

Cost of the Cops



Manpower and deployment in policing

Edward Boyd, Rory Geoghegan and Blair Gibbs



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Glossary

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
BCS	British Crime Survey
BCU	Basic Command Unit
CFF	Crime Fighting Fund
CSR	Comprehensive Spending Review (of October 2010)
Civilianisation	The process of employing an increasing proportion of civilian staff relative to police officers in a force
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service
NPF	Neighbourhood Policing Fund
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency
PCSO	Police Community Support Officer
PSAEW	Police Superintendents' Association of England and Wales

Executive Summary

The Great Police Expansion (2001-2010)

- The backdrop to the current debate around police funding is clear: the police service in England and Wales has never been better resourced. The last decade has seen an unprecedented rise in police expenditure: in nominal terms police expenditure has increased by 56% between 2001-2 and 2009-10 reaching more than £14.5 billion – up 25% in real terms since 2001.
- The increases over the last decade dwarfed even the large increases that the police enjoyed in the 1980s and taxpayers in England and Wales have never spent as much on policing as they do today. In 2010, each household was paying £614 per year for policing, up from £395 in 2001.
- Policing in England and Wales is among the most expensive in the developed world. A comparison of policing revenue expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) for a number of comparable, Common Law jurisdictions shows that UK police expenditure in 2010 was higher than the USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.
- The decade of expansion in police funding also consisted of more local funding (including through business rates) with all police forces seeing significant increases in the police precept on council tax. Share of police funding raised from the precept increased from around 12% in 2001-2 to 23% at the end of the last decade.
- At force level, elements of police personnel expenditure saw marked increases, including in overtime payments which rose from £289 million in 2000-1 to £381 million in 2009-10, having peaked at £437 million in 2007-8. The increase occurred concurrently with a 12% increase in officer numbers, suggesting that poor management drove the increase in overtime rather than under-resourcing (See: *Police Overtime Expenditure*, Policy Exchange, February 2011).
- Total police officer strength rose 15% from 123,476 at March 2001 to 141,631 at March 2010. The number of Special Constables (volunteer officers) also increased 22% from 12,738 to 15,505, having dipped briefly to under 11,000 at March 2004. The increase in officer numbers was principally fuelled by the creation of The Crime Fighting Fund (CFF) in 2000, which provided a Home Office grant “designed to maintain/increase the number of police officers.”
- The result of increased expenditure tied to schemes like the CFF was a large rise in recruitment and subsequently an increase in officers at every policing rank. Between 2001 and 2010 the greatest absolute increase in personnel occurred at the level of constable (12,000 were added to the ranks), yet the make-up of officers tilted in favour of more senior ranks and proportionally there were more significant increases in the middle management of police forces.

- Increased spending since 2001 also translated into a large increase in the number of civilian staff (made up of police staff, PCSOs, Designated Officers and Traffic Wardens), who increased 73% from 57,104 to 98,801 over the decade. The number of civilians now employed means that there are seven civilian staff members for every ten police officers.
- The number of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) in particular has grown since they were first piloted in 2003, reaching 16,685 in 2010, as have the number of designated officers (first introduced in 2005), who have increased to 3,809. PCSOs were a critical component in facilitating the roll-out of Neighbourhood Policing – one of the most important policing reforms of recent history – by creating a more visible and available police service.
- If the police were a single company, they would be a significantly bigger (22% bigger) employer than Tesco Plc in the UK (Tesco Plc employed 196,604 FTE in 2010 (UK), the police service employed 240,432 FTE).

The Next Four Years...

- In this context budget reductions over the next four years will be from a high base and in this regard, policing in England and Wales is in a comparatively strong position: more officers than ever before, better supported by historically high numbers of civilian staff and new technology, and facing reduced crime demand after more than a decade of reductions in volume offences (as measured by the British Crime Survey).
- The reductions planned for 2010-15 are large historically, and they will be challenging, but they are not excessive. Viewed in context, they do no more than reduce annual police funding to the level that would have been reached in 2015 if the trend rate of growth 1979-2001 had continued. The expansion after 2001 took police funding far higher than the trend increases of previous decades, and the funding agreed in the 2010 CSR will act to correct this unprecedented “surge”. The 20% budget reductions from the 2010 high amount to 14% over four years once local funding is taken into account.
- By the end of the period (2014-15), we will still be spending more than £12 billion on policing each year, or £500 per household in England and Wales – more than what was spent in 2004 and £100 more than was spent in 2001 when funding totalled £9 billion.
- Some forces – mostly in the north of England and the Midlands – as HMIC have noted, are facing more significant challenges, particularly if their total share of funding from central government is higher. It is certain that police forces will be smaller in 2015 than they were in 2010. Post the personnel reductions planned by forces up to 2015 there will still be 210,000 police employees in England and Wales – the same number as at March 2004.

Why did spending grow so much?

- Instead of any systemic profiling of need or impact analysis, funding over this period increased because there was a political consensus, which was lobbied for successfully by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO).

- The political consensus that supported an increase in police budgets and officer numbers during this period rested on a simplistic assumption that never received adequate scrutiny – namely, that officer numbers alone are a good proxy for police performance and the more officers a force had, the better they would perform against crime.
- When resources were flowing into the service, the political drive to hire more officers was not questioned – either within the service or externally. Yet in 2011, in evidence to a Commons Committee exploring the police spending and the impact of budget reductions, the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police identified the issue: “[There has been a] political obsession with the number of police officers. We’ve kept that number artificially high. Had large numbers of police officers doing admin jobs.”

What was the money spent on?

- The growth in police budgets over the last three decades and especially after 2000 was driven principally by the expansion of the police workforce, with all employee types greatly increasing in number.
- A sworn officer is a police force’s most valuable asset, absorbing significant upfront recruitment and training costs. The cost of training an officer to be fully competent over two years is around £80,000.
- The mean salary expenditure per officer in England and Wales at 2009-10 was £54,163 (including overtime and pension costs). The mean salary expenditure per civilian staff member in England and Wales at 2009-10 was £33,924 (including overtime and pension costs).
- Taking these two components together, the mean salary expenditure on a police officer was £20,239 more than that of the mean civilian staff employee, thus on average a sworn police officer is 60% more expensive than his civilian colleague.
- Between 2001 and 2010 police forces hired 18,155 officers, at a cost of £983 million in salary expenditure alone. Over the same period forces hired 23,312 police staff (excluding PCSOs, traffic wardens and designated officers) yet – at £790 million – they cost almost £200 million less in salary expenditure than those police officers.

Was the extra spending on police justified?

- The political decision to increase officer numbers was motivated by a desire to reduce crime and improve the service to the public, who remained concerned that police were not sufficiently visible or available. Hiring more officers was designed to bring more offenders to justice and make the police more visible on the streets. Increased expenditure after 2001 was also motivated by a need to increase counter-terrorism capability and specialisms around serious and organised crime – the threat of both increasing significantly in this period.
- More broadly however, the unprecedented growth in police numbers since 2001 would have been justified if conventional demand on policing had also risen substantially but it is not clear that it did: overall crime has fallen from 12.5 million crimes in 2001/2 to 9.5 million in 2010/11 as measured by the British Crime Survey (BCS).

- Clearly demand on policing is not comprised solely of crime, but the demand that is the primary duty of the police and also the most resource-intensive – detecting and investigating crime – is hugely variable across the country, and in those urban areas where most crime occurs, the concentration of police officers in those force areas is well above the national average rate, suggesting more than adequate levels of policing to meet demand. In the four forces that account for over a third of all recorded crime, officers per capita ranges from 259-431 per 100,000 population – far in excess of the England and Wales average of 230.

What was the return on the investment?

- In order to judge whether the large investment in policing delivered an adequate return, some general assessment of police performance is required. Additional expenditure on policing should have delivered a sizeable return in operational performance and it is not clear that it has. In fact it is likely that an unprecedented growth in police posts in the last 10 years has delivered diminishing returns; driven an unsustainable increase in the police wage bill; and has not markedly improved police performance, which in some areas and on some measures has actually deteriorated.
- There has been no robust analysis of whether the general increase in police resources delivered reductions in crime. We know that the police do affect crime rates – especially certain categories of offence that can be deterred by targeted policing operations, and by those investigations and other police activity that disrupt and incapacitate prolific offenders who commit a disproportionate amount of volume crime. But as a result of other benign factors, the overall level of BCS crime may have continued to fall over the decade even if police investment had not risen, although it is debatable whether crime would have fallen as far as it did.
- However, we can state that the fall in BCS crime that began in 1995 preceded the large increases in police expenditure (and increased officer numbers). In fact total crime fell by 68% before officer numbers increased after 2001 which means the majority of the fall in total BCS offences (1995-2011) was not the direct result of increased police resources. Additional police officers undoubtedly helped reduce crime in some categories but an increase in police numbers cannot take the credit for crime falls during this period – most of which would have happened without the one-third real terms increase in police funding.
- Detection rates are a key indicator of police performance, providing an indication of the likelihood that a case will be solved. The investment in more police officers ought to have enabled the police to take action against more offenders, especially as the number of reported offences (and therefore the pool of suspects) was gradually shrinking. As crime falls, if police performance is constant then detections – however they are measured – should in most cases rise. But between 2001 and 2010 in which the number of police officers increased by 18,155, the number of civilian staff by more than 41,697, and police expenditure grew by more than £5 billion in nominal

terms, there does not appear to have been a clear translation of this investment into an improvement of detection rate.

- The national headline detection rate has only risen modestly – from 24.4% in 2001 to 27.9% in 2010 – and yet the costs of investigation for key offences has jumped dramatically. Activity-based costing data shows an increase in the investigative spend per robbery offence of £838 (46%) during the period 2003/04 to 2007/08, while the sanction detection rate remained largely flat, with a slight improvement in the later years. The investigative spend per burglary offence increased £1,299 (54%) over the same period, while the sanction detection rate failed to break out of the 12-14% range.
- There has been a considerable increase in the investigative spend for a number of offences over the period during which activity based cost data was collected (2003/4-2007/8) This increased spend does not appear to have translated particularly well into improved sanction detections, with burglary seeing an increase of just 1.5% over the period. The investigative spend per sexual offence increased by 60%, an increase of £2,188 in cash terms, while the sanction detection rate remained flat.
- In the case of particular offence groups, the number of “active” detections comprised of a charges/summons has been falling, while the “passive” detections – where a suspect admits to a string of offences which are then ‘Taken Into Consideration’ (TICs) – now regularly account for almost half of all detections, even though they are not the result of proactive police activity. If TICs are excluded then the primary detection rate falls to 7.9% for burglaries and 6.0% for offences against vehicles which equates to the police solving fewer than 1 out of every 12 burglaries and fewer than 1 out of every 16 offences against vehicles.
- Despite heavy investment in both police officers and civilian staff, these factors – indeterminate impact on crime and poor performance on detections – support the conclusion of the Audit Commission's latest assessment that: “there is no evidence that high spending is delivering improved productivity”. The primary reason for this being the ineffective deployment of officers over the last decade.

Did the service to the public improve?

- Trust in the police as a profession has fallen over the last several years, despite more investment in neighbourhood policing and a greater focus on “public confidence” and expectations of service. In the YouGov survey of trust in institutions and professions, the police scored a trust rating of 82% in 2003. That rating had fallen by 14 percentage points to 68% in July 2011 which is a significant fall and a cause of concern.
- In 2010 Consumer Focus examined the levels of customer service and satisfaction with policing in England and Wales. The research found that, in general, 30% of the public are dissatisfied with the way police dealt with them. A comparison of customer service ratings against other organisations, including the health service, demonstrates that it is possible for organisations to score more highly for customer service.

- When surveys ask the public of their confidence in policing locally, a more favourable picture emerges. The BCS data since 2005/06 demonstrates rising public confidence in the police with an increase from 63% in 2005/06 to 72% in 2010/11. However, while the improved performance is to be commended, the confidence levels remain poor for an organisation that historically could command upwards of 80% satisfaction rates.
- Looking at complaints made against the police (and reported to the Independent Police Complaints Commission), there has been a rising number of complaints since 2002-03, with 6,700 (20%) of the 33,800 complaints made against police in 2009-10 related to “incivility, impoliteness and intolerance”.

Did the police become more visible?

- Long-running social factors and the changing nature of police work have served to make the police less visible to the public on a daily basis. Structural reforms within forces also changed how visible and available the police routinely were. With the sell off of traditional police houses, rising property prices and the introduction of free public transport for officers (in London), many more live far away from the communities they police. In London, half (49%) of Metropolitan Police officers do not live in a London borough – and most of those that do, live in the outer London boroughs. The combined result is that the last 40 years have seen police move from public-facing duties to less visible policing roles, move out of the communities they police, and move away from beat patrols on foot to vehicle-based patrol and response.
- However the public should have seen more officers as a result of the large increases in personnel but visibility rates remain low. With police officer numbers at an historic high, it is a legitimate public expectation that the police should be more visible than they have been in the past but, as Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has stated, on average only 12% of police officers are currently “visible and available” to the public at any one time, and although this analysis is disputed, what should not be is the need to improve levels of visibility which are too low. There is also significant variation in the level of visibility and availability in forces, ranging from 9% in Devon & Cornwall to 17% in Merseyside (total officers visible at any one time). HMIC analysis identified shift patterns as the most significant influence on a force’s ability to maximise the visibility and availability of its officers and PCSOs.
- The BCS also asks how often respondents see a police officer or PCSO on foot patrol. The data available shows an improvement in the proportion of respondents seeing police on foot patrol, with the proportion of people claiming to never see police on foot patrol falling from 40% in 2006-07 to 23% in 2009-10. These figures must be understood in context. They relate to a period in which police officers and PCSO numbers reached an all-time high. At a more granular level, between 2005/6 and 2008/8 there were 1,429 fewer police officers assigned to community policing (a generally visible function), offset by an increase of 7,100 PCSOs – a net increase of 5,671

heads. This suggests that the increase in visibility has, for the period in question, been down to employment changes and the development of a new neighbourhood policing model (known as ‘Safer Neighbourhoods’ in London) built upon PCSOs, rather than deployment or other practice changes affecting sworn officers.

- Between 2003-04 and 2007-08 forces were required to produce activity-based costing data for a range of police activities. Analysis of these figures reveals that for the period in which data was available, the majority of police forces shifted their resource spend away from visible patrol, with some forces reducing annual spend on visible patrolling over this period by an average of up to 15%.

Public opinion

- The historic investment in additional police funding and the net increase of 18,155 officers between 2001 and 2010 has not transformed public perceptions of police availability or performance. On officer numbers, it is almost as if the investment never happened.
- A new survey conducted by YouGov suggests the public did not see a benefit comparable to the investment made. Half of those surveyed thought there were either the same number of police, or fewer police, than in 2000. Women and those in poorer socio-economic groups were more likely to think there were less police than in 2000. Just a fifth (22%) thought there were more police today than in 2000.
- When asked if there are more police *on the street* than there used to be, a majority (58%) disagreed, just 17% agreed. Two-thirds of poorer voters – those more likely to live in high crime areas and to be victims of crime – disagreed with the statement that there were more police than there used to be.
- When asked what was a more common sight when they did see a police officer in their neighbourhood, a majority (56%) said that they usually saw officers walking together in pairs. Just a quarter (26%) said that a single officer on the beat alone was a more common sight. Just 10% of those surveyed in London said the more common sight was a lone officer patrolling, against 81% who said a pair of officers was the more common sight. Taken together this strongly suggests that the default policy of single patrolling is not a reality for most people, and even where it is championed as the policy in London, the vast majority of people do not experience it. These results directly challenge the assumption that officers patrol in pairs only rarely on in high crime neighbourhoods where risks are higher.
- The same YouGov survey asked about public attitudes to the service the police deliver, and whether it represented value for money. When asked if £600 per household per year for policing represented good value for money or poor value for money, half (51%) said poor value, and a third said good value (36%). One in eight (12%) thought it represented “very poor” value for money.
- In a crucial question that asked whether over the last decade, the service provided by the police had got better, almost half (46%) said it had got worse.

Less than a fifth of the public (17%) think it had got better between 2000 and 2010. Again, those poorer voters more likely to be victims of crime and more likely to require service from the police, were significantly more likely to say the service had got worse (51%), than had got better (14%). These overall shares for the public as a whole were reflected broadly across all regions except London where respondents were more likely to say it had got better (24%). Older voters everywhere were more of the view that the service had got worse.

- The survey also asked respondents what they thought police were paid. The questionnaire asked what the public thought the average police constable with five years' service was paid annually, excluding any additional payments for working overtime. Two-thirds (64%) thought a PC with five years' service had an annual salary of less than £30,000. In fact, it is £31,032 – excluding overtime. Less than a fifth nationally assumed that constables with five years' service earned between £30,000-34,999, and just 23% of London voters thought a constable was paid what they actually are paid in London (£33,165 including the London weighting), with 56% assuming they earned less than that.
- The survey results demonstrate that there remains a clear gap between the additional resources put into policing and the service received by the public. Most of the additional officers were not even noticed by the public, and a majority of people think there remain less police on the street than there used to be – highlighting ongoing concerns about visibility and availability. Most people think what they pay for policing represents poor value for money and almost half think that the service as a whole has actually got worse over the last decade, not better. It is therefore not surprising that the public do not see the determinant of a good police service being how much is spent on it. Just 5% take this view, compared to 78% who think that the “most important thing that determines how successful the police are is how efficiently and effectively they are run”.

The Inefficient Police Workforce

- The political argument to increase the number of police officers almost irrespective of how they are deployed is based on a flawed assumption that more police officers mean more officers available to fight crime through performing front line, warranted roles. But this does not automatically follow because an unreformed workforce allows too many police officers to remain off the front line.
- The additional resources were not tied to reforms to pay or modernised working practices, and so the police organisation remained monolithic – growing in size but not become more flexible or efficient with its staff. With respect to the police's primary investment – its own people – this has led to a service with a large amount of wasted assets.
- A 2004 report by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) found “widespread concern” about the impact of the CFF and other central grants on workforce modernisation, with a rush to hiring often overtaking any assessment of efficient force mix. This resulted in situations where

resources were knowingly wasted, sometimes because of a drive to hire officers unnecessarily. An HMIC report noted: “To quote one finance director: ‘I could save the Police Authority £400,000, but I am unable to do so because I cannot lose officers.’”

- Responses from around half of police forces in England and Wales show that significant numbers of sworn officers made no arrests at all last year (2010). In some forces, the proportion was as high as half of all officers. In West Yorkshire, over 2,000 officers made no arrest in 2010, and in Derbyshire, a much smaller force, over 1,000 officers made no arrests. In total, from 18 forces, over 14,500 officers made no arrests in 2010. While this figure will include those not in a position to make an arrest, it does suggest that there remain too many officers not in frontline roles where their warranted powers are being exercised.
- At the same time, and despite modest progress in recent years, there is still substantial room for increasing the use of civilians in police forces in England and Wales. An investigation into the general level of civilianisation across forces shows some significant variation at March 2010, ranging from 55% civilianisation in Surrey to just 34% in West Midlands. The range of civilianisation across forces is not a symptom of their locality or their size. Similar forces have taken contrary policy decisions with some – most notably Surrey – choosing to civilianise across a whole range of functions, while West Midlands chose otherwise. In Surrey for example, there are now 122 staff members for every 100 officers, compared to the West Midlands where there are just 52 staff members for every 100 officers.
- The analysis in this paper highlights the picture of where staff and officers are currently deployed.
 - In March 2009 13 forces had more than 90% of their control rooms staffed by civilian staff, with a force average of 85%. The forces with the lowest civilianisation rates – and therefore the highest proportion of officers – in their control rooms were North Wales with a 56% civilianisation rate (accounting for 65 officers), West Yorkshire with a 63% civilianisation rate (accounting for 235 officers) and Durham with a 67% civilianisation rate (accounting for 71 officers).
 - The Metropolitan Police – with a control room civilianisation rate of 72% – also had 648 officers in their control rooms. This has risen substantially from 195 officers in 2003, suggesting that the MPS management has allowed more officers to be “parked” in this function without a clear operational need. To put this into context, if the Metropolitan Police had the same ratio of officers to civilians in their control room as Staffordshire, they would save around £13 million every year through reduced salary expenditure costs.
 - In West Midlands, at March 2010 only 34% – 4,478 of their 13,106 personnel – were civilian staff. Their current use of police officers in civilian roles is costing the force dear. Looking at just the five functions we have analysed in this report, the cost of using officers instead of staff is costing the force £8 million every year.
- The police service also suffers from the poor management of absenteeism in many forces. Assuming that sick leave is constant across police employee types

and using a benchmark of the best five performing forces (6.5 days annually per employee), then 767 officers would be freed up for duty, as well as almost 553 police staff, if all forces could match the performance of the best. Whilst such a saving would not be cashable, the increased value that would be accrued by forces would amount to £60 million.

- Furthermore, there are question marks over whether officers who are not currently performing front line roles would be able to take up the roles which resilience might require of them. The current lack of any regular fitness test for the majority of officers in many forces prevents a Chief Constable from having any picture of the true number of officers they can call upon to perform difficult and physically demanding front line work, such as at Public Order Incidents like the recent August riots.
- Overall there were 3,509 officers on recuperative duties in 2009/10. Furthermore, the four forces with the largest percentage of officers on recuperative duties – Dyfed-Powys, Warwickshire, Wiltshire and Northamptonshire – despite having only 3% of the total police force numbers – represented just under a tenth of all officers on recuperative duties. In total there are 5,964 officers on restricted duties, with Kent and West Yorkshire – both with close to 9% of their officers being on restricted duties – representing 14% of all officers on restricted duties (despite having less than 7% of the total number of officers across forces). The number of officers on restrictive duties has been expanding rapidly – between 2002-3 and 2009-10 the number of officers on restricted duties increased from 2,299 to 5,964. A significant proportion of this can be explained by restrictions on ill-health retirement pushing officers into restricted duties.
- Our analysis has looked in more detail at what this workforce mix means for officer deployment and value for money. Whilst some back office and middle office functions would benefit from the experience and skills of sworn officers, and there are only a few departments that could be staffed entirely by civilians, it is the view of the authors that there could be significantly fewer officers working in back and middle office roles, without compromising service to the public.
- Our analysis has shown that there are at least 7,280 officers who are doing roles that should be being done by civilians, and at significantly lower cost. This has been calculated by benchmarking the proportion of officers to civilians in forces against the best 10 performing forces. We have analysed 5 functions (Business Support, Control Room, Criminal Justice, Forensics and Operational Support) in detail in this paper – which account for just over a quarter of total force employees. These 7,280 officers who are not in policing roles and who are not visible and available to the public are equal to 40% of the entire complement of additional officers hired between 2001 and 2010.
- Over the last ten years, as resources increased significantly, if all forces had succeeded in driving civilianisation deeper and wider, so all forces matched the workforce mix of the best-performing quarter (top ten forces), then £147 million would have been saved every year through the lower salary expenditure alone.

- Had this been achieved over the last few years, forces would have saved significant resources, year on year, before the recession and the resulting fiscal crisis gave rise to reduced budget settlements in the Comprehensive Spending Review of October 2010. Because civilianisation stalled and these reforms never happened, the police service in England and Wales over four years wasted an estimated £588 million enough in itself to pay for 2,714 extra officers in each of these years.
- Had these reforms taken place, so these roles had been filled by civilian staff rather than officers, then the police would have been more visible to the public and service would have improved at the same time as costing taxpayers much less. These reforms alone would have realised substantial savings in almost every force that could either have been reinvested in the frontline (hiring additional sworn officers), or reduced the annual police funding demands on the Home Office and local government.

Getting More for Less

- To ensure an effective service with reduced resources over the next four years will be challenging – for some police forces more than others. Total officer and staff numbers will fall and policing services on the frontline will change. But how policing performs depends upon how those more limited resources are used in the years ahead, and this requires a focus on delivering more for less through:
 - **Deployment over employment** – inefficiencies in how staff are assigned and poor police deployment practices need to be addressed.
 - **Business transformation** – how reengineered services can free up assets (uniformed officers) and deliver cash savings through back and middle office efficiencies around outsourcing, procurement and business transformation.
- Both issues would be of general interest irrespective of the funding available for policing, as they are critical to ensuring an effective and efficient service to the public. The budget reductions over the next four years however, make these two areas of even greater importance as Chief Constables pursue a “more for less” agenda and seek to protect the front line. Both elements demand a focus on what productivity gains can be secured within the current framework, even though they are not enough to put the future of the service on a more sustainable financial footing.
- Because of the reduced budgets for police forces up to 2015, and the inability to make officers redundant, even if those forces which have too many officers in back room roles wanted to replace them with civilian staff now, they could not do so on the scale outlined here. That opportunity existed 2001-2010 but has now been missed. That should not mean, however, that forces should not try and minimise the number of civilian posts lost over the next four years. If too many civilians are made redundant, the progress that has been made will be reversed and the police will become less efficient, and less visible.
- As police budgets – and officer numbers – fall in the years ahead, maintaining and where possible enhancing police visibility should be a key priority for forces. Two options for forces to consider might include:

- **A determined move to embed single-patrolling** in neighbourhood policing teams to enhance police presence and effectiveness at little or no cost.
- **New regulations on uniform** to require those officers who benefit from free public transport to wear their uniforms home-to-station to improve visibility at no cost.
- On maximising the value of existing assets, the visibility of sworn officers currently in frontline and visible roles could be enhanced further by a systematic drive to embed single-patrolling in neighbourhood policing teams. Our recommendations on this aspect of deployment would effectively mean doubling the visibility of the significant number of officers currently policing in pairs. The effect of single-crewing foot patrols is two-fold: it can double the level of visibility compared to double-crewing and enhances the community interaction role of the patrolling officer by increasing approachability. Research finds that lone officers on patrol experience a greater rate of public initiated contact with the public perceiving officers in pairs to be “busy.”
- ACPO policy calls for forces to operate single-crewed patrols as the default policy, subject to exceptions on the basis of risk assessment. There is, however, still a long way to go to fully embed single-crewing within the police service and many neighbourhood police teams routinely patrol in pairs, even in safe, relatively low-crime areas. Burdensome risk assessment processes have led, in some cases, to supervisors instead defaulting to a policy of double-crewing. Where the policy is publicly endorsed – in London – it is not apparent that it is yet happening routinely on the ground and it is not the policing profile on the beat that most of the public actually experience, despite the ACPO guidance.
- Visibility of uniform officers working in all functions could be enhanced further by establishing new uniform procedures for those officers who benefit from free travel on public transport. By introducing a strong presumption that officers travelling from home to station wear their uniform if using public transport, police visibility can be greatly increased without any additional cost. The annual value of this travel benefit where it exists in London – at as much as £5,792 per officer – is not insignificant: it is nearly half (46%) of the average bonus given to employees in the financial sector (2010). The introduction of free rail travel for Metropolitan Police officers cost £24 million in 2008 and is estimated to cost an average of £21.4 million per year between 2009 and 2014, or more than £100 million in total.
- In a scenario modeled for London (where free transport is available and public transport use is high), we estimate that this procedural change would enhance visibility to such an extent, that it would be equivalent to hiring over 1,200 additional officers in the capital. Forces should take fully into account the significant ‘bang for your buck’ potential of this policy of expecting officers to wear uniform on the way to work – it will increase visibility significantly and without having to increase officer or PCSO headcount or even changing deployment practices.

Recommendations

- The numbers game has distorted public debate and skewed spending priorities. Police leaders should advocate publicly that total employment is not a useful measure of police performance and that the effective deployment of the officers that a force has available is the most important factor.
- Future funding of the police should not repeat the pattern of the last decade – national resources should be directed at investments that maximise operational outcomes, build capability and leverage assets like technology and intelligence, not funding that inflates staff numbers or artificially drives up recruitment.
- Whatever the total resources available for policing in the years ahead, more funding should increasingly be raised locally, with national Home Office funding falling as a share of all income. With the exception of counter-terrorism, all ringfence grants should be abolished, and the practice of ear-marking Home Office funds curtailed, as these restrict the autonomy of Chief Constables to decide how best to use their resources locally.
- Police forces should look beyond the current CSR period (up to 2015) and plan for a decade of smaller increases in police funding from central government and a smaller total workforce. Forces should put emphasis instead on the case for growing local funding sources, expanding the police family and improving the productivity of the staff and officers hired in recent years.
- In an environment of fewer resources, the unit cost of a police officer – which has risen in recent years – will militate against expanding staff numbers. Addressing salary and pension costs by reforming pay and conditions will safeguard some posts in the short-term, and make the police workforce more affordable in the long-term.
- Future work by Policy Exchange on creating a reformed police profession and modernising police pensions – which remain generous and which contribute significantly to the total employment cost of an officer – will set out additional reforms that might reduce the costs of policing in the years ahead.
- Police performance on detections is poor, particularly in respect of burglary offences. While detection rates alone are an inadequate measure of the quality of policing and should not become a performance target, police forces should seek to raise the proportion of “active” detections, rather than relying on “passive” detections (TICs), and be completely transparent with the public about their detection performance.
- Record investment has coincided with an increase in public confidence in the police. Community policing and the recruitment of PCSOs – who are

highly visible – is a key element of this. However the record investment represents poor value for money on this measure as it has not transformed public confidence levels, complaints are on the increase and a large minority of citizens remain dissatisfied with the service they receive.

- Every member of the police workforce should regard themselves as servants of the public whose role demands that they address concerns, respond to complaints, and treat law-abiding residents as consumers of policing services who should never leave dissatisfied.
- From May 2012, Police and Crime Commissioners – unlike police authorities – will have a clear incentive to improve public satisfaction rates and their oversight should help focus the police to respond better to public priorities – especially quality of life crimes and anti-social behaviour (ASB) – and deal adequately with complaints.
- PCCs should set out to improve the satisfaction rates of their local residents, especially crime victims, without making public confidence a service performance target. Improved public satisfaction rates are the consequence of effective, responsive and legitimate policing – not its object.
- The roll-out of neighbourhood policing teams has made the police more accessible and helped to partly reverse many years of low visibility. But poor levels of police visibility remain a concern for citizens who are sceptical that the hiring of additional police officers has markedly improved the service they receive. Improving the visibility and availability of officers to the public must be a key strategic priority for police forces – irrespective of the available resources.
- The chasm that exists between officer and staff remuneration is not conducive to good morale and a cohesive workforce. Separate from changes to how staff are paid and for what, operationally, police forces should have an integrated workforce wherever possible. Even traditional policing functions like investigation should be opened up to trained civilians, where these roles do not demand warranted powers and can be undertaken at much lower cost.
- Civilianisation in some police forces and in a number of important functions has not gone far enough, and progress made in the 1990s was not built upon consistently in the decade 2001-2010. In recent years, even as spending increased and more officers were recruited, some forces permitted more officers to fill back office roles than was the case in 2001. Forces with a high proportion of officers who typically make no arrests should study closely the reasons for this and ensure it is not because too many officers are performing staff duties.
- The result of this stalled civilianisation has meant that some forces – like the West Midlands and the MPS – are significantly worse off in coping with reduced budgets in future because they have too many officers in non-policing roles and too few civilian staff. Forces should fund a detailed empirical analysis of the optimum civilianisation rate in specific functions taking account of resilience and cost effectiveness.
- The police workforce has institutional problems of poor health and above average absence rates – even among civilian staff. Forces need to practice better absence management in line with best practice from the private

sector and examine the nature and problems affecting existing officers on recuperative duties to expedite the return of as many officers to frontline duty as possible.

- Police officers – like fire-fighters and armed forces personnel – should be required to undertake and pass a standardised fitness test not just at point of entry but annually. Failure to pass regular fitness tests should have career consequences. Improved fitness among officers will enable more officers to undertake frontline roles and will enhance general workforce health.
- The budget reductions for police forces up to 2015 are challenging but manageable if forces take the right decisions to reshape their workforces, change business processes, redeploy officers to frontline roles and maximise the visibility of officers to the public. For instance, there is scope to go much further by outsourcing certain services and future funding settlements should partly be predicated on savings arising from more efficient working practices and service arrangements. Major efficiencies can be realised by this route.
- Greater outsourcing will deliver resource efficiencies and redeployment opportunities that will help protect the frontline, but years of tentative steps by individual police authorities have not delivered savings on the scale necessary. Only a degree of incentivisation from the Home Office will encourage police authorities to strip out cost and free up officers for the front-line through a bold programme of shared services and outsourcing of back office functions.
- The Home Office should establish an incentive scheme for early movers in the outsourcing of these additional areas and produce a menu of options for forces, so police leaders are aware of the reform and business transformation approaches available, but any deals should be brokered locally.
- With police forces facing challenging budget reductions, it is critical for public confidence and crime reduction that an appropriately visible and available police presence is maintained, instead of these officers being drawn into, or parked in, civilian roles in the middle and back office. Forces should guard against ‘reverse civilianisation’ that makes the police less productive and less visible.
- Wherever possible, some recruitment of new officers, as in the example of Cambridgeshire and Surrey Police, should be maintained – even at very low levels – to support morale and avert future problems of management. Forces must be free to utilise whatever tools they currently have to reduce their workforce (including A19), but a voluntary redundancy scheme for officers – as recommended by the Winsor Review (Part I) – should be introduced as soon as possible, to aid them in this process.
- Forces should examine closely their staffing mix and determine how many officers in back and middle office functions could be redeployed to policing roles. As recruitment ceases and the total number of officers falls, management should prioritise the proper deployment of their most valuable assets – sworn officers – to policing roles where warranted powers are required, if necessary by reengineering shift patterns and operational units.

- Reducing Home Office regulation and the internal audit demands flowing from guidance should free up posts and prevent the need for additional hiring of staff when officers are redeployed. Where those roles remain necessary – and warranted powers are not a prerequisite – then only civilian staff should fill those posts.
- Forces should maximise the public value of the officers they do have by deploying them more effectively when they are in visible roles. All forces should examine regulations on uniform to require officers – especially those claiming free or subsidised travel – to wear their uniform from home to station. In addition, the concerted effort by the Metropolitan Police to standardise single-patrolling should be mirrored in other forces and appropriate mechanisms established to ensure this deployment pattern becomes ingrained.

Part I

The Expansion

“One thing that can be said about the Government, more than anything else, is that we have invested in police and policing numbers.”

David Hanson, former Minister for Policing, Crime and Counter-Terrorism, 2010
(Hansard, February 2010, c321).

The backdrop to the current debate around police funding is clear: the police service in England and Wales has never been better resourced. The decade of record investment in policing (2001-2010) was driven by a political consensus that there were too few police officers and that public safety would be improved if more police officers were hired. The result was a large increase in recruitment and a net gain in personnel that mirrored and built upon the previous decade of expansion in the 1980s. Police funding itself was driven principally by the growth of the police workforce.


Taken together, both officers and staff now make up a police service in England and Wales that is significantly larger than ever before. Future funding reductions will be challenging for forces and will mean a reduction in total personnel, but these reductions will be from a high base and in this context, policing in England and Wales is in a comparatively strong position: more officers than ever before, better supported by historically high numbers of civilian staff and new technology, and facing reduced crime demand after more than a decade of reductions in volume offences.

1

The Decade of Growth

The last decade has seen an unprecedented rise in police expenditure: in nominal terms, police expenditure has increased by 56% between 2001-2 and 2009-10 reaching more than £14.5billion. Over that period revenue expenditure has typically made up at least 95% of expenditure.


Figure 1.1: Overall nominal police authority expenditure (£bn)



Source: CIPFA Police Actual Statistics 2002 to 2010

Even after adjusting for inflation, the growth in police revenue expenditure alone has been significant, with the increases over the last decade dwarfing even the large increases that were enjoyed in the 1980s and 1990s. There was a 25% increase in real terms between 2001-2 and 2009-10.


Figure 1.2: Growth in police revenue expenditure in real terms (£bn)



Sources: CIPFA Police Actuals Statistics 2009-10 & Police Expenditure 1999-2009, Kings College London

Such large increases in expenditure on policing have not been confined to England and Wales either. Between 1982 and 2006 the United States of America increased nominal government spending on policing by more than 420%.¹ This equates to an annual increase of 8.6% (3.8% when adjusted for inflation). Yet over the same period, we have outspent the USA with police revenue expenditure in England and Wales increasing by 475% in nominal terms.

The overall increase in police revenue expenditure in England and Wales can be seen in the figure below, showing total spending since 1967 and the pronounced increases of the last decade; together with the projected spending on policing out to 2015




The reductions between 2010 and 2015 are large historically, but they do no more than reduce annual police funding to the level that would have been reached in 2015 if the trend rate of growth between 1979-2001 had continued. The expansion after 2001 took police funding far higher than the increases of previous decades, and the funding totals agreed in the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review, correct this unprecedented “surge”. The result is that over £12 billion will be spent on policing in 2015, up from around £9 billion in 2001.

Taxpayers in England and Wales have never spent as much on policing as they do today. In 2010, each household pays £614 per year for policing, up from £395 in 2001. Even after the funding falls agreed under the Comprehensive Spending Review of October 2010, by the end of the period (2014-15), we will still be spending more than £12 billion on policing each year, or £500 per household in England and Wales – more than what was spent in 2004 and £100 more than was spent in 2001.²

1 Cited in Gascon, G., and Foglesong, T., “Making Policing More Affordable”, New Perspectives in Policing, Harvard Kennedy School & the National Institute for Justice, 2010

2 Includes both revenue and capital expenditure.

Figure 1.4: Cost of policing per household annually



Source: CIPFA Police Actual Statistics 2001 – 2010 & DCLG Household projections

In this context the police in England and Wales have been described as “the most expensive in the world.”³ This view is supported by a comparison of policing revenue expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) for a number of comparable, common law jurisdictions: UK police expenditure is higher than the USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.

Figure 1.5: Policing expenditure as a % of GDP




Source: US Bureau of Justice, Statistics Canada, New Zealand Treasury & Australian Institute of Criminology

Viewed in historical context, total funding for the police in England and Wales has been a story of famine followed by feast since the 1960s, although with a broad upward trend in overall expenditure. Periods of strong growth in budgets and increased workforce numbers in the 1960s and 1970s were interspersed with brief periods of famine where workforce numbers were flat or even fell in some years. Before the decade of expansion (2001-2010), the 1980s was the biggest period of feast with workforce numbers rising every year for a decade or more until 1994. This

³ David Wilson, “Don’t listen to police scaremongering on public safety,” *The Guardian*, 2011. Can be found at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/04/police-acpo-public-safety>

was followed by a famine in the mid to late 1990s when officer numbers actually fell for three consecutive years (1998-2000) before the years of feast returned and total workforce (1953 to 2010) numbers increased every year for a decade.

Figure 1.6: Annual change in police workforce size




Source: Home Office

Where the money came from

Policing in England and Wales is funded by a mixture of central government grants, from the Home Office and Department for Communities and Local Government, and funds raised locally through business rates and the police precept component of council tax bills. Modest additional funding comes from private sources, such as revenue raised through charging for services for instance in recouping the costs of policing football matches. The figure below shows sizeable increases over the last decade in central funding made available by government (£3.5 billion) and the police precept raised locally (£2.1 billion):

Figure 1.7: Police funding sources, 2000–01 vs 2009–10




Source: House of Commons Library & CIPFA

The last decade also saw the introduction of specific, ringfenced or ear-marked, grants which by 2009-10 accounted for 17% (£1.7 billion) of central government funding, equating to almost £1 in every £5 of police funding. The eligibility criteria and restrictions associated with these grants provided the Home Office with a means of managing and dictating the nature and management of policing at force level.

This was accompanied in many forces by significant increases in the police precept. Over the last decade, the share of police funding raised from the precept increased from around 12% in 2001-2 to 23% at the end of the last decade.


Figure 1.8: Share of police funding (Local vs Central)



Source: House of Commons Library & CIPFA

This increase in the size of the police precept is starkly illustrated in the following figure, showing it more than tripling in less than ten years.

Figure 1.9: Income from police precept



Source: House of Commons Library & CIPFA

The increased spending on the police since the 1980s was the result of political decisions by successive governments who responded to growing public concern about social unrest and rising crime, and demands from police leaders and staff associations to increase officer pay and police numbers in response. And yet apart from a general concern about rising crime (which according to the British Crime Survey increased 73% between 1981-1995), the funding increases agreed by the Home Office beginning in the 1980s were not the result of any meaningful analysis of need (bold added for emphasis):

“The incremental growth in police numbers in the 1980s and 1990s was based on annual manpower bids to the Home Office. These bids were predicated on a view that additional police numbers would bring better service delivery... **the yardstick used to determine outcome was almost invariably the availability of central funding, not specified function or measured need...** [no] evaluation [was] undertaken by either [the] police authority or [the] police force to assess the impact of the manpower increase.”⁴

Instead of any systemic profiling of need or impact analysis, funding over this period increased because there was a political consensus, which was lobbied for successfully by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO).⁵ This approach is due in part to the majority of ACPO’s members – senior police officers – not being considered government servants but rather Officers of the Crown who are free to advocate for additional resources if desired, rather than because they are demanded by a financial imperative.⁶ The Police Federation – which represents officers below the rank of Superintendent – also took on a more active role lobbying on law and order and campaigned for more expenditure on policing from the 1970s onwards.⁷

“Instead of any systemic profiling of need or impact analysis, funding over this period increased because there was a political consensus, which was lobbied for successfully by the Association of Chief Police Officers”

How the money was spent

Police expenditure over the last three decades was driven principally by the growth of the police workforce. This meant that a large proportion of the increase in expenditure was seen in resource rather than capital costs, a high proportion of which – £4 out of every £5 spent on policing – was made up by workforce costs, as at March 2009.⁸

This workforce expenditure is split across a number of different employee types: police officers, police staff, Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), Traffic Wardens, Designated Officers and volunteer Special Constables.⁹ The majority of this workforce spend is dedicated to community policing functions (which consists of community safety, response and neighbourhoods teams) as shown below. The next largest areas of spend are investigation, business support and operational support. Taken together, these functions account for 60% of the workforce, increasing to 80% if the control room and criminal justice functions are included.

4 Loveday, B. (2008), “Workforce Modernisation and Future Resilience within the Police Service in England and Wales,” *The Police Journal*, Volume 81

5 Mills, H., Silvestri, A. and Grimshaw, R. (2010), “Police expenditure, 1999 – 2009,” Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, Kings College London


6 Jones, T, “The governance and accountability of policing”, in Newburn, T. (ed), “Handbook of Policing”, 2003

7 Loader, I. and Mulcahy, A., “Policing and the Condition of England: Memory, Politics and Culture,” Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003

8 As calculated using Police Force Value For Money Profiles, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, March 2010 and CIPFA Police Actual Statistics 2010

9 Note that the following categories are included in the definition of ‘non-officer employees’: police staff, PCSOs, Traffic Wardens, Designated Officers and Special Constables

Figure 1.10: The components of local policing



Note: The above chart takes officer and staff numbers working in local policing for 2009 and therefore excludes national policing functions and those officers who were not available for duty. The area of the pie charts reflects their relative size.

Source: HMIC, House of Commons Library, CIPFA & CLG - WAG

10 Geoghegan, R. and Gibbs, B., "Police Overtime Expenditure," Policy Exchange, 2011

11 CIPFA Police Actuals 2010 and Mills, H., Silvestri, A. and Grimshaw, R. (2010), "Police expenditure, 1999 – 2009," Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, Kings College London

12 <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmhaaff/117/11707.htm>

13 Note that officer and staff figures are adjusted to not include officers on secondments, career breaks or maternity/paternity leave in order to make them comparable with pre-2003 figures

14 Note that the analysis in this section is carried out up to March 2010, rather than March 2011 as the focus of this section is to identify the make-up of policing prior to the budget reductions, which took place from March 2010 onwards

15 Note that special constable numbers are measured in headcount, whilst all other figures are measured as full time equivalents (FTEs)

16 www.mpa.gov.uk/publications/factsheets/budget/. And see the following link for 2009/10 figure www.local.odpm.gov.uk/finance/0809/.../crime%20fighting%20fund.xls

17 Mills, H., Silvestri, A. and Grimshaw, R., "Police expenditure, 1999 – 2009," Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, Kings College London, 2010


At force level, other elements of personnel expenditure have also seen similar marked increases, including police overtime payments, which rose from £289 million in 2000-1 to £381 million in 2009-10, having peaked at £437 million in 2007-8.¹⁰ The increase occurred concurrently with a 12% increase in officer numbers, suggesting that poor management drove the increase in overtime rather than under-resourcing.

At the level of national funding, the last decade has seen a large swing toward ringfenced grants that specify the ways in which police resources can be spent. There were no Home Office specific grants ten years ago. Since 2000, centralised ring-fencing of Home Office police funding has increased from £127 million to over £1.7 billion (2009-10) in real terms – now accounting for 10% of total police funding, or £1 in every £5 that the Home Office allocates.¹¹

Counter-terrorism expenditure (itself a ringfenced grant) has increased markedly to over £569 million per annum. In just three years, between 2007 and 2010, counter-terrorism police budgets increased by 30%, leading to a total of 7,700 officers – 5% of all officers – working in "counter-terrorism and protective security".¹²

Total police officer strength rose 15% from 123,476 at March 2001 to 141,631 at March 2010.^{13, 14} The number of Special Constables also increased 22% from 12,738 to 15,505, having dipped briefly to under 11,000 at March 2004.¹⁵


The increase in officer numbers was principally fuelled by the creation of The Crime Fighting Fund (CFF) in 2000, which provided a Home Office grant "designed to maintain/increase the number of police officers."¹⁶ It has provided £1.8 billion of funding to Police Authorities from creation to 2009-10.¹⁷ The rise

Figure 1.11: Police officer numbers (2001–2010)

Source: Police Service Strength, Home Office 2001 to 2010

in police numbers over this period was the result of a clear political objective to expand police forces, partly to meet a perceived on-going rise in demand, but also to increase police visibility and make up for a period of moderate investment in the 1990s when officer numbers remained broadly flat (and actually reduced by 3% between 1992–2000).

The result of increased expenditure tied to schemes like the CFF was a large rise in recruitment and subsequently, an increase in officers at every policing rank. The greatest absolute increase between 2001 and 2010 occurred at the level of constable, which rose by 12%. This is understandable given that the great majority of officers are constables – 78% of the total number of officers were constables in 2001. However, over a ten year period, the make-up of officers tilted in favour of more senior ranks and proportionally there were more significant increases in middle management ranks. By 2010 the proportion of officers made up of constables reduced to 76%, resulting from larger increases in chief inspectors (up 27%) and sergeants (up 23%). ACPO ranks also grew (up 14%) more than constables (up 12%).

Figure 1.12: Officers at each rank (2001–2010)


Source: Police Service Strength, Home Office 2010

Civilian staff

There has been a long-standing recognition of the benefits that civilian staff bring through their specialist expertise, their often lower cost and their ability to free officers to perform the warranted, visible roles that the public expect of them and for which they are trained. That recognition has not always translated into recruitment decisions by police forces who have been constrained by ringfenced grants that have prioritised officer employment (like the CFF) and restrictive pay and conditions.

Despite these factors, the increased spending since 2001 also translated into a large increase in the number of civilian staff – especially police staff, who increased 43% from 54,588 to 77,900 over the decade.¹⁸ This was the largest expansion of police staff in any single period and meant that by 2010, front line police officers were supported in their operational roles by more civilian staff than ever before. Out of a total police workforce of 255,937 (including special constables) – police staff (excluding PCSOs) – now make up 30%, compared to 28% in 2001.

Figure 1.13: Civilian staff numbers




Source: Police Service Strength, Home Office, 2001 to 2010

The number of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) has also grown steadily since they were first piloted in 2003, reaching 16,685 in 2010, as have the number of designated officers (first introduced in 2005), who have increased to 3,809 employees. PCSOs are the single most important element of the reforms that expanded the civilian involvement in policing during the last decade. They underpinned the roll-out of neighbourhood policing which is now regarded as a successful and necessary reorientation of the service towards the public desire for a visible policing presence. Since legislation in 2002, neighbourhood policing teams were rolled out off the back of the Neighbourhood Policing Fund (NPF) – a Home Office specific grant that required the recruitment of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) who are dedicated to public facing, uniformed patrolling as part of local beat policing teams. The grant provided 75% of the funding for PCSO salary costs (as calculated by the Home Office). With the exception of counter-terrorism grants and the police pension top-up grant, the

¹⁸ Note that the Special Constable figures are measured via head-count not full-time equivalent

NPF is the largest of all the grants awarded by the Home Office at £332 million in 2009-10.¹⁹

Figure 1.14: Growth in police numbers (2001–2010)




Source: Police Service Strength, Home Office 2001–2010

In total there was a 73% increase in the number of civilian staff (police staff, PCSOs, traffic wardens and designated officers) employed over the past decade. This easily outstripped the 15% increase in police officer numbers over the same period.

Taken together, both officers and staff now make up a police service that is significantly larger than at any time in England and Wales. If the police were a single company, they would be a significantly bigger (22% bigger) employer than Tesco Plc in the UK (Tesco Plc employed 196,604 FTE in 2010 (UK), the police service employed 240,432 FTE).²⁰

Figure 1.15: The size of the police workforce (2001–2015)^{21, 22}



Source: Police Service Strength, Home Office, 2010 & HMIC, 2011

¹⁹ www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2010-11-22b.25044.h

²⁰ http://ar2011.tescopl.com/pdfs/tesco_annual_report_2011.pdf

²¹ Note that the figures for March 2015 do not include Traffic Wardens and figures are estimated using HMIC, "Adapting to Austerity," 2011

²² Special Constables = headcount. All other categories are FTE.

2

Officer and Staff Costs

A sworn officer is a police force's most valuable asset, absorbing significant upfront recruitment and training costs. Training costs over the two year probationary period alone are estimated at between £14,300 (Hampshire Constabulary) and £16,900 (Metropolitan Police).²³ There is no metric that captures the cost across forces, so assuming an average training cost of £15,000 per officer and adding the cost of an officer's first year of probation, the cost of training an officer to be fully competent is around £50,000. This is calculated in this way because "in a probationer's first year, the officer carries out relatively little duty in the face of the public other than as part of their training."²⁴ If we include both years of an officers probationary period the cost rises to over £80,000.²⁵

Over the career of a police officer the training costs will be significant, especially with the proliferation of specialist functions. Police officers receive substantial training for specialist functions – such as firearms – and also senior leadership courses on topics such as media encounters and business skills, as they progress through the ranks. In 2009-10 senior leadership courses alone cost £1.3 million.

The level of basic pay for an officer is dependent on their rank and the pay point they are on within that rank. This pay is stepped up incrementally on the basis of years of service alone – not performance in any given role.

In 2001-2 the mean salary expenditure per officer in England and Wales was £36,963 and by 2009-10 this had risen to £54,163 (including overtime).²⁶ This increase is largely explained by a 37% increase in employee costs between March 2005 and March 2006, from £41,025 to £56,344. This significant increase (and the similar increase for identical reasons experienced in civilian pay) is due largely to a change in pension accounting, that saw pensions being accounted for as part of salary expenditure from March 2006 onwards.

Annual police officer salaries continue to benefit from a historic settlement following the Royal Commission in 1962, which proposed a 40% increase in police pay, and the Committee of Inquiry on the Police by the Rt Hon Edmund-Davis in 1978 that hiked pay by 45%, partly to account for many years of relatively low salaries. Also absorbed into current pay bands for all officers (regardless of their role) is a 9% general uplift in pay from the levels of the previous pay regime to take account of shift working and unsocial hours. The recent Part I report of the Independent Review into Police Officer and Staff Remuneration by Tom Winsor (2011) included labour analysis by Professor Richard Disney, which showed that

23 Hampshire: <http://www.hampshire.police.uk/NR/rdonlyres/B19F26F7-6BAF-4A48-AE98-E3CF27FBD694/0/HC0020107.pdf>
Metropolitan: http://www.met.police.uk/foi/pdfs/disclosure_2011/may/2011040001974.pdf

24 Neyroud, P., "Review of Police Leadership and Training," 2011

254 This is by taking the lowest starting salary for a constable – £23,259 as at 2010 and allowing for an extra 40% employer cost on top of their salary for National Insurance contributions, health insurance etc.

26 See Mills, H., Silvestri, A. and Grimshaw, R. (2010), "Police expenditure, 1999 – 2009," Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, Kings College London for a detailed break-down of what is included in salary expenditure.

officer pay in England and Wales is now generally 10-15% higher than other emergency services and the armed forces, for equivalent roles.²⁷

In 2001-2 the mean salary of civilian staff was £23,011. In 2009-10 it had increased 47% in nominal terms to £33,924. Pulling these two components together, the mean salary expenditure on a police officer was £20,239 more than that of the mean civilian staff employee in 2009-10, thus on average a sworn police officer is 60% more expensive than his civilian colleague. As shown by the level of savings generated through civilianisation by Suffolk over the past three years (see appendix A) this mean is not incongruous with the reality experienced within forces. Between 2001 and 2010 police forces hired 18,155 officers, who cost £983 million in salary expenditure alone. Over the same period forces hired 23,312 police staff (excluding PCSOs) yet – at £790 million – they cost almost £200 million less in salary expenditure than those police officers.

The YouGov survey commissioned for this report asked respondents what they thought police were paid. The questionnaire asked what the public thought the average police constable with five years' service was paid annually, excluding any additional payments for working overtime. Two-thirds (64%) thought a PC with

Officer Pay Based on Tenure Not Performance

National pay setting for police officers (unlike for police staff) requires national 'pay spines' based on levels of experience. Thus progression up pay spines for officers generally becomes automatic, breaking the link between effort, ability and promotion. This is because the local knowledge gleaned by managers at the local level about the performance of individuals does not hold as much weight on national pay spines as experience and attempts to find nationally acceptable performance metrics often create perverse incentives, limiting their viability. The mid-point for each pay band on the police officer pay spine (and the mean pay for Chief Constables, Deputy Chief Constables and Assistant Chief Constables) is shown below:²⁸

Rank	Average/mid-point level of pay
Chief Constable	£169,792
Deputy Chief Constable	£117,965
Assistant Chief Constable	£98,289
Chief Superintendent	£76,513
Superintendent	£67,441
Chief Inspector	£54,321
Inspector	£49,803
Sergeant	£38,780
Constable	£31,241
PCSO	£21,844

Source: The Police Negotiation Board, 2010

This approach awards pay based on length of service rather than an individual's performance, an approach largely phased-out in the private sector decades ago. This undermines any incentives for excellent performance by officers and places the most experienced – not necessarily the best possible candidate – in the most senior roles.

²⁷ Note that salary expenditure data for all police personnel is current up to 2009-10 as the CIPFA data for 2010-11 was not available at time of publication

²⁸ Note that this excludes all allowances, such as overtime

five years' service had an annual salary of less than £30,000. In fact, it is £31,032 – excluding overtime.

Figure 2.1: Most police officers are police constables or “PCs” – the most junior rank in the service. Excluding any payments for working overtime, how much do you think the average salary is for a police constable with five years of service?



Source: YouGov, 2011

Less than a fifth nationally assumed that constables with five years' service earned between £30,000 and £34,999, and just 23% of London voters thought a constable was paid what they actually are paid in London (£33,165 including the London weighting), with 79% assuming they earned less than that.

3

The Numbers Game

Discussion around the efficacy of policing in England and Wales often becomes a debate about whether we employ enough police officers. This “numbers game” continues to dominate media discussion about police resources and is based on a simplistic assumption that never receives adequate scrutiny – namely, that numbers alone are a good proxy for police performance and the more officers a force has, the better that force performs against crime.

The political argument to increase the number of police officers almost irrespective of how they are deployed is based on a flawed assumption that more police officers means more police officers available to fight crime through performing front line, warranted roles. This link is stressed repeatedly by the Police Federation:

“A significant fall in police numbers would have put at risk the reductions in crime which have been achieved in recent years.”

Peter Smyth, Chairman of the Metropolitan Police Federation, 2011²⁹

Yet there is no simple causal relationship between the number of police officers and the level of crime. One of the key reasons for this disconnect is because more officers does not translate into more officers performing warranted, front line roles – even if that is what the additional funding was allocated for. Specific central funding streams, such as the Crime Fighting Fund (CFF), provided the extra resources to forces with stringent, time-limited eligibility requirements for use, which encouraged rapid recruitment and prevented chief officers from deciding the most effective use of the additional funds. A 2004 report by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) found “widespread concern”³⁰ about the impact of the CFF and other central grants on workforce modernisation, with a rush to hiring often overtaking any assessment of efficient force mix.

The use of large funding streams, such as the CFF, also reinforced the crude assumption that officer numbers are the be all and end all of effective policing. Fieldwork by HMIC found many chief officers and Basic Command Unit (BCU) commanders describing how the CFF had impaired their ability to develop workforce modernisation and civilianisation initiatives: “Many Basic Command Unit (BCU) commanders in particular are tightly constrained by the force’s need to maintain officer numbers in order to meet the requirements of the CFF.”³¹

The proliferation of time-limited, ringfenced grants – which became one of the favoured means of providing national support for local police activities in the last decade – provided additional resources, but removed almost entirely any flexibility and discretion from both chief officers and BCU commanders about how those resources might be spent. This resulted in situations where resources were knowingly

29 “Mayor Boris Johnson: MET Police recruitment freeze over,” BBC 2011

30 “Modernising the Police Service,” Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, 2004 p.13

31 Ibid

wasted, sometimes because of a drive to hire officers unnecessarily. As the same HMIC report noted: “To quote one finance director: ‘I could save the Police Authority £400,000, but I am unable to do so because I cannot lose officers.’”³²

Impact of the Crime Fighting Fund

HMIC’s 2004 report *Modernising the Police Service* discovered a number of forces able to cite civilianisation and workforce modernisation initiatives that had to be postponed or cancelled due to the reduction in flexibility resulting from the ringfenced and time-limited nature of specific Home Office grants.

In 2002-3 one force had planned to replace police officer supervisors with specialist members of police staff and return the officers to front line duties. The plan had been to fund the scheme through natural wastage. However, the requirements of the CFF meant the force needed to raise officer numbers and so were only able to fund the increase in police staff through a rise in the precept.

The force went on to state that at the expiry of the CFF funding stream, they would be left having to either backfill the civilianised posts with police officers and make the staff that had been employed redundant or to increase the precept in order to continue funding the posts.

When resources were flowing into the service, the political drive to hire more officers was not questioned – either within the service or externally – although in 2011, in evidence to a Commons Committee exploring the police spending and the impact of budget reductions, the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police identified the issue:

“[There has been a] political obsession with the number of police officers. We’ve kept that number artificially high. [We] ... had large numbers of police officers doing admin jobs.”

Peter Fahy, Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police³³

The police can and do reduce crime, yet the untested assumption reigned – that however many officers are currently employed, having more police officers is an unqualified benefit. Policing, like other public services, has an optimisation that comes from matching personnel to demand, so that on occasion police officer numbers ought to go down if demand has dropped (as in the fire service in the Post-War period). In this respect, the growth in police numbers since 2001 driven by rising expenditure would be justified if demand on policing had also risen substantially but it is not clear that it has: overall crime has fallen from just over 12.5 million crimes in 2001-2 to 9.5 million in 2010-11, as measured by the British Crime Survey (BCS).³⁴

Clearly, demand on policing is not comprised solely of crime, and as some crimes have reduced (burglary, vehicle and other property crimes), new and more complex crimes (sexual offences, cyber-crime and fraud) have increased (not all of which are accounted for in the annual BCS). Furthermore, the complexity of the policing mission has grown to meet a rise in public demand (not all of which is legitimate)³⁵ and the shortcomings of local public services (for example out of hours mental health services). In 2009-10 police forces received 8.8 million 999 calls – many of which related to social problems that involved no criminal activity but which were time-intensive and diverted resources.

32 Ibid

33 Home Affairs Select Committee, 11 January 2011

34 In the longer term, as the Executive Session on Policing and Public Safety at Harvard University have acknowledged, much more detailed empirical analysis is needed to test the anecdotal view that policing is becoming more demanding, to understand the nature and scale of demand on the police, and whether structural changes to the nature of the policing role are driving increased expenditure (See: Gascon, G., and Foglesong, T., “Making Policing More Affordable,” in *New Perspectives in Policing*, Harvard Kennedy School & the National Institute for Justice, 2010).

35 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-kent-11908583>

The bureaucratisation of the police's daily activities and the fact that, despite advances in technology, some day-to-day police work has become more complex has clearly absorbed additional resources as routine activity (for example in preparing files for court following arrests) has become more time-consuming. But these mitigating factors are set against two large macro trends that ought to have worked in the police's favour: unprecedented new resources and equally historic falls in crime, which remains the principal demand on policing.

Furthermore, the demand that is the primary duty of the police and also the most resource-intensive – detecting and investigating crime – is hugely variable across the country, and in those urban areas where most crime occurs, the concentration of police officers in those force areas is well above the national average rate, suggesting more than adequate levels of policing to meet demand.³⁶ Over a third of all crime (both recorded and BCS) in England and Wales occurs in just four police force areas: the Metropolitan Police, Greater Manchester Police, West Midlands Police and West Yorkshire Police. Taken together, 35% of all recorded crime happens in these four forces, and they have a significantly higher proportion of officers per 100,000 population than the average across all forces (230):

Table 3.1: Officers per capita in major forces (2010)


	Officers per 100,000 population
Metropolitan Police Service*	431
West Midlands Police	327
Greater Manchester Police	313
West Yorkshire Police	259

* 33,000 MPS officers are devoted to specialist national functions but per capita police coverage is still high

Source: CIPFA Police Actual Statistics, 2010

There is substantial variation across forces, with the number of officers per 100,000 population ranging from 170 in Surrey to 431 in the Metropolitan Police. The average force has 230 officers per 100,000 population across England and Wales in 2009-10.³⁷

Figure 3.1: Number of police officers per 100,000 population (2009-10)



Source: CIPFA Police Actual Statistics 2010

³⁶ In assessing police coverage per capita, only intra-country comparisons are valid because direct comparisons with the police services of European and other international partners are not robust as countries organise policing systems in very different ways. Some include border agencies or count personnel who perform military duties (for example the Gendarmerie in France), whilst many do not. Some have a single, national force, whilst others have many operating at several levels within a single jurisdiction.

³⁷ 230 officers per 100,000 = average of all forces. The average for the whole of the population of England and Wales is 260 officers per 100,000.

The number of civilian staff within forces will also significantly affect the productivity of police officers. If a force has a large number of civilian staff then functions that do not require an officer to perform them are undertaken by civilian staff instead. This might include fielding calls in a control room, performing custody duties or taking statements from witnesses. This civilianisation frees officers to perform front line roles, which utilise their training and expertise and require their warranted powers, and which contribute more directly toward maintaining public safety and confidence. In England and Wales the number of civilian staff now employed means that there are seven civilian staff members for every ten police officers.

RAND Police Workforce Resilience Study

The RAND study, published in July 2011 and commissioned by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA), examines the workforce programme and the resilience issues that face police in England and Wales and employs an econometric approach to estimate the number of police officers needed to control crime.³⁸ The study goes on to build a Factors of Resilience Mapping (FORM) framework with which to assess changes in the level and composition of the police workforce.

The predator-prey model is used to describe the way crime and the police workforce interact. The authors state that England and Wales are “currently in the phase of the police-crime cycle in which a past abundance of crime (the prey of the model) encouraged significant growth of police numbers (predator population level).”


The study found that it takes up to three years for the police workforce to adjust to match the level of crime and that workforce strategies have failed to take account of lagged effects and trend reversal (i.e. reductions in crime):

“police workforce planners have tended to chase rising crime trends without suitable adjustments for lagged effects and trend reversal.”

The study concludes that:

“the demand and supply for policing in England and Wales will reach a balanced accommodation when there are approximately 130,000 police officers and approximately 5 million crimes per year.”

Figure 3.2: Current police and crime levels relative to steady state



38 http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR838.pdf

At present, for 2010-11, there are currently 7% (9,000) more police officers than the steady state suggests, while recorded crime is 19% below the steady state level. Considering the model of police force and crime level dynamics produced by RAND it is not clear that the current crime levels demand the police numbers currently employed. As the authors of the RAND report state:

“...across England and Wales the number of police officers and staff could be reduced by 7 per cent without disturbing the accommodation process between crime and police workforce size represented within the model.”

The study acknowledges that its conclusions are based on a limited time-series (15 years) and figures for recorded crime, which do not necessarily reflect the totality of crime. The authors also emphasise the need to move beyond a discussion of total workforce numbers:

“We need to progress from using relatively crude estimates such as total workforce numbers to accounting for all the ways in which local commanders and managers ... can bolster resources in any department suffering overload.”

The RAND study therefore demonstrates the importance of considering questions beyond how many officers and civilian staff are employed, such as how such officers and staff are deployed.

In this context, policing in England and Wales is in a comparatively strong position: more officers than ever before, better supported by historically high numbers of civilian staff and new technology, and facing a flat or falling demand because of more than a decade of reductions in volume crime. From this strong position, police forces are better placed to manage funding cuts than some of their counterparts in North America, where similar budget reductions are now underway but where levels of civilianisation are much lower.

Recommendations

- **The numbers game has distorted public debate and skewed spending priorities. Police leaders should advocate publicly that total employment is not a useful measure of police performance and that effective deployment of the officers that a force has available is the most important factor.**
- **Future funding of the police should not repeat the pattern of the last decade – national resources should be directed at investments that maximise operational outcomes, build capability and leverage assets like technology and intelligence, not funding that inflates staff numbers or artificially drives up recruitment.**
- **Whatever the total resources available for policing in the years ahead, more funding should increasingly be raised locally, with national Home Office funding falling as a share of all income. With the exception of counter-terrorism, all ringfence grants should be abolished, and the**

practice of ear-marking Home Office funds curtailed, as these restrict the autonomy of Chief Constables to decide how to best use their resources locally.

- Police forces should look beyond the current CSR period (up to 2015) and plan for a decade of smaller increases in police funding from central government and a smaller total workforce. Forces should put emphasis instead on the case for growing local funding sources, expanding the police family and improving the productivity of the staff and officers hired in recent years.
- In an environment of fewer resources, the unit cost of a police officer – which has risen in recent years – will militate against expanding staff numbers. Addressing salary and pension costs by reforming pay and conditions will safeguard some posts in the short-term and make the police workforce more affordable in the long-term.
- Future work by Policy Exchange on creating a reformed police profession and modernising police pensions – which remain generous and which contribute significantly to the total employment cost of an officer – will set out some additional reforms that might reduce the costs of policing in the years ahead.

Part II

Return on Investment

“I would always like to have more police, but the reality is it is not just numbers but, more importantly, what you do with them.”

Bill Bratton, former Chief of the LAPD (2002-09) and Commissioner of the NYPD (1994-6)

The decade of expansion of the police service after 2001 was designed to improve public safety by helping to detect more offences, bring more offenders to justice, and therefore to suppress crime. As measured by the British Crime Survey (BCS), volume crime peaked in 1995 at 19.1 million offences and had been declining for five years before police numbers began to rise in 2001.

In order to judge whether the large investment in policing that followed delivered a return, some general assessment of police performance is required. Was the record investment in policing worth it? Did it deliver a return for the huge sums expended and what did more officers, more staff and more resources actually achieve?

Additional expenditure on policing should have delivered a sizeable return in operational performance but the evidence available to us shows that this is not the case.


4

Police Performance

A review of policy by the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit in 2007 admitted that "Police resource increases appear unrelated to changes in productivity" – signaling concern at the top of government that large increases in resources had not boosted police performance.³⁹

Similar concerns are evident from within the police service. HMIC has published the survey results for 11 basic command unit (BCU) inspections, conducted between April 2006 and August 2010. The survey, "circulated to a statistically significant cross section of all BCU staff", included a question asking individuals to register their level of agreement or disagreement with the statement "resources are effectively managed within the BCU including specific issues of demand and deployment".⁴⁰

Figure 4.1: Percentage of Negative Responses in BCU to the Statement: "Resources are effectively managed within the BCU including specific issues of demand and deployment"



Source: HMIC Basic Command Unit Level Inspections⁴¹

The best and worst performing BCUs were both within the Metropolitan Police force area, with more than one in two officers in Westminster disagreeing with the statement, versus one in four in Haringey. Nine of the 11 BCUs had 40% or more of respondents stating that resources were not being effectively managed.

On a more macro level, the issue of police performance needs exploring in order to justify the return on investment that additional resources provided. No single, robust measure of police performance exists and criminologists and statisticians caution against using any single organisational metric as an indicator

39 "Policy Review: Crime, Justice and Cohesion", Strategy Unit, 2007

40 <http://www.hmic.gov.uk/media/metropolitan-police-service-westminster-basic-command-unit-inspection-20090330.pdf>

41 http://www.hmic.gov.uk/search-publications/?cat=basic-command-unit&post_type=publication

of wider police performance. However, the additional expenditure on policing should have delivered a sizeable return in operational performance and it is not clear that it has.

Three separate proxy measures that may reveal the level of return on investment are:


- **Crime** – the level of crime as measured by the BCS
- **Cost per crime** – the cost of detecting and investigating each offence
- **Detections** – the proportion of recorded offences ‘cleared-up’ by the police

Crime

The police contribution to falling crime is contested, with wider macroeconomic factors often judged as more influential: namely, a growing economy and low unemployment (2000-2008), improvements in home and vehicle security, and wider social and demographic factors. The expansion of the prison population over this period was the principal step-change in the criminal justice system that will also have removed more offenders from circulation for longer periods of time, thereby suppressing some crime.

Nevertheless, the police do affect crime rates – especially certain categories of offence that can be deterred by targeted policing operations, and by those investigations and other police activity that disrupt and incapacitate prolific offenders who commit a disproportionate amount of volume crime. As a result of other benign factors, the overall level of BCS crime may have continued to fall over the decade even if police investment had not risen, although it is debatable whether crime would have fallen as far as it did.

Figure 4.2 Police workforce vs BCS all crime index (index = 1991)




Source: Home Office and British Crime Survey

The fall in BCS crime that began in 1995 preceded the large increases in police expenditure (and increased officer numbers). In fact total crime fell by 68% before officer numbers increased after 2001 which means the majority of the fall in total BCS offences (1995-2011) was not the direct result of increased police resources.

Cost Per Crime

Activity-based costing data shows an increase in the investigative spend per robbery offence of £838 (46%) during the period up to 2007-08, while the sanction detection rate remained largely flat, with a slight improvement in the later years.


Figure 4.3: Robbery: sanction detection rate & spend per offence



Source: Home Office (Activity Based Costings)

The investigative spend per burglary offence increased £1,299 (54%) over the period up to 2007-08, while the sanction detection rate failed to break out of the 12-14% range.


Figure 4.4: Burglary: sanction detection rate & spend per offence



Source: Home Office (Activity Based Costings)


The investigative spend per vehicle crime offence increased £117 (41%) over the period up to 2007-08, while the sanction detection rate improved by 2.9 percentage points.

Figure 4.5: Vehicle crime: sanction detection rate & spend per offence



Source: Home Office (Activity Based Costings)

Figure 4.6: Sexual offences: sanction detection rate & spend per offence



Source: Home Office (Activity Based Costings)

There has been a considerable increase in the investigative spend for a number of offences over the period during which activity-based cost data was collected. Burglary and robbery both saw investigative spend per offence increase by approximately 50%. This equates to actual increases of £1,299 and £838 for burglary and robbery offences respectively. The increased spend does not appear to have translated particularly well into improved sanction detections, with burglary seeing an increase of just 1.5% over the period. The investigative spend per sexual offence increased by 60%, an increase of £2,188 in cash terms, while the sanction detection rate remained flat.


Table 4.1: Change in Investigative Spend and Impact on Sanction Detection Rates (2003/4-2007/8)

Offence Type	Change in Investigative Spend per Offence	Increase in Investigative Spend (%)	Change in Sanction Detection Rate (% points)
Sexual Offences	+£2,188	+60%	+0.8%
Burglary	+£1,299	+54%	+1.5%
Robbery	+£838	+46%	+3.1%
Vehicle Crime	+£117	+41%	+2.9%

Detection Rates

If police investment alone does not deliver a return in terms of crime reduction, then the police response to crimes recorded – as measured by the clear-up or “sanction detection” rate – should have improved as a result of record levels of investment. The investment in more police officers ought to have enabled the police to take action against more offenders, especially as the number of reported offences (and therefore the pool of suspects) gradually shrank. As crime falls, if police performance is constant then detections – however they are measured – should in most cases rise. If police resources are growing while crime is falling, then the performance on detections should be even more marked, with more officers each year detecting a higher proportion of a smaller number of total crimes. Again, the evidence for this improvement is poor.


Detection rates are a key indicator of police performance, providing an indication of the likelihood that a case will be solved. There are a number of methods that can result in a detection. The primary means are charges – summonses and cautions. Secondary measures include the use of so-called offences “Taken Into Consideration” (TICs) and, more recently, Penalty Notices for Disorder (PNDs) and Cannabis Warnings (CWs).

Figure 4.7: Total detections (millions) by method

Source: Home Office Crime Statistics

Between 2001 and 2010 in which the number of police officers increased by 18,155, the number of civilian staff by more than 41,697, and police expenditure grew by more than £5 billion in nominal terms, there does not appear to have been a clear translation of this investment into either improvements in the number or rate of detections.


Figure 4.8: Detection rates, 1985 to 2010/11, England and Wales



Source: Home Office, "Crimes Detected in England and Wales, 2010-11"

The period has of course seen changes to counting rules, new guidance on detections and the introduction of the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS). However, during a period of falling crime in which resources increased substantially – both personnel and technology – detection performance appears to have stagnated.


Figure 4.9: Number of sanction detections for all offences



Source: Home Office "Crimes Detected in England and Wales 2010-11"

In more recent years, the number of charges/summonses has been largely flat at an aggregate level and TICs only account for 6.5% of sanction detections. In particular offence groups, the number of charges/summonses has been falling and TICs regularly account for almost half of all detections, even though they are not the result of proactive police investigation, but are typically admitted by a suspect in custody.

Figure 4.10



Source: "Crimes Detected in England and Wales 2010-11", Home Office

In the case of offences against vehicles, TICs account for 46% (22,700) of all sanction detections and in the case of burglary offences TICs make up 40% (27,900) of all sanction detections. If TICs are excluded for these offences the primary detection rate falls to 7.9% for burglaries and 6.0% for offences against vehicles. This equates to solving fewer than one out of every 12 burglaries and fewer than one out of every 16 offences against vehicles. It is not clear how much net-widening resulted from having more police, and how much was driven by new disposals (such as conditional cautions and fixed-penalty notices) that made formal police intervention against crime quicker and cheaper, as HMIC recently noted.⁴²

Despite heavy investment in both police officers and civilian staff, these factors – indeterminate impact on crime and poor performance on detections – support the conclusion of the Audit Commission in their latest assessment that found that: "there is no evidence that high spending is delivering improved productivity."⁴³

42 http://www.hmcpsi.gov.uk/documents/services/reports/THM/CJI_20110609.pdf

43 "Sustaining value for money in the police service," Audit Commission, 2010

5

Public Verdict

If record levels of investment did not lead to a step-change in police performance, did the investment improve the public attitude to the police, increase visibility and raise confidence? Again, the evidence of significant return on the record investment in this respect is not conclusive. Three key elements of satisfaction are:

- **Confidence and satisfaction** – the British Crime Survey measures trends in confidence in the police, asking whether they agree or disagree (strongly or not) to the statement: “Taking everything into account I have confidence in the police in this area.”
- **Public view of service and value** – what do the public think about the value provided by policing and the quality of service they receive?
- **Police visibility** – how far do the police satisfy the legitimate and widely held public expectation that they should be visible and available?

Confidence and satisfaction

Trust in the police as a profession has fallen over the last several years, despite more investment in neighbourhood policing and a greater focus on “public confidence” and expectations of service.⁴⁴ In the YouGov survey of trust in institutions and professions, the police scored a trust rating of 82% in 2003. That rating had fallen by 14 percentage points to 68% in July 2011 which is a significant fall and a cause for concern.


When surveys ask the public of their confidence in policing locally, a more favourable picture emerges. The BCS data since 2005-06 demonstrates rising public confidence in the police with an increase from 63% in 2005-06 to 72% in 2010-11. Analysis of the confidence figures by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) found three factors to be significantly associated with having confidence in the police: the extent to which people felt local priorities were being tackled, the way in which police treat local citizens and perceptions of anti-social behaviour.

However, while the improved performance is to be commended, the confidence levels remain poor for an organisation that historically could command upwards of 80% satisfaction rates.

In 2010 Consumer Focus examined the levels of customer service and satisfaction with policing in England and Wales. The research found that, in general, 30% of the public are dissatisfied with the way police dealt with them.


44 Embodied in the 2008 Home Office “Policing Pledge” which was replicated by all forces locally as a symbolic customer charter for public expectations of police service. It was subsequently abolished in 2010

Figure 5.1: Percentage of respondents saying they “tend to agree” or “strongly agree” that “Taking everything into account I have confidence in the police in this area”



Source: British Crime Survey


Figure 5.2: General satisfaction with how the police have dealt with you



Source: Consumer Focus

This equates to a third of those who come into contact with the police (excluding suspects and offenders) ending up dissatisfied. No private business could survive if one in every three of their customers were dissatisfied with the service. A comparison of customer service ratings against other organisations, including the health service, demonstrates that it is possible for organisations to score highly for customer service.

Figure 5.3: Comparison of Customer service ratings



Source: Consumer Focus

Looking at complaints made against the police and reported to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, there has been a rising number of complaints since 2002-03, with 6,700 (20%) of the 33,800 complaints made against police in 2009-10 related to “incivility, impoliteness and intolerance”.

Figure 5.4: Complaints against police with IPCC



Source: IPCC Complaint Statistics


Public view of service and value

Further evidence of this ongoing confidence problem is provided in a survey of public attitudes to the police conducted by YouGov in August 2011 for this report.

The historic investment in additional police spending and the net increase of 18,155 officers since 2001 has not transformed public perceptions of police availability or performance. On officer numbers, it is almost as if the investment never happened.

The survey conducted suggests the public did not see a benefit comparable to the investment made. Half of those surveyed thought there were either the same number of police, or fewer police, than in 2000. Women and those in poorer socio-economic groups were more likely to think there were less police than in 2000. Just a fifth (22%) thought there were more police today than in 2000.


Figure 5.5: There are currently 139,000 police officers in England and Wales. Do you think that this means there are...



Source: YouGov, 2011

When asked if there are more police *on the street* than there used to be, a majority (58%) disagreed, just 17% agreed. Two-thirds of poorer voters – those more likely to live in high crime areas and to be victims of crime – disagreed with the statement that there were more police than there used to be. The number thinking there are less police than there used to be has actually increased since 2007 when the same question was asked by ICM.


Figure 5.6: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement - “There are more police on the street than there used to be”



Source: YouGov, 2011

The same YouGov survey asked about public attitudes to the service the police deliver, and whether it represented value for money. When asked if £600 per household per year for policing represented good value for money or poor value for money, half (51%) said poor value, and a third said good value (36%). One in eight (12%) thought it represented “very poor” value for money.

Figure 5.7: Each household pays on average £600 per year through council tax and general taxation for the police. Do you think this is:




Source: YouGov, 2011

In a critical question that asked whether overall over the last decade, the service provided by the police had got better, almost half (46%) said it had got worse. Less than a fifth of the public (17%) thought it had got better in the decade 2000-2010. Again, those poorer voters more likely to be victims of crime and more likely to require service from the police, were significantly more likely to

say the service had got worse (51%), than had got better (14%). These overall shares for the public as a whole were reflected broadly across all regions except London where respondents were more likely to say it had got better (24%). Older voters everywhere were more of the view that the service had got worse.


Figure 5.8: Over the last ten years, do you think the service provided by the police has...



Source: YouGov 2011

The survey results demonstrate that there remains a clear gap between the additional resources put into policing and the service received by the public. Most of the additional officers were not even noticed by the public, and a majority of people think there remain less police on the street than there used to be – highlighting ongoing concerns about visibility and availability. Most people think what they pay for policing represents poor value for money and almost half think that the service as a whole has actually got worse over the last decade, not better. It is therefore not surprising that the public do not see the determinant of a good police service being how much is spent on it. Just 5% take this view, compared to 78% who think that the “most important thing that determines how successful the police are is how efficiently and effectively they are run”.

Figure 5.9: Which comes closest to your view?



Source: YouGov 2011

Police Visibility

The share of a police force's total personnel who are visible to the public has been in long-term decline. This has been driven by a range of factors including changing threats encountered by the police, especially more cyber-crime, driving different forms of police activity, especially a growth in investigations and specialisation. This combined with the greater complexity and volume of administration and audit imposed by government or self-imposed (bureaucratisation) and an expansion in welfare services that modern policing provides (a form of mission creep).

The Post-War period saw new technologies transform the nature of policing with a significant rebalancing of activity since the 1970s towards vehicle-based patrol and response, within the emerging doctrine of intelligence-led policing.

Structural reforms within forces also changed how visible and available the police routinely were. A notable trend in the 1990s saw an end to police housing allowances. This combined with the property price boom of the 2000s to drive the large scale sell-off of police section houses and many under-utilised police stations.⁴⁵ These reductions in a local police presence were accompanied by changing work practices and an increase in journey times to work, meaning that police officers now live further from their place of work and no longer step out onto their beat (as was still common in the 1960s). Instead, police officers travel to work in much the same way as the rest of the private and public sector workforce, with more commuting by public transport in London and the South East.

In London, half (49%) of Metropolitan Police officers do not live in a London borough – and most of those that do live in outer boroughs.⁴⁶ Police officers commuting to work is not just a London phenomenon either, with police forces across England and Wales typically allowing officers to live up to 20 miles away from their usual place of work (officers can live further away, but require explicit approval).⁴⁷ The combined result is that the last 40 years have seen police move from public-facing duties to less visible policing roles, move out of the communities they police, and move away from beat patrols on foot to vehicle-based patrol and response.

In 2001, when total officer numbers were broadly flat and before the advent of national community policing initiatives under the Labour governments (with various roll-outs between 2002-2008), the growing distance between the public and police, together with their reduced visibility was summarised by the Police Superintendents' Association of England and Wales:

*"We have reached the situation where an innocent member of the public could be standing next to a police officer without realising it."*⁴⁸

Since then, police resources have steadily increased – up 25% in real terms since 2001⁴⁹ – and officer numbers reached an all-time high of 141,631 at March 2010. The creation of PCSOs – whose duty is to provide a "highly visible patrol with the purpose of reassuring the public,"⁵⁰ and who, by the nature of their function cannot be abstracted from the street – has increased both overall police employment and local patrol visibility. Until 2010 there were steady increases in PCSOs each year in most forces to a total of almost 17,000.⁵¹

Yet this increase in overall headcount and the introduction of PCSOs – dedicated to the highly visible community policing role – has relieved forces of

45 Lashmar, P. and Kelly, A., "Police housing crisis as forces sell off homes," *The Independent*, 2000

46 Response to a question to the Mayor of London in 14 July 2010 (released 30 June 2010) which showed that just 15 officers live in Kensington & Chelsea, 24 in Southwark, 41 in Islington and 64 in Westminster according to the Metropolitan Police Force's Human Resource Unit.

47 "Change of Accommodation Policy – Police Officers," Thames Valley Police briefing paper by the Director of Resources, 2008

48 "Improving Visibility," Police Superintendents' Association of England and Wales, 2000

49 CIPFA Police Actuals 2001–2010


50 ACPO Guidance on PCSOs - December 2005 (cited in <http://www.gloucestershire.police.uk/sei/s/931/f111.pdf>)

51 <http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs10/hosb1410.pdf>

any express need to improve visibility through changes to deployment and working practices for regular sworn officers. This has meant the potential to maximise visibility, and its deterrence and reassurance benefits, has for many years gone unfulfilled – even while total officer numbers increased.

There is significant variation in the level of visibility and availability in forces, ranging from 9% in Devon & Cornwall to 17% in Merseyside.⁵² Analysis done by HMIC identified shift patterns as the most significant influence on a force's ability to maximise the visibility and availability of its officers and PCSOs. The most recent data available on police visibility, from the British Crime Survey (BCS) 2009-10, shows that 33% of respondents believe that “in the last two years” they have seen “the police or PCSOs on foot patrol more often:”⁵³


Figure 5.10: “In the last two years have you noticed any change in how often you see the police or PCSOs on foot patrol in your local area?” (2009–10)



Source: Home Office Statistical Bulletin, 19-10, November 2010

The BCS also asks how often respondents see a police officer or PCSO on foot patrol. The data available shows an improvement in the proportion of respondents seeing police on foot patrol, with the proportion of people claiming to never see police on foot patrol falling from 40% in 2006-07 to 23% in 2009-10.

Figure 5.11: “How often a respondent saw a police officer/PCSO on foot?” (2006/07–2009/10)



Source: British Crime Survey, England and Wales, 2006/07–2009/10


⁵² “Demanding Times: The front line and police visibility,” Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (2011)

⁵³ Home Office Statistical Bulletin, 19-10, November 2010

These figures must be understood in context. They relate to a period in which officers and PCSO numbers reached an all-time high. At a more granular level, between 2005-6 and 2008-9 there were 1,429 fewer police officers assigned to community policing (a generally visible function), offset by an increase of 7,100 PCSOs⁵⁴ – a net increase of 5,671 heads. This suggests that the increase in visibility has been down to employment changes and the development of a new neighbourhood policing model (known as ‘Safer Neighbourhoods’ in London) built upon PCSOs, rather than deployment or other practice changes affecting sworn officers.

Looking at spending on the visible patrol function within forces also demonstrates that this element of policing has not been prioritised by all forces in recent years. Between 2003-04 and 2007-08 forces were required to produce activity-based costing data for a range of police activities.⁵⁵ Analysis of these figures reveals that for the period in which data was available, the majority of police forces shifted their resource spend away from visible patrol, with annual spend on visible patrol falling by up to 15%.

Figure 5.12: Average increase in visible patrol spend (2003/04–2007/08)



Source: Home Office (Activity Based Costings) & CIPFA (Police Spending)

Recommendations

- **Police performance on detections is poor, particularly in respect of burglary offences.** While detection rates alone are an inadequate measure of the quality of policing and should not become a performance target, police forces should seek to raise the proportion of “active” detections, rather than relying on “passive” detections (TICs) and be completely transparent with the public about their detection performance.
- **Record investment has coincided with an increase in public confidence in the police.** Community policing and the recruitment of PCSOs – who are highly visible – is a key element of this. However the record investment represents poor value for money on this measure as it has not transformed public confidence levels, complaints are on the increase and a large minority of citizens remain dissatisfied with the service they receive.

⁵⁴ “Valuing the Police: Policing in an age of austerity,” Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, 2010

⁵⁵ Our analysis of the ABC data may exclude those forces for which data was incomplete.

- Every member of the police workforce should regard themselves as servants of the public whose role demands that they address concerns, respond to complaints, and treat law-abiding residents as consumers of policing services who should never leave dissatisfied.
- From May 2012, Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) – unlike police authorities – will have a clear incentive to improve public satisfaction rates and their oversight should help focus the police to respond better to public priorities – especially quality of life crimes and anti-social behaviour (ASB) – and deal adequately with complaints.
- PCCs should set out to improve the satisfaction rates of their local residents, especially crime victims, without making public confidence a service performance target. Improved public satisfaction rates are the consequence of effective, responsive and legitimate policing – not its object.
- The roll-out of neighbourhood policing teams has made the police more accessible and helped to partly reverse many years of low visibility. But poor levels of police visibility remain a concern for citizens who are sceptical that the hiring of additional police officers has markedly improved the service they receive. Improving the visibility and availability of officers to the public must be a key strategic priority for police forces – irrespective of the available resources.

Part III

Wasted Assets

The rise in police expenditure 2001-2010 led to substantial additional resources flowing into a service that was largely unreformed in terms of workforce pay and conditions of service. The additional resources were not tied to reforms to pay or modernised working practices, meaning that the police organisation remained monolithic – growing in size but not becoming more flexible or efficient with its staff. With respect to the police’s primary investment – its own people – this has led to a service with a large amount of wasted assets. Two key aspects to this are:

- **A stalled process of civilianisation** – Despite a consensus in favour, the service made only modest progress on civilianisation over the last decade, with many officers still undertaking roles that ought to be carried out by civilians at far lower cost.
- **Poor workforce health** – Forces are still carrying the burden of sickness and too many inactive police officers on restrictive duties who are not given enough support to return to a frontline policing role.


In addition to record investment not driving a step-change in police performance, these two elements contribute to a police organisation that is not making the most of its people and consequently providing an inadequate service to the public.

6

State of Civilianisation

There is still substantial room for increasing the use of civilians in policing in England and Wales. One might expect, since powers of arrest are such a fundamental part of an officer's warranted status, that arrests would be conducted fairly frequently for most. Yet this is not the case:⁵⁶


Figure 6.1: Officers who made no arrest (2010)



Source: Freedom of Information requests, 2011

These figures need to be viewed in context – there are a significant number of police officer roles which do not require a police officer to make arrests, such as those in ACPO, Custody Sergeants and undercover investigative roles. Yet despite this, the proportion of officers who made no arrests in 2010 is higher than one might expect, as shown at figure 6.2. The highest proportion of officers not arresting anyone in 2010 was Derbyshire where 49% of officers made no arrest.

Figure 6.2: Proportion of officers who made no arrests (2010)



Source: Freedom of Information request, 2011

⁵⁶ These figures were compiled from returns to Freedom of Information requests. The following 18 forces replied: Bedfordshire, Cumbria, Derbyshire, Durham, Gloucestershire, Lancashire, Leicestershire, Merseyside, North Wales, North Yorkshire, Northumbria, Nottinghamshire, South Wales, Staffordshire, Surrey, Thames Valley, West Mercia and West Yorkshire

This is a proxy measure for the proportion of officers who are in a position to make arrests. Most forces have broadly the same shares of officers in different core functions, so uniform, and plain clothes, and within that, neighbourhood teams, criminal justice, and investigation and covert roles. Officers in some of these categories – especially investigation, management and custody – would not usually make any arrests, so it is not in that sense a metric of performance or productivity per officer.

Instead, the variation across forces could stem from deeper issues in the workforce, either a larger share than normal of officers on restrictive or recuperative duties, or a larger number doing back office administrative roles that don't require their warranted powers (or even put them in a position where they might use them), like in control rooms, forensics, HR or business support. There are also a number of duties the Home Office identified as being suitable for civilian staff (see appendix B) as far back as 1988 that are still being done by police officer today.

What is benchmarking?

Benchmarking is a self-improvement tool used to compare organisations. It is a simple way of comparing business processes and performance metrics in order to identify the comparative strengths and weaknesses of organisations, enabling them to find and adopt good practices.

In this section we investigate how many officers are doing roles that in other forces are being done by civilian staff and therefore could reasonably be assumed to be civilian roles, as of March 2010. We analyse the ratio of officers to staff in each force, forming a 'civilianisation rate' – the percentage of the workforce who are civilian staff, as opposed to officers. We then benchmark forces' relative levels of civilianisation, comparing all forces against the most civilianised.

We focus on five particular police functions⁵⁷ that typically account for over a quarter (27%) of the total employees of police forces. These were chosen due to a clear rationale for a greater use of civilian personnel these areas. The police custody function is a further role where civilianisation would be appropriate, however there has already been considerable outsourcing in this area, rendering comparisons between forces difficult. The list is not exclusive therefore, but rather representative and all other police functions – especially Investigations and Intelligence which have already been civilianised significantly over the past few years – also merit the consideration of Chief Constables when deciding the appropriate use of officers.

Indeed there has already been movement towards the appropriate use of more civilians as part of a workforce modernisation agenda – through which Surrey, for example, have saved over £400,000 in their Response function and over £1.5 million in CID,⁵⁸ in part through a more intelligent use of civilian staff. But other forces have not progressed this far.

The analysis in this section is based primarily on the 2011 HMIC Value for Money profiles⁵⁹ which rely on Annual Data Returns (ADR) completed by forces. The data is qualified to the extent that some forces may have outsourced services

⁵⁷ This report presents a snapshot of civilianisation in 2011, highlighting the staffing mix in selected functions across police forces. The Control Room function should be seen alongside other key functions where civilianisation has taken place – with varying degrees of progress. The other functions explored are: Forensics, Operation Support, Criminal Justice and Business Support (see Chapter 11).


⁵⁸ "The National Workforce Modernisation Programme: Evaluation of the demonstration sites final report," The National Policing Improvement Agency, 2010

⁵⁹ Which shows the police force data as at March 2010

or collaborated with other forces, and may therefore have fewer employees in each function as a result – yet a key consideration for the areas which we have chosen has been the extent to which there have been such arrangements made.⁶⁰

We have analysed the Forensics (Chapter 11) and Control Room functions over a greater time period using returns to Freedom of Information (FOI) requests provided by forces. As the returns cover the last decade, the data is limited to the extent that the classification of what is contained within functions may have changed slightly. This is why we have compared the relative levels across forces as all police forces will have been subject to the same changes, thus making them comparable. Not all forces replied to the FOI requests in a directly comparable manner, so the data is based on a subset of the total number of forces.⁶¹ In total, 70% (29) of the 42 forces⁶² provided comparable FOI returns.

An investigation into the general level of civilianisation across forces shows some significant variation at March 2010, ranging from 55% civilianisation in Surrey to just 34% in West Midlands.



The range of civilianisation across forces is not a symptom of their locality or their size. Similar forces have taken contrary policy decisions with some – most notably Surrey – choosing to civilianise across a whole range of functions, while others, like West Midlands chose otherwise. In Surrey, there are now 122 staff members for every 100 officers, compared to the West Midlands where there are just 52 staff members for every 100 officers.

Surrey Police: More Civilians than Police Officers

Surrey Police is regularly lauded as the leading force in relation to the mix of police staff and police officers. As the figure below illustrates, since 2005 there has been a continued shift in the workforce mix, with the force now employing more police staff than officers.

⁶⁰ This is particularly the case at Cleveland Police who are the only force to have outsourced extensively. For this reason, all analysis in this section excludes Cleveland Police (other than where it is reasonable to consider that a function should have no officers in it whatsoever) because their outsourcing arrangements skew their level of civilianisation, making them incomparable with other forces who have not outsourced a substantial portion of their civilian functions.

⁶¹ The forces who replied to the FOI requests in a comparable manner were Avon and Somerset, Cleveland Cumbria, Derbyshire, Devon and Cornwall, Dyfed-Powys, Essex, Gloucestershire, Greater Manchester, Gwent, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Humberside, Kent, Lancashire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Merseyside, Metropolitan Police, Norfolk, North Wales, Nottinghamshire, South Wales, Staffordshire, Suffolk, Sussex, Thames Valley, Warwickshire and West Mercia.

⁶² Note that the City of London Police and the British Transport Police are not included in this analysis as they are not readily comparable with other forces due to the difference in the nature of their demand and organisational structures.

Figure 6.4: Surrey workforce mix (2005–2010)



Source: HMIC Value for Money Profiles, 2006 to 2011

The overall civilianisation rate for Surrey stood at 45% in 2005, increasing to 55% in 2010. The transformation of Surrey’s workforce has in large part been the result of external factors, as outlined by Surrey’s present Chief Constable, Mark Rowley:

“We got there because of a range of unusual local factors including a sudden growth after taking on a large area from the Metropolitan Police a decade ago, real term reductions in government funding for over a decade and having local budgets capped.”⁶³

A recurrent driver of police force civilianisation has been the historical problem of recruiting officers. In recent years this has been especially true of forces neighbouring the Metropolitan Police force area. The additional allowances and benefits of Metropolitan Police employment presented many forces with challenges in retaining staff, compelling them to civilianise roles. HMIC acknowledged this effect in 2004:

“Many forces in the south-east of England are experiencing such difficulties in the light of a buoyant economic climate and the relatively attractive terms and conditions of employment offered by the MPS.”⁶⁴

West Midlands Police – too many officers, too few civilian staff

The current Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, Chris Sims, faces an uphill battle in his efforts to reduce his force’s expenditure in line with the government budget reductions while maintaining the police force’s level of service to the public.

Not only are the government reductions more strongly felt in West Midlands than in other areas – 83% of their funding comes from central government compared with just 51% in Surrey⁶⁵ – but they also have the lowest proportion of civilian staff relative to number of police officers of any other force in England and Wales. At March 2010 only 34% – 4,478 of their 13,106 personnel – were civilian staff.

This means that reducing the headcount of the force – an inevitable requirement of the budget reductions – will be extremely difficult as almost no officers can be

63 <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/police-chief-defends-use-of-civilian-staff-1975231.html>

64 Modernising the Police Service, HMIC, 2004

65 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmhaff/695/695.pdf>

made redundant. Furthermore, with an average difference in salary expenditure between police officers and staff of £20,239, their current use of police officers in civilian roles is costing the force dear. Looking at just the five functions we have analysed in this paper, the cost of using officers instead of staff is costing the force £8 million every year:

Policing Function	Actual number of officers	Number of officers if they benchmarked themselves against the best 10 forces	Saving
Forensics	3	0	£60,717
Control Room	152	32	£2,428,693
Operational Support	284	144	£2,833,475
Criminal Justice	66	11	£1,113,151
Business Support	135	59	£1,538,172
TOTAL			£7,974,208

They have a requirement to cut their budget by £126 million by 2014-15 and have only identified £40 million of their savings⁶⁶ – if they had civilian staff and not officers in civilian staff roles in just these five functions, then their costs would be £32 million lower over the four year CSR period – accounting for over 25% of their budget reductions. Furthermore – whilst this is only indicative given the different size and make-up of the two forces – if their overall level of civilianisation was the same as Surrey Police then they would have reduced costs by over £55 million per year. This would reduce their costs by £222 million over the four year CSR period, meeting their necessary budget reductions and providing them with a surplus of £96 million to re-invest in policing.

Control Room

Control rooms handle emergency and non-emergency calls from the public and the deployment of police officers. They operate a 24-hour system to handle a large number of incidents at any one time throughout the force.⁶⁷ In England and Wales they receive 67 million calls every year⁶⁸ and are, in most cases, the first point of contact that the general public has with the police service, making them critical to building public confidence in the police.

Prior to March 2010 the control room was considered by HMIC to be a separate function in its own right. Since then it has been amalgamated into a function entitled ‘dealing with the public’ which also includes inquiry-station personnel. For this reason we have analysed the March 2009 figures to keep it comparable with previous years.


In March 2009, 13 forces had more than 90% of their control rooms staffed by civilian staff, with a force average of 85%.

The forces with the lowest civilianisation rates – and therefore the highest proportion of officers – in their control rooms were North Wales with a 56% civilianisation rate (accounting for 65 officers), West Yorkshire with a 63% civilianisation rate (accounting for 235 officers) and Durham with a 67%

66 HMIC, “Adapting to Austerity,” 2011

67 <http://www.thamesvalley.police.uk/aboutus/aboutus-depts/aboutus-depts-cred.htm>

68 “Beyond the call,” Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, 2005

Figure 6.5: Control room civilianisation (2009)

Source: HMIC Value for Money Returns, 2010

civilianisation rate (accounting for 71 officers). The Metropolitan Police – with a civilianisation rate of 72% – also had 648 officers in their control rooms. This has risen substantially from 195 officers in 2003, suggesting that the MPS management has allowed more officers to be “parked” in this function without a clear operational need.

To put this into context, if the Metropolitan Police had the same ratio of officers to civilians in their control room as Staffordshire, they would save around £13 million every year through reduced salary expenditure costs.⁶⁹

Table 6.1: Number of Officers and Staff in the Metropolitan Police Control Room

Date	Police Officers	Civilian Staff	% Officers
2003	195	1,206	13.9%
2005	234	1,682	12.2%
2008	738	1,982	27.1%
2009	678	1,754	27.9%
2010	648	1,776	26.7%

Source: Metropolitan Police⁷⁰

Funding Reductions Driving Decivilianisation

Recent data released by HMIC and covered in the media, suggests a return to the failed tactics of some forces that have previously experienced funding difficulties.

In 1991 Derbyshire Constabulary was in a difficult economic position. A combination of factors had resulted in the force suffering from a financial crunch with the result that “trained police officers [were] being taken off the streets to cover for civilian vacancies.”⁷¹

The MP for Derbyshire South at the time, Edwina Currie, reported that since 1988 it had taken an average of six months to fill a civilian post. Examples were cited of a

69 Through using the mean difference in salary expenditure between officers and staff of £20,239, as analysed in Part I

70 http://www.met.police.uk-Fol-pdfs-disclosure_2011-march-2011030001726.pdf

71 <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1991/jan/22/police-derbyshire>

shortage of civilian control room operators, with officers backfilling posts, and the result that “police are frequently not visible at all on the streets of Derby and in the Derbyshire villages.” At the same time crime rates were climbing in Derbyshire, “partly because [police officers] are forced to do the wrong jobs.”⁷²


This abstraction of officers into civilian roles is not a phenomenon relegated to the history books either, with some forces, such as Warwickshire, resigned to accepting that it is a necessary consequence of the budget reductions. A leaked email to civilian staff in March 2011 told them as much:

“Whilst the force manages the required reductions in the numbers of police officers, it has been agreed that some will be temporarily posted into police staff posts which are currently vacant, or which will become vacant following voluntary redundancy.”⁷³

Across the rest of the country, the past decade has seen an improvement in the level of civilianisation in police control rooms, with the average level of civilianisation across forces increasing from 70% to 86% between 2000 and 2010. Similarly with forensics functions, the majority of the increase was between 2000 and 2005 with the civilianisation rate increasing from 70% to 82%.

The increase in civilianisation was muted as some forces’ civilianisation rates actually declined between 2005 and 2010 – most notably Warwickshire, MPS and Gwent:

Figure 6.6: More officers in control rooms



Source: Freedom of Information returns, 2011

If these three forces had managed to maintain their 2005 civilianisation rates, then 349 fewer officers (297 in the MPS alone) would have been working in police control rooms, saving around £7 million per year between them.

Using 2009 figures, if all forces benchmarked their civilianisation to that of the highest ten (94%) then 1,605 posts – which are currently filled by police officers in control rooms – would be filled instead with civilian staff.

72 Ibid

73 <http://www.coventrytelegraph.net/news/coventry-news/2011/03/18/police-taken-of-f-the-streets-to-work-behind-desks-92746-28359474/>

Understanding Resilience

One argument often advanced against civilianisation is the need for resilience.⁷⁴ Resilience is “...a rather nebulous and all-inclusive term, signifying the capacity (in terms of staff, knowledge, skills and strategies) of an organisation to perform in the face of future, unforeseen events and not immediately visible threats.”⁷⁵

The police are an emergency service and as such must respond to unpredictable events. Occasionally enough events will occur simultaneously to stretch the ability of the police workforce to carry out their duties, such as the Miner’s strikes in the 1980s and the recent riots across England in August 2011. It is argued that the civilianisation of policing reduces the number of police officers who can be called upon to take up front line positions from their civilian posts to add depth to the policing line.

To date this argument has only been anecdotal despite repeated attempts to quantify the necessary level of police resilience. In response to “only nine forces [stating] they had made attempts” to “define and specify a level of operational resilience, linked to preferred policing style, in order to manage risk and to experiment creatively with the mix of staff without threatening core responsibilities” HMIC recommended in 2004 that “... in time to inform the 2005-06 planning cycle, each force command team ... identifies and sets staffing levels that ensure operational resilience, tailored to local need, is maintained.”⁷⁶

Yet it seems this recommendation was not taken on board as it was again picked up in The Review of Policing by Sir Ronnie Flanagan (2008), which tasked the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) to quantify the level of resilience that was needed in UK policing. They contracted this task out to RAND whose paper 'Testing the Police Workforce Resilience Hypothesis' (2011), whilst taking us a step closer to quantifying the necessary level of resilience for policing in England and Wales, has not finalised the matter.

74 <http://www.epolitix.com/members/member-press/member-press-details/newsarticle/public-could-be-at-risk-as-police-service-resilience-is-threatened///sites/policy-exchange-of-england-wales/>

75 S Mills, H., Silvestri, A. and Grimshaw, R. (2010), “Police expenditure, 1999 – 2009,” Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, Kings College London

76 HMIC, “Modernising the Police” Service, 2004

7


Health of the Workforce

The police service also suffers from the poor health of some in its workforce. Leave for sickness is a common and expensive part of any business or organisation. In 2009 the direct cost of absenteeism to UK employers in the private sector was £16.8 billion.⁷⁷ Whilst the average number of days per year taken off sick by employees in the private sector was 5.8 days in 2009⁷⁸ the level of absenteeism in the public sector was significantly higher at 8.3 days annually per employee.

Overall, this public sector absence cost the taxpayer £5.5 billion in direct costs – equivalent to 224,653 members of staff out of the workplace each year⁷⁹ and £3.8 billion in indirect costs – through, for example, stress, medical costs and impact on customer service.

Police forces have suffered from above average levels of sickness, in line with the public sector average at eight days per year:⁸⁰

Figure 7.1: Mean sick days per police personnel



Source: Freedom of Information requests, 2011

77 "On the path to recovery: Absence and workplace health survey 2010," CBI, 2010

78 Ibid

79 "Absence Management in the Public Sector," Accenture Leadership Series, Accenture, 2010

80 Information gathered through Freedom of Information requests to police forces. The 24 forces who replied in a comparable form are represented in the figure

Assuming that all those forces who did not reply to the FOI requests in a comparable manner have the average level of sick leave and using as a benchmark the best five performing forces – North Wales, MPS, Northamptonshire, South Yorkshire and Cheshire – which is 6.5 days annually per employee, then 767 officers would be freed up for duty, as well as 553 civilian staff if all forces achieved the benchmarked figure.⁸¹

If we take the more ambitious private sector benchmark of 5.8 days annually per employee then 1,244 fewer officers and almost 895 fewer police staff would be lost to sickness each year.

There is a potential bias in the data in that those police forces who have seemingly lower rates of sickness absence may well suffer from poor sickness record management and therefore their reporting may be an underestimate. The effect of this bias will be that the overall level of sickness in police forces is underestimated. There is a hint that this may be the case, as the rates recorded in the FOI returns are lower than the sickness levels collected by HMIC's snapshot on 31st March 2010.⁸²

If we use this HMIC snapshot data and take the number of officers and police staff sick on 31st March 2010 and assume that it is representative of any other day, then the average number of annual sick days is 11 for officers and 13 for police staff.⁸³ This figure is unexpected in that it is rational to consider that the physical nature of an officer's work would contribute to higher levels of sickness than amongst staff. This merits further investigation by forces to determine if the levels of sickness are as high as 13 and 11 days per year, and if so, to understand why this is the case as – at more than double than that of the private sector – this level of absenteeism is too high.

Reducing the level of sickness could be aided by approaches such as those suggested by Accenture (see below), but it is critical that this remains a matter for Chief Constables rather than become subject to any nationally mandated processes, especially considering it is smaller organisations that generally manage to gain lower rates of absenteeism.⁸⁴

81 This figure also assumes that on average police officers and staff work 220 days per year, excluding overtime. This is calculated by taking all possible weekdays in a given year (52 x 5 = 260), less holiday allowance (25 days), less bank and public holidays (8 days) and less an average of seven sick days.

82 HMIC Value for Money Profiles, March 2011

83 This figure also assumes that, on average, police officers and staff work 220 days per year, excluding overtime. This is calculated by taking all possible weekdays in a given year (52 x 5 = 260), less holiday allowance (25 days), less bank and public holidays (8 days) and less an average of seven sick days.

84 Ibid

Absence Management Good Practice

In their 2010 paper, "Absence Management in the Public Sector", Accenture outlined five useful building blocks to form effective performance management:

1. Board-level commitment and tracking of absence management

Absence management is a board-level consideration for all UK public sector organisations, as it impacts on service provision to the public, the organisation's level of productivity and the cost of delivery. It has ramifications for the wellbeing not only of employees but also of the organisation as a whole. Absence rates are also a strong indicator of the organisation's performance and culture.

2. Clearly defined absence management policies and procedures

There must be a standard set of policies and procedures that are clearly communicated in an easy-to-understand format for different stakeholders in the absence management process, from occupational health providers to employees. Without these policies and procedures, local variations in practice spring up, processes are ignored and the

organisation becomes open to litigation. In addition, employees' best interests are not protected, as the organisation is not consistently fulfilling its 'duty of care.'

3. Training and support for line managers

In many public sector organisations, line managers are now at the front line of managing and improving absence management. Line managers have a role to play at all stages of the absence management cycle, as they manage the relationship with the employee. However, they need effective training and support in order to carry out their duties per the agreed policy guidelines.

4. Effective management of third-party suppliers

Organisations sometimes do not understand the full benefit of suppliers such as occupational health or employee assistance programme providers, and such services may be under-utilised. As these services are paid for regardless of how much they are used, this constitutes an indirect cost to the organisation. Effective suppliers can support the organisation in driving down absence durations and ensuring the value and effectiveness of the service being provided.

5. Standard absence management data-management information collection and monitoring across the organisation

Everyone with a role in absence management – whether a board member, line manager, HR professional or occupational health provider – needs access to the right absence management information. Information must be standardised, up to date and relevant so that the size and source of problems are understood and the return on investment from any interventions being implemented can be measured. By tracking what is important, and using management information effectively, absence management programmes can be flexed and amended appropriately to meet new organisational needs and challenges, such as handling redundancy programmes.

Officer Fitness Tests

Furthermore, there are question marks over whether officers who are not currently performing front line roles would be able to take up the roles which resilience might require of them.

This is not to say that they definitely could not, but rather that the current lack of any regular fitness test for the majority of officers in many forces prevents a Chief Constable from having any picture of the true number of officers they can call upon to perform difficult and physically demanding front line work, such as at Public Order Incidents like the recent August riots. In part one of his review, Tom Winsor, expressed his concerns of a lack of fitness within police forces:

*"Weight-problems and obesity can cause increased joint problems, heart disease and other conditions, and it is understood that these problems are present and increasing in police forces as well as in society at large."*⁸⁵

Regular fitness tests are common practice in fire departments⁸⁶ and the armed forces and should be so for the police service. The Police Federation argue that

85 Winsor, T, "Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions: Part one report," 2011

86 <http://www.hantsfire.gov.uk/theservice/serviceorders.htm?id=51023>

people may fail these tests because they are in “poor physical shape” or have “recently undergone surgery.” In response to Hampshire’s decision to implement fitness tests a Federation representative stated that “the concern for the Police Federation is what happens to those individuals...”⁸⁷ should they fail the fitness test. If police officers were unable to pass a fitness test, and were therefore no longer fit for warranted, front line roles, then the most sensible option available would be for them to be migrated into civilian staff roles.

Some forces, such as Hampshire and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, have already introduced regular fitness tests, but questions remain over whether the entry level of fitness required is meaningful enough and ensures operational resilience in policing.

Hampshire Constabulary – Fitness tests for police officers⁸⁸

As of July 2010, Hampshire Constabulary began piloting annual fitness tests for all of their police officers. As with all forces, there have always been fitness tests at the recruitment stage and annual tests for specialist roles such as dog handling, firearms and public order. Yet there had never been any fitness tests for all police officers on a regular basis.

Chief Constable Alex Marshall explains why he introduced it:

“For me, it’s about fitness to carry out the role of an operational police officer; being fit enough to use the handcuffs, baton and other defensive weapons we give officers to protect themselves and colleagues. There is the public image issue, as the public would expect police officers to have a reasonable level of fitness, and there is a health benefit, in that I think a fit and healthy staff will feel more confident, more able to deal with difficult decisions and working long hours and are less likely to go sick.”

The fitness test is a simple one – officers need to reach a standard of 5.4 on the bleep test. To put this in perspective – the average standard for men aged between 31-40 years is 6.1 (6.3 for females); the average for men aged between 41-50 is 6.9 (5.7 for females). The standard 5.4 is equivalent to a score of ‘below average’ for a 41-50 year old female.⁸⁹

The oldest police officer in Hampshire Constabulary, at 62 has passed it successfully. Only 2% have failed. Whilst it is a step in the right direction, the test is hardly strenuous. If a police officer fails the fitness test they are placed on a “development re-training” programme by a fitness instructor for around eight weeks, before taking the test again. If they subsequently fail the test again then, in the words of the Chief Constable:

“...there are serious questions to ask about whether they are suitable to be police officers.”

⁸⁷ “Hampshire police pilots fitness test for all officers,” BBC, 2010

⁸⁸ “Hampshire introduces fitness pilot,” Police Professional, 2010

⁸⁹ www.brianmac.co.uk/beep.htm

Managing sickness

The police service currently has three mechanisms through which they can attempt to address the high levels of sick leave: ill health retirement, recuperative duties and restrictive duties.

Restriction	Description
Recuperative	A short-term programme designed to reduce the length of recovery time taken by officers recovering from sickness or illness by enabling officers to work reduced hours or a restricted set of tasks prior to returning to full duties
Restrictive	A long-term restriction of duties in order to prevent the inappropriate early medical retirement of police officers
Ill health retirement	Retirement from a police force due to ill health accompanied by pension entitlements that take into account the number of years an officer would have served as well as potential further enhancements


Recuperative duties

When police officers have been injured and are unable to perform front line, warranted roles it makes sense for them to take on recuperative duties in order to allow them to remain in the force and to perform to the extent they are able. The purpose of this is to help re-integrate officers back into their forces following sickness or illness.⁹⁰ It is not normally expected to last beyond 12 months and if it becomes unlikely that an officer will return to full service they are normally moved onto restrictive duties.⁹¹ Officers receive full pay whilst on recuperative duties.

There is significant variation in the use of recuperative duties throughout forces – ranging from 7.3% of officers in Dyfed-Powys to just 0.2% in Cumbria – which represents just two out of Cumbria's 1,238 officers. Overall there were 3,509 officers on recuperative duties in 2009-10.⁹²

The four forces with the largest percentage of officers on recuperative duties – Dyfed-Powys, Warwickshire, Wiltshire and Northamptonshire – despite having only 3% of the total police force numbers, represented just under a tenth of all officers on recuperative duties.

Figure 7.2: Percentage of officers on recuperative duties



Source: HMIC Value for Money Profiles, 2011

90 Home Office Circular 026-2008 – Guidance on Attendance Management


91 Winsor, T., "Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions: Part one report," 2011

92 Four forces – Cambridgeshire, Derbyshire, Hampshire and Sussex – did not provide any figures, so their rate has been assumed to be the average across all forces who did submit returns to HMIC

Restrictive Duties

Restrictive duties are a health and safety measure designed to ensure that officers are not undertaking roles that would put themselves, their colleagues or the public in danger. In total there are 5,964 officers⁹³ on restricted duties, with Kent and West Yorkshire – both with close to 9% of their officers being on restricted duties – representing 14% of all officers on restricted duties, despite having less than 7% of the total number of officers across forces.

Figure 7.3: Percentage of officers on restricted duties



Source: HMIC Value for Money Profiles, 2011

The number of officers on restricted duties has grown rapidly. Between 2002-3 and 2009-10 the number of officers on restricted duties increased from 2,299 to 5,964. A significant proportion of this can be explained by restrictions on ill health retirement pushing officers into restricted duties, as explained below.

Under the Equality Act 2010 police forces are required to make reasonable adjustments for disabled officers that does not put them at a disadvantage to their fellow officers. This affects the options open to police managers when deciding what roles an officer on restricted duties can perform. What constitutes a reasonable adjustment varies from case to case but, as outlined in part one of the Winsor Review (2011),⁹⁴ court case precedent⁹⁵ sets out the following as a guideline of what represents a 'reasonable adjustment' (emphasis added):

- transferring a disabled officer to a vacant post in the force
- creating a new post specifically for the disabled officer (but not if the post is unnecessary for the force)
- requiring another officer to swap jobs with the disabled officer offering the disabled officer employment as a member of police staff, **on police staff terms and conditions**
- transferring a disabled officer to what had been a police staff post, but **on police officer terms and conditions**

There are some officers who are on restricted duties for whom there is little chance of ever being able to take up a front line, warranted role again. It makes sense for those officers to have the option – as the final two guidelines suggest – to take up roles as civilian staff. Yet as highlighted above, there is some debate over whether they should be transferred across on officer or staff terms and conditions. However, to have officers working side by side with civilian staff and performing

93 Five forces – Cambridgeshire, Derbyshire, North Yorkshire, Hampshire and Sussex – did not provide any figures, so their rate has been assumed to be the average across all forces who did submit returns to HMIC.

94 Winsor, T, "Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions: Part one report," 2011

95 From the case of The Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police versus Jelic (2010) and The Chief Constable of Norfolk versus Mr P N James (2008).

the same roles, yet receiving significantly better pay and pension arrangements is unfair and not conducive to a harmonised police workforce.

At the moment whilst officers are often transferred into civilian roles they continue to receive the wages and pension of officers, as highlighted by Sir Ronnie Flanagan:

“Under the current system a uniformed officer who is unable to continue to carry out front line duties could be moved to a support function on ill health grounds. If they are retained in the service their terms and conditions and powers are fixed as if they were still an officer ready to be deployed anywhere, which are considerably better terms than police staff in comparable roles.”⁹⁶

Ill health Retirement

The alternative to restrictive duties for those who can no longer perform the full duties required by the Office of Constable is ill health retirement.

Police Authorities may retire on the basis of ill health any officers who are “permanently disabled for the ordinary duties of a member of the force.”⁹⁷ Regardless of which pension scheme an officer is on, when retiring on grounds of ill health, they receive their pension immediately and index-linked, providing they have two years’ qualifying service at the time of retirement.

All officers who have served more than five years who were also included in the Police Pension Scheme 1987 receive an enhanced pension that compensates them, at least in part, for the pension they would have accrued had they completed a full 30 years of service.⁹⁸ The payment of these pensions gives no consideration to whether or not those officers who had been allowed to retire could perform other roles outside of the police service.

According to a former consultant occupational psychiatrist who worked in the MPS between 2001 and 2004 there was “a culture of entitlement regarding ill health retirement... once an officer saw ill health retirement as his preferred option, there was an imperative to maintain the illness presentation until the matter was decided.”⁹⁹

During that period however the number of ill health retirements actually reduced significantly. This was largely influenced by an increased focus on the issue by ACPO and the Home Office who ran seminars in 1997 and 1998, with HMIC also focusing on the issue with the publication of a thematic report, “Lost Time” in 2007.¹⁰⁰

Figure 7.4: Number of medical retirements per 1,000 officers in service



Source: Hansard, 2006¹⁰¹

96 Sir Flanagan, R., “Review of Policing: Final Report,” 2008

97 <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm061128/text/61128w0035.htm>

98 Ibid

99 Summerfield, D, “Metropolitan Police Blues,” BMJ, 2011

100 <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151426/http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/human-resources/police-pensions/IHR/index.html>

101 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo061107/text/61107w0090.htm>

The New Police Pensions Scheme 2006 addressed the issue of officers being able to claim pension enhancements for loss of earnings due to ill health when they were still able to perform roles outside of policing. They did this by splitting officers retiring on grounds of ill health into two categories: those who were and those who were not permanently disabled for “all regular employment” other than that demanded of an officer. Those deemed disabled for all regular employment (meaning those unable to work for an annual average of at least 30 hours per week) received an enhancement that had “the effect that the pensionable service is enhanced by up to 50% of your prospective service to age 55.”¹⁰²

Since 2004-5 HMIC no longer publish data numbers of ill health retirements,¹⁰³ however these were obtained by part one of the Winsor Review (2011) and show that at 2009-10 1.94 for every 1,000 officers were retired on medical grounds. This represents a fall of 61% since 2002-3 from 708 to 275 officers.

This reduction was a result of a target set out in the National Policing Plan 2003–2006 for forces to achieve a rate of fewer than 6.5 ill health retirements per 1,000 officers by 2006. This target was achieved. However, the success is likely to have caused a perverse consequence through encouraging managers to place more officers on restrictive duties which has rapidly increased over the same time period, as highlighted above.

Recommendations

- **The chasm that exists between officer and staff remuneration is not conducive to good morale and a cohesive workforce. Separate from changes to how staff are paid and for what, operationally, the police should be an integrated workforce wherever possible. Even traditional policing functions like investigation should be opened up to trained civilians, where these roles do not demand warranted powers and can be undertaken at much lower cost.**
- **Civilianisation in some police forces and in a number of important functions has not gone far enough, and progress made in the 1990s was not built upon consistently in the decade 2000–2010. In recent years, even as spending increased and more officers were recruited, some forces permitted more officers to fill back office roles than was the case in 2000. Forces with a high proportion of officers who typically make no arrests should study closely the reasons for this and ensure it is not because too many officers are performing staff duties.**
- **The result of this stalled civilianisation has meant that some forces – like the West Midlands and the MPS – are significantly worse off in coping with reduced budgets in future because they have too many officers in non-policing roles and too few civilian staff. Forces should fund a detailed empirical analysis of the optimum civilianisation rate in specific functions taking account of resilience and cost effectiveness.**
- **The police workforce has institutional problems of poor health and above average absence rates – even among civilian staff. Forces need to practice better absence management in line with best practice from the private sector and examine the nature and problems affecting existing officers on**

¹⁰² Ibid

¹⁰³ <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090112/text/90112w0064.htm>

recuperative duties to expedite the return of as many officers to frontline duty as possible.

- Police officers – like fire-fighters and armed forces personnel – should be required to undertake and pass a standardised fitness test not just at point of entry but annually. Failure to pass regular fitness tests should have career consequences. Improved fitness among officers will enable more officers to undertake frontline roles and will enhance general workforce health.

Part IV

More for Less

“We start from a very inefficient position, particularly in the metropolitan forces, where we have large numbers of officers still in roles that do not require the skills, the powers and expertise of a police officer. It is through that route over the next four years where we will achieve quite a bit of savings.”

Peter Fahy, Chief Constable, Greater Manchester Police, February 2011

To ensure an effective service with reduced resources over the next four years will be challenging – more so for some police forces than for others. Total officer and staff numbers will fall and policing services on the frontline will change. Nevertheless, police performance depends upon how those more limited resources are used in the years ahead. This “more for less” agenda can be seen in two parts:

- **Deployment over employment** – inefficiencies in how staff are assigned and poor police deployment practices need to be addressed.
- **Business transformation** – how reengineered services can free up assets (uniformed officers) and deliver cash savings through back and middle office efficiencies around outsourcing, procurement and business transformation.

Both issues would be of general interest irrespective of the funding available for policing, as they are critical to ensuring an effective and efficient service to the public. The budget reductions over the next four years however, make these two areas of even greater importance as Chief Constables pursue a “more for less” agenda and seek to protect the front line. Both elements demand a focus on what productivity gains can be secured within the current framework, even though they are not enough to put the future of the service on a more sustainable financial footing.

8

The Next Four Years

As a result of the Comprehensive Spending Review in October 2010, the financial settlement for the Home Office for the next four years (up to 2014-15) will mean a reduction in central funding of the police of 20%. As police forces are partly funded locally, this amounts to net reductions of 14% or around 6% in cash terms over four years.¹⁰⁴

The impact of these reductions is unclear, as budget decisions at a force level are a matter for each Police Authority. Some forces, mostly in the north of England and the Midlands, are facing more significant challenges, particularly if their total share of funding from central government is higher, as HMIC have noted. It is certain that police forces will be smaller in 2015 than they were in 2010 and a range of estimates have been provided. Some of these global estimates are more credible than others.

Earlier this year, the Institute for Fiscal Studies predicted 65,000 police posts would be lost in total as a result of the Home Office funding reductions. If true, that would mean the loss of all the extra staff, all the extra police, and all the new PCSOs hired since 1997 – and then some more. The forecast lacked credibility because the IFS assumed no efficiencies in police management, no increase in local funding and a complete freeze on recruitment.

The best and most recent estimate, in July 2011 from HMIC, predicts that forces will need to deliver £2.1 billion in cash savings by 2014-15, and a total of 34,100 posts will be lost. The share of posts lost will be roughly equal between officers and staff, with officer numbers falling primarily because of a recruitment freeze – not lay-offs, as redundancy for in-service officers is impossible – and civilian staff falling due to forced redundancies and voluntary exit schemes.

Table 8.1: HMIC Projection of Lost Police Posts March 2010–March 2015

Staff category	Posts
Police officers	16,200
PCSOs	1,800
Police staff	16,100
Total	34,100

Source: "Adapting to Austerity", Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, 2011

104 Based on estimates by the Office for Budget Responsibility in 2010 and <http://news.sky.com/home/politics/article/16050735>


The requirement for police forces to manage a 14% funding reduction over four years is challenging, and is made more difficult because of how manpower in their forces is currently allocated. Furthermore, the impact of these reductions on service delivery is unclear because of budget decisions still being taken by police authorities. Most forces are using recruitment freezes as their instrument of choice, despite the harm they can cause to morale and management if extended too long.

Losing Posts: Recruitment Freezes

Most if not all forces have already instigated reductions in officer recruitment, some from as early as 2008. Yet after the onset of the recession, between March 2009 and March 2010 there were still 5,917¹⁰⁵ officers recruited into police forces. All but three forces intend to use recruitment freezes to reduce officer (and staff) headcount.¹⁰⁶

Netting off those who joined the force and those who left shows that between 2005 and 2010 there were roughly the same number of officers leaving as there were joining, other than in 2008-9 when over 2,000 more joined than left forces. The security of employment that the police provide could be one explanation for the surge in applications and recruitment as wider unemployment in the economy began to rise:

Figure 8.1: Net increase in police officers



Source: "Police Service Strength 2003 - 2010" Home Office ^{107, 108}

Excluding those leaving one force to join another,¹⁰⁹ 5,930 officers left the police service in 2009-10. The number leaving forces (excluding transfers) has stayed between 5,000 and 7,000 since 2003.¹¹⁰ If we assume that the number of officers leaving the police service remains constant – a view supported by fewer work opportunities elsewhere during the current downturn but this being offset by more senior officers being made redundant – then police forces could reduce officer headcount by around 6,000 a year through a recruitment freeze alone.

Yet instituting a freeze should not be recommended, especially for any length of time. By freezing recruitment the age profile of the police workforce will increase – the average age of a police recruit is already 28¹¹¹ – and the workforce will become increasingly stagnant with less movement up the ranks. This will result in either a significant reduction in the number of opportunities for promotion, as there is no one to back fill the more junior roles, or if police officers continue to be promoted, the workforce will become increasingly top heavy, something that is already becoming a problem. This will contribute to a retreat from the front line as it is the lowest rank – that of constable – that is most visible and available to the public.

¹⁰⁵ This excludes transfers to and from forces

¹⁰⁶ HMIC, "Adapting to Austerity," 2011

¹⁰⁷ Note that this includes transfers between forces – these are netted out when joiners and leavers are compared

¹⁰⁸ www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN00634.pdf

¹⁰⁹ In 2009-10 transfers accounted for 13.1% of all leavers

¹¹⁰ Note that comparable estimates of police force leavers and joiners was only collected centrally from 2003 onwards

¹¹¹ <http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23848848-forcing-police-recruits-to-work-for-nothing-will-damage-met.do>

Other Chief Constables have used – or are preparing to use – one of the only other tools at their disposal to forcibly retire officers who have served for more than 30 years. The mechanism, A19, is controversial and has been poorly received in areas where it is being activated.

Losing Posts: Making Senior Officers Redundant

The other option available for Chief Constables to reduce current officer numbers is to use a termination mechanism for long serving officers. Enshrined in the Police Pensions Regulations 1987, Regulation A19 states:

“This Regulation shall apply to a regular police officer, other than a chief officer of police, deputy Chief Constable or Assistant Chief Constable ... If a police authority determines that the retention in the force of a regular policeman to whom this Regulation applies would not be in the general interests of efficiency, he may be required to retire on such a date as the police authority determine.”

What this means in practice is that all non-ACPO police officers that have more than 30 years of service can be forcibly retired, with 28 days’ notice, on the grounds of the efficiency of the police force. According to HMIC, 22 forces intend to use or have already used A19 to reduce officer headcount.¹¹² For example Nottinghamshire Constabulary plan to use A19 to reduce headcount by 86,¹¹³ Warwickshire Police by 35 and Greater Manchester Police by around 70 officers.¹¹⁴

Yet enacting such legislation to reduce officer headcount can only yield a maximum reduction of around 1/30th of total officer headcount and deprives forces of some of their most experienced officers. The savings it delivers for taxpayers are also minimal, as whilst the Police Authority might save an officers salary, the taxpayer will start paying the officer’s pension. It is a blunt instrument that takes no account of the skills needed by a police force. Coupled with forces’ inability to recruit officers at any level but that of constable, there is a real danger of losing experienced senior managers with necessary skill sets and being unable to replace them.

Losing Posts: Staff Redundancies

With Chief Constables needing to reduce their force headcount in order to balance the books and yet having no sensible or sizeable means through which to reduce officer numbers, they are instead looking to their civilian staff ranks to find savings. From March 2009 to March 2010 police forces across the country made 478 civilians compulsorily redundant and facilitated the exit of 3,288 more through voluntary redundancy schemes.¹¹⁵ Combined with recruitment freezes for staff, the 16,000 losses of civilian posts predicted by HMIC up to 2015 are more likely to refer to existing employees, rather than officers not hired. Whilst 22 forces have either used or are about to use A19, this total will not come anywhere near the total for police staff redundancies over this period.

112 HMIC, “Adapting to Austerity,” 2011

113 “Nottinghamshire Police redundancy plan approved,” BBC, 2010

114 “70 senior cops ‘to be forced to retire’ in police savings drive,” Manchester Evening News, 2011

115 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110720/text/110720w0005.htm#1107211000004>

If the scenario projected by HMIC plays out, forces will broadly see a reversal of the expansion of the previous decade within five years, with a restoration to the workforce size of the early 2000s. As HMIC notes in their report, *Adapting to Austerity* (2011):


“We estimate that this reduction would result in savings of approximately £1.6bn, and take the overall size of the workforce back to its 2003-04 level (with officer numbers reverting to 2001-02 levels).”

The CSR settlement and the budget reductions for forces up to 2014-15 therefore need to be seen in context. Historically, the necessity to reduce public spending to address the unprecedented peacetime budget deficit could not have come at a better time for policing – at the end of a full decade of growth and expansion. Following the personnel reductions planned by forces up to 2015 there will still be 210,000 police employees in England and Wales – the same number as at March 2004.¹¹⁶

Future of Civilianisation

Between March 2009 and March 2010 civilianisation rates increased on average by 0.7% across forces. However between March 2010 and March 2011, only two forces – West Mercia and Humberside – notably increased their level of civilianisation and 33 forces reduced their proportion of civilian employees:

Figure 8.2: Change in civilianisation: March 2010 to March 2011



Source: “Police Service Strength”, Home Office, 2010-2011¹¹⁷

116 Total police personnel as at March 2015 – 208,277 – is comparable with the police personnel (minus Special Constables) as at March 2004 – 209,755.


117 Note that this excludes Cleveland, whose outsourcing agreements distort their changes in civilianisation

118 Peter Fahy, Home Affairs Committee Minutes of Evidence, Response to Question 46, 11 January 2011

Looking ahead to 2014-15 (the end of the current spending period) across all police forces the evidence, although not disastrous, is not positive. ACPO lead for Workforce Modernisation, Peter Fahy, stated that he expected the headcount reduction in his force, Greater Manchester Police, to fall “roughly 50/50, so about 1,400 police staff, 1,400 police officers.”¹¹⁸ The recent report by HMIC,

Adapting to Austerity, (2011) reviewed police force's plans from March 2010 to March 2015 and estimated that 16,200 officers, 16,100 civilian staff and 1,800 PCSOs would go during the period. Nearly a third of this reduction has happened already between March 2010 and March 2011 with a reduction of 11,200 personnel over the period. Overall the projections for March 2011 to March 2015 show evidence of decreased civilianisation in forces, with an average reduction of just over 1%. This masks considerable variation, with Humberside once again impressively bucking the trend with plans to increase their level of civilianisation by 6%.

Figure 8.3: Change in civilianisation: March 2011 to March 2015



Source: "Police Service Strength", Home Office, 2011 & HMIC, 2011

Whilst this is a concerning trend, it is not surprising in a period of budget reductions. In many ways, a reduction in civilianisation is an outcome that Chief Constables must battle against to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in their force – as the Policing Minister suggests, Chief Constables must “guard against reverse civilianisation.”¹¹⁹

119 <http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23941567-minister-trying-to-silence-police.do>

9

Back on the Front Line

The well-documented public desire for more ‘bobbies on the beat’ has been interpreted – and responded to politically – with a generalised commitment to hire more officers and to increase the size of the police force when resources allow. This may be one way to improve a force’s visible policing presence, but it is not necessarily the most efficient or sensible way. There is an alternative. Rather than simply employing more officers, forces could focus more on how to deploy the officers they have more effectively. To ensure an effective service with reduced resources, inefficiencies in how staff are assigned and poor police deployment practices need to be addressed so more officers are deployed back to the frontline.

Misdeployed Officers

The five policing functions we have focused on in this paper – with 65,000 posts in them – account for over a quarter of all police employees.¹²⁰ Our analysis has concluded that 58% of the 12,543 officers working in these functions – 7,280 – are performing roles that could and should be performed by civilian staff.

The failure to ensure that officers were in the right roles commensurate with their warranted powers meant that 7,280 officers were being paid more than civilian staff to perform civilian roles in positions that made them invisible to the public. This total equates to 40% of the entire complement of additional officers hired between 2001 and 2010.

Figure 9.1: Officers currently misdeployed



¹²⁰ Note that in this analysis we have excluded Cleveland Police, whose figures have not been compared due to the extent of their outsourcing agreements.

This difference in employment costs, when multiplied by the number of roles that could be done by civilian staff but are currently being performed by officers yields a recurring differential of £147 million per year. If all forces had gone down this route, they would have had the option of either contributing towards their budget reductions without a reduction in service to citizens, or released thousands of officers back onto the front line, thereby improving service and visibility.

Had this been achieved over the last few years, forces would have saved significant resources, year on year, before the recession and the resulting fiscal crisis gave rise to reduced budget settlements in the Comprehensive Spending Review of October 2010. Because civilianisation stalled and these reforms never happened, the police service in England and Wales over four years wasted an estimated £588 million enough in itself to pay for 2,714 extra officers in each of these years.

So far in this paper we have outlined where there are both a significant number of officers performing roles that could be done by civilians and also – through looking at sickness rates (see below) – the savings available if forces benchmark their performance against the best performers.

There should be recognition that these are not immediately cashable savings. Chief Constables have severe limitations on their ability to alter their workforce mix in the short-term due to their inability to reduce officer numbers and even if this was not the case the redundancy and other associated costs of rapidly altering an organisation's workforce personnel are significant.

Rather, this analysis demonstrates:

- These are savings that could have been captured by forces as cashable and recurring, if they had developed a more efficient workforce mix to-date; and
- Over the medium-term, if forces ensure officers are not performing civilian roles they could expect these levels of savings.

These savings would open up new opportunities for forces to either aid budget reduction, or increase the number of officers in front line, visible and available roles. The speed with which Chief Constables can access these savings are, in part, determined by whether they are given greater control to manage the number of officers in their force – for example through bringing in voluntary redundancy mechanisms and short-service commissions for the police.

Reductions in Sick Leave

Assuming that sick leave is constant across police employee types and using a benchmark of the best five performing forces of 6.5 days annually per employee, then 767 officers would be freed up for duty, as well as almost 553 police staff, if all forces could match the performance of the best.¹²¹ Whilst such a saving would not be cashable, the increased value that would be accrued by forces would amount to £60 million.¹²² Whilst bringing in the right processes, practice and culture to reduce the levels of sick leave in forces will not happen instantaneously there are – unlike with efficiencies through civilianisation – no significant direct costs of change, such as hiring and firing, that need to be incurred.

¹²¹ This figure also assumes that on average police officers and staff work 220 days per year, excluding overtime. This is calculated by taking all possible weekdays in a given year (52 x 5 = 260), less holiday allowance (25 days), less bank and public holidays (8 days) and less an average of seven sick days.

¹²² If forces managed to perform at the same level of sickness as the private sector (5.8 days annually per employee) then they would release £97 million more value from their workforce.

10

More Visible and Available

Whilst a force will need many officers in specialist roles that are neither visible nor available, the evidence base for maintaining a visible, uniformed police presence as a core component of a force's personnel mix is strong and is one that accords with a widespread public desire for a visible police presence in communities.

Police officers have a wide range of complex and overlapping duties, from patrolling the streets, aiding people in distress and pursuing offenders to investigating serious and organised crime. It is beyond the remit of this paper to suggest what police officers should or should not be doing at a detailed level, which is the proper preserve of practitioners – rather we focus on promoting a policy that is evidenced to increase public confidence and prevent crime: *police officers should be visible and available to the public.*

The overlapping purposes of this visibility and availability are to reassure the public, prevent crime, gather local intelligence and build meaningful relationships with the public. The public support for this principle is undiminished, with a poll showing that 91% of respondents saying they “want a more visible police force, patrolling their local area.”¹²³

With police officer numbers near an historic high, it is a legitimate public expectation that the police should be more visible than they have been in the past. However, as HMIC has stated, on average only 12% of police officers are currently “visible and available” to the public at any one time.¹²⁴ Although this analysis is disputed, what should not be is the need to improve levels of visibility which are too low. As police budgets – and officer numbers – fall in the years ahead, maintaining and where possible enhancing police visibility should be a key priority for forces.

Policing has traditionally been involved in providing a visible and available uniformed presence on the streets, providing a symbol of lawful authority and a visible deterrent to criminals. This is in part because improving police visibility and familiarity (the extent to which police personnel both know and are known by the local community)¹²⁵ is proven to increase the perceived effectiveness of policing.¹²⁶ It helps to reassure the public, prevent crime, build local intelligence and build meaningful relationships with the public. This is why it is such a key issue for both the public and their elected representatives. Due to these proven benefits a visible and available uniformed police presence remains at the core of the police mission, even if policing is now more complex involving many more non-uniformed personnel.

‘Visibility’ is a term that should not be confused with the term ‘front line.’ In a recent publication, *Demanding Times* (2011), HMIC presented a definition of the front line:

123 “Police will catch more criminals with smaller budgets and fewer officers, says Nick Herbert,” *The Telegraph*, 2010

124 “Demanding Times: The front line and police visibility,” *Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary*, 2011

157 “Open All Hours,” *Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary*, 2001

126 Dalglish, D. and Myhill, A., ‘Implementation of the National Reassurance Policing Programme,’ *Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate*, 2004

“The police front line comprises those who are in everyday contact with the public and who directly intervene to keep people safe and enforce the law.”

As such, visibility (and indeed availability) are subsets of the police front line, as not all those who “directly intervene to keep people safe and enforce the law,” such as ‘Marine-Underwater’ specialists are visible and available to the public in any meaningful sense.

A general metric of the ‘visibility’ of public services can be understood as the degree of exposure to the public. In the case of policing this could relate to the visibility of personnel, vehicles and the estate.

Whilst undoubtedly there are benefits to be accrued through the police simply being visible, the focus should be on the police being both visible and available. Availability yields familiarity and communication between the police and the public, building reassurance and intelligence on the concerns and priorities of the local community.

HMIC outlined the following definitions of the two:


Visible	Staff who wear uniform and mainly work in public
Available	Police officers and PCSOs who are actually ready for duty (i.e. deployable in their substantive role as opposed to being on a training course, attending court, off shift, on leave or sick, etc)

Source: “Demanding Times”, HMIC, 2011

Availability enables interactions with the public and the gathering of intelligence on crime and disorder in the local area,¹²⁷ helping officers target their efforts in the fight against crime and pass valuable information up the chain to investigators in specialist units. One of the most available forms of policing is the uniformed police officer or PCSO on foot patrol.

This chapter focuses on the visibility and availability of uniformed police personnel on foot and in public, whether or not they are technically in a patrol mode. This is a narrower definition than the one employed by HMIC which encompass those officers who are on duty and ‘mainly work in public.’

Police visibility and availability in this context can be understood to be a function of the number of police employed – including both regular sworn officers and PCSOs – and the manner in which they are deployed:



¹²⁷ “Improving Visibility,” Police Superintendents’ Association of England and Wales, 2000

It is easy to be drawn to the conclusion that more police officers and PCSOs translate directly to a proportional increase in police visibility and availability, but there is no such causal linear relationship.

Benefits of Visible Policing

Visible policing reassures the public

Visible policing provides the public with a sense of security and of help being close at hand, demonstrating the presence of lawful authority.¹²⁸ HMIC identified that police visibility is an integral component in the drive to provide reassurance to the public: “Policing and police visibility were consistently expressed as key factors in addressing the need for increased public reassurance.”¹²⁹

Furthermore, analysis conducted for the HMIC report, *Demanding Times* (2011) conducted by the Universities’ Police Science Institute (Cardiff) indicates that “*there is a relationship between police visibility and confidence, that visibility is more important than familiarity...*”¹³⁰

Data from the British Crime Survey has also demonstrated the importance of visibility to confidence, reassurance and satisfaction. Analysis by Thorpe (2009) identified seeing a police officer or PCSO on foot patrol as an important factor in improving confidence.¹³¹ This echoed similar work conducted by Skogan (1994), which found a correlation between public satisfaction levels with patrolling by the police and the visibility of the patrol.¹³²

Visible policing cuts crime

Recent studies have demonstrated that the deterrent effects of greater police visibility can contribute to reduced levels of crime, supported by other research that suggests the greatest impact on crime occurs when officers are deployed in response to a specific problem and employ problem-solving methods.

For example, Draca et al. (2008) used detailed crime and police deployment data for the period following the 7 July 2005 terrorist attacks in London to “pin down the causal relation between crime and police very precisely.”¹³³ The police response to the attacks saw a “surge” in police numbers in central London boroughs where the risk of subsequent attacks was deemed highest. The “surge,” named Operation Theseus, saw police activity in central London increase by 30% and was accompanied by a fall in crime. The research showed an elasticity of crime with respect to police such that a 10% increase in police activity reduced crime by around 3%. This was not due to an increase in officer number per se, but deployment of officers in a way that maximised visibility and availability. The results of the work around Operation Theseus is clear evidence of the impact of visible deployment, based on unique data and with clear transition points between increased and decreased levels of police activity.

Earlier research highlighted the possibility of visible policing reducing crime, with Sherman (1997) showing that community policing lacking in focus showed no effect on crime but found that directed, problem-solving patrols do cut crime: “...*directed patrols, proactive arrests and problem-solving at high-crime ‘hot spots’ has shown substantial evidence of crime prevention.*”¹³⁴

128 Cooksley, J., “The effect of high visibility patrol on crime, fear of crime or public perception of community safety,” 2003

129 “Narrowing The Gap: Police Visibility and public reassurance – Managing public expectation and demand,” Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, 2002

130 “Demanding Times: The front line and police visibility,” Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, 2011

131 <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs09/hosb0109supp.pdf>

132 www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/hors134.pdf

133 Draco, M., Machin, S. and Witt, R., ‘Panic on the Streets of London: Police, Crime and the July 2005 Terror Attacks,’ CEP Discussion Paper No. 852, Centre for Economic Performance, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2008

134 Sherman, L., “Policing for Crime Prevention”, in Sherman, L., Gottfredson, D., et al (eds.), “Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising”, prepared for the National Institute of Justice, 1997

Research by Barry Loveday at the University of Portsmouth even found that as police departments increased in size, the rate of abstractions (officers taken away from the street in the performance of their duties), actually increased, with smaller forces managing to keep more officers on the beat than larger forces with more resources for operational support.¹³⁵

We outline two areas where forces might choose to alter their deployment practices and patrol guidelines to maximise the visibility and accessibility of their officers to the public. The following recommendations should be considered by police leaders (chief officers and local commanders), to enhance the visibility of local policing in an environment of financial constraint.

Beneficial as they might be everywhere, they will be more appropriate policies in some forces than in others. They are not policies that the Home Office should in any way mandate or even seek to encourage through guidance, as they relate to how officers are deployed and the conditions of their daily activities, and are therefore policies that are the proper preserve of local force management, not civil servants.

The recommendations for how the visibility and availability of uniformed police personnel can be increased have the benefit of low or zero cost and where there may be identified downsides, these are not significant enough to override the benefits. Most importantly, the recommendations would serve to provide deterrence and reassurance benefits, in different ways, that at present are not being realised.

Maximising the benefits of police patrol

ACPO and the PSAEW recognise the benefits of single officer patrol. ACPO policy calls for forces to operate single-crewed patrols as the default policy, subject to exceptions on the basis of risk assessment. This recommendation has been adopted by some forces as part of single crewing policies, such as Lincolnshire Police: “The default position will always be single-crewed, unless a risk assessment has been carried out, which identifies a need to deploy further resources.”¹³⁶

The effect of single-crewing foot patrols is two-fold: it can double the level of visibility compared to double-crewing and enhances the community interaction role of the patrolling officer by increasing approachability. Research finds that lone officers on patrol experience a greater rate of public initiated contact with the public perceiving officers in pairs to be “busy”.¹³⁷

There is, however, still a long way to go to fully embed single-crewing within the police service and many neighbourhood police teams routinely patrol in pairs, even in safe, relatively low-crime areas. Concerns have been raised in the past by PSAEW¹³⁸ over the extent of double-patrolling and HMIC have raised concerns that risk assessments are not properly carried out: “Claims of a risk-assessed approach do not bear careful scrutiny; the inspection team found only one example where any science lay behind the risk assessment process.”¹³⁹

This observation is not surprising, nor is it out-dated. Today, the risk assessment process for one force, released under the Freedom of Information Act, consists of a 13-page ‘Divisional Crewing Risk Assessment Handbook’. The handbook requires officers to complete a nine-step process, including instructions on data

135 Loveday, B., “Improving the Status of Police Patrol”, *International Journal of Sociology of Law*, vol 26, 1998

136 <http://www.lincs.police.uk/Library/Freedom-of-Information/Information-Clauses/Our-Policies-And-Procedures/Single-Crewing-App-A-B.pdf>

137 Whitehouse, R., “Are police officers on uniformed foot patrol approached by the public more frequently when patrolling in pairs or on their own,” 1994


138 “Improving Visibility,” *Police Superintendents’ Association of England and Wales*, 2000

139 “Open All Hours,” *Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary*, 2001

to be printed off from different systems, task groups to be formed, meetings to be held, charts to be plotted and paperwork completed and stored.¹⁴⁰ Burdensome risk assessment processes have led, in some cases, to supervisors instead defaulting to a policy of double-crewing. This might be due to genuine, but otherwise un-evidenced, concerns for officer safety or simply due to supervisor preference.¹⁴¹

There is clear evidence that single patrol may be the default policy, but it is not what most members of the public experience. The YouGov survey commissioned for this report asked respondents what was a more common sight when they did see a police officer in their neighbourhood, a majority (56%) said that they usually saw officers walking together in pairs. Just a quarter (26%) said that a single officer on the beat alone was a more common sight. Just 10% of those surveyed in London said the more common sight was a lone officer patrolling, against 81% who said a pair of officers was the more common sight. Taken together this strongly suggests that the default policy of single patrolling is not a reality for most people, and even where it is championed as the policy in London, it cannot be happening on the ground as the vast majority of people do not experience it. These results directly challenge the assumption that officers patrol in pairs only rarely in high crime neighbourhoods where risks are higher.

Figure 10.1: When you see police in your local area, which is a more common sight?



Source: "Police Service Strength", Home Office

Single-Patrolling in London


Since 2009, the former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir Paul Stephenson, has sought to improve police visibility through a renewed focus on single-crewing.¹⁴² This follows similar calls from previous Commissioners, which failed to change the tendency of supervisors to allow neighbourhood teams to default to paired-patrol. This most recent attempt demonstrates how difficult it has proven to embed single-crewing of foot patrol in a time of plenty – even when it was called for by chief officers.

140 <http://www.lincs.police.uk/Library/Freedom-of-Information/Information-Classes/Our-Policies-And-Procedures/Single-Crewing-App-A-B.pdf>

141 Ibid.

142 "Officers 'should walk beat alone,'" British Broadcasting Corporation, 2009

Figure 10.2: Daily single patrols in metropolitan police area (Jan 2010 vs Jan-2011)



Source: Metropolitan Police, 2011

Figures provided by the Metropolitan Police show that the roll-out of single-crewing saw the number of daily single patrols increase by 30% in the last year. The Met already pursued single-crewing in some boroughs, so uplifts in the number of daily patrols for some forces could well be in excess of this figure. This increase in the number of daily patrols will undoubtedly lead to increased visibility. The solo nature of patrols also makes Metropolitan Police officers more approachable and accessible. However, the Met has yet to establish a performance measurement to ensure that single patrols are becoming the established norm.

Forces can also capture many of the benefits of single-crewing even where a risk assessment deems patrolling alone as unsafe. The Metropolitan Police, like some other forces, have found **proximity patrolling** to be useful when officer safety or other concerns prevent single-crewing.¹⁴³ Proximity patrolling is a method of patrol in which officers walk apart but in sight of each other so are sure of backup being close at hand, while continuing to receive many of the visibility and approachability benefits that accrue to single officer patrols. Proximity patrolling can be thought of as two officers each walking in the same direction on parallel streets, or either side of the same street.

As we enter a period when headcount is reduced and numbers of neighbourhood patrol officers potentially diminished, forces should seek to maximise visibility by making the most of single-crewed foot patrols. The default policy of a police force should be single-crewing. Operational supervisors at the local level should have discretion to double-crew according to local intelligence, demonstrable risks to officer safety, allowing for exceptions around the need to accompany probationers and/or Special Constables under training.

To ensure officer safety is not unnecessarily undermined, forces should consider conducting a one-off headline risk assessment of their foot and mobile patrol beats based on location and time of day, with only those areas deemed unsafe at night requiring a paired-patrol deployment arrangement as default. This evaluation should not be a regular exercise because the snapshot assessment will remain valid as a benchmark for risk in that locality.

One force where single-patrolling is the policy (the Metropolitan Police) has yet to establish a performance measurement to ensure that single-patrols are

143 "Rethink on single patrols urged as lone officer beaten Queens park, half mile from two police stations," The London Daily News, 2010

becoming the established norm. Forces moving to this deployment approach should immediately begin to measure how much time neighbourhood teams spend patrolling in this formation. With such a metric in place – and required to be made public – chief officers could confirm that the new deployment model is widely entrenched in practice and actually happening on the ground. Chief Officers could then in future be held to account for any move away from this operating model by the public they serve.

Given their comparative lack of training and limited powers, single-crewing of PCSOs may be harder to justify, especially in urban and other high-crime localities. However, forces should consider making proximity patrolling the default policy for PCSOs during the day time. Implementing proximity patrolling could deliver significant improvements to their visibility and approachability while enabling them to be more vigilant.

Regulations governing uniform

Changes in policing and society generally have seen police officers' and staff commuting to work in broadly the same fashion as the rest of the private and public sector workforce. The days of officers leaving their section house in full uniform and being immediately on their beat are distant memories. Officers commuting to work commonly wear a civilian jacket over their uniform, or else attend work in plain clothes, prior to changing into uniform at their station. Surveys of police commuting habits have been conducted by a number of forces providing a view on the methods of transport typically used.

The most comprehensive survey to date was that conducted by the Metropolitan Police.¹⁴⁴ The results in 2009 showed that 57% of their personnel (officers and staff) took public transport (rail and bus) or walked to work. In the case of London, Metropolitan Police officers currently receive free rail travel within 70 miles of London,¹⁴⁵ applicable as far north as Milton Keynes and south to Brighton, and also receive free bus and underground travel within London. The annual value of this benefit – at as much as £5,792 per officer¹⁴⁶ – is not insignificant: it is nearly half (46%) of the average bonus given to employees in the financial sector.¹⁴⁷ In contrast, traffic wardens and other civil enforcement officers typically wear uniform while using public transport to get to their place of work – often because they have little choice with no provision at council offices, unlike police stations, to change clothes.

The introduction of free rail travel for Metropolitan Police officers cost £24 million in 2008, and is estimated to cost an average of £21.4 million per year between 2009 and 2014, or over £100 million in total.¹⁴⁸ Annually this is more than twice the total bonus being paid out to civil servants (£10 million) in 2010-11. This cost is currently borne by the Metropolitan Police and justified on the basis that the presence of officers on public transport can help reduce crime through deterrence and detection when officers intervene should crime or disorder occur. However, these officers are largely travelling in civilian clothes eliminating their visibility, which is only apparent when they show their warrant card to the bus driver or ticket inspector. Much greater benefits would be derived if the entitlement to free travel came with a publicised expectation that the beneficiary would be wearing police uniform, and providing a visible and available presence.

144 "MPA-MPS Environment Report for 2009-10: incorporating the review of the five year Environmental Strategy 2005-2010," Metropolitan Police Authority, 2010

145 The ATOC Rail Travel Concession allows serving Metropolitan Police officers to travel on National Rail services within an agreed area. The area of agreed travel is defined by a rail map, not a mileage limit, although as a general rule it does not extend beyond a 70 mile radius of London. http://www.met.police.uk/foi/pdfs/disclosure_2011/april/2011040000981.pdf

146 The price of a Southern Railways annual season ticket (2011)


147 <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/12500-bonus-average-in-financial-sector-2316893.html>

148 "£107m bill for police rail travel," London Evening Standard, 2009

Police officers commuting to work in uniform would provide greater police visibility and reassurance to the public. It is also a legitimate expectation as police are not like other employees – the office of constable places upon them a legal obligation as Crown Servants to be consistently prepared to act to uphold the law whether on shift or not. Being in uniform while not technically ‘at work’ would not create any duty to act against crime or disorder that would not already be expected and required of an off-duty officer in civilian clothes.

Police have in the past sought free travel from transport operators in relation to specific operations¹⁴⁹ but the scale of the benefits from a general move towards officers wearing uniform to work could justify the development of more long-term agreements with transport companies to provide discounted travel to help encourage reluctant officers to wear uniform and be visible on their way to work.

It is estimated that uniformed MPS officers spend 8,600 hours commuting into work each day on foot or public transport. This is spread across rail (81%), bus (10%) and on foot (8%). This estimate excludes detectives (24% of officers) who might routinely be expected to serve in plain clothes.¹⁵⁰ If uniformed Met Officers were to wear uniform on their commute to work, the increase in visibility would equate to more than 1,200 additional officers spending 100% of their time in visible roles.¹⁵¹



The highly visible effect of seeing the equivalent of over 1,000 extra Metropolitan Police officers on public transport and on the street would be a significant achievement and could be accomplished at little or no cost and would go some way to offsetting the reduction in Met visibility that will occur through the planned reduction of 1,907 officers between 2009-10 and 2014-15 as part of their budget reductions.

Police officers in uniform roles should be encouraged to wear their uniform to work – from home to station – as a direct and highly effective way of enhancing police visibility and the signalling of a police presence. Such a policy would have most immediate impact in those parts of the country – especially Greater London and the South East – where many officers routinely commute to work by public transport.

Forces should follow the current guidance on uniform adopted by HM Armed Forces and actively encourage this uniform policy to maximise visibility. Certain

149 “Operation Refrain: ‘On the Buses’ – A Problem Orientated Partnership initiative to address Bus related crime,” Hertfordshire Constabulary, 2004

150 At 31 January 2011 there were 7,803 detectives in the Metropolitan Police, accounting for 23.8% of officer strength.

151 Travel survey included MPS officers and staff. Average journey time by mode is from National Travel Survey data. Days worked figure is an average of the data released by HMIC in Valuing the Police (2010). FTE calculated on the basis of an individual working 40 hours per week, less leave, bank holidays and illness.

forces, particularly the Metropolitan Police, could justify a stronger uniform requirement on officers who benefit from free transport. These forces should consider an explicit and publicly communicated expectation that officers who make use of free public transport on account of their vocation should routinely wear their uniform to qualify for the benefit.

Forces should take fully into account the significant ‘bang for your buck’ potential of this policy of expecting officers to wear uniform on the way to work. It will increase visibility significantly and without having to increase officer or PCSO headcount or even changing deployment practices.

Managing Demand

Making the police more visible and available will need to go alongside a more comprehensive analysis of police demand. Although crime demand has fallen, not all the demands faced by the police relate to crime, and not all of these wider social demands are legitimate. There are elements of the policing mission that will never change – the prevention of crime and disorder – but beyond crime-fighting, there is a plethora of other duties that demand the police’s time too. For instance, only 15% of calls for service (phone calls and police desk enquiries) in Cheshire Constabulary result in being recorded as a crime.¹⁵² Whilst this does not include such other calls for service that might provide useful intelligence to forces (such as suspicious activity reports) and critical policing functions (such as missing people) it is an indicator of the multiplicity of demand on forces, their abstraction away from fighting crime, and indeed a certain level of mission creep.

Functions that have in the past been the prerogative of other agencies, such as youth engagement schemes have become a part of the work of forces with the police, for example, combining talks on life in custody with street dance and football.¹⁵³ Whilst these may well be worthwhile activities, they are not considered by the public to be legitimate uses of police time. Only 9% of the public believe “helping to run youth clubs and other community activities” are the role of the police; 58% believe they are the role of the local council.¹⁵⁴ As councils reduce their budgets over the coming years, it is important that police forces do not simply take over their functions.

A more intelligent approach to the use of police resources will require better demand analysis. Yet what demand analysis there currently is “tends to be confined to establishing how much resource should be devoted to providing each service, and is often carried out in silos, focusing on specific policing functions within forces, rather than looking more holistically and across forces.”¹⁵⁵

There needs to be a better understanding of the role of the police in society and specifically which demands are legitimate and which – such as 999 calls reporting thefts of snowmen¹⁵⁶ – are not. This debate will be shaped by the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners in 2012 who will have a mandate to represent the peoples’ wishes in ensuring the police are focusing on the priorities of their local citizens. The introduction of a national police non-emergency ‘101’ number – currently being rolled out in forces in the South East – will also allow some demand reduction on critical 999 services.

¹⁵² Cheshire Constabulary presentation

¹⁵³ <http://content.met.police.uk/News/MetTrack-youth-engagement-scheme/1260267543729/1257246745756>

¹⁵⁴ <http://www.mori-ireland.com/researchpublications/publications/1409/Police-Federation-of-England-and-Wales-Policing-Priorities.aspx>

¹⁵⁵ “Policing the spend: Cutting costs while creating a police work force fit for the future,” Deloitte, 2011

¹⁵⁶ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-kent-11908583>

11

Back Office Reform

Although the required savings cannot come from improved efficiencies alone and staff reductions are inevitable, that should not prevent forces from seizing the initiative to reengineer their services – particularly the non-visible, back office functions that are not part of core policing.

There is scope to go much further by outsourcing certain services and future funding settlements should partly be predicated on savings arising from more efficient working practices and service arrangements. Major efficiencies can be realised by this route but years of tentative steps by individual police authorities have not delivered savings on the scale necessary. There is a long history of forces agreeing the rationale for such reforms and accepting the savings that could be made, while not actually making the changes to deliver them.

Inefficient procurement and administration among police forces has been tolerated while spending settlements were generous but are not sustainable now. Efficiencies in this area will come from greater involvement of the private sector to drive out cost and improve working practices. Greater outsourcing will deliver resource efficiencies and redeployment opportunities that will help protect the front line. With significant savings required in the short-term, only incentivisation or a degree of mandation from the Home Office will encourage police authorities to strip out cost and free up officers for the front line through a bold programme of shared services and outsourcing of back office functions.

Outsourcing in Cleveland

At a time when the majority of police forces are still talking about outsourcing in order to reduce their costs whilst maintaining their service to the public, Cleveland have gone out and done it. Not only have Cleveland engaged in an outsourcing arrangement with Reliance Security from 2007 for custody functions, releasing 33 officers back to the frontline,¹⁵⁷ saving almost £500,000 in efficiency savings and £300,000 in reduced salary expenditure,¹⁵⁸ but they have also opened up other areas through an agreement with Steria.

Entering into a ten-year partnership on 1st October 2010 with Steria, Cleveland have outsourced a wide array of back and middle office functions which do not require the experience of officers. Across seven different areas Cleveland transferred across around 700 employees (under Transfer of Undertakings (TUPE) regulations) to Steria, as broken down in the table below:¹⁵⁹

157 www.reliancesecurity.co.uk/government-services/police/case-studies/cleveland/

158 www.custodialreview.co.uk/Reliance_On_Custody-a-375.html

159 Note that these are approximate figures supplied by Cleveland Police

Area	Officers taken out	Staff taken out
Control Room	40	150
ICT	0	40
Finance/Procurement/Fleet/Estates	0	130
HR	38	47
Central Business Unit	0	78
District Enquiry Desks and District Admin	7	90
Criminal Justice	30	72
Total	115	607

The contract is predicted to yield savings of around 20% (£50 million over the 10 years), while simultaneously freeing up dozens of sworn officers to return to frontline duty.

Incentivising or mandating these reforms is now necessary and the process should start immediately if savings are to be realised in the CSR period. All police forces should be expected to open up their HR, finance and accounting and other commodity functions to competitive tender by the end of 2011. This should be followed by a benchmarking process to encourage a more systematic contracting out of whole service functions, including control room operations and justice administration. All police forces should be required to meet the new benchmark for value for money contracting in these areas by 2014.


To complement any initial mandation, the Home Office should establish an incentive scheme for early adopters of the practice and produce a menu of options for forces, so police leaders are aware of the transformation approaches available. Such a guide will also signal clearly to suppliers and the wider private sector that central government will encourage all such moves, however they should be brokered locally to enable a diversity of provision and a competitive market.

Back office reform would involve driving civilianisation deeper and wider, with outsourcing arrangements, joint ventures, and shared services designed to maximise the use of less expensive civilian staff in a range of key back office roles.

The snapshot of civilianisation rates for functions within police forces in 2011 presented in this paper and the costs identified are based on the Control Room analysis plus the following 4 additional functions, all of which show the scope for reforming the back office in many forces.

Forensics

Forensics functions provide fingerprints, photographic and scene of crime scientific support to police forces. HMIC defines police employees in forensics as: “Staff who are predominantly employed in providing scientific support including Scenes of Crime Officers, their supervisors and those engaged in administrative duties relating thereto.” In March 2010, 21 forces had no officers in their forensics departments, as shown at Figure 11.1. Essex had by far the lowest civilianisation rate at 56% (accounting for 55 officers).

Figure 11.1: Forensics civilianisation (2010)

Source: "Value for Money Returns" HMIC, 2011

Over the last decade there has been a marked improvement in the level of civilianisation in forensic functions, with the force average increasing from 85% to 94%.¹⁶⁰ Almost all of this increase occurred in between 2000 and 2005, with civilianisation levelling off at around 94% between 2005 and 2010. During this period three forces – Hampshire, Merseyside and Humberside – all notably increased the proportion of civilian staff in their functions, shedding 31 officers between them.

With 21 forces performing with no officers in their forensics functions the benchmark of the top ten forces will – quite obviously – be 100%, and it is extremely difficult to argue for the value of having officers in forensics functions. For this reason we advocate that all police forces should staff forensics functions with civilian staff. This would see 210 posts – which are currently filled by police officers – being taken on by civilian staff.


Operational Support

Operational support includes members of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), local commanders, Coroners Officers, Criminal Records Officers, Crime & Incident Management, Departmental Heads, Drivers, Enquiry-Station, Operational Planning, Property, Staff Officers, and Vehicle workshop-fleet. There is a clear need for some officers in ACPO and as local commanders but for other areas of operational support – such as drivers and vehicle fleet managers – there is little need for officers. As at March 2010, the civilianisation rate varied between 84% in Cheshire to 38% in Gloucestershire.

In total there were 5,206 officers in operational support functions at March 2010. The forces with the lowest civilianisation rates¹⁶¹ – and therefore the highest proportion of officers – were Gloucestershire with a 38% civilianisation rate (accounting for 92 officers), The Metropolitan Police with a 46% civilianisation rate (accounting for 1,689 officers) and Lancashire with a 53% civilianisation rate (accounting for 143 officers). Between them these three forces employ a third of the total number of officers in operational support roles across the 42 forces. On the other end of the scale Cheshire and Northamptonshire both had civilianisation rates of 84% (accounting for 48 and 22 officers respectively).

¹⁶⁰ These figures are based on Freedom of Information requests which were returned by 29 forces (including the MET)

¹⁶¹ We have excluded Cleveland from this analysis given their outsourcing arrangement

Figure 11.2: Operational support civilianisation (2010)

Source: HMIC Value for Money Returns, 2011


If Gloucestershire, the MPS and Lancashire had the same proportion of officers to civilians as Cheshire and Northamptonshire, then they would save £27 million between them each year.

The average civilianisation rate across forces is 67% and the average rate of the ten most civilianised forces is 78%. If all forces benchmarked their civilianisation against the ten highest then 2,170 posts – which are currently filled by police officers – would be filled instead with civilian staff.

Criminal Justice

Criminal justice includes:

“Staff who are predominantly employed in the administration, checking and processing of prosecution files including liaison with the Crown Prosecution Service and staff who are predominantly employed in the making of additional enquiries required to supplement the quality of files. Staff who are predominantly employed in the processing and administration of

Figure 11.3: Criminal justice civilianisation (2010)

Source: HMIC Value for Money Returns, 2011

applications in connection with licensed premises, registered clubs and matters concerning betting, gaming and lotteries. Staff who are predominantly employed in the execution of warrants, service of summonses and dealing with general-routine enquiries.”¹⁶²

There is significant variation in civilianisation rates across forces in criminal justice. As of March 2010, 10 forces had civilianisation rates of at least 95%.

The average civilianisation rate across forces was 87%, but two forces in particular had significantly lower rates: Greater Manchester had a civilianisation rate of 45% (accounting for 303 officers) and the Metropolitan Police had a civilianisation rate of 57% (accounting for 948 officers). These two forces accounted for over half (54%) of all officers in criminal justice functions across forces. At the other end of the spectrum, Cambridgeshire and Suffolk operate with no officers. Even if Greater Manchester and the Metropolitan Police brought their level of civilian staff to just the average across all forces they would save around £18 million between them per year in reduced salary expenditure.

If all forces benchmarked their civilianisation to that of the highest ten – 97% – then 1,981 posts – which are currently filled by police officers, would be filled instead with civilian staff.

Business Support

A number of forces have already engaged/are engaging in outsourcing and collaboration arrangements for areas within the business support function, making it difficult to compare forces with one another. Yet there is still substantial scope for civilianisation as the majority of areas within the business support function – such as finance and IT – have little reason to employ any police officers. In March 2010, 10 forces had less than 6% of their roles staffed by officers, the total number of employees are shown in the table below:

Business Support area	Personnel employed (FTE)
IT-Communications	3,478
Corporate development	4,653
Personnel-HR	2,917
Finance	2,382
Other admin- clerical	4,960
Press & public relations	855
Occupational health and welfare	571
Staff associations	304
Complaints & discipline	1,619
Total	21,728

Two areas – staff associations and complaints & discipline – merit the inclusion of some officers in their headcount. Staff associations represent and provide support for both officers and civilian staff and it is reasonable to consider that police officers are best represented by other police officers. Some roles in

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complaints & discipline require warranted powers and because officers are not employees of the Chief Constable, but instead of the Crown, they are able to carry out investigations with a greater assurance of impartiality. This merits some – but not all – of the roles in these two areas to be done by police officers.

Yet these two areas make up less than 9% of the total personnel in the business support function, and by no means do all those in these functions need to be staffed by officers. There are currently 2,490 officers performing roles in business support across forces (as at March 2010), including 746 officers in the MPS, 213 in Greater Manchester police and 101 in Merseyside. Other than allowances for a modest number of police officers in the two areas described above, there is no reason why officers should be parked in roles such as finance, press or HR, and almost all of the 2,490 officers in business support roles should be released back to the front line and replaced with civilian staff. If all forces benchmarked their civilianisation to that of the highest ten – 94% – then 1,314 posts – which are currently filled by police officers – would be filled instead by civilian staff.

Recommendations

- **The budget reductions for police forces up to 2015 are challenging but manageable if forces take the right decisions to reshape their workforces, change business processes, redeploy officers to frontline roles and maximise the visibility of officers to the public. For instance, there is scope to go much further by outsourcing certain services and future funding settlements should partly be predicated on savings arising from more efficient working practices and service arrangements. Major efficiencies can be realised by this route.**
- **Greater outsourcing will deliver resource efficiencies and redeployment opportunities that will help protect the frontline, but years of tentative steps by individual police authorities have not delivered savings on the scale necessary. Only a degree of incentivisation from the Home Office will encourage police authorities to strip out cost and free up officers for the front-line through a bold programme of shared services and outsourcing of back office functions.**
- **The Home Office should establish an incentive scheme for early movers in the outsourcing of these additional areas and produce a menu of options for forces, so police leaders are aware of the reform and business transformation approaches available, but any deals should be brokered locally.**
- **With police forces facing challenging budget reductions, it is critical for public confidence and crime reduction that an appropriately visible and available police presence is maintained, instead of these officers being drawn into, or parked in, civilian roles in the middle and back office. Forces should guard against ‘reverse civilianisation’ that makes the police less productive and less visible.**
- **Wherever possible, some recruitment of new officers, as in the example of Cambridgeshire and Surrey Police, should be maintained – even at very low levels – to support morale and avert future problems of management. Forces must be free to utilise whatever tools they currently have to reduce**

their workforce (including A19), but a voluntary redundancy scheme for officers – as recommended by the Winsor Review (Part I) – should be introduced as soon as possible, to aid them in this process.

- Forces should examine closely their staffing mix and determine how many officers in back and middle office functions could be redeployed to policing roles. As recruitment ceases and the total number of officers falls, management should prioritise the proper deployment of their most valuable assets – sworn officers – to policing roles where warranted powers are required, if necessary by reengineering shift patterns and operational units.
- Reducing Home Office regulation and the internal audit demands flowing from guidance should free up posts and prevent the need for additional hiring of staff when officers are redeployed. Where those roles remain necessary – and warranted powers are not a prerequisite – then only civilian staff should fill those posts.
- Forces should maximise the public value of the officers they do have by deploying them more effectively when they are in visible roles. All forces should examine regulations on uniform to require officers – especially those claiming free or subsidised travel – to wear their uniform from home to station. In addition, the concerted effort by the Metropolitan Police to standardise single-patrolling should be mirrored in other forces and appropriate mechanisms established to ensure this deployment pattern becomes ingrained.

Appendix A

Example of Savings from Civilianisation in Suffolk

Officer Title	Civilian Title	Annual Cost when occupied by Police Officer	Annual Cost when occupied by Police Staff	% Reduction	Saving
Inspector	Management Development & Learning Consultant	£ 67,002	£40,325	39.8%	£26,677
Constable	Prison Intelligence Officer	£ 45,229	£ 30,658	32.2%	£14, 571
Constable	Desk Officer Intelligence	£ 45,229	£ 27,743	38.7%	£17,486
Constable	Intelligence Development Officer	£ 45,229	£ 30,658	32.2%	£14,571
Constable	Intelligence Development Officer	£ 45,229	£ 30,658	32.2%	£14,571
Constable	Public Protection Officer	£ 45,229	£ 40,325	10.8%	£4,904
Constable	Public Protection Officer	£ 45,229	£40, 325	10.8%	£4,904
Constable	Public Protection Officer	£ 45,229	£ 40,325	10.8%	£4,904
Constable	Economic Crime Investigator	£ 45,229	£ 37,225	17.7%	£8,004
Constable	Review Officer – Vulnerable People	£ 45,229	£ 38,811	14.2%	£6,418
Constable	Controlled Drugs Liaisons Officer	£ 45,229	£ 27,443	39.3%	£17,786
Constable	ANPR Supervisor	£ 45,229	£ 30,658	32.2%	£14,571
Constable	Dispatcher / Researcher ANPR	£ 45,229	£ 24,117	46.7%	£21,112
Sergeant	Investigations Supervisor OMU	£54,651	£34,030	37.7%	£20,621
Constable	Assessment & Qualification Officer	£45,229	£30,658	32.2%	£14,571
Constable	Dispatcher	£45,229	£24,117	46.7%	£21,112
Constable	Dispatcher	£45,229	£24,117	46.7%	£21,112
Constable	Dispatcher	£45,229	£24,117	46.7%	£21,112
Constable	Dispatcher	£45,229	£24,117	46.7%	£21,112
Constable	ANPR Administrator	£45,229	£27,443	39.3%	£17,786

Source: Suffolk Police (<http://www.suffolk.police.uk/NR/rdonlyres/6C0B1112-D948-4BB0-93D3-E561333BF9D5/0/03421.pdf>)

Appendix B

Police Roles Suitable for Civilians

There has been a clear consensus reinforced by the Home Office since at least the late 1980s that there were functions within the police force that it was almost never justified to employ an officer to fulfil that role when a civilian staff member could be employed instead. Our analysis shows that those duties listed in the 1988 circular and **highlighted in bold** are even now ones where significant numbers of officers are still employed.

Home Office Circular 105-1988 “Civilian Staff in the Police Service”

Duties Suitable for Civilian Staff in the Police Service

- 1 Clerical and administrative work in the following areas:
 - a Pay, allowances, insurance, pensions and accounts;
 - b Personal, welfare and other records, statistics, aliens;
 - c Firearms and explosives;
 - d Criminal records;
 - e Force orders;
 - f CID support, crime prevention support, including crime prevention surveys, criminal intelligence;
 - g Allocation and maintenance of houses;
 - h Notification and escorting arrangements for abnormal loads, vehicle recovery service;
 - i Ticket office, including sorting and disposal of tickets for parking and other traffic offences;
 - j Lost and found property;
 - k Stores and supplies;
 - l Front office and enquiry clerks;
 - m Selection of traffic wardens;
- 2 Scenes of crime, fingerprint examination and photography;
- 3 Forensic examination;**
- 4 Coroners’ officers;
- 5 Data protection officers;
- 6 Examination of vehicles;
- 7 Road safety;
- 8 Scientific investigation of road accidents and accident records;
- 9 Control room operators-operations room duties;**
- 10 VDU operators;
- 11 Driving instruction;
- 12 Physical training instruction;
- 13 Certain aspects of training, e.g. on management techniques and computer work;
- 14 To the extent that these remain the responsibility of the police service in future, court duties, including the service of summonses and witness citations, collection of fines and execution of monetary warrants;

- 15 **Duties in connection with management services, including organisation and methods work;**
- 16 Maintenance and development work of computer hardware and systems, HOLMES operators;
- 17 Communications technicians;
- 18 Press office and other public relations duties;
- 19 Personnel officers;
- 20 Vehicle fleet management and maintenance, evaluation of proposed traffic management schemes;
- 21 Domestic duties, e.g. canteen, porters, commissionaires, stable and kennel hands;
- 22 **Civilian detention officer duties, in police cells, working to a custody officer sergeant;**
- 23 Evaluation officers at sub-divisional level, providing – by micro-computer or other means – statistical analysis and other management information for sub-divisional commanders; and
- 24 Control, collection, administration and disposal of stray dogs;
- 25 Security of police buildings.

Police staffing and resources are at unprecedented levels. On any basis England and Wales have never been more policed, and police forces have never been so rich in technology or staff support. But budget reductions for the police in England and Wales over the next four years and the need for improved productivity will focus attention on the costs of policing, the pay and conditions of staff and the way in which those resources are deployed.

Eighty per cent of police funding is spent on personnel, so the imperative to ensure efficient staffing arrangements has never been greater. Unfortunately the debate about police funding continues to be played out in line with a damaging two decade-long obsession with officer numbers, and a lack of understanding about how police manpower is presently deployed.

Cost of the Cops examines the cost base of policing over the period 2001-2010 and explores whether current resources of staff and uniformed officers are being used effectively. This report examines in detail manpower and deployment issues affecting the police – including civilianisation, deployment and frontline visibility.

This report finds that low rates of civilianisation still persist in the police, which prevents the right people from being in the right jobs, resulting in inefficiency and a poorer service to the public as warranted officers perform civilian roles far away from the frontline. By exposing striking disparities between how forces allocate their resources, the analysis in *Cost of the Cops* shows the potential for greater efficiencies throughout the service.

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