police who were basically interfering with that expression of liberty they so desired and exhibited. We were also engaged in a very unpopular war during that period of time. So coming out of the societal upheaval of the Sixties, it was felt that American police patrol must change even as America tried to change how it dealt with seemingly intractable issues of racism, poverty, social injustice, and that change was called the professional era of policing.

I grew up in my first ten to fifteen years in that era and it emphasised that police could improve our response to crime. It's a critical word – response – to understand the direction of policing in the United States in the Seventies, Eighties and early Nineties because it dictated how we were evaluated, how we focused our resources, and where our leadership at the time took us. The idea was that we were measuring our success in response to crime; response to 911 calls, how many arrests did we make, how many clearances we made. The belief was that police could not prevent crime. That was not their responsibility, obligation or capability. There's an adage that I have embraced for so many years that exemplifies that type of expectation - you can expect what you inspect. In the United States in the Seventies and Eighties we were inspected as police based on our response to crime. As a young police sergeant in the Boston police department I designed many of the early response measurement systems of the Boston police. The 'Standard B' plan, which basically measured how long did we take at one call, how much time did we spend "out of service," as interestingly enough out of service meant we were out of the vehicle servicing the call... and in service was when we were rolling around waiting for the next call to respond to. We, excuse the expression, got it ass backwards! And for much of those two decades we continued to, in some respects, be measured by our response to crime and we were excused from doing anything about its prevention.

And what happened over that period of time is increasingly American police chiefs focused on dealing and responding in time as numbers were reduced. Most American police departments suffered declining numbers during the Seventies and Eighties in tough budgetary times. The New York City police department which

⁶⁶ The belief was that police could not prevent crime. That was not their responsibility, obligation or capability⁹⁹ until recently had 38,000 officers went down to I think it was 17,000 in the 1970s – an incredibly small number for an incredibly complex city. But with the pressures of reduced resources, the focus of police was on the expectation of society and government

and the expectation of society and government was that we couldn't prevent crime so just focus on the response to it. Improve your professional capabilities, improve your training, improve your education level, improve the quality of police officers. And we had hoped that there would be some beneficial residual effect on crime rates as the police became more professional.

But what began to happen was that we began to feel more distant from our communities. With fewer police officers, with much more emphasis on chasing 911 calls, with much more emphasis on solving crime, we neglected totally in the Sixties, Seventies and Eighties what you describe as anti-social behaviour, which we describe as quality of life crimes, or as George Kelling and Jim Wilson wrote about in their excellent *Atlantic Monthly* article, "broken windows". That our policing focus was on serious crime, on response to crime, and that we lost sight of the importance of what people saw everyday in their lives, in their neighbourhoods, on their transit systems, on their way to work and in their work environments. And New York was probably the poster city. You've all seen the films from the Sixties, Seventies and Eighties where every subway car was totally covered by graffiti. Those of you who visited New York saw the evidence of it in the sense of the disorder on the streets, the aggressive beggars, the homeless population, the encampments, the graffiti everywhere on every public building; a city that in many respects looked like some kind of Fellini movie, if you will, or Mad Max movie, but that was the reality.

And even while police were focusing without success on reducing serious crime, the public was being overwhelmed by these societal crimes in which they saw their neighbourhoods deteriorating and the police response inadequate at best or not at all the norm in most instances. So by 1990 we were a country that was in great disarray to the extent that many of our leading politicians had begun to express, not optimism about being able to do something about the problem, but maybe the idea that this was as good as it gets. Now I use that phrase "as good as it gets" because it was a term used by the then governor of New York State, Mario Cuomo (1989) – an individual thought to be a leading candidate for the Presidency of the United States. When asked about the crime situation in New York State and New York specifically, that was his comment, "maybe this is as good as it gets." When leadership expressed that lack of optimism it did not bode well for our society or its concerns.

Fortunately, in America, in the late 1980s, 1990s, a new form of policing, a new philosophy, a new style of policing was embraced, led in large part by American police chiefs, academics, and some politicians. It was the idea that political leadership, police leadership, community activists believed that something must be done, but more importantly, something *could* be done. But to achieve it we were going to have to, in effect, change the way we police our communities. And the community policing phenomenon, which I acted upon as a police chief, police Commissioner of Boston, Chief of New York Transit and then subsequently Police Commissioner of New York City, I became one of the leaders in the police profession of advocating the new community police model. And the strengths of the community police model were several.

One aspect was partnership. Police made it quite clear that we could not do it alone that we needed to partner up with the rest of government, with the system of government, with the judiciary, with the prosecutors, with the defence attorneys those that represented those we were investigating, with communities where communities would prioritise for us what was it that they wanted the police to

So it's not so much about how many police we had, it's how we were using them ⁹⁹ focus on. In the Seventies and Eighties we thought we could do it all and with our limited resources the focus was on serious crime. We missed the boat if you will in understanding that in so many communities

what was creating fear in their lives was the societal disorder that they encountered every day. There was, in the worst crime year in the history of New York City, 1990, 700,000 reported, documented serious crimes. One out of ten New Yorkers were afflicted by that crime personally. But everyday all 8 million New Yorkers were afflicted by the quality of life offences that they were seeing, that were destroying their neighbourhoods, their transit system, and indeed, destroying the business heart of that city, Manhattan. And we had failed to recognise the need to address simultaneously serious crime but also quality of life crime. We had failed to appreciate that by addressing quality of life crime we were preventing the growth of additional serious crime but also we were seen much more frequently by the public addressing that quality of life crime than making the arrests for the serious crime. So it's not so much about how many police we had, it's how we were using them.

New York City had hired 7,000 additional police in 1991 and 1992 in response to the public demand to do something about the serious crime rate. But in 1993 Rudy Giuliani won the election against the mayor who had fought the battle to hire those 7,000

officers largely on the fact that they were not using those officers in an appropriate fashion, and I say appropriate, in a fashion which the public felt and could see for themselves that something was being done with the investment that they had made in the NYC police department. Because those 7,000 officers, average age 21 or 22, six months of [law enforcement] schooling, had been assigned equally to the city's 75 precincts, approximately 100 officers per precinct. But the precinct commander had no authority to assign them other than to very specific beats in that precinct on very specific hours, to very specific responsibilities. And what ultimately happened over a period of 18 months was the officers were spending about sixty per cent of their time – something that you can relate to here in Britain - filling out paperwork about who they had talked to, what are the problems in the neighbourhood, what am I doing about those problems. There is no 21 year old, 6 month probationary police officer that can do anything about any problem in the city of New York. There are police commissioners who can't do anything about any problem! And that was one of the failed aspects of it, that we had located the power at the wrong location at the bottom rung of the ladder. And the public was not seeing their concerns being addressed because the cops were not out there dealing with the quality of life issues that 7,000 very visible officers could deal with, very visibly, freeing up other more seasoned officers to deal with more serious crime.

The secret of policing in the United States was the duality of focus. Not how many cops you had, but how you used them. And in using them you had to focus on all of the issues that were creating fear and disorder, and we had neglected for over two decades in the United States the issues of quality of life, of anti-social behaviour. In New York City and then subsequently in Los Angeles, there were distinctive differences between the two cities. The principal difference between those two cities was the amount of resources I had to work with: 38,000 cops in New York, 9,000 in Los Angeles; 8 million residents, 300 square miles in New York, 4 million residents, 500 square miles in LA. To see a police officer in LA was a rare experience because we had one police car on average for every 3 square miles on duty at any one time. My wife Rikki and I when we first moved, when she would spot a police car she would say, "Oh look Bill, a sighting!" The rarity of seeing black and white in Los Angeles contrasted with New York, where in the early Nineties you could see police everywhere. But the difference was in LA when you saw them, when you had that sighting, they were doing something; they were usually out of the car in a traffic stop, had someone up against the wall, they were seen as engaged, but there were not enough of them. In New York they were everywhere, but they were not engaged; they were standing around, they were walking around, they were talking with each other.

Actually, Paul Stephenson in a conversation today was very pleased that, with my keen perceptive eye for policing, yesterday as my wife and I were walking around up toward Piccadilly, I saw three different constables on patrol, and what I noticed was they were on patrol by themselves. In my experience, over fifteen years coming to London, I never saw a bobby by himself or herself. They were always in pairs. They sell them in match sets! And similarly in New York for years we had this issue because of the concerns for danger several of the officers had to be partnered up all the time. And Sir Paul talked about some of the changes in trying to get more out of the existing resources; and all of the studies that have been done in the United States reinforce that. Interestingly enough officers are much more perceptive and much more attentive to their surroundings when they're by themselves than when they're walking or in a car with their partner, when they spend most of their time talking. So even yesterday the idea of seeing those constables on patrol, what were they doing? They weren't talking to their partner they were looking, and when I said hello to them they acknowledged my hello.

When I was commissioner in New York City, shortly after my appointment, I was walking my dog in front of my apartment building and the precinct commander was kind enough to assign a couple of walking officers in the neighbourhood to make sure I wasn't mugged while I was walking my dog. And I can remember walking down this long walk, walking my dog and here's these two

officers coming towards me. I'm feeling pretty good, officers on patrol. We get closer and we get closer and never once did they look at me and even when I said "Good evening officers" I got a begrudging "Good evening" and they never looked at me. So these two officers walking in front of the police commissioner's house never noticed that the police commissioner was walking towards them. So it's the idea of, it's not so much how many police you have – it's great to have a lot – it's what you do with them. So

⁶⁶ The principal difference between those two cities was the amount of resources I had to work with: 38,000 cops in New York, 9,000 in Los Angeles; 8 million residents, 300 square miles in New York, 4 million residents, 500 square miles in LA⁹⁹

my experience in Los Angeles, 9,000 officers, and New York, 38,000 officers, LA was actually a more significant crime problem because it was so gang influenced and the area was so huge. It was the focus of how we used the police that was so important. And that focus of how we used the police really came to how we led the police. Let me speak about that because I think it has some relevance to the current situation that you are now engaged in, in rethinking how you direct your police services.

It's been referenced that the model you're looking at is the American model; the idea of a chief constable reporting to an elected official. We have no model in America! We have such a hodge-podge of different ways of doing things. In New York City as Police Commissioner I reported directly to the Mayor but as the civilian commissioner I had total responsibility for policy, operations, discipline, hiring, it was all under my control. In LA as Police Chief I reported to a five-member board of police commissioners, appointed by the Mayor; I was responsible for the operations of the department, but policy was the responsibility of the police commission. So my two most significant police experiences were totally different administrative experiences in terms of what was expected of me. So your model that you're looking at is more of a generic model in that you're talking about a single person, an elected official, interacting exclusively with the chief constable. As to how that works out over time is part of the effort that you engage in. But, I speak to that because the American experience is that as a police leader you are always responsible to an elected official, mayor, town

⁶⁶ What we designed was basically the push down of authority, accountability, and responsibility to an appropriate level ⁹⁹ manager, city council person, and the responsiveness to that leadership is about that idea of how best you use your resources.

The changes in the Nineties and the 21st century in policing was the idea of decentralisation. In organisations that I worked for and had the privilege of leading,

what we designed was basically the push down of authority, accountability, and responsibility to an appropriate level where that dual issue of dealing with serious crime and anti-social behaviour could be adequately met. And in the 75 precincts of the New York City police department and the 21 area Los Angeles police department, that location was precinct captain or area captain who on average had three to four hundred officers assigned to them. What we did was to give away our power, the central control that the police commissioner had, the chief of the LA police department had. The only thing I wanted from them was the vision, in Los Angeles as in New York: reduce crime, reduce fear and disorder, post 9-11 keep the city safe from terrorism, that those were the goals, it was that simple. That was the vision. I surrounded myself with leaders and I had great discretion where I could effectively select the key leaders that were going to work with me and together we developed the goals that

were going to be the goals of the department. And they were simple goals like reduce crime and disorder. And then we pushed farther down into the organisation to develop strategies to address what were the identified issues that were creating fear. In New York City in 1994 there were eight of them, including drugs, guns, youth violence, stolen automobiles, police corruption.

There were eight issues that were creating not only serious crime in combination or all alone, but also the linchpin strategy was quality of life because everyday every New Yorker was experiencing that. But they were not experiencing the same thing. Manhattan was experiencing in certain neighbourhoods a different form of fear than in Eastern New York - the precinct where I live in Manhattan there were no murders in 1994 but in the 75th precinct in East New York there were 150. And when you went to those two neighbourhoods, they were two very different neighbourhoods in terms of quality of life – the graffiti, the abandoned cars, the street scene - but we were trying to police with one overriding monolithic set of police strategies. We changed that. We allowed the precinct commander to develop the strategies and tactics to address their particular issues. They were allowed to decide how many police were in uniform, how many in plain clothes. They were allowed for the first time to get drug warrants, they were allowed for the first time to engage in a lot of anti-crime activities, things that in the Seventies and Eighties a lot of police departments had moved away from because of the fear of corruption. The NYPD had become a very risk averse organisation and one of the reasons it did not deal with a lot of the street level anti-social behaviour drug dealing on the corner, prostitution, a lot of the issues that people saw everyday and called 911 about but police would not respond or not respond adequately enough - was the fear of corruption. Effectively what they created was a sense that the cops must be corrupt because they don't do anything about this problem, it's there year after year, and I call and nothing is done.

So in the effort to not risk officers further down the food chain from being corrupt, headquarters held such a tight leash that to deal with drugs in New York City that were overflowing in every precinct, out of the 35,000 person police department at that time, only 1,000 were committed to dealing with drugs at the headquarters level. Precincts could not deal with drugs, uniformed officers could not make drug arrests, they were discouraged. The specialised units were working Monday to Friday, nine to five, bankers' hours. They had the weekend off meanwhile the criminals basically were working seven days a week, 365 days a year.

So, in summary, what had happened, you can expect what you inspect. The NYPD was inspecting to ensure its officers stayed out of trouble and they stayed out of trouble. The corruption issues went down in the Seventies and Eighties. But in the system that was put in place to stay out of trouble they had become risk averse. And the quality of life went out of hand and crime went out of hand. So in the Nineties with that growth in the department we authorised precinct commanders, we expected them to be miniature police chiefs: "you decide, we will tell you what you should be putting out

⁶⁶ Officers are much more perceptive and much more attentive to their surroundings when they're by themselves than when they're walking or in a car with their partner ⁹⁹ to address your 911 call workload, but you can have the ultimate decision of how you staff your precinct – how many officers here, how many officers there". However, I wasn't born yesterday. I love cops, I trust them but they can get in trouble faster than any human being so you have to hold them accountable, that's the reality, you have to hold them

accountable. So the accountability system we put in place was CompStat. The idea that the focus I wanted was on crime, the focus I wanted was on quality of life, how were we going to measure that in the freedom that we were giving our precinct commanders – they were responding to those overriding issues but addressing the particular issues in their respective precincts. And it was the CompStat, where twice a week they would come in, half a dozen precincts at a time, and report on what they were doing about crime and disorder.

The CompStat system has some basic elements, including crime mapping. Look at crime dots on the map as you receive them and very quickly you start seeing hot spots and crosses. What do you then do? Cops on the dots. I might have had limited numbers of cops in

Los Angeles and large numbers of cops in New York but in identifying where they should be I maximised the effectiveness by spotting a pattern after the second or third event rather than two or three months down the line. Because the dirty secret of American policing was that we were not using crime numbers to direct the assignment of our resources. Why? Because we are responding to 911 calls, we were investigating crimes after the fact, we were not focused on the

You can expect what you inspect and what we were inspecting was reduction in crime and addressing quality of life issues ... it worked in New York with a lot of resources and it worked in LA with many fewer resources

prevention of crime and the prevention of crime can be greatly assisted by spotting patterns and trends after the second or third event. So the American model focused in the Nineties - and many other cities were doing the same thing not just New York - and this experiment worked; cops on the dots, accountability, decentralisation, inclusion – inclusion meaning letting the public, letting the rest of the criminal justice system work with you - and transparency. The idea of talking openly about crime numbers, reporting them on our websites, reporting them on our crime maps, so that the public actually had the same access to the crime maps that the police commanders did. You can expect what you inspect and what we were inspecting was reduction in crime and addressing quality of life issues. And I'm a great believer in that philosophy in that it worked in New York with a lot of resources and it worked in LA with many fewer resources. Indeed I left a year ago in LA [and] my successor, who grew up in that system over the last seven years, over the past year he's had to deal with a significant reduction in resources. While we grew the size of the LA police department by ten per cent up to almost 10,000 officers, this past year dealing with the economic recession he has had to eliminate overtime. In exchange for doing away with the overtime officers get compensatory time

⁶⁶ I love cops, I trust them but they can get in trouble faster than any human being so you have to hold them accountable⁹⁹ off, meaning that they have to take a day off instead of being paid overtime. In reality the new chief of police in LA is policing the city today with fewer officers available to him than I had in 2002. One benefit he has is that there is 50 per cent less crime to deal with but the

reality is he has diminished resources. But what has not diminished is the system to allow that kind of reduction in the first place.

In the city of LA over the last seven or eight years, one of the other benefits of the assertive policing, the focused policing, the transparent policing has been improved public confidence. In a city where for 40 years the African-American population was literally at war with the police department that was abusing it for most of those 40 years, the turnaround in race relations over that same period as crime has reduced, as quality of life has improved, has resulted in the most recent survey by the Los Angeles Times and a Harvard study, with two-thirds of African Americans and Latinos in LA now rate the LAPD as doing a good to very good job. So there was the ability to reduce crime, deal with individual neighbourhood issues, improve the quality of life and, at the same time, because the police were seen as responsive, the overall impression and levels of satisfaction with the LAPD increased and during this past year of declining resources has stayed the same.

So in summary, cops count, police matter, and you can expect what you inspect. In your country, as I've visited here over the last fifteen years, one of the constant complaints I always received from chief constables and others was the control of the Home Office over so much of what they did through the budgetary process. The idea that you had to do certain things to receive this money, you had to hire this certain category to get funds. The idea that the ability to respond to local issues was diminished by control at the national level, and that is the distinct difference between your country and mine. Because we have always been decentralised; out of those 17,000 police agencies none of them respond to a national mandate...other than to the dictates of the Constitution. We might all vie competitively to get federal dollars for certain initiatives, but the national government is not dictating how we police other than that we police constitutionally. So, the system that you appear to be moving toward, its similarity to American policing is in that regard, in that there's an effort to decentralise if you will, and empower at a much lower level. Instead of, as I understand it, chief constables working to the national government, they'll now have the opportunity to work much more closely with their individual communities and respond to those community's interests and desires.

To close how I began, we live in interesting times and you are certainly about to enter a period of interesting times and I wish you well and I hope to get back from time to time to stay abreast of how those issues are moving forward. Thank you.

4. Vote of Thanks

Sir Paul Stephenson, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police

Charles started this fascinating session off by saying that many of us think that we know something about the American policing model. Well thank the Lord we've had an expert on the American policing model and debunking the idea that there is one single model; that was fascinating. And before I continue, Minister can I thank you for your opening as well because I think it is important to stress the very great similarities between our police services but also to understand the differences. Interestingly one of the differences is Ray Kelly – the very illustrious Commissioner of the NYPD – is the 40th Commissioner of the NYPD which was formed in 1901; I understand I am the 26th Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service which was formed in 1829. That is one heck of a difference!

Actually Minister you did properly stress that we are joined both by our similarities and a very clear understanding of our differences because very often we do learn from each other. And that brings me to Bill; a very good friend of this country, a very good friend of police in this country, and certainly a very good and close friend of a number Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police Service. Bill, you didn't need to mention your Boston accent because let me assure you, you've come from 6,000 miles away with your Boston accent, but it is almost certainly more acceptable in London than mine which only comes from 250 miles away.

Seriously, some of the points you make are so powerful. I'm not surprised, I've heard you before, and I will come and listen to you again next time because you are always worth listening to. You mentioned something in my language, talked about the business of policing, what is our priority and purpose. In my language it equates to: we are in the security service; our job is to create the conditions of security in which people enjoy their rights. And you properly mentioned the importance of Peel's Nine Principles which again is about saving life, preventing crime, detection of crime, and keeping the Queen's Peace – that sense that we are there to protect. And certainly, I've heard you before speaking powerfully about how police can make a difference; it requires leadership. That's something that you've been passionate about for many, many years and something we've been listening to.

And on the community policing model – I think you're absolutely right. It seems to me when you study Peel's principles you cannot implement Peel's principles unless you do adhere to a proper community policing model that recognises different citizens' needs and responds to those needs in different ways. And your address I think has come across quite powerfully and you've seen that that can make a difference where it wasn't present in the United States and where you've brought it in.

I'm grateful that you have referred to some of the experience you've seen over here how we can learn from each other and certainly we constantly want to export and import experts from around the world and the United States. I'm also very grateful that you mentioned the power to select your own team and how important that is. That is something that I've been powerfully saying along with Sir Hugh Orde for a number of years. You also mentioned points of transparency and you're absolutely right. When we get it right we should say we got it right and we should stand up for our officers and say it quite clearly. When we get it wrong, we should stand up and say we got it wrong. That's about honesty and transparency and that is something you have practiced throughout all your varied policing careers. For me the one thing you didn't mention, is almost the central tenet of your whole policing model, and that is the importance of constitutional policing; just don't break the law to enforce the law and you did refer to that in some of the problems you faced in New York and how you brought in a very clear accountability model. And it's a passion that we both share.

But, you know, what has epitomised your career Bill has been that desire for accountability, that desire to devolve power, but also that very clear desire to put creativity into policing and above and beyond anything else, your absolute commitment to personal leadership. You have been a great friend to policing in this country, you continue to be a great friend to policing in this country and as far as we're concerned you continue to be a great leader in world policing.

Appendix A

Transcript of Evidence to the Commons Home Affairs Select Committee Inquiry in the 'Future of Policing'

Oral Evidence Taken before the Home Affairs Committee Tuesday 30 November 2010

Members present:

Keith Vaz (Chair) Nicola Blackwood Alun Michael Mr Aidan Burley Mark Reckless Lorraine Fullbrook Mr David Winnick Steve McCabe

Q1 (Chair): Mr Bratton, thank you very much for coming today to give evidence to this Select Committee. We are conducting a wide-ranging inquiry into policing and the issues that are confronting the public as a result of the Government's very ambitious and challenging agenda, so some of our questions are going to be asking for comparisons between America and the United Kingdom. If you can't answer them, we perfectly understand.

We are very interested in what you have done in your distinguished career, both in New York and in Los Angeles. Perhaps I could start with a question about the "broken windows" model.

Some academics have cast doubt on whether or not this is an effective way of dealing with policing. What are your views on this?

Bill Bratton: The "broken windows" theory advanced by George Kelling and Jim Wilson—actually 30 years ago this year; it's the 30th anniversary of it—has been a strategy and a concept that I have embraced throughout my policing career in 40 years, in every police organisation I have worked in. It is not an end-all in and of itself, and I think that's some of the debate among academics in which it is believed that some are asserting that the turnaround in New York City specifically was a direct result of "broken windows". "Broken windows" was one of eight strategies that were employed in New York City to make that city the safest large city in the United States.

I think it is an essential component of any set of police initiatives anywhere in the world to address what I believe are the issues of concern by members of the public anywhere in the world about public safety. There is serious crime, but there are also the crimes, the violations, that people experience every day in their neighbourhoods, on their way to work, or in their work environment. That's what "broken windows" seeks to address—those issues that are seemingly minor create fear, create disorder and, if left unaddressed, ultimately result in significantly more crime and more serious crime.

Q2 (Chair): Indeed. There is a debate at the moment, obviously because of the current economic climate that will result in the numbers of police officers in a local area being reduced. Do you think there is any correlation between the numbers of officers in a particular area and the level of crime?

Bill Bratton: As a police chief for many, many years, I would always like to have more police, but the reality is it is not just numbers but,

more importantly, what you do with them. More is fine, but if they're just standing around or if they're not focused on issues of concern to the public, then those numbers are not ultimately going to achieve what you would hope to achieve, which is improve public safety and reduce crime. So by way of comparison, if you will, in New York City I had 38,000 police officers to work with during the two years I served as commissioner there. That size force allowed a very rapid turnaround when that force was focused on serious crime, through use of our CompStat processes, but at the same time focusing also on the "broken windows" or, as you refer to it in your country, "antisocial behaviour". I strongly believe that you need to focus on both at the same time. One might receive more of a priority at given times than another on a neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood basis. some because neighbourhoods are fortunate not to have serious crime but are very concerned about behaviour.

So, I had 38,000 police officers in New York City. In Los Angeles I had 9,000. Los Angeles: 500 square miles, worst gang problem in America, 4 million residents. New York: 38,000 police officers, 300 square miles, 8 million residents, a drug crime problem. To have the equivalent of what I had in New York City in Los Angeles, I would need 18,000 police officers, I only had 9,000 but, over a seven-year period, every year crime went down in Los Angeles; every year the public perception of police and their effectiveness improved with that dual focus of crime and social disorder enforcement. Reinforcing the adage: it's not so much the numbers but how you use them, how you inspire them, how you direct them and what their priorities are.

Chair: Indeed. I am sure that we will have further questions on that issue, because the cutting of red tape and the focusing of police officers on core tasks is, of course, extremely important, whether it's the United States or it's in the United Kingdom. **Q3 (Mr Burley):** Prior to becoming an MP this year I was a councillor in a part of London called Hammersmith and Fulham, where we tried to model our policing on the "broken windows" theory through a zero tolerance approach. I was just wondering whether you thought that that was a model you could replicate anywhere in any city in this country or elsewhere in the world, or whether there are some areas—rural areas for example—where that model isn't applicable and doesn't work?

Bill Bratton: First, I would not advocate attempting zero tolerance anywhere in any city, in any country in the world. It's not achievable. Zero tolerance, which is often times attributed to me and my time in New York City, is not something we practised, engaged in, supported or endorsed, other than zero tolerance of police corruption. Zero tolerance implies that you in fact can eliminate a problem, and that's not reality. You're not going to totally eliminate crime and even social disorder. You can reduce it significantly.

So I would stay away from use of the term. It sounds great. Politically it's a great catchphrase. The term originated here in England when Jack Straw, as Shadow Home Secretary, visited me in New York in 1995, and by that time the impressive change in New York City had begun to occur. He heard the term "zero tolerance" when we were speaking about police corruption but then applied it across the eight strategies that we were engaging in in New York, including "broken windows", drugs, gangs, crime, stolen cars and police corruption. So it was a term misappropriated and misapplied. You seem to love it over here, because I have the hardest time convincing you to stay away from it.

But on the issue that you talked about—the focus on dealing with quality of life, as we refer to it in America, antisocial behaviour as you refer to it here—I believe that any police initiative that is conducted without taking into account that issue is doomed to failure in the sense of convincing the public that we are effective in dealing with

crime. Because while there is a lot of serious crime, the average citizen is often times not going to be affected by it in the sense of being personally victimised by it. Case in point: New York City. In the worst crime era in the history of New York City there was 700,000 reported major crimes in New York City, population 8 million. So you had less than a one in 10 chance of being murdered, raped, robbed, larceny, burglary, car theft. However, every day in every neighbourhood of New York you were confronted with the social disorder—the aggressive panhandling, the prostitution, the drug dealing, the abandoned cars—and, if left undeterred, if left unaddressed, it would grow. Thus, the "broken windows" theory.

In a country that loves gardening, you fully appreciate the idea if you don't weed a garden, that garden is going to be destroyed; the weeds are going to overrun it. Similarly for social disorder: if you don't deal with those minor crimes, they're going to grow. What also grows is fear. What also grows is flight. People are going to leave those neighbourhoods because they don't feel safe. So any police strategy—Bill Bratton speaking based on the American police experience—that does not simultaneously address serious crime in what the average person experiences every day that's negative and creates fear in their life is doomed to failure in the sense of the crime stats can tell you crime is falling—well, in fact, it may be falling but if people don't feel better about their neighbourhood they're just not going to believe it.

Q4 (Mr Burley): One of the things they did in New York, which enabled people to record those things that affect their everyday quality of life that you mentioned was the implementation of 311, a very easy to remember number where you could record anything that you see on your way to work—antisocial behaviour, graffiti, broken windows. We tried to do this in this country several years ago with a 101 number as an antisocial behaviour hotline, and the tagline was, "When it's less urgent than 999 but still important". That kind of kicked into the long

grass and there were some pilots and it was never rolled out nationally. Could you just give us an idea of your thoughts about the impact that that number has had in New York and the benefits that it could bring if we decided to roll it out in this country?

Bill Bratton: In New York Mayor Bloomberg would certainly argue, because he took what had begun under Mayor Giuliani and then expanded it, it has been a success. It's not just for the reporting of quality of life issues, but for any absence of city services that a citizen wants addressed. We implemented the 311 system in Los Angeles shortly after I arrived there and the newly elected mayor. It never quite achieved the same level of success as New York, in that Mayor Bloomberg invested a lot of personal capital in driving it, much the same as he has CompStatted the whole city. He also used 311 as a means of supplying information to his City CompStat system. New York probably has one of the more successful models of its use.

I can't speak to your issue in the sense of why it didn't catch on. My sense, in the short time I've been here, is that the term that you use, "antisocial behaviour", has a broader context in your country than the term "quality of life, broken windows" in my country. When we refer to "quality of life" in the United States, the average person thinks of the idea of the minor crime or violation. I think there is some bleeding in your country into more serious crime, or what we would think of as more serious crime, connected with antisocial behaviour—again, it's just a sense I have. I don't know what the actual definition of antisocial behaviour is in the law.

Chair: I call Alun Michael. I should tell you, Mr Bratton, that Mr Michael is a former Police Minister for the British Government.

Q5 (Alun Michael): When I visited New York, the thing that impressed me most was the way that local commanders were being held to

account for the effectiveness of their policing and their reduction of crime within their area. I wonder if you could tell us a little bit more about the way that was achieved, because very often the devil is in the detail. It sounds easy, but use of CompStat and things like that was a part of that, wasn't it?

Bill Bratton: The overall direction of police that we changed in New York City in 1994 began first with the vision that something could be done about crime. That was a turnaround, because in the '70s and '80s it was felt the best we could do was respond to what was occurring, attempt to address it and hopefully, by addressing it effectively, it would be reduced. In the '90s we were much more forceful. In some respects, it's very similar to what your Government appears to be engaged in with this new initiative-the idea, the belief, that police can do something much more directly about crime by focusing on it in a different way; that we can focus on preventing it rather than measuring our success on the process of responding to it. So when I talk about the process of responding: we measured response time, we measured arrest rates, we measured clearance rates-it was all a process and they were all after the fact. What changed in American policing, particularly in New York in a leadership role, was that we accepted responsibility-we, the police—that we could do something about crime, about the cause of crime, which is human behaviour.

Q6 (Alun Michael): So who would be responsible at what level? This was at the precinct commander level?

Bill Bratton: Well, it began first with me as police commissioner and, by my accepting responsibility, I now devolved lower into the organisation that same responsibility. But also I empowered: a lot of the power I had as police commissioner, where I was directing and controlling and my predecessors were directing and controlling in a very hierarchal and bureaucratic organisation, we pushed further down into the organisation to an appropriate level where there would be adequate resources, adequate intelligence and adequate authority to effect change. In the NYPD, with 75 precincts, that was the precinct level: the captain in command of 300 officers, on average, policing a three square mile area. What we gave that captain was the authority to determine how he was going to assign his or her officers, uniform, bicycles, walking, anti-crime, narcotics whatever the issues were in his neighbourhood.

Q7 (Alun Michael): So it depended on his analysis of the problems in his area and, therefore, matching resources to problems?

Bill Bratton: That's correct. We, at the department level, had identified the eight areas of concern in the city. They were drugs, youth crime, guns-all interrelated-auto theft, domestic violence, police corruption, traffic issues, and "broken windows" quality of life offences, which were the lynchpin. At the same time, in 75 precincts, some precincts did not have a serious crime problem. Other precincts were like the 75 in East New York, called the "killing fields", which had 144 murders in one year. So to try and police this very diverse city with a monolithic set of strategies would not work. We gave our broad strategies but then the police precinct commander was free to refine them to his issues. He would then be measured through the CompStat process—I love cops, I'll give them power, but I understand that you have to control what you give away, so you hold them accountable. Precinct commanders were expected to report through the CompStat process what was happening in their area and what they were doing to address it.

A lot was said about the fact that I replaced 75% of the precinct commanders in the first year. Many thought that I was replacing people who were not achieving success. No. Many of them were being rewarded for their success and promoted up, so the turnover was as much promotion up as basically taking people who were in a round slot but were a square peg and moving them elsewhere.

The idea was transparency and inclusion and decentralisation. Those were the three things. Indeed, your Government is talking about much more transparency in the new policing plan. It's talking about inclusion and it's talking about decentralisation. Having lived that experience in New York, while what is being proposed here is personalised certainly to your country, your laws, your issues, it has many similarities to what we did in New York and later in LA with great success: the decentralisation, the pushing down from the, in your case chief constable, in my case police commissioner, to the area level commander and then him pushing down further into the precinct level, where constables and police officers could bring their ideas into the mix about what to do in their particular patch.

Transparency: in CompStat, much as we're sitting here, everybody is hearing what worked, what didn't work—"Geez, in my precinct I have the same problem; maybe I'll try what you're doing." Then, lastly, the idea of inclusion: everybody is in the game together, the sharing. Policing is a very exclusive profession. The idea of not sharing information and not telling the person next to you their coat's on fire. It basically reduces the force multiplication impact of everybody being engaged. It starts at the top with leadership leadership that's willing to be creative but leadership that's allowing creativity further down into the organisation.

Q8 (Alun Michael): Can I just ask one other question, which is about the question of public confidence and so on, because I understand the methodology of that and it depends on the proper analysis of what is going on and all the rest of it. On public confidence, we saw, for instance in my own city, and we had evidence in the Committee, of a 40% reduction in the number of victims of violent offences measured by how many people go to the accident and emergency unit; on the other hand, people don't take that too seriously and

don't feel any safer in the city. You managed very effectively to get across what you were managing to achieve within the police force. Have you any lessons for us there?

Bill Bratton: This goes back to the earlier comment about dealing with quality of life, antisocial behaviour at the same time that you're dealing with the serious crime. You can report all the reductions you want—30%, 40%, 50%—in the press, but if that person, as they step out their front door is slipping on a condom from the prostitute who used the front door the night before, and the abandoned car they'd been calling about for three weeks is still sitting there and each day there are more broken windows and tyres disappearing, then what the public in general is hearing about isn't their reality. In your society, particularly here in London and probably in some of your major cities where the news is tabloid driven, they are also then reading about the most sensational case that just occurred.

The change in New York City and then in LA was the transparency of our crime stats, because we were publishing them all the time, reporting them all the time. It wasn't a couple of times a year. Indeed, in Los Angeles we put the crime stats up on our website and eventually the Los Angeles Times asked for access to our records that fed the website. When the LA Times looked at that, they found some deficiencies and worked with us to correct the deficiencies. In Los Angeles now, the crime stats that are put out everyday, the Los Angeles Times is putting out the same crime stats, so they're validating the crime stats. But what is also changing is the focus on the quality of life issues in the neighbourhoods. So that's why I say you can have the most efficient police force in the world dealing with serious crime but if they're not, at the same time, addressing, neighbourhood by neighbourhood, what's creating fear you're not going to win. You're not going to win public sentiment and satisfaction.

Chair: Thank you, Mr Bratton.

Q9 (Steve McCabe): Mr Bratton, our Government is planning to adopt the American model of elected police and crime commissioners and elected city mayors. You have quite a lot of experience of elected police commissioners working alongside elected mayors and career police chiefs. What can we learn from the American experience and what should we look out for?

Bill Bratton: What I would suggest is create your own experience; don't try to learn from us-seriously. It's been referenced in the several days I've been here that part of the Government plan is modelled after the American police system of political control of the police. There are 17,000 police departments in the United States in which the police chiefs of those departments either report to a mayor, a city manager or a board of council members - 17,000. There is no generic American police system, other than the police chief is usually appointed by and reports to a political person or entity. But in New York City, as the police commissioner, I was a civilian who reported directly to the mayor. As police commissioner I had total responsibility for policy development, operations in the department, discipline. In Los Angeles, the second largest city in the United States, I was the police chief. I was responsible for the operations and discipline of the department but I reported to a civilian board of commissioners appointed by the mayor who were responsible for the policy and oversight of the police department and had an inspector general to evaluate the performance of the police department. We both reported to the elected mayor.

There's an example of the two largest cities in America where they have totally different political reporting relationships. There is an idea that it's modelled after the American system, but what is being proposed here is a much more generic system where all 43 chief constables will report in 2012, as I understand it, to an elected police commissioner. I understand the actual language and the details of how that will work are being submitted to Parliament today. So the

idea of much more intimate political influence and control in your country is new, certainly from a national Home Office direction to now a regional direction. That's where the comparison to America might be appropriate, but 43 versus 17,000? The comparison ends there. It's a much more intimate form of control and a much more standardised form of control.

Q10 (Steve McCabe): How much do you think elected mayors and elected police commissioners are influenced in the decisions they take by the way the media treats them?

Bill Bratton: Quite influenced, much the same as police chiefs are also, to be quite frank with you, in terms of we all seek to get good news stories, good media. I've often times been accused too much of never meeting a camera that I didn't like. The reality is that I don't have a public relations budget, so to get my story out, I can't put up billboards, I can't put out my own advertising, I have to use the public media. So I have always been very accessible, very transparent to the media.

I've always told my cops, "I'm going to tell the story that you give me. Nobody can tell it better. I'm good at telling it. You give me corruption and I'm going to talk about corruption. You give me bad cops I'm going to talk about them. But you give me success, you give me initiatives and I'll get that story out." Fortunately that story is the more common story than the negative. So the idea that the police chief or a politician is going to play to the media, that's the way of the world because that's how you get the story out particularly, I think, in your city where there must be 10 different papers each day. In Los Angeles I only had to play to the LATimes. The Daily News was there but that was more of a suburban paper. In New York I had a deal with the New York Post; so that's the equivalent like your Sun, I guess.

Steve McCabe: Thank you.

Chair: Mark Reckless?

Q11 (Mark Reckless): Mr Bratton-

Mr Bratton: Mr Reckless, that's an interesting name.

Chair: Only by name, not by nature.

Mark Reckless: We used to have a Reckless town in New Jersey, but there was a Senator Bullock from there who was so embarrassed by the name he changed it to Crossings.

Bill Bratton: I had two officers that worked for me in Boston, one was Officer Law and the other was Officer Order. Law and Order both worked together. It was many, many years ago and they were actually partnered together—Law and Order.

Chair: Indeed. Order, I think we can take this a long way. Mark Reckless?

Q12 (Mark Reckless): In the UK we have a concept of operational independence for the police. Now, we have sought to emphasise that in areas of individual investigation or individual arrest it's quite proper that the police should be entirely independent of politicians in exercising their judgment, but in the wider area of strategy and setting priorities for the police more broadly, we do think that is an area where politicians can properly be involved. Do you think that is a distinction we could sustain if we were to model our policing on that basis?

Bill Bratton: If I understand what is being proposed, it has three basic elements in terms of the world of the chief constable changing. One, you are proposing a police commissioner that in 2012 would now work with and report to and, over time, that person would also be responsible for selection and discharge of the chief constable.

Mark Reckless: Yes.

Bill Bratton: That person, as elected official, would seek to bring the priorities of the community in a more decentralised way than the Home Office into the police department that polices that area. That's a new concept for the chief constable certainly, where he was looking up; he's now going to have to be looking directly across the reporting relationship.

Secondly, over the next several years there's going to be a force reduction of approximately 20% in personnel in the chief constable agency. So he's going to have to, in any event, refocus his priorities because the resources are going to be less to work with in some respects.

Thirdly, there will be the issue of promised operational independence. A lot of the earmarking and restrictions that came from the Home Office over the last number of years—that burden in some respects, that restriction or limitation on how resources could be assigned—would be lifted. So the chief constable with fewer resources would have more flexibility to assign those fewer resources to changing priorities, some of which would be identified by the PC.

It seems to me to be a very workable situation. The challenge is going to be that 20% force reduction. However, in some respects, I've been there—I've already referenced that in New York I had 38,000 and in Los Angeles I had 9,000 officers. In some respects, it's not so much the number of police that you have—we'd love to have a ton of them—but what you do with them, how they are used. The public is quite clearly indicating in your country, as they did in mine, that while they are very concerned with serious crime they also want something to be done about the social disorder and quality of life. I think the challenge is going to be, with this reduced workforce, to broaden the policing field from focus on and measurement of the serious crime to more focus on and activity in dealing with the so-called minor crime. Over time, it will be very interesting to see how that works out. It is going to require creativity, that visibility, but visibility where the officers are seen to be doing something.

I saw a clear example, being quite frank with you, on Sunday, when my wife and I first arrived. We were walking in Oxford Street, which was packed to the rafters—you wouldn't know there was an economic crisis in this country based on the people out shopping on Sunday-but walking the length of about a mile I passed three constables, bobbies with the bobby hats, and after I passed the first one, when I encountered the second one further down the line, I found myself thinking, "What's wrong here?" And it dawned on me, why were they by themselves? Then as we came closer to Marble Arch where we're staying, I saw a third one and it dawned on me what was different was you always used to see them in pairs. In the 15 years I've been coming to London—I first came here when Paul Condon was the head of the Met-bobbies have always been two together. I've never seen a bobby by himself or herself. Yesterday, at tea with Sir Paul Stephenson, talking about these issues we're discussing, he was talking about one of the things he had recently effected as a force multiplication effort was requiring that, in a lot of areas of the city, bobbies walk by themselves instead of in pairs, so that he doubled his visibility, if you will.

What also occurs, in my experience in American policing in a similar way, is that officers by themselves tend to be much more attentive to their surroundings because they're not talking with each other. The idea there is that you get more visibility, but you also get more activity because they're effectively more engaged. It's a decision that has to be made post-by-post because some locations do require two bobbies; in the United States, there are two officers in a car. But it's that type of management discretion that you want your chief superintendents to have in determining how can they maximise, with their more limited resources, the effectiveness and the visibility of their officers.

Chair: Mr Reckless, you can have one final question if you want one, and a brief answer if that's possible.

Q13 (Mark Reckless): We've had various attempts in the UK on the policing of some serious organised crime going across force boundaries and the national arrangements for that, which I think most people agree are proving disappointing to date. What lessons could we draw from the US in terms of how the FBI and potentially other agencies work across the 17,000 boundaries?

Bill Bratton: I have a very limited understanding of some of what is being proposed. I just left the Home Office meetings with a number of the people who are being charged with creating this national FBI type of entity. Again, our two countries are very different in that we also have in our country states, which you don't have. So we have federal, state, county and local. Our national police are indeed the FBI, DEA, ATF, and that system works for us. I'm not informed enough about what you're proposing to do and your structure as a country is so different from mine that I would not want to advance an opinion on that at this stage. I'm just not informed enough.

Mark Reckless: I understand. Thank you.

Chair: Mr Burley has one very quick question and we'd like a quick reply.

Q14 (Mr Burley): Mr Bratton, you have spent a lifetime working in crime. A huge amount of what you have had to deal with has been

around drugs and you will be aware that there is a movement now in America, Law Enforcement Against Prohibition—which is a group of criminal justice professionals, police chiefs and so on—who say that prohibition is no longer remedying the drug problem and that, in fact, prohibition is just making it worse in terms of drug abuse and gang violence and so on. Do you have a view of this growing body of professionals who now think it's time to look seriously at drug prohibition in the same way that we looked to alcohol prohibition 70 years ago?

Bill Bratton: My viewpoint is that movement is nearly invisible. It's the first I'm hearing of it. I'm being quite frank with you. I was the president of the Major City Chiefs of the United States and I can assure you that that organisation and the IACP, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, are not supportive at all of legalisation of drugs at this time. There may be those who, out of frustration, are advancing that idea but I certainly do not and I don't believe that my colleagues who are still in the business are supportive or advocating of it.

Q15 Chair: Mr Bratton, I don't say this of many witnesses but it is a great pleasure to have had you here giving evidence to this Committee. We are most grateful. If there is any other information you think would be helpful to us in our deliberations please do keep in touch with us.


Bill Bratton: Thank you for the courtesy of inviting me to appear before you.

Chair: Order order, this Committee stands adjourned until next Tuesday.

Appendix B

Crime statistics for New York and Los Angeles (1990-2009) – New York vs. London

The following are crime statistics for the cities of New York and Los Angeles for the period 1990-2009. Bill Bratton served in New York 1994-96, and in Los Angeles 2002-2007.




New York Police Department	Crime Statistics – 1990-2009 ¹
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	Overall Total	Violent crime total	Property crime total
1990	710,222	174,542	535,680
1991	678,855	170,390	508,465
1992	626,182	159,578	466,604
1993	600,346	153,543	446,803
1994	530,120	136,522	393,598
1995	441,530	114,023	327,507

1 FBI Uniform Crime Reports, NYPD, 1990-2009

	Overall Total	Violent crime total	Property crime total
1996	382,555	98,660	283,895
1997	355,884	92,853	263,031
1998	323,150	85,891	237,259
1999	299,477	78,945	220,532
2000	288,311	75,692	212,619
2001	287,585	74,413	213,172
2002	250,630	63,839	186,791
2003	236,215	59,448	176,767
2004	226,876	55,688	171,188
2005	217,132	54,623	162,509
2006	205,522	52,086	153,436
2007	199,941	50,453	149,488
2008	198,419	48,430	149,989
2009	188,357	46,357	142,000
Total	-73.5%	-73.4%	-73.5%
Average Annual	-6.7%	-6.7%	-6.7%

Los Angeles Police Department Crime Statistics – 1990-2009²



2 FBI Uniform Crime Reports, LAPD, 1990-2009

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	Overall Total	Violent crime total	Property crime total
1990	321,536	83,809	237,727
1991	346,224	89,875	256,349
1992	338,531	88,919	249,612
1993	312,789	83,701	229,088
1994	278,351	73,102	205,249
1995	266,204	70,518	195,686
1996	235,260	62,840	172,420
1997	204,556	56,538	148,018
1998	183,706	49,201	134,505
1999	167,495	46,840	120,655
2000	180,538	50,241	130,297
2001	189,278	52,243	137,035
2002	190,992	51,695	139,297
2003	184,605	48,824	135,781
2004	167,986	42,786	125,200
2005	149,052	31,767	117,285
2006	135,985	30,526	105,459
2007	129,263	27,806	101,457
2008	127,374	26,553	100,821
2009	118,310	24,070	94,240
Total	-63.2%	-71.3%	-60.4%
Average Annual	-5.1%	-6.4%	-4.8%

Appendix C

Origins of Peel's 'Nine Principles of Policing' (c1829)

The Home Secretary, Sir Robert Peel, generally recognised as the father of policing, has had a number of policing principles attributed to him. While the Nine Principles were not penned directly by Peel, they were surmised from some of the many speeches³ he made by police historians in the twentieth century.⁴ Perhaps best-described as "Peelian" principles, they are today regularly described as Peel's Principles⁵ and remain at the heart of the conventional policing mission.

The Nine "Peelian" Principles⁶

- 1. To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and severity of legal punishment.
- 2. To recognize always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour, and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.
- 3. To recognize always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of the willing cooperation of the public in the task of securing observance of the law.
- 4. To recognize always that the extent to which the cooperation of the public can be secured diminishes, proportionately, the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives.
- 5. To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion, but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial

3 *The Speeches of Sir Robert Peel,* Routledge, 1853.

4 Lentz, S.A. Chaires, R.H., 'The invention of Peel's principles: a study of policing 'textbook' history', *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 35 (2007) pp.69-79

5 See Mayhall, P.D. (1985) Police-community relations and the administration of justice (3rd ed.). New York: John Wiley and Sons. pp.425-426 and Reith, C. (1952) The blind eye of history: a study of the origins of the present police era. London: Faber and Faber Limited. p.154

6 Mayhall, P.D. (1985) Policecommunity relations and the administration of justice (3rd ed.). New York: John Wiley and Sons. pp.425-426 (sourced from Reith, C. (1952) The blind eye of history: a study of the origins of the present police era. London: Faber and Faber Limited. p.154) service to law, in complete independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing; by ready exercise of courtesy and good humour; and by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.

- 6. To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public cooperation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or restore order; and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.
- 7. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.
- 8. To recognize always the need for strict adherence to policeexecutive functions, and to refrain from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary of avenging individuals or the state, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty.
- 9. To recognize always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.

"The Primary Objects of Police" – Introduction to the General Instructions to the Metropolitan Police by Colonel Charles Rowan and Sir Richard Mayne, 1829⁷

The following General Instructions for the different ranks of the Police Force are not to be understood as containing rules of conduct applicable to every variety of circumstances that may occur in the performance of their duty; something must necessarily be left to the intelligence and

7 Cited in: Kleinig, J. and Zhang Y., Professional law enforcement codes: a documentary collection (1993), p.27 discretion of individuals; and according to the degree in which they show themselves possessed to these qualities and to their zeal, activity, and judgement, on all occasions, will be their claims to future promotion and reward.

It should be understood, at the outset, that the principal object to be attained is the Prevention of Crime. To this great end every effort of the Police is to be directed. The security of person and property, the preservation of the public tranquillity, and all the other objects of a Police Establishment, will thus be better effected, than by the detection and punishment of the offender, after he has succeeded in committing the crime. This should constantly be kept in mind by every member of the Police Force, as the guide for his own conduct. Officers and Police Constables should endeavour to distinguish themselves by such vigilance and activity, as may render it extremely difficult for any one to commit a crime within that portion of the town under their charge.

When in any Division offences are frequently committed there must be reason to suspect that the Police is not in that Division properly conducted. The absence of crime will be considered the best proof of the complete efficiency of the Police. In Divisions, where this security and good order have been effected, the Officers and Men belonging to it may feel assured that such good conducted will be noticed by rewards and promotion.

"New Police Instructions" printed in The Times, September 18298

"It should be understood at the outset, that the object to be attained is "the prevention of crime". To this great end every effort of the police is to be directed. The security of person and property, the preservation of the public tranquillity, and all other objects of a police establishment, will thus be better effected than by the detection and punishment of the offender after he has succeeded in committing the crime. This should constantly be kept in mind by every member of the police force, as the

8 Eugene McLaughlin, and John Muncie, "The Origins and Development of the Police," in *Controlling Crime*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001), p.28. guide for his own conduct. Officers and constables should endeavour to distinguish themselves by such vigilance and activity as may render it impossible for anyone to commit a crime within that portion of the town under their charge."

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